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PRECIS
The thesis is a study of the role of the Pakistan military in foreign 
policy, with particular emphasis on the linkages between defence 
and foreign policy, using relations with the Soviet Union to 
demonstrate the extent to which the military has dominated 
Pakistan's external directions from independence in 1947 to the 
country’s dismemberment in 1971.
From the very start, Pakistan's political leadership, military and 
bureaucracy adopted an anti-Soviet and pro-Western foreign policy, 
with the m ilitary showing particular interest in establishing 
defence links with the West. Pakistan-Soviet relations were 
therefore tense as Pakistan ignored Soviet overtures, motivated by 
the Soviet desire to curb Western influence in a strategically placed 
country.
Pakistan-Soviet tensions reached their peak as Pakistan formally 
entered into anti-Soviet alliances with the West. Internal 
developments guided Pakistan's foreign policy, with the military 
dictating the country's domestic and external orientations. 
Internally, the Wlitary High Command exercised power in partnership 
with the bureaucracy, as bureaucratic-controlled governments 
advanced the military's interests. Pakistan's uncertain external 
environment, particularly its conflictual relations with India, 
advanced the military's internal standing as it was used to justify 
ever-increasing defence spending. As the military's autonomy grew, 
it embarked on independent, although parallel, efforts with the 
bureaucracy to obtain Pakistan's entry into US-sponsored regional 
pacts, motivated by its desire to obtain Western arms assistance.
While Pakistan's entry into the pacts and rejection of Soviet 
overtures led the antagonised Soviets into supporting India and 
Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan, the main beneficiary of 
alignment was the military as US military aid poured into the 
country, further strengthening the Pakistan Armed Forces' internal 
position. Close links with the US in turn reinforced the anti-Soviet 
and pro-Western views of the Pakistan officer corps.
The military took over direct power in 1958 when its i'nternal 
autonomy and Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy directions were 
threatened by domestic opposition. It then moved to consolidate its 
position by supporting Ayub's rule and in the external sphere 
continued to dictate a pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy. 
However, external determinants such as superpower detente and US 
partiality towards India downgraded Pakistan's importance in 
American regional strategies, forcing Ayub to readjust his foreign 
policy rhetoric. He then attempted to use the Chinese and Soviet 
cards, hoping to pressure the Americans to revise their policies 
vis-à-vis Pakistan, especially in the wake of the US arms embargo 
in 1965.
Although Pakistan-Soviet relations improved as the Soviet Union 
reacted positively, motivated by its desire to curb Chinese and 
Western influence in Pakistan, tensions remained due to Ayub's 
continued efforts to consolidate relations with the West.
Ayub’s failure to persuade the Americans to resume arms 
assistance, combined with dissatisfaction arising from the conduct 
and aftermath of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, led the military to 
withdraw its support as internal opposition grew to Ayub's 
authoritarian rule. Army C-in-C Yahya Khan then took over power 
as Martial Law was imposed in 1969.
Under Yahya, the military once again kept its options open vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union as long as the Americans downgraded Pakistan's 
importance as an ally, although Pakistan's primary foreign policy 
objective remained a strengthening of relations with the West, with 
an emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. Once US 
global interests, including Pakistan's role in helping the Americans 
to open relations with the PRC, led to the establishment of closer 
US-Pakistan relations, the Yahya regime downgraded relations with 
the Soviet Union.
Pakistan's foreign policy directions assumed a new significance in 
the wake of the East Pakistan crisis, as the Soviets supported India 
during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, while Pakistan's American and 
Chinese allies only extended it limited support. Yahya's shortsighted 
in terna l and external d irections u ltim ate ly  led to the 
dismemberment of Pakistan.
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1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
When I started work on my doctoral dissertation, I had intended to 
focus on Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union. Soon after I had 
begun researching the topic, it became evident that any examination 
of Pakistan's foreign policy was incomplete without a detailed 
understanding of the linkages between the external and internal 
variables of foreign policy making in Pakistan. The focus of my 
thesis increasingly shifted to the role of the military as a major 
actor not only in Pakistani politics but also in the realm of foreign 
policy.
Domestic politics in Pakistan are characterised by one constant 
factor, the influence and power demonstrated by the military, with 
the country experiencing direct military rule for over half of its 
existence. An examination of Pakistan's political history also reveals 
that the Pakistani military has been a powerful force even when it 
has not been in direct control. Given that the military has played a 
singularly important role in politics, it then seemed logical to 
inquire into the extent and significance of its role in influencing and 
determining the direction of Pakistan's foreign policy.
An assessment of the military's role in foreign policy in turn drew 
attention to the importance of its conception of security and defence 
concerns in shaping Pakistan's external relationships. During the 
course of the study the military emerged as a major domestic 
variable in determining not only Pakistan's foreign policy but also
2the direction of its defence policy, with a stress on the need for 
'security' through the acquisition of military assistance. It also 
became increasingly evident that Pakistan's foreign policy was to a 
considerable extent an offshoot of defence policy as perceived and 
formulated by the military establishment, with the institution's 
orientations, needs and requirements given precedence over all other 
concerns. The focus of this thesis is, therefore, on the role of the 
military in foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the linkages 
between defence and foreign policy, using Pakistan's relations with 
the Soviet Union to demonstrate the manner in which the military 
has dominated the country's external directions.
The existing state of scholarship on the Pakistani military is 
somewhat uneven. While some books and articles have been written 
on the military’s role in politics since independence,1 very little 
work has been done on the military's role in foreign policy. The 
academic debate on Pakistan's foreign policy, especially since the 
breakup of the state in 1971, is increasingly recognising the 
necessity of examining domestic variables in influencing Pakistan's 
external directions. There is even acknowledgment of the need to 
determine the military's role in foreign policy.^ Yet while most 
analysts of Pakistan's foreign policy and domestic politics conclude 
that the Pakistan military plays a "very influential role in shaping 
both the domestic and foreign policy" of Pakistan,^ and that the 
military has been a significant component in the decision-making 
apparatus, especially where decisions regarding foreign and defence 
policies are concerned, there has been no indepth effort to determine 
the military's influence and role in the field of foreign policy.
3Similarly while there is general agreement that security has always 
been of prime concern to Pakistani policy makers;4 that the issue of 
arms assistance is of primary importance to foreign policy 
fo rm u la t io n a n d  that the military plays a predominant role in the 
assessment of strategic requirements and defence policy,6 no real 
effort has been made to ascertain the military's role in influencing 
the adoption of foreign and defence policy options, aimed at 
fulfilling, above all, the requirements of the Armed Forces for 
military assistance. Although some research has been undertaken on 
the m ilitary's role in determining and influencing Pakistan's 
relations with the West, with particular emphasis on Pakistan-US 
re la tions,7 no work has been conducted on the implications of the 
military's role in domestic, foreign and defence policy making for 
Pakistan-Soviet relations.
So far all major works written by both Pakistani and foreign 
observers on Pakistan-Soviet relations have tended to focus on 
either the interrelationship between the policies of the two 
superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, towards 
Pakistan or on Pakistan's relations with the three major powers, the 
Soviet Union, the USA, and the People's Republic of China.8 Other 
works extend this emphasis on external variables in Pakistan-Soviet 
re lations to regional factors, such as Indo-Pakistan and 
Pakistan-A fghan re la tions. The focus of a number of works, 
moreover, has largely been on the study of the relationship from the 
Soviet perspective, that is, Soviet policies towards, perceptions of 
and relations with Pakistan.1^ Even when an attempt has been made
4to identify the domestic components of Pakistan's relations with the 
Soviet Union, the role of the Pakistan military has been touched upon 
only briefly or completely ignored.11
The thesis will, therefore, seek to determine the extent to which the 
Pakistan m ilitary 's orientation, interests and requirements, 
especially the need for arms, affect Pakistan's foreign policy 
directions, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations, with 
the objective of gaining a better understanding of the internal 
dynamics of Pakistan's foreign policy and to establish the linkage, 
missing in most analyses so far, between the internal and external 
determinants of foreign policy making, using the relationship with 
the Soviet Union as a tool to demonstrate the role of the Pakistan 
military in foreign policy.
A number of factors will be examined in order to ascertain the 
military's position in the domestic arena including an analysis of its 
history, organisation, character and the constitu tiona l and 
extra-constitutional roles it has adopted in Pakistan's political 
history. This will help us to evaluate its influence on the course of 
domestic politics and foreign policy both under civilian leadership 
and during periods of direct military rule.
In any assessment of the military's internal political role, its 
relationship with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state is of 
special significance. The relative positions of the civil and military 
bureaucracies are helpful in determining not only the military's role 
in domestic politics but also the extent and nature of its
5involvement in the foreign policy making processes.
Special stress will also be laid on the military's role in shaping 
defence policy and the impact of defence and security concerns on 
the course of Pakistan’s foreign policy as a whole and 
Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular. The areas of defence policy 
which will be explored will centre on the military's perceptions of 
Pakistan’s strategic environment and the influence of internal 
military expenditure and external arms assistance on both Pakistan's 
internal politics and foreign policy directions.
Since relations with the Soviet Union will be used to demonstrate 
the m ilitary’s role in foreign policy, the thesis will attempt to 
determine the input of this powerful institution in shaping 
Pakistan-Soviet relations during the period under consideration. It 
should be emphasised that the study will examine Pakistan-Soviet 
relations from the Pakistani perspective, concentrating mainly on 
Pakistani perceptions, initiatives and reactions.
Some of the issues which will be addressed will include an analysis 
of the impact of the military's external orientation, interests and 
needs on Pakistan-Soviet relations and the implications of the 
military's emergence as a key domestic actor and decision making 
force on the relationship. The influence of defence and security 
concerns on Pakistan-Soviet relations will receive special attention. 
Aside from the m ilitary's determination of Pakistani strategic 
doctrines, its influence on the adoption of certain foreign and 
defence policy options and the linkages of defence and foreign
6policies, the thesis will also look at how Pakistani domestic 
policies, especially the internal use of the 'communist' threat 
affects Pakistan-Soviet relations.
No indepth analysis of Pakistan-Soviet relations can afford to ignore 
the close interrelationship between internal and external variables. 
Thus the Pakistan military's role in Pakistan-Soviet relations cannot 
be looked at in isolation from external factors such as great power 
(the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China) interests, objectives and competition both at the global level 
and within the South Asian region.
Since Pakistan-Soviet relations are partly dependent on Soviet 
objectives, interests and goals, it will be important to identify 
Soviet stakes in South Asia and Pakistan's position in Soviet 
bilateral, regional and global strategies. It will also be necessary to 
assess the impact of great power relations at the global and regional 
levels on Pakistan-Soviet relations and the military's role in the 
acceptance or rejection of options available to Pakistan in the 
course of its relations with the Soviet Union. While Sino-Pakistani 
relations will be significant in the context of Chinese global and 
South Asian strategies and Sino-Pakistani bilateral relations, 
especially in the sphere of defence and diplomatic assistance, the US 
factor is vital to any understanding of the Pakistan military's role in 
foreign policy formulation, including policy towards the Soviet 
Union.
While US policy towards Pakistan has been dictated by its overall
7global concerns, Pakistan's changing position in American regional 
strategies has its repercussions on Pakistan-Soviet relations. 
US-Pakistan military ties and the question of arms assistance12 are 
of special significance because of their impact both on Pakistan's 
politics and on its overall foreign policy directions, including the 
shaping of Pakistan-Soviet relations. The thesis will, therefore, 
explore and analyse the military’s role and influence in forging 
defence and security links with the West and the effect of these ties 
on Pakistan-Soviet relations as well as on the military's internal 
political standing. It will also assess the impact of Pakistan's 
participation in the Western-sponsored anti-Soviet alliances on the 
external orientation of succeeding generations of the Pakistani 
Officer Corps and the implications of these perceptions for 
Pakistan-Soviet relations.
Thus some of the key questions the thesis will attempt to answer 
will include a determination of how Pakistan's policy directions 
towards the Soviet Union have been influenced by changes in 
East-West relations and Pakistan's position in American global and 
regional strategies; and to what extent have Pakistani military or 
military-dominated governments attempted to use the Soviet card as 
a lever in their dealings with the West. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on the degree to which the requirements of the military, 
especially the need to acquire American military assistance, have 
influenced the adoption of certain policy options vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union. In the internal context, it would be relevant to explore 
whether the 'communist threat' has been used by Pakistani 
governments to gain domestic legitimacy and international support.
8The thesis will also need to take into account Pakistan's regional 
relationships and policies, especially its territorial disputes with 
India and Afghanistan, and their repercussions on Pakistan-Soviet 
relations. Aside from Pakistan's differences with Afghanistan on the 
Pakhtunistan issue, the main focus of Pakistan's regional policies 
has been its troubled relationship with India, with the Kashmir 
dispute being the main bone of contention. Any analysis of this 
dispute once again cannot afford to ignore the significance of 
domestic constraints and imperatives of Pakistan's foreign policy 
and the military's role in influencing foreign policy. The dividing line 
between internal and external variables is a very thin one indeed.
It shall therefore be necessary to examine the impact of conflictual 
relations with India on the Pakistan military's internal political 
standing as well as its role in deciding the course of Indo-Pakistan 
relations. An attempt will especially be made to determine if the 
Indian 'threat' has been used by the Pakistan military to acquire 
political legitimacy, justify domestic defence expenditure and the 
adoption of certain foreign policy directions and alignments, and 
finally, to evaluate the impact of these internal and external 
directions on Pakistan-Soviet relations.
The focus of the thesis is on the years of united Pakistan, covering 
the period from independence to the country's dismemberment in 
1971. So far as the structure and organisation of the thesis are 
concerned, a historical-cum-analytical approach has been adopted, 
with chapters divided into chronological periods. This methodology
9has been used since the timeframe under examination covers distinct 
phases in Pakistani politics and foreign policy. The six substantive 
chapters of the thesis will, therefore, cover various stages in the 
Pakistan military’s role in foreign policy and political history.
Chapter Two, entitled, "Pakistan-Soviet Relations: The Initial Years", 
covers the time period from 1947 to 1951. This chapter will examine 
the initial years of Pakistan's independence under the country's first 
Governor-General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and first Prime Minister, 
Liaquat Ali Khan. It will look at the evolution of Pakistani foreign 
policy, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet relations. It will 
examine the emergence of the Pakistan military establishment and 
its roles in the internal and external spheres, including an 
assessment of its relationship with the political leadership and the 
civil bureaucracy with regard to their respective positions in the 
domestic arena and in the formulation and direction of Pakistan's 
foreign policy.
External factors, including the global and regional policies of the 
former colonial state, the United Kingdom, and the two superpowers, 
the Soviet Union and the United States, will be examined. Special 
emphasis will be placed on determining the influence of defence 
concerns, particularly the military's need for arms assistance, on 
Pakistan's foreign policy directions. The chapter will also look at 
Pakistan's hostile regional environment, examining the impact of 
Indo-Pakistan conflictual relations on the m ilitary’s domestic 
position, its external orientation and strategic perceptions.
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Chapter Three, "The Parliamentary Era, the Military and Foreign 
Policy", will cover the period from 1951 to 1955, following Prime 
Minister Liaquat's assassination, until Iskander Mirza's assumption 
of the post of Governor-General and later President of the new 
Republic of Pakistan. This chapter will examine the continuing links 
between internal and external variables in Pakistani foreign policy, 
focussing on the Pakistan military's role both in domestic politics 
and in the formulation and direction of foreign policy as the Cold War 
engulfed Asia.
In the domestic context, the relationship between the military and 
civil bureaucracies vis-a-vis other political forces in the state will 
be closely followed. In the external sphere, stress will be placed on 
the Pakistan military's role in forging defence and security links 
with the West. An attempt will therefore be made to ascertain how 
far the military's orientation, interests and requirements dictated 
Pakistan's entry into the Western sponsored security pacts. The 
chapter will then look at the impact of these developments on both 
the military’s involvement in politics and on Pakistan's relations 
with the Soviet Union. Finally, Soviet reactions to Pakistani 
alignment with the West will be examined.
Chapter Four, "The Iskander Mirza Years", covering the period from 
1955 to 1958, will study the last years of parliamentary rule, under 
Governor-General and later President Iskander Mirza, until the first 
successful military coup d'état under the leadership of General Ayub 
Khan.
¥
The chapter will lock at the implications of Pakistan's entry into the 
alliances on both its foreign policy directions and internal politics. 
This will include an assessment of the Pakistan military's position 
in American regional strategies and the effect of US military 
assistance, links and contacts not only on the external orientation of 
the Pakistani officer corps but also on the position of the military in 
the internal political arena.
The chapter will examine the effect of Pakistan's participation in 
the Western pacts on Pakistan's bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union and on Soviet regional strategies concerning South Asia. It will 
also look at the repercussions of Pakistan's foreign policy directions 
on its relations with neighbouring India and Afghanistan.
Chapter Five, "Martial Law in Pakistan", covers the first period of 
direct military rule, under Army C-in-C and later Field Marshal 
Mohammad Ayub Khan, from 1958 to 1962. This chapter will evaluate 
the implications of the military takeover for Pakistan's internal 
politics and foreign policy. In the domestic context, an attempt will 
be made to analyse the various strategies employed by the military 
to legitimise and consolidate its hold over power. The position of the 
civil bureaucracy in the policy formulating processes will also be 
assessed.
In the external sphere, the chapter will examine the military's role 
in shaping foreign policy after emerging as the key decision making 
force, with special reference to the impact of US-Pakistan defence 
links on Pakistan-Soviet relations. The chapter will also look at the
11
implications of Pakistan's changing position in US regional and global 
strategies for Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union as well as 
evaluate the Soviet reaction to the Pakistani military government's 
internal and external directions during the period under study.
Chapter Six, "The Military in Mufti", covers the course of Pakistani 
po litics  and fore ign policy, w ith specia l reference to 
Pakistan-Soviet relations, from the formal withdrawal of Martial 
Law in 1962 till the replacement of Ayub Khan's government in 1969 
by Pakistan's second military regime. The chapter will examine the 
nature of the new political order devised by Ayub in order to assess 
the military's position in both domestic and foreign policy making 
processes.
The linkages between defence and foreign policy will be analysed, 
with special emphasis on the influence of the military's strategic 
perceptions, interests and requirements on the adoption of certain 
foreign policy options and their impact on Pakistan-Soviet relations.
The interconnection between internal and external variables will 
also be examined for their effect on Pakistan's foreign policy in 
general and on Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular. These will 
include Pakistani attempts to play the Chinese and Soviet cards in 
the ir dealings with the United States; the emergence of 
American-Soviet detente; and the common desire of the two 
superpowers to contain China.
12
Regional developments assume a new significance in influencing the
13
course of Pakistani domestic politics and foreign policy in this 
period. Hence the chapter will assess the impact of the 
Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and its aftermath on Pakistani foreign 
policy directions and on the fate of the Ayub regime.
The final substantive chapter, "The Yahya Regime and the 
Dismemberment of Pakistan", will cover the period from the 1969 
military takeover until the breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971, 
leading to President Yahya's downfall. It will look at the military's 
publicly acknowledged re-emergence as the dominant domestic actor 
and its roles in dictating the course of Pakistan's politics and 
foreign policy.
The chapter will focus on the influence of the military's orientation 
and requirements in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy and internal 
politics. In the internal context, it will examine the domestic 
repercussions of the military's attempts to perpetuate its control. It 
will then attempt to establish the linkages between internal and 
external variables, especially in the wake of the East Pakistan 
crisis, including the effect of the military's domestic policies on 
relations with India and the regional policies of the external powers, 
the United States, China and the Soviet Union, before and during the 
Indo-Pakistan conflict. Finally, it will evaluate the role of the 
military regime's internal and external policies in determining the 
outcome of the crisis, with special reference to Pakistan-Soviet 
relations.
Note on Sources: It is necessary, in view of the nature of the topic,
14
to explain the nature of some of the source material I have used.
During my fieldwork, both in Pakistan and in the national archives of 
the United States and Great Britain, I was able to consult a 
substantial body of primary source material, very little of which has 
been used by previous researchers on either Pakistan's foreign policy 
or domestic politics. This is especially true of the material I 
consulted in the Public Record Office in London, since the material, 
covering the initial years of Pakistan's independence, had only 
recently been made available for public use.
It was, however, difficult to obtain access to relevant primary 
sources since documents from the mid-1950s are still covered by 
the Official Secrets Act. Considerable problems were, in fact, 
posed by the sensitivity of the topic, which made access to material 
and information very difficult. This was especially true in Pakistan, 
where all relevant documentation remains secret since the Official 
Secrets Act does not appear in practise to be time-barred. I have, 
however, managed to fill in some of the gaps by using all available 
government sources, including Constituent Assembly and National 
Assembly debates, handouts and reports. I have also attempted to 
demonstrate some of the hypotheses under examination by making 
extensive reference to press clippings, especially from the Pakistani 
press. Similarly I have made frequent use of primary military 
sources, including books published by influential Pakistani military 
figures, publicly available Pakistani military journals, such as the 
Pakistan Armv Journal, as well as inhouse military periodicals 
including Sarhang. (37 Division) and The Owl (Staff College, Quetta).
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I have also interviewed a number of senior Pakistani military 
personnel and civil bureaucrats, who had served in sensitive posts 
during the days of united Pakistan. Similar interviews were 
conducted with senior serving and retired American officials, 
dealing with Pakistan during the period under consideration. The 
sensitivity of the topic did pose some problems. While a number of 
persons interviewed provided valuable insights derived from their 
experiences, others were not as forthcoming. Moreover, some of the 
interviewees did not give me permission to quote them directly. 
Hence the list of interviews attached to the bibliography will 
exclude a number of names; but no part of this thesis is wholly or 
primarily dependent upon evidence from sources who decline to be 
identified.
Apart from the available primary source material, I have also made 
extensive use of published secondary sources, such as books, 
journals and monographs, as well as unpublished material, including 
conference papers and reports.
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CHAPTER TWO
PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE INITIAL YEARS M 947-1951^
Pakistan-Soviet relations, in the in itia l years of Pakistan's 
independence, under the country’s first Governor-General Mohammed 
Ali Jinnah and first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan were determined 
by a number of internal and external variables. Internally, the main 
domestic actors playing a role, directly or indirectly, in the 
formulation, implementation and direction of the relationship were 
the country's political leadership and the two inherited state 
institutions, the military and the bureaucracy.
The external orientations of these three power groups, along with 
their respective positions in the internal power structure were to 
influence the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations. There was, at the 
same time, a close interrelationship between domestic and external 
variables. Amongst the major external factors influencing 
Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union were the former's 
relations with the regional states, especially India, as well as the 
global and regional policies of the former colonial state, the United 
Kingdom and the two super powers, the USA and the Soviet Union.
The Traumas of Partition
The evolution of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the initial years was 
greatly influenced by the problems confronting the state and its 
leadership, including the establishment of a viable governmental 
system, the aftermath of partition and the country's differences
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with India. Communal rioting had increased tensions amongst the 
Muslims and Hindus of undivided India. With partition, communal 
violence rapidly accelerated, leading to a mass movement of 
refugees in both countries, creating problems of law-and-order and 
rehabilitation. Other issues contributed to India-Pakistan tensions, 
including differences over the division of economic and military 
assets as well as territorial disputes such as the Indian annexation 
of Junagarh and Hyderabad and clashes over Kashmir. Pakistan's 
western borders were also tense because of Afghan hostility, with 
the Afghan government questioning Pakistan's claim over the tribal 
te rr ito rie s .
The massive internal problems of restructuring and administration 
combined with mounting external tensions led to an increasing 
reliance of the Muslim League government on the country's civil and 
military bureaucracies. The ruling party, even under the leadership 
of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was to find its tasks of governance and the 
establishment of a new administrative system a difficult one. 
Unlike its counterpart, the Indian Congress, the Muslim League had 
become a mass party only a few years prior to independence. Its 
organisational links with the areas that now constituted Pakistan 
were therefore weak. Even when the Muslim League assumed the role 
of a mass party in pre-partition India, its programme had focussed 
on the achievement of an independent country for India's Muslims, 
and no specific political or economic strategies had been worked out 
for the newly independent country. Not only did the Muslim League 
fail to move towards building up a mass base for itself within 
Pakistan, it soon began to crumble from within. A number of Muslim
League politicians in India had not been men "noted for total 
commitment to any cause” and once Pakistan had been achieved the 
"struggle for power within the League was pursued by all sorts of 
dubious means."1
Jinnah, as Governor-General and President of the Muslim League, made 
no real attempt to institutionalise parliamentary democracy in 
Pakistan. Although the Pakistan Cabinet was meant to be responsible 
to a Constituent Assembly, which was both the constitution-making 
body and the Parliament, the Assembly had very little effective 
power.2 While it is claimed that Governor-General Jinnah exercised 
unchallenged authority in the governm ent,3 Jinnah’s illness, 
combined with the enormous internal and external problems facing 
Pakistan, forced him to delegate more and more of the considerable 
powers he possessed. Instead of conferring those powers on his 
Cabinet and on Parliament, Jinnah chose to delegate his authority to 
the bureaucracy.
Unlike the inexperienced politicians, the bureaucracy in Pakistan was 
well versed in the tasks of administration. "The politicians", states 
an authoritative source, "lacking party and political programmes 
started depending on civil servants for guidance."4 Guidance had 
already been provided by bureaucrats, later to opt for Pakistan, in 
the pre-partition negotiations of questions such as the division of 
assets, and in independent Pakistan the dependence of the politicians 
on the bureaucracy grew even further.
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The Pakistan bureaucracy had inherited its structure from its
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predecessor, the Indian Civil Service (ICS), part of the "Steel Frame" 
of the British Indian Empire. The ICS, the small tightly-knit elite 
group at the very top of the Indian bureaucratic hierarchy, had been 
granted special privileges by the British and kept aloof from the 
native population and its aspirations. Serving a colonial power, the 
ICS was contemptuous of politicians,^ and exercised considerable 
adm inistrative powers. But while the ICS was ultimately 
responsible to the British Secretary of State, under Jinnah the 
Muslim League Cabinets and political machinery "were handed over to 
the control of governors and bureaucrats."6 The autonomy of the 
bureaucracy grew as the administrative problems facing the new 
state multiplied, making it more and more d ifficu lt for the 
inexperienced politicians to cope, and thereby increasing their 
dependence on the bureaucrats.
The Muslim League politicians were even more inexperienced in the 
fields of defence and foreign policy, as these had remained the sole 
prerogative of the British colonial government until 1947. This 
inexperience was to have a particular significance for all aspects of 
Pakistan's foreign policy, including Pakistan-Soviet relations.
The events pertaining to partition were to have a considerable 
impact on the other half of the "Steel Frame" of the British Indian 
Empire, the Armed Forces. Despite British opposition to a division of 
the military in India, Muslim League and Congress pressure led to the 
decision to hand over operational control of the British Indian Army 
by 15 August 1947. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee was 
set up, under Field Marshal Auchinleck, to recommend an equitable
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division of the personnel and assets of the British Indian Army.7 It 
was decided that the division of manpower would take place on a 
communal basis, while the division of assets was set at one-third of 
the joint stock for Pakistan and the remainder for India.
The disputes over the division of assets remained for the Pakistan 
military a source of major grievance against India. Most of undivided 
India's military depots, as well as all of the ordnance factories, 
were on what was now Indian soil. While the question of the division 
of stores remained unsettled, the Supreme Commander’s Office, 
responsible for carrying out the inter-Dominion moves of personnel 
and stores closed down on 30 November 1947 (instead of April 1948) 
under Indian pressure.8 The Indian government promised to deliver 
Pakistan its just share of the assets, but the Pakistan military claim 
that H. . . very few of these warlike stores ever reached Pakistan.
Although the division of manpower posed fewer difficulties, the 
Pakistan Army was confronted with serious problems of 
reconstitution and reorganisation. Most of the military's training 
establishments were in India, and the lack of all-Muslim combat 
units meant that Muslim elements had to be separated and 
reconstitu ted.10 Pakistan was also faced with an acute shortage of 
officers, especially in the higher and technical ranks since Hindus, 
particularly Bengalis and South Indians, had dominated the Indian 
component in the Officer Corps.
While the Pakistan Armed Forces were in the midst of reorganisation 
and reconstitution, the traumas of partition placed heavy 
responsibilities on them. The communal rioting in India and Pakistan
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had led to the mass movement of refugees into both countries. When 
the Punjab Boundary Force, set up by the Partition Council, failed to 
provide adequate protection to the refugees, it was disbanded and its 
duties handed over to the Pakistan and Indian Armed Forces. Thus the 
Pakistan Armed Forces in their very earliest days not only escorted 
and protected Muslim refugees but also acquired administrative 
responsiblities, managing refugee camps in Sind and the Punjab and 
assisting the civil administration in restoring law and order in the 
disturbed areas.11
Hence the circumstances attendent on the gaining of independence, 
including differences with India over the division of military and 
economic assets, combined with the disputes over territories, were 
to lead to the emergence of "perennial militarism" in Pakistan, that 
is, the predominance of military over civilian factors in its internal 
and external relations.12
Pakistan's Strategic Perceptions and the Soviet Union
The British had strongly opposed the division of the British Indian 
Army since it was felt that it would leave the Subcontinent 
vulnerable and defenceless against any threat from the North. Hence 
the British Prime Minister, Mr Attlee, instructed the last British 
Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, to emphasise to the Indian leadership the 
necessity of ensuring that the transfer of power was effected with 
full regard to the defence requirements of India and the avoidance of 
any "break in the continuity of the Indian Army" and of maintaining 
the organisation of defence on an all Indian basis.13 The British
hopes for a united Indo-Pakistan defence force were unrealised; 
partition inevitably meant the division of the Armed Forces.
In undivided India, the areas which now constituted Pakistan were 
considered particularly important in British strategic perceptions. 
While British sea power had controlled the security of India's coastal 
approaches, the land frontiers in the north were, in British thinking, 
vulnerable to external intervention. Moreover, the North West 
Frontier had been considered "not only the frontier of India" but "an 
international frontier of the first importance from the military point 
of view for the whole Empire".14 It was here that the British were 
involved in their Great Game with the Russian Empire. After the 
revolution in Russia, the British were equally concerned about 
communist penetration in India and the possibilities of Indian 
nationalists appealing to the USSR for help.1^
As partition grew closer, the British emphasised the importance of 
an indivisible defence of the Subcontinent from "threats from the 
N orth ".16 The British concept of joint defence in the Subcontinent 
had equal relevance to British policies in the Middle East and the Far 
East since the united Indian Army had "played a vital role in 
defending British interests" in these areas and had, in fact, been "the 
main instrument of power in the hands of the British in the Indian 
O c e a n ."17 The British continued to impress the same strategic 
perceptions upon the leadership of Pakistan even after the Armed 
Forces of united India had been divided and came under the 
autonomous control of the two Dominions.18
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The Muslim League politicians, belonging to the Muslim elite of India, 
were largely conservative in their political outlook and a number of 
them had close links with the British colonial government.1^ They 
were, therefore, predisposed towards the West and distrustful of the 
Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union, an unknown entity, was 
perceived as a potential threat, the political leadership of Pakistan 
was equally antagonistic towards communism as an internal or 
external force. Before partition, the Muslim League leaders 
therefore accepted British perceptions of the need for the united 
defence of the Subcontinent against the threat from the North, with 
Jinnah envisaging an "alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and 
Hindustan in the mutual interests of both and against any aggressive 
outsiders", at the same time referring to a potential Soviet threat to 
the proposed state of Pakistan.20
The Pakistan military and civil bureaucracies, with their common 
British heritage, training and traditions, were even less ambiguous 
about their ideological affiliations and external orientations. The 
bureaucracy, descended from the colonial civil service, remained 
staunchly pro-Western. Key posts in the bureaucracy, including three 
of the four provincial Governorships, continued to be manned by 
British officials. Relations between the Pakistan bureaucrats and 
Britain remained cordial while the bureaucrats mistrusted the Soviet 
Union and looked towards the West for support. Internally too, the 
Pakistani bureaucrats clamped down on communist activities from 
the very beginning.
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The Pakistan military, even more than the bureaucracy, remained
closely linked with its parent institution. The Pakistan Army was an 
"ex-colonial army",21 which retained its colonial ties. Due to the 
acute shortage of an indigenous Officer Corps and training 
institutions, a large number of British officers were retained in 
se n io r and te ch n ica l p o s itio n s , inc lud ing  the firs t  
Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force.22 After 
partition the Pakistani officers, like their predecessors in the 
British Indian Army, were sent to training institutions in the UK, 
USA and Commonwealth countries. Since the British had "ruled the 
subcontinent long enough to perpetuate at the higher level a 
particular military thinking"23 and since the higher policy making 
levels were under direct British control, the military was inclined to 
accept British strategic perceptions of the Soviet Union.24 It was 
perceived that Pakistan had inherited the traditional role of the 
defence of the north-western approaches of India.2^ It was also felt 
that immediately after partition, Pakistan was faced with a 
confrontationist India on the East, a hostile Afghanistan on the West 
while beyond Afghanistan lay Russia from where "the menace of 
Communism was staring" Pakistan "in the face." 26
Pakistan's strategic perceptions did, however, undergo a certain 
change in the initial years of independence. While British strategic 
perceptions of the Soviet Union were accepted, the increased 
hostility towards India in the aftermath of partition led to an 
increasing focus of Pakistan's foreign and defence policies on India, 
and an abandonment of the possibilities of joint defence. The 
hostility towards the Soviet Union remained, but Pakistani military 
strategists and defence experts considered the Soviets only a
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potential and not an immediate threat.27 Pakistan's downgrading of 
the threat from the North was obvious in the strategies adopted 
after independence. Despite the antagonism shown by neighbouring 
Afghanistan, advocating the cause of "Pathanistan",28 the Pakistan 
government continued to centre its attention on events on the 
country's eastern and not western, frontiers.
Downplaying a potential Afghan and Soviet threat from the North, the 
Pakistan government abandoned the Forward Policy pursued by the 
British in the tribal areas. While the government continued the 
previous British policy of paying subsidies to the tribes and 
respecting tribal customs, it withdrew its troops from garrisons in 
North and South Waziristan,2^ and handed over control of the tribal 
belt to civil armed forces, under the guidance of regular Army 
personnel. The withdrawal was dictated by military concerns; it 
"made available the units so urgently needed for the reorganization 
of the army on an operational basis, and gave the army the 
operational flexib ility  it required."30 The under-manned and 
under-equipped army prepared itself to meet what it regarded as its 
real foe, India, while it perceived no real threat on the northern 
approaches from either the Soviet Union or Afghanistan.
Soviet Perceptions of Pakistan
Pakistan-Soviet relations were bound to begin on a cool note as the 
country’s pro-Western leadership was not inclined to make overtures 
to the nearby Soviet Union.31 The Muslim League leadership, even 
prior to independence, made clear future directions for the country's
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foreign policy, which were quite different from those of India. In the 
Interim government, the then Foreign Minister Pandit Nehru decided 
to exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union on 14 April 1947.32 
However not only did the Muslim League representative in the Interim 
government, Liaquat AN Khan, oppose the move, but the Pakistan 
government after independence made no immediate attempts to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
On their part, the Soviets were equally distrustful of the Muslim 
League leadership, had serious misgivings about the future regional 
role of the newly independent country, and adopted a wait-and-see 
attitude towards Pakistan. The Soviet attitude in fact reflected their 
analysis of the Indian freedom movement and demand for Pakistan. 
Before independence, the Soviets had attributed Hindu-Muslim 
tensions in India to the British imperialist policy of divide-and-rule, 
and denounced the Muslim League as a reactionary communal 
organisation, dependent on the British for survival.33 Although the 
end of the Second World War saw the Soviets preoccupied with 
Eastern European affairs and problems of internal economic 
reconstruction, with little attention being paid to the Subcontinent, 
acceptance of the Mountbatten plan by the Muslim League and 
Congress and the subsequent partition of India led to increased 
Soviet criticism.
Soviet commentators denounced the Mountbatten plan as "a 
manoeuvre of British imperialism,"34 designed to perpetuate their 
control over the Subcontinent, "inspired by the tried and tested 
maxim of British imperialism ’Divide and Rule'" and alleged that the
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granting of Dominion status to Pakistan and India "was with the 
same old purpose - to perpetuate British rule."3^
Soviet analysts claimed that partition was bound to lead to a 
perpetuation of British political and economic interests in Pakistan, 
since its economy was dominated by British monopolies. The visible 
British presence there was considered as proof of Pakistan’s 
continued military, political and economic dependence on Britain. "A 
large number of generals and higher officials in the Army were 
British nationals", pointed out one Soviet analyst, as were a majority 
of Provincial Governors and civil servants who played "a prominent 
part in the administration"36 of Pakistan. It was also felt that in 
the Pakistani internal political environment, "reactionary elements" 
were "stronger than in Hindustan."37
Despite misgivings about the nature of the Pakistani state and the 
political orientation of its leadership, the Soviets made a number of 
friendly overtures towards Pakistan. In September 1947, the Soviet 
Union voted in favour of Pakistan's admission to the UN, and in 
November 1947 it favoured Pakistan's inclusion in the list ’ of 
countries to be consulted on the proposed peace treaty with Germany. 
Pakistan's response was, however, cool and indifferent. This was 
Pakistan's foreign policy outlook when it embarked upon its 
adventure in Kashmir in 1947-48, which was to influence both the 
country's internal and external policies.
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The Kashmir Episode
On the eve of independence, uprisings began in Muslim majority areas 
in Kashmir, where the Hindu Maharajah was attempting to gain 
independence and to resist pressures to accede to India or Pakistan. 
The Muslim League government of Pakistan decided to force the 
Maharajah's hand by sending tribesmen from the Frontier Province 
into Kashmir.38 Although the Pakistan government denied Indian 
accusations of complicity in the tribal invasion and of the 
involvement of regular Pakistani troops in Kashmir,3^ the invasion 
gave the Indian government the opportunity to obtain the Instrument 
of Accession from the Maharajah on 27 October and send its forces 
into Kashmir.
By April 1948, the Indian military strength in Kashmir had grown, 
while Pakistan had failed to find a favourable solution of the dispute 
in international forums and the invasion had come to a halt on the 
outskirts of Srinagar.
The government therefore openly sent regular troops into Kashmir in 
April and by July there were over three Pakistani brigades in the 
disputed territory. But Pakistan was not militarily in a position to 
make any substantive gains in Kashmir, as it had an Army of 55,000 
against an Indian Army of 200,000, and faced serious deficiencies of 
equipment, since the ordnance factories and military stores of the 
British Indian Army lay in what was now Indian territory, and with 
the start of the Kashmir conflict the Indian government had halted 
the supply of Pakistan's share of military hardware.40 Nor was the
Pakistan government able to augment its scarce military resources 
by acquiring equipment from abroad. The Treasury had "not yet taken 
full stock of our ready foreign exchange and we had little with which 
to go to the open world market to make cash purchases of arms and 
ammunition . . states one m ilitary source,41 while the UK 
threatened to withdraw British personnel in the Pakistan Armed 
Forces.42 An escalation of the conflict was therefore to be avoided 
at all costs, while the Pakistan government, at the same time, made 
desperate attempts to find a peaceful solution of the conflict. The 
negotiations finally proved fruitful and a ceasefire was ordered in 
Kashmir from 1 January 1949.43
The Kashmir conflict was to have a considerable effect on the 
military's understanding of its internal and external roles in the 
state. Firstly, the Kashmir war increased the military's hostility 
towards India, and it was felt that the Indians, by seizing Kashmir, 
had taken the first step on a policy of dismembering Pakistan.44 
Secondly, the war greatly enhanced the military's position in the 
state as guardian of the country's borders against the Indian threat. 
It created greater awareness within the Administration and the 
military of the need to strengthen the Armed Forces by increasing 
defence spending. Finally and most importantly, the conduct of the 
entire operation increased the military's distrust of the ability of 
the country’s politicians to run Pakistan's defence and foreign 
policies effectively.
The political leadership's decision to send in the tribesmen, with 
limited military support, had not produced the desired results of
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forcing the Maharajah's hand or pressuring India, and the 
international community to accept the right of the Kashmiris to 
accede to Pakistan. It had, on the contrary, given India the 
opportunity to intervene militarily and obtain the accession of a 
state with a Muslim majority. The Pakistan government had not 
properly assessed the implications of its decision to intervene. The 
country was not in a position to confront India in the first year of its 
existence. The military was weak, disorganised and nowhere near 
the Indian military in strength and equipm ent.4 ^ The move had 
endangered not only Pakistan's stand on Kashmir but the country's 
security as a whole. Conduct of the war had proved disastrous. 
According to a senior Pakistani m ilitary official, there was 
"complete ignorance about the business of anything in the nature of 
military operations".46 In the military's perceptions the troops in 
Kashmir were handicapped by "political considerations"47 in every 
conceivable way. The m ilitary was poorly equipped, kept 
under-strength and denied the facilities it badly needed, including 
artillery and air support in the earlier stages.
There are differences in the m ilitary's interpretation of the 
conclusion of the conflict. Certain senior military commanders 
claim that the m ilitary's admirable performance in the field, 
especially in the first and only large-scale Pakistani offensive in 
December, would have led to a decisive victory, had not the 
government accepted a ceasefire in Kashmir.48 Other military 
accounts, including the interview of an Air Commodore involved in 
the operation, state that the military was never on the brink of a 
breakthrough and that in the "absence of military supplies from
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outside, our stocks of ammunition would have lasted our Army hardly 
a fortnight of open clash with India and that too on the Kashmir front 
o n l y . " 4 ^ All military accounts, however, agree that the conduct of 
the government and civil administration let down not only the 
military but the entire country.50 There were also factions within 
the military unhappy over the ceasefire and restrictions on offensive 
action. The military made its bitterness known to the Pakistan 
g o ve rn m e n t51 but was repeatedly assured that justice would be 
obtained in international forums.52 When the hopes of a plebiscite 
in Kashmir came to naught, the military's feelings of being let down 
by the political leadership intensified.
The Beginnings of a Relationship
Jinnah's government also began to set the course of Pakistan's 
external policy outside the regional context. In their first foreign 
policy declarations the Pakistan leaders emphasised their decision 
not to take sides with either the Eastern or Western blocs, with 
Governor-General Jinnah declaring that "Our foreign policy is one of 
friendship and goodwill towards all the nations of the world"53 ,and 
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stating that Pakistan had started 
"its career without any narrow or special commitments and without 
any prejudices in the international sphere. Whatever conflict of 
ideologies there may be between certain other nations, Pakistan is 
not concerned with them and will not take sides."54 Yet the 
preferences of the Muslim League leaders were clear, nor were there 
any indications that Pakistan would opt for neutralism in the Cold 
War. Even before partition, Jinnah said that, "Naturally no nation
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stands by herself. There will be an alliance with other nations 
whose interests are common.”55
Pakistan therefore embarked on a foreign policy which was hostile in 
tone and content to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The first 
overtures made by the Pakistani leadership in the international arena 
were to the West, calling on the UK and the USA for political, 
economic and military support, and trying to convince them that a 
weak Pakistan would lay open the entire Subcontinent to Soviet 
expansionism. A militarily strengthened Pakistan, they argued, 
would, on the other hand, be in a position to serve as a bastion of the 
Free World against the communist bloc. Thus, for example, in 
approaches to the US in 1947 and early 1948 for military and 
economic assistance, Pakistani officials claimed that the "burden of 
protecting India had been placed on Pakistan, at least the burden of 
protecting the Northwestern Frontier, which is the only possible 
source of danger", and that: "In its external and defence policy . . .  the 
proximity and vulnerability of Western Pakistan to Russia is the 
most dominant factor . . .  If Pakistan yielded to any external threat, 
the defence of India will become almost an impossibility." They 
added that Islamic Pakistan, which was strongly opposed to 
communist Russia,"must be ready, decisively, to do what it could to 
bar the path should Russia decide to move South", but this would not 
be possible without the assistance of the UK and the USA.56
The Pakistan government escalated its efforts to acquire Western 
diplomatic, defence and economic assistance with the outbreak of 
the Kashmir conflict, which exposed the glaring deficiencies of the
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Pakistan military. The Pakistanis continued to stress the Soviet 
threat to the Subcontinent which only a strengthened Pakistan under 
a pro-Western leadership could effectively meet. While Jinnah 
informed US officials in Pakistan about the "activities" of Soviet 
agents in Kalat and Gilgit, the Pakistan UN representative, Zafrulla 
Khan, warned his British and American counterparts that a lack of 
Western support for Pakistan could possibly lead to the present 
pro-Western government being "swept away" with the new Ministers 
going "over to Russia". That would provide an opening to the Soviets 
which would "leave India defenceless if the Russians crossed the 
Khyber Pass into Kashmir."57
Pakistan's overtures proved futile since the UK was not inclined to 
side with Pakistan against India.58 Nor were the Americans 
interested in providing Pakistan's defence requirements, since South 
Asia was an area of low priority in US global policy and regarded as a 
British responsibility. Both USA and UK equally adopted a neutral 
approach to the Kashmir conflict. The UK curtailed the supply of 
military equipment to both India and Pakistan and threatened to 
withdraw its officers in both armies in the event of an all-out war 
between them, while the US imposed an informal arms embargo on 
both.
Frustrated in their attempts to convince the West of the need to 
provide Pakistan with diplomatic, military and economic assistance, 
the Pakistan Government now decided to resort to another pressure 
tactic, by moving to improve its relations with the Soviet Union.5^ 
Therefore, Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan on 13 April 1948 proposed
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an exchange of Ambassadors to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko in New York.
The Soviet Union was concerned about the policy directions of the 
Pakistan Government. In view of the overt bias of the Pakistani 
leadership towards the West and their continuing defence and 
economic links with Britain, the Soviets accused Pakistan of 
entering into secret pacts with the Anglo-American bloc. Soviet 
commentators claimed that the "leaders of the . . . Muslim League are 
becoming tools of the imperialists"60 and that "Pakistan is being 
converted into a British bridgehead in the East, into a second 
Transjordan of enormous dimensions."61 Referring to the continued 
existence of British bases on Pakistani soil, the Soviets charged 
Pakistan with providing the bases in return for military equipment, 
claimed to be anxious about the militaristic policies of the Pakistan 
government, which they alleged were increasing regional tensions, 
and attributed Pakistani hostility towards India to a "ploy" by which 
the "ruling circles" in Pakistan retained "their influence on the 
masses with the help of Pan-lslam ic and anti-H industan  
dem agogy."62 The Soviets were, however, keen to establish cordial 
relations with Pakistan because of its strategic location and 
concern over the extension of American influence so near the Soviet 
southern borders. They were particularly apprehensive about the 
opportunities the Kashmir dispute presented the Western powers to 
intervene in the area. It was alleged that "Anglo-American 
strategists aimed to convert Kashmir into a link in the chain of 
military bases with which they are doing their best to surround the 
Soviet Union."63 The Soviets therefore welcomed the Pakistani
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overture and the two governments exchanged notes on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 May 1948. The Soviet 
Union expressed interest in the development of economic ties with 
Pakistan, offering liberal terms of trade, and in October 1948, 
accepted a Pakistani order for 30,000 tons of wheat to meet 
deficiencies arising from floods in West Punjab, Sind and East 
B enga l.64 They also reportedly expressed their desire to open a 
Consulate in the NWFP capital of Peshawar.65
Governor-General Jinnah died on 11 September 1948. Prime Minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan decided to remain at his post and Khawaja 
Nazimuddin was appointed Governor-General. Liaquat continued 
Jinnah's policy of emphasising the acquisition of Western diplomatic, 
military and economic support, with little interest shown in 
improving the country's relations with the Soviet Union. The Liaquat 
government publicly and privately called on the Western powers to 
acknowledge Pakistan's strategic position and its desire to play a 
part in bolstering the Free World against Soviet expansionism. This 
policy was taken a step further by a highlighting of Pakistan's 
linkages with the Middle Eastern countries and a call on the 
Americans to strengthen "the Muslim countries between Cairo and 
Karachi", both economically and militarily, which Liaquat said had 
"an important part to play in the struggle against Communism."66 
The Pakistan Government also pointed out that it was in Western 
interests to strengthen Pakistan which "in a period of emergency . . . 
can form a base both for military and air operations."67
Liaquat on the one hand complained of the "stepmotherly treatment"
given to Pakistan by the UK and the Commonwealth, warning that 
"should there be no reorientation of their policy towards Pakistan, 
Pakistan will necessarily have to reorient her policy towards 
them ,"68 but on the other linked Pakistan's urgent need for arms 
with "the communist threat in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia" 
and Pakistan’s desire "to play our proper part in any general
emergency.
There was some change in both UK policies and American thinking 
towards Pakistan, with Great Britain now calling upon the Americans 
to concentrate on the Muslim areas of the Middle East and to meet 
some of Pakistan's more acute military d e fic ie n c ie s /0 while the 
American military establishment pointed out the possibility of the 
"Karachi-Lahore area in Pakistan" becoming "under certain conditions 
. . . a base for air operations against central USSR and . . .  a staging 
area for forces engaged in the defence or recapture of Middle East oil 
a re a s ."71 But the British were still concerned about the need for 
neutrality on Indo-Pakistan issues72 and the Americans considered 
India "the natural political and economic centre of South Asia." 
Hence "aid given to the peripheral countries would have to be adapted 
to conditions in India."73 The Americans therefore, issued an 
invitation to the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, to visit the US 
in October 1949.
British and American indifference, combined with the clear 
preference being shown to India by the Americans led the Pakistan 
government, once again, to attempt to pressure the West by turning 
towards the East. The Liaquat government began to react positively
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to Soviet gestures of friendship, and a number of Soviet-Pakistan 
exchanges took place in 1949. In August, the Soviet Union sent a 
trade delegation to Karachi to negotiate a trade agreement with 
Pakistan. As "industrial and commercial circles in Pakistan" 
declared that "the sphere of Russo-Pakistan trade can be 
cons ide rab ly  w id e n e d ",74 the pro-Government daily D aw n  
commented: "The Russo-Pakistan trade agreement, now nearly 
accomplished, would mark a bright era of trade and commerce 
between the two countries."75 In the cultural sphere, a delegation of 
Soviet writers attended the Conference of Pakistani Progressive 
Writers in Lahore in November, and, addressing a public meeting in 
Karachi said that their tour had removed some of the wrong 
impressions created by the "enemies of peace".76
On 8 June 1949, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan, 
announced that Liaquat had accepted a Soviet invitation to visit 
Moscow. He would thus become the first Commonwealth Head of 
Government to visit the Soviet Union. Complaining of the lack of 
support from the West, Liaquat declared that his intended visit was 
"a friendly visit to a neighbouring country", expressed the hope that 
it would benefit both countries and added, "Pakistan cannot afford to 
wait. She must take her friends where she finds them."77
There was great public support within Pakistan for the government's 
decision .78 The news media highlighted the event, with the daily 
Dawn calling it "a personal triumph" for the Prime Minister, adding 
that: "This gesture by the leaders of Soviet Russia . . .  is a 
recognition of the unique position which Pakistan has come to occupy
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in the short span of less than two years."79
Neither the US nor the UK believed that the invitation or its 
acceptance would lead to a change in Pakistani foreign policy 
orientations and both interpreted it as an attempt by Liaquat to 
pressure the West and to gain domestic support. There was growing 
opposition within the country to the Liaquat government's 
pro-Western foreign policy, which had failed to achieve any of its 
objectives, including support on the Kashmir is s u e d  Opposition to 
the domestic policy of the Muslim League government, from both 
within and without the ruling party, was also on the increase. 
"Abuses abound in the Muslim League", wrote a well known Muslim 
League worker, "They are the abuses of inaction and confusion. The 
best have no work to do, the worst have no check which restrains, no 
test which selects . . . Today . . .  the League has become a thin veil 
behind which tribalism, personal factionalism and unprincipled 
groupings flourish without check . . ."81 The Soviet invitation gave 
the Prime Minister an opportunity to deflect the criticism of 
subservience to the West and focus attention away from the growing 
discontent at home.
The government's actions, following the announcement of the Soviet 
invitation^ were to confirm the Western interpretation. For example, 
it delayed the exchange of ambassadors; 82 not until 31 December 
1949 did Pakistan's first Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Shoaib 
Qureshi, present his credentials in Moscow. In November 1949, the 
Pakistan Foreign Office announced the appointment of Ivan 
Nikolaevich Bakulin, a former Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, as
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Ambassador to Pakistan, but for undisclosed reasons Bakulin was not 
to take up his appointment and on 15 March 1950 Alexander 
Stetsenko was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan.®3
Pakistan was unlikely to change the direction of its foreign policy, 
not only because of the pro-Western leanings of its leadership but 
also because of the growing role of its bureaucracy in foreign policy 
making. The members of Pakistan’s superior civil service, the Civil 
Service of Pakistan (CSP), maintained close links with Britain after 
independence and had started making overtures to both the US and UK 
independently of the Muslim League government.®4 The concept of 
accountability of the bureaucracy to the Cabinet was not 
institutionalised under either Jinnah or Liaquat, and as the Muslim 
League's hold over the country weakened the influence of the 
bureaucrats grew even more pervasive. The CSP had "little patience 
with politicians’’ and "were quick to establish their presence at the 
head of the decision-making process when the politicians became 
bogged down in internecine conflict."35 Amongst the most powerful 
of the serving and retired bureaucrats who exercised considerable 
influence in foreign policy making were the Finance Minister Ghulam 
Mohammed, formerly from the Department of Finance and Audits and 
Accounts in united India, Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan, previously a 
member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and Chaudhri Muhammad 
Ali, Secretary-General to the Government of Pakistan, who had held 
several posts, including the post of Financial Adviser, War and 
Supply, in the British Raj.36
After the announcement of the Prime Minister's intention to visit the
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Soviet Union, both the Pakistani political leadership and the 
bureaucracy continued to seek assurances of support from the West, 
with Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah and Defence 
Secretary Iskander Mirza visiting the US in 1949. Ghulam Mohammed 
also approached both the US and the UK, to probe the former for an 
invitation for the Pakistan Prime Minister to visit, and to call on the 
British to provide a Commonwealth guarantee of Pakistan’s security 
against any potential threat from India.
While the British took the stand that the "Commonwealth was not 
built on the assumption that one member might conceivably fight 
against one another"87 and hence the question of such a guarantee 
did not arise, the American response was more positive. In the wake 
of the communist victory in China and the first Soviet atomic 
explosion, the US had wanted to build up India, with its great size 
and potential, as a counter to the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
Prime Minister Nehru's visit in October 1949, however, proved a 
disappointment, due to his emphasis on non-alignment and reluctance 
to involve India in the Cold War. The Americans therefore decided to 
explore the Pakistani option and in December 1949 President Truman 
extended an invitation to Liaquat to visit the US in May 1950. The 
Pakistanis were convinced that their policy of using the Soviet card 
to pressure the West had succeeded. "Your acceptance of the 
invitation to visit Moscow was a masterpiece in strategy", wrote 
Pakistan's Ambassador in the United States, M.A.H. Ispahani; to 
Liaquat, "overnight Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and 
consideration of the US government."88
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During his visit to the US, Liaquat Ali Khan did not openly call for 
Pakistan's alignment with the West in the Cold War, but made several 
references to Pakistan's "strategic importance in relation to the 
oil-bearing areas of the Middle East", controlling the "mountain 
passes through which the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent had been 
invaded ninety times in the past centuries."89 Liaquat drew 
attention to Pakistan's "commitment" to democracy and said that 
communism was unlikely to flourish in Islamic Pakistan. He called 
on American businessmen to invest in Pakistan, stating that 
"democracy" and the "right of private ownership" were "matters of 
faith" to Pakistanis.90 His country, he said, had extended "her hand 
of friendship to the freedom-loving people of the world" and he 
expressed the hope that Pakistan and America would become 
comrades in the "noble task of maintaining peace and in translating 
the great constructive dreams of democracy into reality."91
The Prime Minister held talks with US Defence Secretary Johnson, in 
which he requested assistance for Pakistan’s Armed Forces.92 
Addressing a press conference, Liaquat said that defence spending 
was a heavy burden on Pakistan and the size of the Pakistan Army 
would depend "on this great country of yours", adding that: "If your 
country can guarantee our territorial integrity, I will not keep any 
army at all."93 He also called for US support for a Commonwealth 
guarantee for both India and Pakistan.94 Proceeding to Canada, he 
emphasised the fact that Pakistan was the guardian of the Khyber 
Pass, the traditional invasion route to India, and pointed out that he 
had no knowledge of the strength of the Soviet forces, stationed a 
few miles away from the Pass since "they (the Soviets) have not
44
given me any intimation," implying the presence of such forces in 
Afghanistan. 95
While Liaquat tried his best to align his country with the West, the 
Americans, unsure of his domestic position, were more interested in 
f irs t assessing the leanings of the fu tu re  Pakistani 
Commander-in-Chief (since the British C-in-C General Gracey's term 
was coming to an end) before making any definite commitments to 
strengthen Pakistan militarily.96
Developments Within the Military
The political scene in Pakistan was tense as the Muslim League 
Government under Liaquat made no attempts to institutionalise 
parliamentary democracy. The Constituent Assembly remained 
powerless and constitution making was ignored, as well as the 
principle of Cabinet responsibility to the Parliament.97 As dissent 
grew both inside and outside the Muslim League, opposition parties 
such as the Awami Muslim League and the Azad Pakistan Party 
emerged. Liaquat's response was to depict all opposition to his 
government as treasonable and unpatriotic. Condemning the 
mushroom growth of political parties, Liaquat reminded the 
Pakistani people of their duty to strengthen the Muslim League as 
that would mean making Pakistan strong.98 Denouncing opposition 
leaders as "dogs let loose by the enemies of Pakistan",99 Liaquat 
tried to crush the growing opposition by the use of instruments such 
as the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act or 
PRODA.100
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While the political infighting preoccupying the government provided 
the bureaucracy the opportunity to strengthen its position within the 
central government, discontent was also on the increase within the 
Armed Forces. The heritage of the Pakistan military was that of the 
British Indian Army, which had been kept strictly apart from the 
nationalist movement in India till the years immediately preceding 
partition. Only when the decision for partition had been taken did the 
Muslim officers switch their allegiance to Pakistan.101 Since the 
newly established Pakistan Armed Forces had "no real knowledge of 
the personalities involved" in the political struggle, states one 
military authority, "the politicians were largely an unknown quantity 
to us as we were to them".102 That the military's loyalties to the 
country's political leadership had developed only very late in the day 
would have a significant impact on civil-military relations.
The Pakistan military also inherited the British concept of a division 
of responsibilities in the state into two separate spheres, the 
military and the civil, with the ultimate control of the military lying 
in responsible civil hands. Recruitment to the British Indian Army 
moreover, had been mainly from the most conservative segments of 
Indian society and the most politically backward areas of the 
country. This did not, however, mean that the military in India had 
no political role to play. In the early years of the British Indian 
Empire, military representatives had governed the country, and even 
at the time of independence the Commander-in-Chief was the 
executive head of the Armed Forces and a member of the 
Governor-General's Executive Council. The military in Pakistan was, 
therefore, both aware of the previous military roles in governance
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and conscious of the responsibilities of civil and military leaders in 
fulfilling their respective roles in the state.103
When the new state came into existence, ambitious military officers 
were anxious to provide guidance to the political leadership and 
assume a greater role than the political government desired. A 
senior m ilitary o fficer, on one occasion, complained to 
Governor-General Jinnah that, "instead of giving us the opportunity 
to serve our country in positions where our natural talents and 
native genius could be used to the greatest advantage, important 
posts are being entrusted to foreigners . . . .  This was not our 
understanding of how Pakistan would be run". Jinnah retorted that 
the Armed Forces were "the servants of the people", they did "not 
make national policy. It is we, the civilians who decide these issues.
. ."104 Addressing the Staff College on another occasion, Jinnah 
expressed his concern over the attitude of "one or two very 
high-ranking officers", pointing out that the Officer Corps should ". . . 
study the Government of India Act (of1935) as adopted for use in 
Pakistan, which is our present constitution, that the executive 
authority flows from the head of the Government of Pakistan who is 
the Governor-General, and therefore, any command or orders that may 
come to you cannot come without the sanction of the executive 
head."105
Yet another British heritage which was to have serious implications 
for civil-military relations in Pakistan was the use of the military 
for ’aid-to-civiP operations. The British had frequently used the 
military in India to control internal disturbances. Their role in
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aid-to-ci vi I operations during the nationalist movement for 
independence created in the military a contempt for politicians, from 
both the Muslim League and the Congress.106 Under the British, 
however, aid-to-civil operations were conducted under a strictly 
controlled procedure, whereby the military operated under the 
civilian control of the colonial government.
This distaste for politicians and political disorder was inherited by 
the Pakistan Army, and reinforced by the events following partition. 
The newly formed Pakistan Armed Forces were as averse as their 
parent body to the use of the military for aid-to-civil, particularly 
law-enforcing, duties. Yet the military was frequently called upon 
by the government in the early years to put down domestic unrest and 
opposition. In addition to its role in assisting the administration in 
the wake of the refugee crisis and communal violence,107 the 
military was used in 1948 to force the Khan of Kalat to accede to 
Pakistan and to prevent a police mutiny in Dacca, to maintain law and 
order during riots in Karachi in January and July 1949 and in Dacca in 
1950.
The m ilitary deeply resented its increasing deployment in 
aid-to-civil duties.108 This frequent use of the military by the civil 
government to maintain internal security increased the government's 
dependence on the military on the one hand, and on the other led the 
military to contrast its own strengths with the government's 
weaknesses. After the first couple of years of reconstruction and 
reorganisation the military was now a cohesive force, contrasting 
its professionalism, discipline and orderly outlook with the growing
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divisiveness, corruption and nepotism within the ranks of the Muslim 
League government.109
In September 1950, Lt. General Mohammad Ayub Khan was nominated 
the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army and 
took over on 17 January 1951. Ayub's appointment was unexpected, 
since he was neither the most senior Pakistani officer nor the most 
outstanding.110
The appointment seems to have been made on political grounds, since 
Prime Minister Liaquat and Defence Secretary Lt. Col. Iskander Mirza 
were aware of the growing unrest in the Armed Forces. Ayub was a 
friend and contemporary of Mirza's at Sandhurst,111 and appeared to 
his sponsors a compliant and unambitious officer.112
Ayub Khan was, however, neither devoid of political ambitions nor 
the willing and compliant officer he appeared to the Prime Minister 
and Defence Secretary. His political ambitions and his distrust of 
politicians, which had been reinforced by the events of partition, 
were to play a crucial part in Pakistan's domestic politics. During 
his tenure as GOC East Pakistan, Ayub became even more convinced of 
the ineptitude of the politicians, expressing the opinion that the 
Pakistani provincial government was "politically weak and unstable" 
faced with "gigantic" problems which "pygmies" were trying to 
solve.113 When Ayub was appointed C-in-C, the promotion gave him 
the chance of advancing his ambitions. During September 1950, he 
visited the UK, where he told a fellow officer that: "This Army has a 
much greater and wider role to play than people realise. The C-in-C,
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in fact, is a much more important man than the P.M. (Prime Minister) 
in our country as the situation stands today . . ."1 14 Ayub's 
interaction as C-in-C with the Muslim League government increased 
his contempt for the politicians. T he  affairs of the Muslim League . . 
. were in a mess", said the C-in-C, "The Muslim League High Command 
and the Working Committee were controlled by a small coterie of 
men and the party had no organisational structure", while Karachi 
was "a hot bed of intrigues" and the "malaise in the political and 
administrative life of Pakistan was becoming painful."115
A few months after Ayub took over office, Prime Minister, Liaquat, 
announced an attempt by dissatisfied factions within the military to 
overthrow the civil government.
The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case
On 9 March 1951, Liaquat announced the discovery of a conspiracy 
involving m ilitary personnel and civilians to overthrow the 
government, including the Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan 
Army, Major General Akbar Khan, Brigadier Latif and the Pakistan 
Times Editor, Faiz Ahmed Faiz. The Prime Minister said that the "aim 
of the conspiracy was to create commotion in the country by violent 
means and, in furtherance of that purpose, to subvert the loyalty of 
Pakistan’s defence forces."116 The initial arrests were followed by 
several others, including those of the Director of Personnel, Royal 
Pakistan Air Force, Air Commodore M.K. Janjua^and Communist Party 
of Pakistan (CPP) Secretary-General, Sajjad Zaheer, with the 
government now claiming a "communist hand" in the unsuccessful
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On 21 March 1951, Liaquat Ali told the Constituent Assembly that 
the Rawalpindi conspirators had planned to bring the country "under a 
military dictatorship, when the existing authorities, both civil and 
military had been eliminated." The plan was to set up a government 
"patterned on the Communist model, but under military domination", 
with the assistance of "economic and constitution-making missions" 
which were "to be invited from a certain foreign country", implying 
the Soviet Union.11®
Little evidence was produced by the government to prove a 
communist connection, or even the existence of a conspiracy. The 
trials of the accused were held in camera under the Rawalpindi 
Conspiracy (Special Tribunal) Act 1951.119 The "ringleader", Chief 
of General Staff, Major General Akbar Khan, had played a prominent 
role in the Kashmir operations of 1947, and had been dissatisfied 
with the government's policy on Kashmir. All of the other military 
personnel involved had also served on the Kashmir front. Akbar Khan 
was also reportedly unhappy about Ayub's appointment as C-in-C, 
though this motivation was strongly rejected by the Pakistan 
governm ent.120 Akbar Khan later disclosed that a meeting had been 
held at his residence in Rawalpindi on 23 February, where he had 
proposed that the government be dismissed and a caretaker 
government, under an "advisory military council", be set up, 
consisting of all the Generals, which would hold general elections on 
the basis of adult franchise, frame a constitution, and adopt a more 
positive policy on Kashmir. This plan was discussed with certain
plot.117
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members of the CPP, including Secretary-General Sajjad Zaheer. But 
the meeting decided that "nothing was to be done by us," and these 
tentative plans were never put into operation.121
The CPP, formed in March 1948, under Secretary-General Zaheer, 
was an independent offshoot of the Communist Party of India. It had 
made little headway in Pakistan, particularly in the western wing, 
although it did have linkages with a number of trade unions, including 
the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions, and had sympathisers in the 
news media, including Pakistan Times Editor Faiz Ahmed Faiz.122 
The anti-communist government and bureaucracy in Pakistan had 
placed severe curbs on the operations of the CPP from the very 
beginning, including anti-communist drives in 1948 and 1949. The 
'threat of communism', despite the weakness of the communists 
within the country, became a convenient rallying cry for the Pakistan 
government to gain both domestic legitimacy and international 
support. The "communist hand" and the external "link" of the 
conspirators were therefore played up by the Liaquat government. 
Internally the "communist connection' gave the government the 
opportunity of arresting a number of communists, their supporters 
and other political opponents in mid-1951, charging them with 
subversive and anti-state activities. The disclosure of the 'plot' also 
strengthened the hand of the Prime Minister on the eve of the most 
important provincial elections in the Punjab, the first to be held in 
Pakistan and thus the first trial of strength for the Muslim 
League,123 with the government stressing that had the conspirators 
been successful they "would have struck at the very foundations of 
our national existence and disrupted the stability of Pakistan."124
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Externally the "Soviet” connection was used in an attempt to gain 
Western support for the tottering government. Providing information 
to the US Embassy, the Pakistan government said that the conspiracy 
involved military officers and civilians "most of them with Commie 
connections", who were "actively assisted by . . . Commie elements", 
and after the seizure of power, the Soviet government was to be 
asked for assistance in "drafting a Constitution along Commie 
lines."125 The Pakistan government did succeed in persuading the 
Americans of Soviet complicity to some extent, as can be seen in 
American assessments of the political aftermath of the case.126 
In its policy statement on Pakistan in July 1951, the US State 
Department emphasised that the increasing feeling in Pakistan for "a 
greater rapprochement between the USSR and Pakistan" had been 
"sharply reversed" because Pakistani communists had been prevented 
from overthrowing the government, and that the Pakistan "central 
government is aware of the dangers of Communism and the Pakistan 
Communist Party" and has "used strong measures" to curb communist 
activities in the country.127
The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case had equally significant 
repercussions within the military. The case provided Ayub Khan and 
Mirza the opportunity of proving their loyalty to the West and 
strengthening their position internally. The investigations into the 
proposed "military coup to overthrow the government" were given by 
Liaquat Ali to them, and they reported back to him that they had 
"enough evidence" and proof that "an uprising had been planned."128 
While Ayub strongly denounced the plot of the "Young Turk" element
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in the Armed Forces and their communist supporters, Mirza informed 
the US that the officers concerned wanted Pakistan to turn to the 
Soviet Union, and that General Akbar Khan was a "one hundred per 
cent communist."129
Internally Ayub Khan was given the chance of ridding himself of 
potential opponents in the Armed Forces, including Akbar Khan and 
Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmed, another officer senior to Ayub, who had been 
in the running for the post of C-in-C.130 The "results of this 
incident", states one military authority, "started a witch hunt and 
surveillance of senior officers of the Army who had any kind of 
standing and following . . brother officer was encouraged to spy on 
brother officer." This "allowed the Senior Officers to be smeared by 
those in authority senior to us while claiming to do so in the service 
of the state."131 Ayub Khan claimed, of course, that: "We examined 
the antecedents of officers and got rid of the doubtful ones. We 
tightened up on discipline . . .  I knew the cancer had been 
removed."132 Ayub thus managed to eliminate any opposition within 
the institution which could have hindered the fulfilment of his 
ambitions.
The Military. Muslim League and Defence
While the Military High Command had little regard for the political 
leadership's ability to manage the domestic environment, it was also 
to soon become disillusioned with the guidance of the politicians in 
defence and strategic concerns. The British Indian Army had seen 
itself as the sword arm of India, ensuring internal security as well
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as guarding the frontiers of the country.133 The Pakistan military 
soon acquired similar self-perceptions of its role in the state.
The politicians' inexperience in defence and foreign policy, and 
ignorance of military concerns, were to have a deep impact on the 
Armed Forces' position in the country's internal power structure. 
Before independence the Muslim League leaders had had little 
knowledge of or exposure to the military as an institution, and after 
partition they became too involved in internal politicking to work out 
an effective and sure way of institutionalising civilian control over 
the military. 134 This was to encourage the Pakistan military to 
obtain as much autonomy as possible in the early years. At the same 
time, the military began increasingly to resent any intervention by 
the civil government in defence decision making and implementation.
The Muslim League governments of Jinnah and Liaquat began to give 
the Armed Forces and defence concerns more and more importance, 
due to Pakistan's uncertain internal and external environments. 
Despite the country's limited economic resources more and more 
expenditure was earmarked for defence, and strenuous efforts made 
to meet the demands of the military. Military expenditure was at 
times "half and . . . even more of the central budget", as the table 
below shows, and the "original plan for an army of 125,000 men was 
revised upward."135
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Year
Revenue 
(millions of Rs)
Defence Expenditure 
of government 
of Pakistan10D 
(millions of Rs)
Defence
Expenditure
as
% of Revenue
1947-48 198.9 154.1 77.5
1948-49 667.6 577.6 86.5
1949-50 885.4 752.2 85.0
1950-51 1,273.2 703.0 55.22
Under both Jinnah and Liaquat, frequent references were made to the 
importance of strengthening the country militarily.137 From 1947 
onwards, the Muslim League government also made frequent attempts 
both to obtain military assistance and purchases for the Armed . 
Forces from Western countries.
The military, however, remained unimpressed by either the rhetoric 
or the actual policies of the Jinnah and Liaquat governments. On the 
contrary, it felt that the politicians were hindering rather than 
advancing the interests of the infant Armed Forces. These were the 
years of reorganisation and reconstruction of the Pakistan military 
and this task, says a military historian, was adversely affected by 
the government "always looking for a chance to scale down its 
expenditure on the army", citing as an example an attempt to 
implement a release programme, which was abandoned when tensions 
with India increased. "Whenever the immediate threat to Pakistan's 
security had passed", commented General Fazal Muqeem, "the 
Government would again cut the army’s budget." The Army's 
successful reconstitution "in the face of such odds was little short 
of a miracle."138
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The military was equally unimpressed with the performance of the 
political leadership in the management of foreign policy. The 
Kashmir episode had on the one hand enhanced the military's 
ambitions for an expanded role within the state,139 and on the other 
made it contemptuous of the Muslim League government's 
understanding of m ilitary and strategic concerns. When 
Indo-Pakistan relations worsened in 1950 and 1951, the 
government's policies were regarded as highly irresponsible by the 
Pakistani Military High Command as Liaquat, who was fast losing 
control over his party, adopted a harsh anti-Indian rhetoric as one 
way of regaining popularity.140 The increased militancy of the 
Pakistan government was one of the reasons cited by the Indian 
leadership for its border concentration.141
The playing up of the Indian "threat" by the Pakistan leadership did 
win it a measure of domestic support.142 In the Pakistan military's 
thinking, however, such a course could have forced Pakistan into a 
war when its Armed Forces were ill-organised and ill-equipped. 
According to Ayub Khan, the Prime Minister "seemed tempted by the 
prospect of war". He told Ayub Khan: "I am tired of these alarums 
(s ic ) and excursions. Let us fight it out." Whereupon Ayub warned 
him that Pakistan was in no position to confront India militarily. For 
example,the Pakistan army had "only thirteen tanks with about forty 
to fifty hours engine life in them to face the Indian Army."143 The 
Military High Command was also apprehensive that the jingoism of 
the political leadership was affecting the troops. Not "only our 
politicians but our troops were itching to settle accounts with 
India", stated Ayub. "It was my job to hold them back, which, thank
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Heavens, I did."144
By 1950-51, the military was also aware that the political 
leadership had failed in its efforts to obtain adequate assurances of 
security or requirements of military hardware from external 
sources. Although there were reports of the Pakistan military 
purchasing arms from Czechoslovakia and exploring the possibilities 
of arms acquisitions from other Soviet bloc sources,145 it was but 
natural for the Armed Forces to look towards the West for 
assistance.
The senior leadership of the Pakistan Army was British, the 
indigenous Officer Corps had received its training at British 
institutions, and the practice had been continued after partition of 
sending its officers for higher training to British military 
academies. It was also dependent on the British for ammunition and 
spare parts. So, when a procurement machinery was set up by the 
Pakistan m ilitary,146 attention was at first focussed on Britain, 
which was considered "a natural friend and ally" .147 The Pakistan 
military was also, from the very start, to play a role, in tandem with 
the pro-Western political leadership and bureaucracy, in advocating a 
policy of alignment with the West in the Cold War.146
The Pakistan Officer Corps was loyal to its British heritage and the 
"senior Pakistan officers themselves" were "most conscious of the 
debt" they owed to the British officers who made "their army 
possib le ".149 The directions of the British officers at the helm of 
affairs were therefore to influence the external orientations of the
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Pakistan military. The British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, for 
instance, advised his Pakistani officers to study the world picture 
and be fully aware of the Cold War, emphasising that: "Pakistan has a 
vital role to play in the future and the army must be ready to play its 
part.”150
The military joined the political leadership and bureaucracy in 
appealing to the UK and US to provide Pakistan with a security 
guarantee, while, at the same time, pressing the Western bloc to 
meet Pakistan's defence requirements, since it faced not only 
Indo-Afghan hostility but also "the uncertainty created by the 
attitude of Russia."151 C-in-C General Gracey approached both the 
Americans and the British to provide support to Pakistan with the 
outbreak of the Kashmir conflict, warning them that if "Pakistan 
could not get support from the 'Anglo-American block' she would 
have to look elsewhere to Russia." The support General Gracey 
requested was "an unequivocai declaration" of assistance to "the 
victim of aggression" in Indo-Pakistan disputes, which should take 
"the form of a squadron or two of modern fighter aircraft and a 
sufficient naval force."152
General Gracey's approach was followed by one by the Deputy Chief 
C-in-C, Major-General Cawthorn, on the possibilities of Pakistani 
defence talks with the UK, pointing out the "strategic value" of 
Pakistan "in relation to naval and air defence of the Indian Ocean 
area", particularly "as bases for the collection of intelligence by 
special means." Pointing out Pakistan's status as a Muslim state in 
the Persian Gulf possessing "considerable political potential in
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relation to British interests in the Middle East", Cawthorn said that 
in the event of war, "Pakistan would join the allies", and, in any case 
in "intelligence matters the exchange of information on Russian 
activities in Afghanistan and on the spread of Communism in the 
Middle East or Far East would . . .  be of much assistance to the 
UK.-153 jh is  was reiterated by Gracey, who told the UK Secretary 
of State that, given "some form of guarantee against aggression" and 
the military assistance it required, "Pakistan would . . .  be ready and 
willing and able to supply Forces for service in other parts of the 
Commonwealth", for example in ". . . the Persian oil-fields in case of 
emergency", unlike neutral India.154
The UK government noted that in Pakistan's expressed desire for 
participation in Middle East defence, the "military authorities" were 
"well ahead" of the Pakistan government, asking in return for "some 
quid pro quo if only training and equipment . . . "  The offer of 
participation had not come formally from the Pakistan government 
but from "military leaders" and pro-West Ministers such as Zafrulla 
Khan.155 jh@ British government was unable to fulfil Pakistan's 
defence requirements or its requests for a security guarantee, partly 
because of its limited resources and partly because Britain was 
unwilling to side with Pakistan against India. The Pakistan military 
therefore began to explore other Western sources and from 1949 
onwards attention was increasingly focussed on the Americans, with 
a number of purchasing missions, including a high level military 
delegation in June 1949, headed by Iskander Mirza, visiting the US. 
Mirza's mission was ostensibly to "acquaint Pakistan defence 
personnel with the organization and operations of the national
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military establishment and to observe the US Army and Air Force 
organization, training and equipment".156 But in his discussions 
with US officials, Mirza stated that the "principal objective of his 
Mission was to get for Pakistan an assured source of military 
supplies - the United States."157
By the beginning of 1951, however, the Pakistan Army's demands 
were only partially met. "The requirements were many and 
Pakistan's balance of foreign exchange poor." Moreover, some "of 
these ad hoc purchases were not of the desired quality and 
standard."158
South Asia did start receiving more attention from the US policy 
makers after the communist victory in China, combined with the 
developments in Indo-China and Korea, and the National Security 
Council's (NSC) Policy Statement on South Asia in January 1951 now 
stressed that: "The time has come to pursue our objectives in South 
Asia with more vigor" and that the "political, strategic, manpower 
and resource potential" of the "key" regional states, India and 
Pakistan, must be "marshalled on the side of the US", with the 
"minimum requirement for the fulfilment of US regional objectives" 
being the "continuation in power of non-communist governments", 
which were to be encouraged to join the US in the Cold War against 
the Soviet Union.159 A cooperative regime in Pakistan, with full 
control over the internal political arena, would, therefore, be best 
suited to fulfil American regional objectives.
Liaquat's government was more than willing to cooperate and he was
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keen to obtain US support in order to strengthen his own domestic 
p o s itio n .160 But the Americans were aware that the Pakistan 
military was fast emerging as a powerful institution internally, 
while Liaquat, who also held the portfolio of Defence Minister, had 
little knowledge of military matters and was in far from complete 
control over the affairs of even his own political party. Hence the 
cooperation of the Pakistani Armed Forces assumed even greater 
importance at a time when the Pakistan military was itself gaining 
greater significance in US regional strategy, with American policy 
planners reaching the conclusion that "Pakistan could provide 
important ground forces . . . for use in South Asia or on the western 
flank." So the "United States military authorities should consider on 
an urgent basis the desirability of the United States entering into an 
early understanding with Pakistan, which would provide for 
equipping and building up Pakistan’s military forces and insure the 
availability of Pakistan's ground forces on the western flank at the 
outset of war."161
In January 1951, the new C-in-C, Ayub Khan, was aware that he 
"could not continue to make demands on an already over-burdened 
exchequer" for the military's needs. The "Pakistan Army had to learn 
to depend on itself and on its meagre resources."162 Another option 
for the new C-in-C was to try to succeed where the political 
leadership, the civil bureaucracy and his Army predecessors had 
failed, by obtaining a steady source of external supply and assistance 
from a reliable ally.
As Deputy C-in-C Ayub Khan had already approached British military
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authorities, emphasising the necessity for "the UK to have friends in 
the East and the necessity for the UK to enable those friends to 
become effective." When the response was that the UK "had only a 
certain amount of equipment and that we naturally gave that 
equipment to those who had declared themselves openly on our side 
and had accepted commitments", Ayub replied that he had already 
discussed the subject with Secretary-General Chaudhri Mohammad 
Ali and that "it was his (Ayub's) intention to tell his Government that 
they must come out in the open and come clean (his exact words) and 
say which side they were on. He fully appreciated that without this 
it was not possible to get far on anything."163
Ayub was convinced that the "answer to the problems" facing 
Pakistan, and the only way of meeting the requirements of the 
military, was to have "a strong and reliable friend."164 Since the 
British government was as yet unforthcoming, by mid-1951, Ayub, 
had now begun "definitely thinking" of turning to the Americans for 
the assistance the Pakistan Armed Forces required.165
Tensions in Pakistan-Soviet Relations
As Pakistan's political leadership, bureaucracy and military 
continued to focus their attention on forging ties with the West, 
proving their antipathy towards communism and ignoring Soviet 
overtures, Pakistan-Soviet relations, in all spheres of interaction, 
economic, cultural and political, began to come under strain. 
Although both Pakistani and Soviet sources said that trade 
negotiations were nearing completion and that the first
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Pakistan-Soviet trade agreement would soon be concluded,166 the 
Soviet team returned home as the talks failed due to Pakistani 
indifference.167 In fact, Pakistani exports to the Soviet Union went 
down to Rs 14 million in 1950-51 from the 1949-50 and 1948-49 
figures of Rs 45 million and Rs 71 million respectively.168
Cultural relations also received a setback in 1950 when the Pakistan 
government refused to issue passports to Pakistan writers intending 
to visit the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Soviet writers' 
delegation which had visited Pakistan in 1949. The Liaquat 
government even considered banning the sale of Soviet literature in 
Pakistan, demanding that "facilities available to Russian Information 
Service in Pakistan have to be based on reciprocal facilities for 
dissemination of Pakistan information in the USSR."169 The Interior 
Minister, Khawaja Shahabuddin, told the Constituent Assembly that 
the government was aware of the increase in the distribution and 
supply of Soviet literature on communism, and had "taken necessary 
steps in the matter".170
The Soviet government was particularly concerned about the 
Pakistan government's attempts to forge security links with the 
West. The unsuccessful attempt to bring about a Pan-lslamic bloc 
under Pakistani leadership came under severe Soviet attack. When 
sessions of the International Islamic Conference were held in 
Karachi in 1949 and in Tehran in 1950, the Soviets denounced the 
movement on the grounds that "these Moslem politicians" were 
preaching religion and socio-economic cooperation but were actually 
"plotting against the national liberation movement in Asia and the
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Middle East and supporting the anti-Soviet military schemes of the 
US and British imperialists."171 The Karachi conference, they 
claimed, had been concerned mainly with "preparing the ground for 
the formation of a military and political bloc of the Islamic 
countries", which would be "anti-Soviet" in nature,172 while Soviet 
scholar A. Dyakov commented that " . . .  in foreign policy, the task of 
Pan-lslamism is to mask the Pakistan Government's reactionary 
policy of scraping together an anti-Soviet bloc among the Muslim 
countries of the Near and Middle East. By Pan-lslamic slogans and by 
demagogy about the common interests of all Muslims in the world, 
the Muslim League is trying to conceal the dependence of Pakistan's 
present policy on British and American dictats (s ic ) and to veil 
Pakistan's role as the bridgehead of the Anglo-American bloc . . ."173
Soviet concern about American penetration in Pakistan centred on 
the country's strategic location. The Soviets were particularly 
perturbed by Anglo-American shows of interest in Pakistan’s 
northern areas. In a report on a visit by four American Senators, 
accompanied by a team of experts, to the Khyber Pass, a Soviet 
writer noted that they "seemed to be particularly drawn to the 
northern areas, which are close to the frontiers of the Soviet Union." 
They "studied the country around" and "made photographs of the 
locality" indicating that the "American and British imperialists are 
interested in Pakistan, not only as a market and field of investment" 
but are "out to make it one of their military bases."174
Prime Minister Liaquat had made clear his external orientation when 
he gave precedence to an invitation from Washington over the prior
invitation from Moscow. Although "well informed sources" in Karachi 
maintained that Liaquat's acceptance of the American invitation did 
not "in any way" affect his intention to visit Moscow,175 the Soviet 
trip did not materialise. Some analysts claim that Liaquat "appeared 
willing to journey to Moscow after his trip to the USA, but the Soviet 
Union . . . assumed a sphinx-like silence about his visit"176 and that 
the "default of Pakistani leaders in not responding positively to 
Soviet overtures hardened the Soviet attitude to Pakistan so much 
so that Liaquat Ali's visit to Moscow was postponed indefinitely 
,.."177 In fact, the Pakistan side, once it obtained the American 
invitation, did not seem interested in the Soviet offer.
Although authoritative sources had disclosed that the Prime 
Minister's visit to Moscow would take place during the second half of 
November 1949,178 after the extension of the American invitation in 
December 1949, Liaquat declared that no date had been fixed for his 
Soviet trip "although the invitation still holds".179 After his visit 
to the United States, the Prime Minister was less ambiguous about 
his intentions to visit the Soviet Union. When asked if the invitation 
still stood and if he intended to avail himself of it, Liaquat "chuckled 
. . .'Yes, I suppose it still stands but I am a humble man and never 
aspire to greater heights'."1 80 The British and American 
governments appear to have been informed privately by Pakistani 
authorities that Liaquat had decided to "postpone" the visit 
"indefin ite ly".181
The Soviets strongly denounced the "reactionary policy" of the 
Pakistan government, which, they claimed, was "fully in line" with
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Anglo-American plans "of turning the country into an imperialist 
stronghold in the East . . ,"182 In an article entitled "Pakistan Model 
of Synghman Rhee", the Literaturnava Gazeta alleged that Liaquat Ali 
Khan had "returned to Karachi after assuring his American bosses 
that he would assist their plans for enslavement of Pakistan and 
converting it into a political, economic and strategic base for Wall 
Street", turning it from a "British colony" to "an American colony." It 
added: "As regards Liaquat Ali Khan himself, he has been transformed 
into the Pakistan variety of Chiang Kai-shek or Synghman Rhee", an 
"agent of Anglo-American imperialism to promote its interests in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia in return for arms and 
equipment."188
The Soviets were aware of the growing domestic opposition to the 
Liaquat government, and conscious of the use of anti-communist 
rhetoric by the Pakistani authorities to gain domestic legitimacy and 
Western support. They therefore claimed that the Muslim League 
Government's attempts to convert Pakistan into a military base 
corresponded "with the aspiration of the ruling circles of Pakistan" 
but that the people of Pakistan "were beginning to realize what the 
warmongers expected of their country - that it should be a vantage 
ground against the USSR and the national liberation movement in 
Asia."184
The Soviets also interpreted accusations of a Soviet-backed 
communist conspiracy to overthrow the government as dictated by 
the internal compulsions of the Liaquat government. They accused 
the "reactionary circles of Pakistan" of inventing the "communist
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plot" so as to suppress domestic opposition and win support "on the 
eve of the elections in West Punjab province," and went on to accuse 
the Liaquat government of holding the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case 
trials in camera in order that "anti-British" Army officers and 
members of progressive political parties, including the CPP, who had 
"earned the displeasure of the reactionaries" could be "conveniently 
disposed of". They stressed that: "This is not a conspiracy by the 
Communist Party", adding that "communists do not believe in 
military conspiracies." It was claimed that the Muslim League was 
trying to "mislead the people of Pakistan" by "systematically" 
poisoning them with "reactionary propaganda dished out in religious 
ja rgon ."185 The Muslim League government did, in fact, use the 
Rawalpindi conspiracy to round up CPP members and sympathisers as 
well as other political opponents throughout the country.
While the Soviets continued to maintain a neutral posture on the 
Kashmir issue, they expressed their concern that it provided "US and 
British imperialists with opportunities to exert pressures" on both 
Pakistan and India.186 While "Delhi and Karachi are engaged in their 
endless diplomatic duel over Kashmir", commented a Soviet analyst, 
"several Anglo-American military missions have visited the state on 
the lookout for convenient sites for military bases . . .  for the 
furtherance of their own strategic designs."187 At the same time 
the Soviets alleged that the continuing tensions between India and 
Pakistan were adversely affecting socio-economic development in 
the two countries, due to the priority given to defence expenditure.
The Soviets were particularly critical of the enormous Pakistani
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appropriations for defence. Attacking the Pakistan government's 
domestic and foreign policies, the Soviets accused "the ruling circles 
of Pakistan” of "converting their country's economy for war."188 
Instead of solving the massive socio-economic problems facing the 
country, "the Moslem League is militarizing the country", said one 
Soviet commentator, with "military expenditure comprising 75 per 
cent of the entire budget."189 But while there was "huge expenditure 
on armaments", there was very "little for social services."190
The Soviets continued to stress the significance of the links between 
the Pakistan Armed Forces and the West. The "military secrets of 
Pakistan" said the Soviet news media "were well known to British 
generals" since "the armed forces were under British supervision and 
in the higher ranks more than fifty-five per cent of the posts were 
held by Englishmen."191 It was also claimed that the Pakistan 
government was following an "anti-people" and pro-imperialist 
policy by devoting most of the country's resources to "purchasing 
US-British armaments, constructing airfields, strategic roads and 
railways and maintaining a large army."192 These developments 
were militarising the country on the one hand, and on the other 
increasing the opportunities for "imperialist intervention" at a time 
when the Anglo-American powers were "out to make (Pakistan) one 
of their military bases", supplying it with "arms and handling the 
training of its army."193
The Last Davs of Liaauat Ali Khan
No efforts were made by the Liaquat government to assure the
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Soviets that Pakistan would stay neutral in the Cold War. Even the 
previous claims of neutrality were abandoned for an openly 
pro-Western posture, with Pakistan extending diplomatic support to 
the West during the Korean crisis and over the question of the 
Japanese peace treaty.
With the outbreak of the Korean crisis, Prime Minister Liaquat 
declared that the North's action was a clear case of aggression. 
Pakistan, he said, had accepted the UN resolution on Korea and would 
provide the UN any help within its means, "knowing full well what its 
implications are."194 When it came to the question of sending 
Pakistani troops to Korea, the Prime Minister's pre-conditions of 
American support to Pakistan against India and Afghanistan were 
considered too high a price by the US Administration.195 All the 
same, it appreciated Pakistan's full and unconditional diplomatic 
support, which contrasted sharply with India's neutrality. The US 
also accepted the Pakistani explanation of inability to supply troops 
as due to the threats to its territorial integrity from India and 
Afghanistan.196
While Pakistan’s stand on Korea won it American support, it 
antagonised the Soviets even further. Liaquat was denounced for the 
"servile zeal with which he hastened to proclaim his solidarity with 
the ugly deeds of American imperialism" and warned of the 
"deplorable consequences" of following such a policy.197 The 
Soviets were equally critical of Pakistan’s participation in the San 
Francisco Conference on the Peace Treaty with Japan, which was 
signed by the Pakistan government.198
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Despite the Liaquat Government's policy of siding with the West, at 
the cost of the country's relations with the Soviet Union, the Prime 
Minister did not succeed in obtaining the diplomatic and military 
support or the assurances of security he was seeking. Within the 
country his position steadily weakened, as opposition grew to both 
the internal and external policies of his government.
The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Zafrulla, and the pro-Western 
bureaucrats including Foreign Secretary Ikramullah urged the US and 
the UK to extend assistance to the Muslim League government. 
Ikramullah, for instance, warned the Americans that should Liaquat’s 
government fall, it could lead to "an extremist group, who would go 
to the Soviets for political support" coming into power, adding that 
"there was not much time left."199 Similar appeals were made by 
Liaquat to the UK to help Pakistan reach "a state of preparedness to 
resist aggression from whatever source", adding that "Pakistan can 
play its part in defence of freedom"200 only if it had adequately 
equipped Armed Forces and a government committed to the defence 
of the Free World.
The position of the Muslim League government steadily declined. 
While the military and the bureaucracy were concentrating on 
strengthening their position in the internal power structure, Liaquat 
Ali Khan was assassinated at a public meeting in Rawalpindi on 16 
October 1951.
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Summary
In the initial years of Pakistan's existence, there was a consensus 
between the Muslim League government, the military and the 
bureaucracy to support the West in the Cold War against the Soviet 
Union. All three major Pakistani actors, with their pro-Western 
orientation, perceived the Soviets as a vaguely threatening entity. 
Hence Soviet overtures to Pakistan were ignored and efforts made to 
forge close links with the West.
The military in Pakistan rapidly consolidated its position within the 
state, transforming itself from a weak, disorganised body into a 
fairly formidable force. Internally its position was enhanced by the 
role it played in supporting and assisting the government in 
overcoming the problems arising from partition. Externally its role 
as the guardian of the country's frontiers was strengthened by the 
involvement in conflicts with India.
Conscious of the need to acquire external assistance in order to 
further strengthen the institution the Military High Command, 
especially under the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, began to 
explore the possibilities of establishing defence and security links 
with the West.
The internal and external orientations of the "ruling circles'* in 
Pakistan were viewed with concern by the Soviet Union which 
became increasingly critical of the Pakistan government. The foreign
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policy directions of Pakistan in the initial years set the stage for 
events to follow.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PARLIAMENTARY ERA. THE MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY
(1951-1955)
In the years following Liaquat AM Khan's assassination, 
Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to be determined by the 
relationship between internal and external variables, with the 
Pakistan military playing a particularly significant role in both 
domestic politics and the formulation and direction of foreign policy.
Internally, the military began openly to demonstrate its growing 
power, in partnership with the civil bureaucracy, with the two 
institutions now consolidating their control over all other political 
forces in the state. The importance of the military also grew in the 
external sphere as the Cold War slowly engulfed the South Asian 
region. Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union during this period 
were therefore to be determined by the changes in the global 
environment, combined with political developments at home.
Politics in Pakistan
Liaquat's assassination resulted in Finance Minister Ghulam 
Mohammed taking over the post of Governor-General, succeeding 
Khawaja Nazimuddin who was now appointed Prime Minister. 
Nazimuddin's position was very weak. The Muslim League continued 
to be troubled by internal rifts. Political conditions in Pakistan 
steadily deteriorated, with no serious attempts being made by an 
ineffective Constituent Assembly to provide the country with a
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constitution or to make the executive accountable to the 
legislature.1
It was in these circumstances that the central government came 
under direct control of the higher bureaucracy. The composition of 
the executive after Liaquat's assassination was in itself the result 
of secret negotiations between a number of serving and retired 
bureaucrats, leading to the appointments of Ghulam Mohammed and 
Khawaja Nazimuddin as heads of state and government respectively, 
with the Secretary-General of the Pakistan Civil Service, Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali being given the Finance portfolio in the Cabinet. This 
Hfait accompli" was then presented to the majority party, the Muslim 
League, and both the party and the Constituent Assembly accepted it 
without any resistance.2
Following the legacy of Pakistan's first Governor-General, Jinnah, 
Ghulam Mohammed began to exercise his powers in a vice-regal 
manner, ignoring the concepts of Cabinet control or answerability to 
the legislature, and taking the stand that Pakistan "needed strong 
leadership from the top by a Head of State, who, because he was 
independent of all party ties and affiliations, could afford to ignore 
everything but the interests of the nation at large."3
A former CSP official claims that the ineptitude of the politicians 
and the deteriorating political situation after Liaquat's death 
"bestowed upon the civil servant a privilege which he had never 
demanded : the right to administer without really being answerable 
to the declared representatives of the people". The domination of the
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bureaucracy was, however, the result of a number of factors. These 
included the internal cohesion of the higher bureaucracy, whether in 
service or in retirement and their monopolistic control of sensitive 
government posts. Another significant factor was the perpetuation of 
the Interim Constitution, the Government of India Act 1935, whereby 
senior bureaucrats were not answerable to their Ministers either at 
the Centre or in the provinces.4
While Ghulam Mohammed and his bureaucratic allies were now in 
control of the central government, they were conscious, from the 
very start, of the importance of gaining the active support of the 
Armed Forces. Hence an "important member of this power hierarchy" 
was the C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, Ayub Khan.5 Ayub, a friend and 
former comrade-in-arms of Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza, was 
willing at this time, to cooperate with the new leadership. He had 
been aware of the growing impotence of the Muslim League 
government under Liaquat Ali Khan.6 With Liaquat's death, Ayub grew 
contemptuous not only of the political leadership but also of the 
senior bureaucrats/
The C-in-C was equally conscious of the military's growing power in 
the country's internal power structure, as the post-Liaquat 
leadership grew increasingly dependent on it to assert their power 
and authority both at the Centre and in the provinces. The military 
found itself frequently called upon for aid-to-civil power duties as 
"hard pressed governments were forced to call for its assistance in 
times of grave natural and man-made calamities which became 
increasingly common . . ."6 Thus, for example, the military assisted
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in combatting floods in both wings of the country in the early 1950s. 
More important duties were also entrusted to the Army, including 
anti-smuggling operations such as "Operation Jute” in East Pakistan 
in 1952-1953.
This was a specially significant operation since the military, 
although under overall civil control, was given far-ranging powers by 
a special ordinance "to arrest, detain or take into custody, any person 
engaged in smuggling" and authorised "to use whatever force they 
considered necessary to make their mission successful."9 "Operation 
Jute' ended successfully in January 1953. According to a senior 
military source, the Army "learnt many lessons" from it.10 
Undoubtedly, one was that the Army had succeeded, where all 
previous civilian efforts had failed, in solving an essentially civil 
problem.
The military's growing confidence in its ability to run the civil 
administration was enhanced by its role in the anti-Ahmediya 
agitation in the West wing in 1953. Riots against the Ahmediyas or 
Qadianis, who differ from other Muslim sects on the finality of the 
prophethood of Mohammed, led to a serious deterioration of 
law-and-order, resulting in the imposition of Martial Law, for the 
first time since independence, in Lahore, the provincial capital of 
Punjab, on 6 March 1953.11
This had a significant impact on politics, and particularly on the 
military as an institution. As the anti-Ahmediya agitation 
intensified,the Military High Command grew even more convinced
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that Pakistani politics was "a struggle of personalities rather than 
ideas, prompted by the personal ambitions of a few politicians who 
cared little for the welfare of the country or her people."12 They 
were also convinced of the inability of the civil government to deal 
with a religious agitation which could potentially damage the 
cohesiveness of the Armed Forces, and decided to take the initiative 
independently, regardless of the wishes of the political leadership. 
Thus the decision to impose Martial Law in Lahore was not taken by 
the Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, but by C-in-C, Ayub Khan, 
at the urging of the Lahore Commander, Major General Azam Khan, and 
with the backing of the Defence Secretary, Iskander Mirza.13
With the imposition of Martial Law the military was given the first 
opportunity of directly running the civil administration. Within 
twenty-four hours the situation was brought under control, leading 
the military to contrast its success with the civil government's 
failure. Once law-and-order was restored the military did not 
withdraw to the barracks. The local Martial Law Administrator, Maj. 
Gen. Azam Khan? "with the blessings of the army chief, General Ayub 
and the Defence Secretary General Iskander Mirza went on to extend 
his tenure," despite the Prime Minister's appeals to the military 
authorities "to call it a day and go home."14
The military now began the "second phase" of Martial Law, aimed at 
improving the local civil administration by means such as 
anti-corruption measures.15 The "work of the army" says an Army 
historian, "and the way in which it was carried out made a 
tremendous impact on the minds of both the people and the
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politicians", and there were demands from other towns and cities 
that the Army take over the country, but the Army "was not even 
prepared to discuss the subject."16 According to a senior officer, in 
charge of legal affairs in the Army at that time, however, the Army 
had been thoroughly politicised by its frequent participation in 
law-and-order duties and after the Lahore Martial Law in particular 
a number of officers in GHQ spent a "great deal of time" on "political 
discussions". A private conversation with Iskander Mirza and Ayub 
Khan at this time convinced General Sher Ali that "it would not be 
long before political power would pass from the hands of the 
political leaders to that of the Civil-Military bureaucracy, headed by 
Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan."17
Even prior to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the Army Chief 
had told a US diplomat that if an attempt was made to overthrow the 
Ghulam Mohammed government, "the Pakistan Army would 
immediately declare Martial Law and take care of the situation." If 
the situation "was critical, the Army would declare a Military 
Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan."16
The military's growing power was demonstrated at the national 
level when Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, with the support of 
the civil and military bureaucracies, dismissed the Prime Minister in 
April 1953.19 He then appointed Pakistan's Ambassador to the 
United States, Mohammed Ali Bogra, as Prime Minister, and also 
nominated the new Cabinet, assigning the Ministers their various 
posts.20
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The dismissed Prime Minister had been the elected leader of the 
majority party, the Muslim League, but the weak Constituent 
Assembly not only failed to rally behind Nazimuddin but promptly 
ratified the new Prime Minister.21 The Muslim League proved 
equally powerless to resist, and accepted the new Prime Minister as 
its leader, although he had previously been neither a member of the 
party nor of the Constituent Assembly.
Mohammed Ali Bogra had been deliberately chosen by the 
Governor-General as a figurehead, since he had been abroad for five 
years and had no party affiliations or base of popular support. The 
real power now clearly lay with the Governor-General and his 
bureaucratic allies backed by the military, which was willing to 
work in partnership with the bureaucracy in controlling the central 
government.22
With the Bengali Prime Minister, Nazimuddin's, departure, and the 
consolidation of power by the Western-dominated civil and military 
bureaucracies, Bengali participation in the central government 
became even more limited at a time when East-West tensions were 
on the increase. The more populous East wing was discriminated 
against in every sphere of the country's political and economic life. 
Thus, for example, approximately two-thirds of development and 
non-development expenditure, as well as foreign aid, was allocated 
to the West wing, agricultural and industrial development was 
promoted in the West and neglected in the East, while East Bengal's 
foreign exchange earnings were allocated to the West. East 
Pakistani demands for greater autonomy and for recognition of
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Bengali as an official language led to clashes such as the language 
disturbances in Dacca in 1952, which were forcibly suppressed by 
the the Army.23
The growing administrative and military expenditure of the state 
was to a considerable extent responsible for this disproportionate 
division of funds. Both central government and Armed Forces were 
mainly based in the West, while there was discrimination against 
Bengalis in appointments to senior posts in the civil bureaucracy and 
a glaring underrepresentation of them in the Armed Forces. The East 
Pakistanis realised that they were being deprived of the large 
amounts of expenditure earmarked for defence, as also of 
participation in a national organisation of increasing importance. 
East wing demands for greater representation within the institution 
therefore began to grow.
The dominance of West Pakistanis in the military was partly a 
heritage of the British Indian Army where recruitment on the basis 
of the concept of 'Martial Races' led to a predominance of Punjabi 
Muslims in the rank and file and Officer Corps, while there were no 
Bengali Muslim regiments or cantonments in East Bengal.24 The 
Pakistan Armed Forces inherited this unequal structure, with 
Bengalis constituting only one per cent of their total strength 25 and 
very little was done to remove regional disparities excepting the 
formation of an East Bengal Regiment (EBR) in January 1948.
The military justified the continuation of British Indian Army 
recruitment patterns by perpetuating the British myth of Martial
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Races. More importantly, the Pakistan Military High Command, as 
their British predecessors before them, adopted a national defence 
strategy which concentrated on the land frontiers of the Western 
wing. Due to the British strategic perceptions of a Russian threat to 
the Indian Subcontinent from the northern approaches, attention was 
focussed more on the northern rather than the southern borders of 
India. Following the British strategic doctrines, 6 the first 
Pakistani C-in-C, Ayub Khan, adopted the stand that defence of the 
East lay in the West, and that East Pakistan could not be defended 
militarily unless the western wing was sufficiently strengthened. 
According to this strategic analysis, the western wing would be the 
main target of foreign attack, launched either from India or 
Afghanistan and the "battle for Pakistan, in the defence of Pakistan, 
would be fought in the West . . . the nerve centre" of the country. 
Even in the unlikely case of an attack on East Pakistan, the Pakistan 
military would adopt an offensive strategy in the West, thereby 
diverting Indian forces from the East. Thus a majority of forces 
must be recruited from the West and a maximum amount of military 
expenditure earmarked for the development of the defence 
infrastructure of West Pakistan.27
As East Pakistani demands for greater representation and the 
development of the defence infrastructure in the East wing grew,28 
a Committee was formed by the Constituent Assembly to look into 
the matter, but its recommendations and findings came to naught. 
According to the Armed Forces Member of the Committee, the 
implementation of the report was in the hands of neither the 
legislature nor the executive, but with the C-in-C who "was fast
becoming a Warlord.” Ayub was strongly opposed to greater East 
Pakistani representation, while the "excuse given, of course, was 
lack of funds and 'priorities'."29
The growing East Pakistani unrest led to an increase in the 
popularity of East-based parties calling for greater provincial 
autonomy, such as the Awami League of Maulana Bhashani and the 
Khrishak Shramik Party of A.K. Fazlul Huq. As the first general 
elections for the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly drew near, the 
opposition parties formed a United Front in early 1954, demanding an 
autonomous East Pakistan, with the Centre controlling only defence, 
currency and foreign affairs, and also calling for military 
self-sufficiency for the East wing, including a shift of the naval 
headquarters from Karachi to Dacca, and the establishment of an 
ordnance factory in the province.30
The March 1954 elections were a rout for the Muslim League, which 
won only nine seats in the 309-member House, and Fazlul Huq was 
sworn in as Chief Minister of East Pakistan. The United Front 
government's demands for greater autonomy, improved economic and 
cultural links with India, and the dissolution of the unrepresentative 
central Cabinet and Constituent Assembly alarmed the central 
government. The Centre embarked on a campaign to bring down the 
provincial government, and accused the United Front government of 
collaborating with communists and Indian agents, with Prime 
Minister Ali Bogra calling the East Pakistan disturbances a "foul 
conspiracy", and adding that "Communists and other elements 
inimical to Pakistan (both) within and from outside the country have
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had a hand in instigating and organizing the disturbances.”31
On 30 May 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed the 
United Front government on the grounds that it had proved incapable 
of ruling. Prime Minister Bogra on his part accused the East 
Pakistani Chief Minister of treason and working towards the 
disintegration of the country.32 General Iskander Mirza33 was 
appointed Governor of East Pakistan, and began his tenure of office 
by arresting hundreds of political opponents of the central 
government, including Fazlul Huq and a number of his Cabinet 
Ministers, while at the same time playing up the issue of communist 
penetration of the East wing.34 The bureaucrat-controlled central 
government, with the advice and assistance of the Armed Forces, 
therefore succeeded in putting down the first organised show of 
resistance to its authority.35
The events in East Pakistan made the Centre determined to merge the 
provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit, so that the 
Bengali challenge could be effectively met. Realising that this would 
institutionalise the control of the Western-dominated Centre over 
the provinces, the Bengali representatives in the Constituent 
Assembly rejected the scheme when it was presented to the 
Parliament in September 1954. With the backing of Sindhi and 
Baluchi members, they then passed a Constitution Amendment Bill on
24 September, proposing that the Western wing be composed of six 
provinces. The bill deprived the head of state of the right to dismiss 
the Constituent Assembly and Cabinet, and made the executive 
dependent on the legislature. It also gave the Assembly complete
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constitution-making powers and a drafting committee was given 
until January 1955 to prepare a constitution.36 The Assembly 
managed to get the support of Prime Minister Bogra, who adjourned it 
sine die on 21 September before embarking on an official visit to the 
US, accompanied by C-in-C Ayub Khan, Foreign Minister Zafrulla and 
Finance Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali.3 '
The success of the faction opposing the Governor-General was to a 
large extent dependent on the attitude of the Military High Command. 
While the Ghulam Mohammed coterie relied on the military's 
continued support for survival, the Army C-in-C's powers had 
increased enormously, and the institution was operating more or less 
autonomously. As Prime Minister Bogra anxiously probed senior 
military officials on the legislature's move, Ayub Khan decided to 
throw in his lot with the Governor-General and his bureaucratic 
allies. Ayub himself had strong views on how Pakistan should be run, 
which corresponded with those of the clique in power. While in 
London, en route to the US with Bogra in October 1954, Ayub 
"produced a document which contained my thinking and set out my 
approach to the problem facing the country." In the Appreciation, 
Ayub made clear his aversion to politicians and parliamentary 
democracy. He advocated a strong presidential system; an electoral 
college to check the "shortcomings" of universal suffrage; and the 
establishment of a "controlled form of democracy with checks and 
counter checks."38 The C-in-C also favored the One Unit scheme, 
since it was clear by now that the more populous Eastern wing could 
threaten the interests of the Armed Forces should the future 
constitutional structure be dictated by the Bengalis.39
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The Governor-General, having obtained the support of the military 
and civil bureaucracies, recalled the Prime Minister from the US. 
Bogra returned home, accompanied by the C-in-C and Defence 
Secretary, Iskander Mirza.40 While Army contingents made a show 
of strength in the capital, Karachi, Bogra, finding himself completely 
powerless, accepted the Governor-General's ultimatum of a 
reconstituted Cabinet and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. 
Ghulam Mohammed proclaimed a state of General Emergency and the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, on the grounds that it had 
"lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function."41 The 
Cabinet was dismissed, and a "Cabinet of Talent", headed by Bogra, 
was appointed by the Governor-General.
In the new Cabinet all sensitive portfolios were given to serving or 
former bureaucrats and military men, with Maj. Gen. Mirza as 
Minister of the Interior, former Secretary-General Chaudhri 
Mohammad AN as Minister of Finance and C-in-C Ayub Khan as 
M inister of Defence.42 The civil servants, headed by the 
Governor-General, now ruled the country, with military backing, 
through decrees and ordinances. In November 1954, the completely 
powerless Prime Minister announced the central government's 
decision to establish a unified administrative unit in West Pakistan 
by 1955.
Ayub Khan emerged from this power tussle in a very comfortable 
position as both serving Army Chief and Defence Minister . He later 
claimed that Ghulam Mohammed had asked him to take over the
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administration, and "to produce a constitution in three months," but 
that he had declined the offer, declaring, "I am engaged in building 
up the army" and "I can serve this country better in my profession."43 
The C-in-C was content with the state of affairs as it was. His 
appointment as Defence Minister "raised his prestige and that of the 
army still higher"44 and helped him consolidate his position.45
He used the opportunity to circulate his "draft constitution paper" to 
the Cabinet and senior civil and military officials.46 But though the 
military had now openly emerged as a political force, it was still 
willing to work in partnership with the bureaucracy, so long as the 
latter continued to fulfil its demands. Hence, while "the strongest 
voice" in the Cabinet was that of the C-in-C "and there was nothing 
he could not have done if he wanted", Ayub Khan was willing to 
exercise patience, since he knew "that the prize was his for the 
asking."47
PaKistan-Sqiviflt. EtelatiQns. and .lhs..C.Qld .War
The post-Liaquat period in Pakistan-Soviet relations proved to be as 
turbulent as the internal political arena in Pakistan. Developments 
within both the Soviet Union and Pakistan were to dictate the 
unsteady course of the bilateral relationship. On the Soviet side, 
during the last days of the Stalinist era, the Soviets adopted a more 
flexible foreign policy, with a reduction on emphasis on the "Two 
Camps Theory" and stressed the possibilities of peaceful coexistence 
between communism and capitalism.43 The Soviets also claimed to 
be in a position to offer substantial cooperation to the developing
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world.
The Soviet Union continued to make overtures to Pakistan, 
attempting to prevent an extension of Western influence there. Thus 
the Soviets, in 1951-52, made a number of attempts to improve 
economic and cultural relations. In April 1952 they offered to 
provide agricultural machinery and textiles, and when Pakistan was 
faced with a grave food shortage in September 1952 they agreed to 
supply 150,000 tons of wheat, in exchange for 22,000 tons of jute 
and 13,000 tons of cotton.49 The Soviet gestures did not, however, 
lead to any real improvement in the economic linkages between the 
two countries. Although, for example, a team of Pakistani 
businessmen on their return from an International Economic 
Conference in Moscow concluded that "Russia could be an important 
source of capital goods and other essential commodities", no regular 
trade agreement was concluded, due to Pakistani hesitancy.50
As the Cold War intensified, Soviet concern about the extension of US 
influence in Pakistan grew. The Soviets were deeply concerned about 
the possible exploitation of the Kashmir dispute by the West to 
penetrate the region and acquire bases on Pakistani soil. 
Anglo-American proposals for a plebiscite in Kashmir, to be 
supervised by UN forces, were therefore denounced by the Soviet 
media as "an obvious excuse to infiltrate British and American 
troops into the country, which will convert it into a base for attack 
on the Soviet Union and China".51 And when the Security Council 
took up the Graham report on Kashmir in January 1952, the Soviet 
representative, Jacob Malik, breaking the Soviet official silence on
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the issue, strongly condemned the proposed UN-sponsored plebiscite 
as "an impossible demand by the US and Britain,” and called the 
proposed introduction of UN forces to supervise it an 
Anglo-American excuse "to secure the entrance of their armed forces 
into Kashmir, so it might be turned into an armed Anglo-American 
colony" and a "military and strategic base." He also accused the 
Anglo-Americans of "interference in the internal affairs of Kashmir" 
and deliberately prolonging "the dispute between India and Pakistan," 
and added that his government "considers that the Kashmir question 
can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an 
opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status 
by themselves, without outside interference", through their 
democratically elected Constituent Assembly.52 While Mr. Malik's 
reservations were reiterated by the Soviet delegate, Valerain Zorin, 
when the issue was brought up again during the same year, the 
Soviets continued to refrain from taking sides with either of the 
regional parties in the dispute, and abstained from voting on all UN 
resolutions on it.
Soviet internal developments continued to influence the course of 
Pakistan-Soviet relations, as the new Soviet leadership under 
Khrushchev emphasised the policy of peaceful coexistence. In a bid 
to counter the Western policy of containment, an increasingly 
flexible approach was adopted towards the newly-independent 
countries of Afro-Asia, with recognition of the existence of a "third 
force” in the international arena, that of a progressive national 
bourgeoisie, which followed an independent nonaligned course in 
foreign policy.53 This reinforced the previous Soviet policy of
improving relations with Pakistan in order to counter Western 
influence in that country. In a statement in the Supreme Soviet in 
August 1953, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, G.M. 
Malenkov, declared that, "The Soviet Union attaches great importance 
to the successful development of relations with Pakistan and to 
strengthening of every kind of relations between the two 
countries."54
The Soviet overtures and the more flexible Soviet policy were to 
bear no fruit in Pakistan-Soviet relations. The post-Liaquat 
Pakistani leadership, on the contrary, was even more inflexible 
towards the Soviets and pro-Western in orientation than either 
Jinnah or Liaquat. Liaquat's successor, Khawaja Nazimuddin, 
demonstrated his anti-Soviet bias when, in a major speech on foreign 
policy on 21 October 1951, he omitted any mention of the Eastern 
bloc, declaring that, "Besides the Moslem states we have friendly 
relations with other countries. I count among these states the 
countries of the Commonwealth. I include America and, in addition 
to these, other countries of the world."55
The bureaucratic clique now in political power, which included 
Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, Secretary-General Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali, Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza, Foreign Minister 
Zafrulla Khan and Foreign Secretary, M. Ikramullah, had 
demonstrated its loyalty to the West during the Liaquat years. Now 
with complete control over the "formulation and direction of foreign 
policy", they accelerated their efforts to align Pakistan formally 
with the West.56
113
114
A few days after Liaquat's assassination, Foreign Secretary 
Ikramullah visited the US, where he approached Assistant Secretary 
of State George McGhee for military equipment "as a gift, under a 
loan arrangement, or by outright purchase." He implied that Pakistan, 
in return, "was prepared, when in a sound position, to take a greater 
part in promoting moderation throughout the Near East."57 Later, in 
talks with the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, David 
Kennedy, Ikramullah reiterated that Pakistan was vitally interested 
in the defence of the Middle East. At the same time he warned that 
with "the establishment of the Embassy of the USSR" in Pakistan, 
"Russia has been encouraging dissatisfaction" against the 
Government, and added that if Pakistan "does not get assistance from 
the West, the Government's position will be grave" and "Pakistan may 
turn away from the West."58
Ikramullah's views were reiterated by Foreign Minister Zafrulla 
during his visit to the US in November 1951, when he assured Dean 
Acheson that, "it was inconceivable that Pakistan could ever be on 
the Soviet side in the event of trouble." He however added that since 
Pakistan would become "a target of Russian animosity" if it openly 
sided with the West, it would first require assurances of support and 
assistance from the West.59
Although the Truman Administration initiated a small-scale military 
programme for Pakistan, it was unwilling to hurry into any 
long-term agreements or pacts with it.60 The new Eisenhower 
Administration, however, in 1953 began an accelerated effort to
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implement the Truman Doctrine of containment of communism by 
establishing a ring of military bases around the perimeters of the 
Soviet Union and China. The Pakistanis were particularly pleased 
with the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, 
since he had close and cordial links with a number of key Pakistani 
figures, including Foreign Minister Zafrulla. It was therefore 
expected that Pakistan-US rapprochement would be "speeded up".61
The change of government in Pakistan was equally significant, as 
Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed replaced Prime Minister 
Nazimuddin in April 1953 with Mohammed Ali Bogra, thereby 
asserting increased bureaucratic control over all spheres of 
governmental activity. Bogra, a former Ambassador to the US, was 
merely a figurehead and more than willing to accept the pro-Western 
policy directions of the bureaucratic leadership.62 With the Ghulam 
Mohammed clique in control, Pakistan was, more than ever before, 
the logical choice for US bases and a partner in future US-backed 
alliances to contain communism in the Near East and Southeast Asia.
In May 1953 Dulles visited a number of Middle Eastern and South 
Asian countries, including India and Pakistan. During his visit, 
Pakistan showed willingness to comply with the US anti-Soviet 
regional strategies, with Bogra declaring that his country was 
willing to promote collective regional security, and adding that 
"Pakistan is both a Middle East and South Asian country. We have an 
abiding interest in the security of countries in the Middle East." 
Dulles stated that he had "high regard" for the contribution which 
Pakistan could make for the defence of South and Southeast Asia.63
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On his return home, Dulles said that the "strong spiritual faith and 
martial spirit" of the Pakistanis made them "a dependable bulwark 
against Communism." Assessing the prospects for a Middle East 
Defence Organisation (MEDO), he observed that: "A Middle East 
Defence Organization is a future rather than an immediate 
possibility. Many of the Arab countries are too engrossed with their 
quarrels, they pay little heed to the menace of Communism," adding 
that ". . . there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In 
general, the northern tier of nations show greater awareness of this 
danger."64 Then again, during Senate hearings on a Pakistani request 
for wheat in June 1953, Dulles reiterated that the people of Pakistan 
were "strong in their Islamic faith which is absolutely opposed, as 
our faith is, to the view of Soviet Communism," adding that Pakistan 
and Turkey were the "two very strong bulwarks" of the free world in 
a region vulnerable to Soviet expansionism.65
A number of developments led the US to accelerate formation of a 
Middle Eastern military alliance including strategically placed 
Pakistan. These included the successful Soviet test of a 
thermonuclear weapon in August 1953, which increased the 
importance of strategic bases around the Soviet Union from where 
the Strategic Air Command (SAC) could operate. Nasser's takeover in 
Egypt in June 1953 also increased Pakistan's importance, since the 
US' major ally, the UK, was now deprived of bases in the Suez area. 
Finally, the US-engineered overthrow of Mosaddeq and 
re-instatement of the Shah meant that Iran could be included in a 
’'Northern-tier" arrangement with Pakistan and Turkey.66
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The visits to the USA of General Ayub Khan and Ghulam Mohammed in 
September/November 1953, led to speculation in US media that the 
two countries were "exploring the possibilities of a military 
alliance", involving "a sizeable military assistance programme to 
Pakistan similar to the aid given to Turkey."67 Both governments, 
however, strongly denied the possibility either of a future bilateral 
military arrangement or of Pakistani provision of base facilities to 
the Americans in return for military assistance.66
These developments heightened Soviet fears that Pakistan was about 
to join anti-Soviet regional alliances and provide facilities to the 
Western bloc. The Soviet media expressed concern over the plans "to 
include Pakistan in the Anglo-US imperialists' aggressive Middle 
East bloc" and warned the Pakistanis that their participation in the 
scheme would "mean the political enslavement of Pakistan and 
constitute a direct threat to its independence."69
The changes within the Pakistan government, particularly the 
dismissal of Nazimuddin, led to a further deterioration in 
Pakistan-Soviet relations. The new Prime Minister Bogra declared 
that his country "would be prepared to do everything short of 
prejudicing its sovereignty to foster friendly relations with the 
USA", but where relations with the communist bloc were concerned, 
"the initiative would be left to them."70
Ignoring Soviet warnings and protests, the Ghulam Mohammed regime 
concentrated its attention on formulating defence ties with the 
Western bloc. The Soviets viewed these developments with
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increasing hostility. Following visits by senior Pakistani officials 
to the US and the Middle East in 1953, particularly that of Ayub and 
Ghulam Mohammed, the Soviets were convinced that Pakistan was 
negotiating a "bilateral military pact" with the US which was 
"closely connected with plans to create a wide-based military bloc 
of the countries of the Near and Middle East under Washington's 
control", that would be "a branch of the North Atlantic bloc." They 
expressed concern that the Pakistan-US negotiations also involved 
the setting up of "American military bases" on Pakistani territory, 
which would be used against the Soviet Union.71
On 30 November 1953 Soviet Ambassador Stetsenko delivered the 
first formal note of protest to the Pakistan government concerning 
US news media reports of Pakistani agreement to allow the 
establishment of US bases. In the note the Soviet government stated 
that it could not be "indifferent" to reports of negotiations for an 
agreement which would create "American military bases on the 
territory of Pakistan, that is, in areas which are near to the USSR 
borders." It added that Pakistan's joining of the proposed Middle East 
bloc was also "directly connected with the security of the USSR" and 
demanded clarification.72 While the Pakistan government denied any 
offer of bases or entry into a US-sponsored alliance, Soviet media 
continued to criticise Pakistani policy directions. Soviet 
commentators reiterated that the Pakistan-US negotiations would 
lead to the establishment of American "military bases" in "areas near 
to the Soviet frontier", adding that "military bases situated at a 
distance of several thousand kilometres from America" could not be 
"of defensive character; they can only have an aggressive purpose,
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not only with regard to the Soviet Union, but also with regard to the 
countries of Asia . . ."73
In its official reply to the Soviet note on 19 December the Pakistan 
government once again denied the Soviet accusations of a deal, and 
assured them that Pakistan did not "contemplate taking any step in 
hostility or unfriendliness" to the USSR, but added that it was "the 
duty of the Government of Pakistan to take every step to safeguard 
the security of Pakistan and in the discharge of this paramount duty 
and all other duties that fell upon the Government, to adopt and take 
such measures as may appear appropriate and adequate."74
In December 1953, US Vice President Nixon visited Pakistan. While 
in Karachi, he pledged that the US "would continue to stand by 
Pakistan against the forces working for its destruction" and 
expressed his admiration for the "firm determination" of the 
government and people of Pakistan to thwart communist 
expansionism. On his return home Nixon urged both publicly and 
privately that the ring around the communist bloc be closed by the 
formation of a "military crescent", consisting of a number of friendly 
Middle Eastern nations, including Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and 
called for the extension of military assistance to Pakistan.75
These exchanges of visits and public pronouncements served to 
confirm Soviet suspicions that Pakistan was rushing headlong into a 
hostile alliance with the West. The year therefore ended with 
Pakistan-Soviet relations at a new low.
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Pakistan's Entry into the Western Alliances
While Pakistan-Soviet relations steadily deteriorated, efforts by 
pro-Western Pakistani governments to convince the Americans of 
their country's strategic importance and willingness to serve 
Western regional interests finally bore fruit. On 19 February 1954, 
the National Security Council recommended that the Administration 
support the present Pakistani government "so long as it remains 
friendly to the United States and seek to insure that any successor 
government is not Communist-controlled and is friendly to the 
United States." The NSC called for the provision of military 
assistance to obtain Pakistan's "available manpower, resources and 
strategic facilities" and encourage Pakistani "participation in any 
defence association which is judged to serve the interests of the 
United States." As a first step to the formation of such a Middle East 
association, it stated that, "Priority should be given to the 
establishment of such an arrangement between Pakistan and 
Turkey."7®
This first step towards forging an anti-Soviet regional bloc was 
taken when Pakistan and Turkey announced, on 19 February, their 
decision to cooperate in the political, economic and cultural spheres 
and in ways "of strengthening peace and security in their own 
interest as also that of all peace-loving nations."77  It was 
followed, on 22 February 1954, by an official request by the 
Pakistani Prime Minister "for military assistance within the scope 
of the US Mutual Security Legislation." The US President responded 
favorably, stating that such assistance would help to secure
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"stability and strength” in the Middle East. According to Eisenhower, 
Pakistan would use the US military assistance to strengthen its 
internal security and for self-defence as well as ”to participate in 
the defence of the area of which it is a part."78
On 2 April 1954, Pakistan and Turkey entered into an "Agreement for 
Friendly Cooperation", Article Four of which dealt with 
"consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the 
field of defence", while Article Six provided for accession to the 
Agreement in future of "Any state, whose participation is considered 
by the contracting parties useful for achieving the purposes of the 
Agreement . . ."79
The Pakistan government then concluded a Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement (MDAA) with the US on 19 May 1954. Under Article One, 
the US agreed to provide military "equipment, materials, services or 
other assistance", to be used by the Pakistan government for the 
maintenance of "its internal security, its legitimate self-defence or 
to permit it to participate in the defence of the area . . ." Under 
Article Six, the Pakistan government committed itself to "make, 
consistent with its political and economic stability, the full 
contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and 
general economic condition to the development and maintenance of 
its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free 
world."80 Simultaneously, the two governments issued identical 
declarations that the MDAA did not establish either an offensive or 
defensive military alliance, nor did it invoke any obligation for 
Pakistan to provide military bases to the United States.81
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The US and UK favored a defence alliance of cooperative regional 
states, willing to pledge their forces for the containment of 
communism in the Southern sector, which would help close the gap in 
the ring around the communist bloc. A conference was therefore held 
in Manila on 6 September 1954 to discuss the formation of such an 
alliance. Of the Colombo Plan countries, Pakistan was the only state 
willing to cooperate, while in Southeast Asia the Philippines and 
Thailand were interested.
The Manila Conference led to the signing of a South East Asia 
Collective Defence Treaty by Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Australia, New Zealand, the USA, UK and France.82 The Pakistan 
government ratified the Manila Pact and became a member of the 
South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) on 19 July 1955.
The next regional arrangement which Pakistan joined was the 
Baghdad Pact. In 1951-52, the US and UK had at first discussed the 
possibilities of forming a Middle East Command and then a Middle 
East Defence Organisation (MEDO) to protect and advance Western 
interests in this strategic area. By 1953, however, in the aftermath 
of Nasser's takeover in Egypt, it became increasingly clear that a 
large number of Middle Eastern states, engrossed in inter-regional 
disputes or differences with Western powers, would either be 
indifferent or actively opposed to its formation. Dulles, for example, 
told the ANZUS Council meeting in September 1953 that, "MEDO is not 
practical as long as the sponsoring powers are not sure of the 
cooperation of the countries participating in the alliance."83
123
Anglo-American attention, therefore, began to focus on a 
"Northern-tier" arrangement focussed on "two strong points", 
Pakistan and Turkey, with the possible inclusion of Iraq.
With US and UK encouragement, Iraq and Turkey signed a "Pact of 
Mutual Cooperation" in defence and security. Britain associated 
itself with the Pact on 5 April 1955, and on 1 July, the Pakistan 
Prime Minister announced his country's decision to join the 
arrangement.84 Pakistan formally joined the Pact on 17 September, 
followed by Iran on 3 November 1955.85 Pakistan thus became the 
only Asian country to join both the military alliances, SEATO and the 
Baghdad Pact.88 There was, however, to be no Joint Military 
Command on the lines of NATO, and the US declined to associate 
itself formally with the Baghdad Pact, fearing an adverse regional 
reaction.
The Pakistan Military and the Move Towards Alignment
The Pakistan military played a significant role in influencing 
Pakistan's foreign policy towards alignment with the West. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, the military had rapidly 
consolidated its position in the internal power structure, 
particularly after the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government in
1953. The Armed Forces, represented by their C-in-C, were now 
consulted by the central government on every important issue, in any 
field, including foreign policy.87
124
Ayub Khan had been convinced as early as 1951 of the need for a 
steady source of military assistance from a "strong and reliable 
friend,88 with the logical choice for the pro-Western military being 
the United States. The military therefore not only approved of the 
Ghulam Mohammed Administration’s attempts to forge closer links 
with the West, but itself played a major role during the negotiations. 
Various channels of communication were used by the Pakistani 
Military High Command to convey their point of view to their 
counterparts in the Pentagon and to the American civil 
administration.
As the Cold War intensified in the last days of the Truman 
Administration, the Pakistan Army C-in-C briefed Maj. Gen. M.G. 
Jilani, on his way to the US in August 1952 as Pakistan's Senior 
Military Liaison Officer, "to negotiate with the authorities at the 
Pentagon and impress upon them the desirability of strengthening 
Pakistan militarily, for the regional security of the Middle East and 
South-East Asia" and to explore "the possibilities of Pakistan 
joining in a defence alliance." Ayub took this step without 
consulting the central government. General Jilani sent him "periodic 
reports" about "his progress with the authorities in Washington."89
Ayub Khan then sent the Master-General of Ordnance, Maj. Gen. Shahid 
Hamid, to initiate discussions with the Pentagon on possible military 
cooperation between the two countries. According to General Hamid: 
"I went in there to clear the ground, to see how the lay of the land 
lies, to see what is possible . . ."90 The discussions proved very 
fruitful.91 At the conclusion of the talks, the Director of the Office
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of Military Assistance in the Pentagon disclosed that "a very definite 
understanding . . . that a programme" of military cooperation "would 
be undertaken" had been reached, and that the Pakistanis had made 
clear their military requirements.92 He was convinced that a 
military alliance with Pakistan would be advantageous to American 
interests, due to the "fighting quality of Pakistani soldiers, the 
anti-communist outlook of the Pakistani people and the strategic 
location of Pakistan's Airfields which could offer a point of return to 
US planes after forays into Soviet territory."93
Shahid Hamid's visit was followed by a visit of the US Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Radford, to Pakistan in November 1952. While in 
Karachi, Radford emphasised that Pakistan was strategically placed 
to play a significant role in preventing the expansion of global 
communism. During his visit he held talks with Governor-General 
Ghulam Mohammed and C-in-C Ayub Khan, was particularly impressed 
by Ayub, and continued to maintain contact with him.94 Internally, 
the Pakistan Military High Command was in constant touch with 
American diplomats based in Pakistan, whom they reminded of the 
military's pro-Western orientation and also told of the Pakistan 
Armed Forces' desire to contribute to the policy of containment of 
communism through bilateral and regional arrangements.
In private conversations with American officials, Ayub made it 
amply clear that if the military was given assurances of US support 
and assistance, it would force the politicians to align themselves 
formally with the Western bloc. At the same time, the Americans 
were warned that hesitancy in deciding to extend support to
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Pakistan and include it in the proposed regional alliances would 
weaken the position of its pro-Western military and political 
leadership.
The Pakistan Army High Command emphasised that anti-American 
feeling was already on the increase due to America’s non-committal 
attitude on sensitive regional issues such as Kashmir. Warning US 
Consul-General Gibson in September 1952 about this, Ayub stressed 
that "the US attitude towards Pakistan should be the same as it was 
towards Turkey, since Pakistan could be an effective strength 
against Communism," whereas India would remain neutral.95
In continuing representations to the Americans to extend military 
assistance, Ayub argued that "Pakistan is basically pro-Western in 
its outlook" and a "deep friend" of the United States. He pointed out 
that he had discussed potential alignment with the West with the 
country's leading politicians and "had told them that they must make 
up their minds to go wholeheartedly with the West." He added that 
"the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of 
hand". The crux of the matter, he said, was that "the Pakistan Army 
was friendly to the US" but this "friendship will be consolidated by 
military aid and weakened without."96
He urged the Americans to extend military aid to Pakistan and 
include it in the alliances, and argued that "failure to grant aid will 
inevitably be interpreted as a decision on the part of the US to allow 
its foreign policy to be directed by Nehru", which would damage 
"American prestige in this country"; and if the US followed a
"weak-kneed” policy its "name will be mud in Pakistan" as well as in 
the region. He warned that Pakistan had been "subjected to public 
official pressure from other countries, particularly India and the 
USSR" and that American indecision would, moreover, be "disastrous" 
not only for the US in Pakistan but also for Pakistan's present 
political and military leadership.97
With the advent of the Eisenhower Administration, he was more 
hopeful of a favorable US response. In continued private 
conversations with US authorities in Pakistan, therefore, he called 
on the Americans to "invite Pakistan to participate in a regional 
defence organization immediately", like the proposed MEDO, adding 
that "if there were no such organization at present, we should have a 
bilateral agreement", and made it amply clear that in the event of a 
favorable American decision the military would dictate the Pakistani 
response. The Pakistan Cabinet, he said, "did not have enough 
internationally-minded people," but "they would do what he told them 
to do," and he repeatedly stated that "he would stand no nonsense 
from the politicians."98
This stand was reassuring to the US Administration, which was 
aware of the considerable influence exercised by the Armed Forces 
High Command in the internal power structure and the increasing 
dependence of the Ghulam Mohammed Administration on it. The 
Americans were also interested in the outlook of the military, since 
the Pakistan Armed Forces would be required to play an important 
role in the proposed Western scheme to contain communism through 
regional alliances. That the Americans were impressed by their
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potential can be seen in Secretary of State Dulles' testimony to the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations after his return from 
Pakistan in May 1953. Dulles remarked: "I was truly surprised by the 
carriage and demeanour of their people and the army", adding that, 
"They had an armed guard for my visit which was one of the finest I 
have ever seen in the world."99 According to Ayub's biographer, Col. 
Ahmed, Dulles was "full of praise for the military potential of 
Pakistan" and referred to General Ayub Khan as "the most outstanding 
personality I met throughout my tour."100
As the Americans concluded that the Pakistan military could play an 
important role in furthering US objectives in the region, Ayub 
continued to play a vital role in the negotiations on a future 
anti-Soviet alignment. In July 1953 the State Department received 
an official approach from the Pakistan Defence Secretary, Major 
General Mirza, seeking approval for a visit by Ayub to the US. 
Arriving in the US in late September, ostensibly to tour American 
military installations and explore the possibilities of increasing the 
numbers of Pakistani officers in American schools, Ayub used his 
visit to initiate discussions on a future US-Pakistan defence 
alliance, independent of any Pakistani Cabinet supervision, with the 
appearance of a "free agent" with full powers.101
He spoke with the "highest authorities" in the land, including Dulles, 
Under-Secretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Radford.102 During these talks he 
offered "complete cooperation," including the "use of Pakistan 
facilities" and the services of the Pakistan Army, if the US agreed
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to enter into "bilateral military cooperation" with Pakistan.103  
Ayub was then joined by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, who 
also pressed for a military alliance. As the C-in-C and 
Governor-General toured the US, the American news media leaked 
information about the negotiations, emphasising the benefits which 
would accrue to the United States. It was pointed out that apart 
from the benefit of obtaining bases very near the Soviet Union, the 
proposed pact would also mean the cooperation of the Pakistan Army, 
an approximately 300,000 strong "friendly army" which was 
"admirably positioned to fill a possible gap to the immediate 
W est."104 As a result of the talks both the Pentagon and State 
Department agreed to extend military assistance to Pakistan, and 
this decision was conveyed to Ayub before he left for home.105
Prior to his departure, Ayub said to Bedell Smith, " I trust that you 
will keep an eye from your angle and I will do the best I can from our 
side."106 He and other high-ranking Army officials then continued to 
pressure the US for a "quick decision on the deal."107
When Vice-President Nixon arrived in Pakistan in December 1953 to 
assess the possibilities of a military alliance, the C-in-C once again 
played an important role, stressing Pakistan's antipathy to 
communism and expressing his concern about the communist threat, 
both ideological and military, to the region.103 On his return home, 
Nixon strongly advocated the extension of military assistance to 
Pakistan and the establishment of a "Northern-tier" arrangement, 
comprising Pakistan, Turkey and Iran.
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On 19 February 1954, the NSC recommended that the Administration 
provide military assistance to Pakistan. According to the NSC study, 
a major US objective to be achieved by extending such aid was to 
"insure that in the event of general war, Pakistan will make 
available manpower, resources and strategic facilities" to the West, 
thereby acknowledging the significance of the Pakistan military.109 
During the same month President Eisenhower announced the US 
decision to extend military assistance. According to Ayub's 
biographer, the "decisive factor" responsible for this significant 
change in US policy were the "persuasive and untiring efforts of 
General Ayub."110
An American precondition for a formal US-Pakistan bilateral 
military arrangement was the conclusion of a defence pact between 
Pakistan and Turkey. Ayub was an active participant in the 
discussions which followed, and accompanied his Prime Minister to 
the United States and Turkey in both 1953 and in 1954. The 
negotiations led to the signing of the Turco-Pakistan agreement of 2 
April 1954 and the US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement of May 1954. Ayub's visit to Turkey in June 1955 led to 
Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact, which was described by 
Ayub as "the dawn of a new ushering in of stability and security for 
the Muslim world in the Middle East."111
Pakistani Motivations and the Military
The true significance of the military's role in guiding Pakistan into 
anti-Soviet alliances can be seen in an assessment of Pakistani
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motivations for alignment with the West. It was obvious that the 
main motivating factor for alignment was not the fear of Soviet or 
communist expansionism. The Pakistani leadership, both civil and 
military, was indeed hostile to the Soviet bloc. But, as has been 
discussed earlier in the thesis, the Soviets were not regarded as an 
immediate threat to Pakistan's security by the country's defence and 
foreign policy formulators.112 The Pakistanis, therefore, during the 
period under examination, downplayed a potential Soviet threat from 
the North and this was obvious in the strategies adopted in the 
northwestern approaches of the country.113
The Pakistani leadership of the time justified the adoption of an 
aligned position during the height of the Cold War on a number of 
grounds. Firstly, it was claimed that Pakistan needed external 
diplomatic and material support against its threatening and hostile 
neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Secondly, entry into the pacts 
was justified on the grounds of Pakistan's desperate economic plight. 
Finally, it was argued that US military aid would help Pakistan to 
"build our defences to the requisite level" without imposing on it a 
"heavier financial burden than it has hitherto carried". It would then 
be in a position to "devote increasing sums" from its revenue to "the 
development of our country and the promotion of the welfare of the 
people".114
As far as the "threat" from Afghanistan was concerned, relations 
between the two countries had in fact been tense, due to 
Afghanistan's continued support of the Pakhtunistan issue. In the 
early 1950s, there were limited clashes along the border, with the
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Pakistan military being deployed to subdue Afghan and local 
supporters of the Pakhtun cause. Yet Afghanistan had not at any 
point been considered either by the Pakistanis or their British 
predecessors as more than a minor irritant along the northwest 
frontiers. The Afghans were in no position to pose a credible threat 
to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity on their own. The 
only credible threat scenario would have been one in which the 
Afghans were supported by the neighbouring Soviets. The civil and 
military leadership in Pakistan did not, however, envisage the 
possibilities of such a regional alliance emerging. Hence the Afghan 
"threat" was an unlikely motivation for Pakistan's entry into the 
alliances.1 15
A large number of analysts, Pakistani and foreign, accept the Indian 
"threat", actual or perceived, as the main motivating factor behind 
Pakistan's alignment with the West.116 The relations between India 
and Pakistan had, indeed, been tense in the past, with the two 
countries engaging in a limited war in Kashmir. Hostility towards 
India was rife in Pakistan, with Pakistani governments frequently 
resorting to aggressive anti-Indian rhetoric. But Pakistan's hostility 
towards India did not imply "fear" of Indian aggression.117 Equally 
significant was the fact that Indo-Pakistan relations had been on the 
mend at the time of Pakistan's overtures to the West and 
negotiations leading to its entry into the pacts.
Moves for Indo-Pakistan rapprochement had begun soon after Liaquat 
Ali Khan's assassination. His successor Nazimuddin and Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru began a correspondence on the
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possibilities of direct talks to improve bilateral relations. The next 
Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, continued to follow 
this policy. The Pakistani leadership now spoke of the need for joint 
defence with India, with the two Prime Ministers meeting in London 
in June 1953 and Nehru visiting Pakistan in the next month.118
The main source of conflict between the two countries remained 
Kashmir. A breakthrough of sorts was achieved during Bogra's return 
visit to India in August 1953. In the joint communique issued at the 
end of the visit the two Prime Ministers declared that the Kashmir 
dispute "should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the 
people of that State", with the "most feasible method of ascertaining 
the wishes of the people" being "a fair and impartial plebiscite."119 
It was also decided to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator by the end 
of August 1954.
It is therefore clear that while Pakistan's suspicions of India had 
lingered, its policy of hostility towards its neighbour had slowly 
been replaced at least overtly by one of rapprochement. Hence 
Pakistan's opting for the Western-sponsored pacts could not have 
been motivated primarily by its perceptions of an Indian "threat" to 
its security and territorial integrity.
Yet another motivating factor put forward by the Pakistani 
leadership had been the decline in the country's economic position. 
This presents the pact as a means of gaining desperately needed 
economic assistance.
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The Pakistani economy had deteriorated in 1953, but in that year 
Pakistan still had a trade surplus of Rs 295 million.120 Even if the 
Pakistani leadership had still felt the need for external aid, the 
Western bloc had not made membership of defence pacts a 
precondition for the extension of such assistance, nor had the 
Pakistani leaders attempted to explore any alternative source of 
aid, such as the Soviet bloc.
The unfavorable economic situation in Pakistan was, in fact, closely 
linked with the high expenditure on defence. Justifying Pakistan's 
decision to approach the US for military assistance, Prime Minister 
Bogra had stated: "Hitherto we have been spending on an average 
two-thirds of our total income each year on our armed forces. 
Similarly a major part of our foreign exchange earnings has had to be 
set apart annually for the import of defence equipment . . . .  We have 
thus been left with only a small part of our revenue and foreign 
exchange earnings with which to develop our country." Yet Pakistan 
had "despite the very large sums and resources . . .  not been able to 
become as strong militarily as we should like." He added that: "The 
grant of military aid by America will help us to build our defences to 
the requisite level without imposing on our country a heavier 
financial burden than it has hitherto carried," thereby allowing the 
government to spend more on economic development.121 The 
Pakistani leadership therefore implied that a major motivation for 
alignment was the desire to reduce defence expenditure by acquiring 
external military assistance.
While it is possible that this emphasis on defence expenditure was
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the consequence of a lack of belief in the possibility of long-term 
rapprochement with India, it must be stressed that political 
considerations played a significant role in defence and foreign policy 
formulation in Pakistan. It has been noted that the "idea that a 
country has a foreign enemy is easy for the people to understand. It 
can also provide a powerful stimulus to national unity. For Pakistan, 
this role was filled by India. The general public did not understand 
the intricate defence problems but they supported any effort which 
they thought would preserve and protect Pakistan and enable her to 
face the 'threat' from India and Afghanistan . . ,"122 The Indian and 
Afghan 'threats' were used not only to stimulate "national unity," but 
also as a convenient whipping boy by the bureaucratic clique ruling 
Pakistan to obtain domestic support and suppress political 
opposition. Such strategies were resorted to in the dismissal of the 
United Front government in the East wing in 1954 and against 
supporters of provincial autonomy in the NWFP.
The use of the "threat1' from a hostile India and Afghanistan for 
internal political considerations was particularly convenient for the 
Armed Forces. As the ambitious C-in-C vied for the largest share of 
the country's meagre economic resources, the strain on the economy 
was tremendous. It was, however, very difficult for the budding 
opposition, mainly from the East wing, which was underrepresented 
in the Armed Forces, to curb the continuously increasing defence 
expenditure. This was due to the fact that the expenditure was 
justified on the grounds of "threats" posed to the country's very 
existence by its hostile neighbours. The military benefitted not only 
financially; this emphasis on the ever-present external hostility also
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enhanced its position as the guardian of Pakistan's territorial 
integrity. Thus the politically expedient use of the external threat 
had an impact both on domestic politics and on the orientation of 
foreign policy. Internally, the policy was resorted to in order to 
suppress political dissent, while externally it was used to justify 
the decision to opt for alignment with the West in the Cold War. For 
the Armed Forces, it was a useful internal tool to claim a 
disproportionately large share of annual governmental expenditure. 
Externally, a policy of alignment was in fact best suited to fulfil the 
requirements of the military.
TOTAL REVENUE AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN123
Revenue Defence Expenditure Defence Expenditure 
Year (millions of Rs) (millions of Rs) as % of Revenue
1951-52 1,448.4 907.9 62.69
1952-53 1,334.3 994.6 74.54
1953-54 1,110.5 802.3 72.24
The Mutual Defence Assistance Alliance with the US and the 
subsequent alliances to which Pakistan became party meant above all 
the provision of military funds, equipment and training for its Armed 
Forces. According to an authoritative source: "Before aid was 
forthcoming, the Pakistan Army, though first class in manpower, was 
ill-equipped" and the Army C-in-C "could not . . . ensure reliable 
sources of supply to meet present and future needs."124 Pakistan 
had virtually no defence industry, and was desperate to acquire a 
constant supply of modern weaponry from reliable sources.125 Not
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only was sophisticated military hardware expensive to acquire, it 
was mainly released by the major arms suppliers only to politically 
reliable allies. Hence even if the "financial resources had been 
available, Pakistan did not have sufficient diplomatic status to 
purchase the arms and equipment needed to modernize her army."126
As the Americans rewarded allies with military aid and equipment in 
the Cold War era, it was but natural for the pro-Western Pakistani 
Armed Forces to work actively in favor of alignment against the 
Soviet bloc .127 A policy of rapprochement with neighbouring states 
might have reduced regional tensions, but would also have weakened 
the military's case. A policy of alignment, however, did not 
necessarily aim at armed confrontation with the Eastern bloc but 
was best suited to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. Thus, for 
instance, highranking Pakistan Army officers informed the 
Americans that, "such clearcut alignment of Pakistan with the West" 
was "the cheapest way for Pakistan to get modern military 
equipment without draining its own treasury".126
The military had by now acquired considerable political influence, 
and was in a position to dictate the orientation of the country's 
foreign policy. The Ghulam Mohammed clique was heavily dependent 
on the support of the Armed Forces, as domestic unrest was on the 
increase. The military's support for a policy of alignment did not, 
however, lead to tensions with the bureaucracy because of both the 
latter's pro-Western orientation and the military's role in assisting 
the bureaucracy in controlling the central government.
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For the Army Chief, General Ayub, apart from the acquisition of 
modern weaponry, a policy of alignment promised other equally 
important benefits. The addition of external defence funding to the 
substantial internal defence expenditure would mean a corresponding 
strengthening of the military's political influence in the country.129 
At the same time, the emphasis on the regional 'threats' would 
ensure continued acceptance of maximum domestic spending on 
defence and of the military's importance as guardian of Pakistan's 
territorial integrity. Entry into the pacts would also strengthen 
Ayub's own position within the Armed Forces. According to a former 
CIA official, Ayub "engaged in establishing his predominance in the 
Pakistani military, was attempting to deal directly with the United 
States on the amount and type of equipment and defence-support to 
be supplied" since the "larger the program and the greater his 
autonomy in acquiring and using aid, the greater impression he could 
make as the one who could get what the military wanted."130
It can therefore be seen that Pakistan's entry into the 
Western-sponsored alliances and the bilateral military relationship 
with the US was not dictated by the necessity of bolstering a 
faltering economy or by defence and security concerns alone. The 
decision was to a considerable extent influenced by the orientation 
and interests of the Armed Forces, with the Military High Command 
playing an active role in formulating and influencing Pakistan's 
foreign policy directions.
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The Soviet Union and Aligned Pakistan
Pakistan's entry into the alliances led to an intensification of 
governm ental an ti-S ov ie t and anti-com m unist rhetoric. 
Pakistan-Soviet relations had sharply deteriorated even while entry 
was being negotiated. Once Pakistan formally joined the Western 
bloc, according to a senior Pakistan official, it soon became "more 
anti-Communist than the United States itself."131 The Pakistani 
leadership used the "threat" of communism in the internal context as 
a means of suppressing internal dissent and opposition, while at the 
same time, condemning Soviet ''expansionism" and "global communism1' 
in international forums.
Internally, the Ghulam Mohammed clique used the communist "threat" 
to forcibly suppress domestic opposition just prior to and following 
Pakistan's entry into the alliances. This was the strategy deployed 
by the Centre during the language riots in Dacca in 1952. Then again, 
during the Karachi student demonstrations in January 1953, the Chief 
Commissioner, A.T. Naqi, stated that he had reliable information that 
the riots were communist-inspired, although he provided little 
evidence to support his claim.132
The communist "threat” was also used by the government to 
neutralise the threat to central control posed by the pro-autonomy 
United Front alliance in East Pakistan. The East Pakistani provincial 
polls were held while the central government was negotiating the 
pacts with the West. Amongst the more prominent United Front 
personalities was the left-leaning leader of the Awami League,
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Maulana Bhashani, who was staunchly opposed to the country's drift 
towards alignment. The United Front, therefore, mobilised 
opposition against the proposed alliance and, on 22 September 1953 
observed a "Day for Struggle against Imperialism" throughout the 
Eastern wing.
After the United Front became the provincial government in March
1954, it continued to oppose the policy of alignment. 
Demonstrations and rallies were organised against the central 
government's foreign policy, and 162 members of the new Provincial 
Assembly issued a statement calling for abandonment of the 
alignment policy.
The Centre reacted by dismissing the provincial government and 
imposing Governor's rule in May 1954, soon after the signing of the 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. Chief Minister Fazlul Huq was 
accused of treason, and communist forces blamed for the domestic 
turmoil in the province. While Prime Minister Bogra claimed that 
"Communists and other elements inimical to Pakistan . . . have had a 
hand in instigating and organising the disturbances",133 the new 
Governor of East Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, alleged that "the worst 
among the subversive elements" in the East wing "were the 
communists." He added that the "spreading of disorder and anarchy" 
in the province was "done in furtherance of their (communist) 
designs of which the inspiration and guidance came from outside 
Pakistan", implying Soviet involvement in Pakistan's internal 
affa irs .134
The central government then banned the CPP, first in the East wing in 
June 1954 and in West Pakistan on 24 July, and embarked on 
large-scale arrests of political opponents, including members of the 
Pakistan-Soviet Friendship Association. A group of communists 
arrested in Lahore were accused of working as paid agents of the 
Soviet Em bassy.135  Prime Minister Bogra also justified the 
suppression of political opposition on the grounds that the 
government was taking every measure possible to fight international 
communism.136
The United Front's victory in East Pakistan, on a pro-autonomy and 
anti-alignment platform, had been welcomed by the Soviet Union. 
Soviet analysts claimed that the 1954 election results were proof 
that "the people of Pakistan are categorically opposed to their 
country's participation in America's aggressive war plans", and that 
the "chief reason for the Muslim League's defeat" was "the 
unpopularity of its foreign policy."137
The dismissal of the Fazlul Huq ministry and the subsequent ban on 
the CPP and repression of leftists in the country therefore added to 
the tensions between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The Soviets 
accused the Americans of involvement in the dismissal. "This 
reactionary regime", alleged one Soviet analyst, "has been established 
. . . as a direct consequence of US interference in the country's 
internal affairs" since the United Front government had been 
"dissolved on direct orders from Washington", eleven days after the 
signing of a US-Pakistan military deal.1 3 3  The Pakistani 
government's actions, it was alleged, were part of "a plot of the
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Pakistani reactionaries who are trying to suppress the popular 
resistance to Pakistan's conversion into an American colony and 
Pentagon air base" in accordance with the "anti-national policy of 
the Muslim League."189
The bilateral relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union rapidly 
deteriorated. Even before Pakistan entered formally into an alliance 
relationship with the West, Prime Minister Bogra declared that the 
country's relations with the communist countries would be left to 
the latter's initiative, implying that Pakistan was uninterested in 
actively pursuing closer ties with the Eastern bloc.140 A month 
after signing the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the Pakistan 
government announced its intentions to impose "full and complete" 
reciprocal restrictions on the movement of Soviet diplomats in 
Pakistan. On 27 July 1954, restrictions were officially imposed on 
the movement of Soviet diplomatic personnel and their dependants in 
the capital within a 35-mile radius, with the Karachi General Post 
Office as the centre.141 Although these restrictions were reciprocal 
in nature, their importance lay in the fact that the Pakistan 
government had earlier raised no objections to restrictions on the 
movement of its diplomats in the Soviet Union.
Other measures designed to show the government's disinterest in 
cultivating closer relations with the Soviet Union included denial of 
visas to a Soviet delegation wanting to visit East Pakistan; 
cancellation of the license of a Soviet-owned insurance company 
operating in Pakistan, on the grounds that the Soviets did not allow 
foreign insurance companies on their soil; and in September 1954,
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the Pakistan government asked for permission to distribute 
propaganda iiterature within the Soviet Union.142
The Pakistanis also launched a virulent anti-Soviet campaign in 
international forums. At the Conference of South Asian Prime 
Ministers in Colombo in April 1954, for example, Prime Minister 
Bogra sponsored a resolution calling global communism "the biggest 
potential danger" to the region and warned that while the South 
Asian states "can rid ourselves of colonialism . . . any country 
overrun by communism would be lost forever."14® Then again at the 
Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, the Pakistani 
delegation blamed the Cold War on the expansionist ambitions of the 
Soviets, called the Warsaw Pact an offensive military alliance, and 
warned the international community of the dangers posed by global 
communism to newly independent states.144
The Soviets had been aware that Pakistani alignment with the West 
would lead to a further deterioration of the uneasy Pakistan-Soviet 
bilateral relationship. But they were particularly concerned that 
Pakistan's entry into the pacts would not only increase Western 
influence there, but would also involve a quid pro quo, namely the 
establishment of Western bases on Pakistani soil in return for 
military assistance. Hence, while the negotiations were still 
underway, the Soviets launched an aggressive propaganda campaign 
aimed not only at discrediting the pacts in the global and regional 
arenas but also at convincing a Pakistani audience of their 
government's "shortsightedness" in pursuing a policy which, the 
Soviets alleged, would undermine Pakistan's territorial integrity,
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sovereignty and future well-being.
Thus, while Pakistan was negotiating the pacts, a Soviet analyst 
alleged that, "The supply of American arms must inevitably convert 
Pakistan into an American military base. And this is fraught with 
danger not only to Pakistan but to all the Asian countries."145 As 
Pakistan entered into a socio-economic agreement with Turkey in 
February 1954, Soviet commentators claimed that the alliance would 
further the "aggressive plans" of the US in the Middle East and South 
East Asia and its "immediate purpose is to convert Pakistan into an 
American military base." The subsequent Turco-Pakistan agreement 
of April 1954 was condemned in even stronger language. The pact, it 
was alleged, bore "all the hallmarks of American imperialist 
aggression which threatens the security and independence of many 
countries." At the same time, it was claimed that this short-sighted 
policy on the part of Pakistani "ruling circles" would lead to the 
subservience of Pakistan's "domestic and foreign policy concerns to 
American interests."146
In March 1954, the Soviet Union handed a second formal protest note 
to Pakistan, accusing it of intending to join anti-Soviet regional 
pacts and agreeing to provide military bases to the US. The Soviets 
warned that such a course was "not in her interests and cannot bring 
any good to the people of Pakistan, who like other people, are 
interested in peace, the protection of their independence and the 
improvement of their welfare."147 Thus the Soviets made a careful 
distinction between the policies followed by the allegedly 
reactionary "ruling circles" in Pakistan, entering into alliances to
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advance their self-interest, and the "peaceloving" Pakistani people. 
The Pakistani reply of 4 May 1954 denied the allegations, and 
stressed the defensive nature of the agreement.148
Rejecting the Pakistani explanations,the Soviets continued to 
criticise Pakistan in sweeping and propagandistic terms. When 
Pakistan entered into the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the 
Soviets alleged that "Pakistan is being converted into an American 
base of war and is assigned a definite place in America's general 
strategic plan." In this way, Pakistan would "henceforth serve 
America's aggressive designs against the Soviet Union and the 
Chinese People's Republic and against the national liberation 
movements in the Near and Middle East and South Asia."149
Similarly, the Soviets strongly condemned Pakistan's entry into the 
SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. SEATO was denounced as a "military 
threat directed against the people of Asia", aimed at the 
"preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of 
national liberation movements and interference in the affairs of the 
Chinese People's Republic and other Asian countries." The Baghdad 
Pact came in for even more serious criticism. Soviet commentators 
stated that the Western-sponsored Middle East "military blocs", of 
which Pakistan was a member, were being set up "right on the Soviet 
frontiers", and were "directed against the USSR and the peoples' 
democracies." At the same time, it was claimed that these pacts 
placed "a new means . . .  at the disposal of the colonial powers, 
America and Britain to bring pressure to bear on the member 
countries", adding that, "This in itself constitutes a serious threat to
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the Soviet Union and security of the peoples of the Near and Middle 
E ast.”150 It was therefore obvious that Pakistan's entry into the 
pacts had seriously impaired its bilateral ties with the Soviets.
Summary
During the post-Liaquat period, tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations 
continued to increase and reached a peak when Pakistan formally 
entered into anti-Soviet alliances with the West.
Political developments in Pakistan contributed significantly to the 
country's foreign policy directions. Although the bureaucracy had 
been a dominant force during the Jinnah and Liaquat years, it now 
came out in the open, as senior retired and serving bureaucrats 
consolidated their hold over the central government.
These internal political developments were closely interlinked with 
the global environment, as the Cold War intensified and the new 
Republican Administration in America upgraded Pakistan's potential 
role in its strategy of containing communism through regional 
military blocs. The Americans were aware of the internal political 
strength of the Pakistani bureaucracy, and the latter had already 
proved their loyalty to the US in the early years of Pakistan's 
existence. Their constant overtures to the West were finally 
rewarded, as Pakistan's strategic significance as a potential 
Western base of operations against the Soviet Union grew.
147
The bureaucracy in Pakistan could not, however, have either 
consolidated their internal position or achieved their major foreign 
policy objective - alignment with the West - without the active 
support and assistance of the military. The Military High Command 
found it expedient to exercise power in partnership with the 
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy in turn ensured that the interests of 
the Armed Forces, in particular a continuation of the enormous 
internal defence expenditure, were not endangered by the growing 
opposition in the East wing.
In foreign policy, the military was to play an even more prominent 
role. In fact, a major determining factor leading to Pakistan's entry 
into the alliances was the self-interest of the Armed Forces. 
Domestic defence expenditure was not sufficient for the military, 
and the need was felt to supplement it from external sources. An 
equally pressing requirement for the Armed Forces was the 
acquisition of sophisticated hardware from reliable as well as 
ideologically acceptable "friends". Moreover, the military decided 
not to leave the initiative in foreign policy to their bureaucratic 
partners, but embarked on independent, although parallel, efforts to 
woo the Western bloc. This course had already been initiated during 
the Jinnah and Liaquat years, but under Ghulam Mohammed the Armed 
Forces adopted a completely autonomous approach. C-in-C Ayub 
Khan, on his own accord, went so far as to offer not just military 
facilities on Pakistani soil to the US, but even the use of the Armed 
Forces to further Western regional objectives. These offers of 
assistance and active cooperation were to influence strongly the 
American decision to include Pakistan in its policy of containment of
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communism through regional blocs ringing the Soviet and Chinese 
borders. The military's importance lay in the fact that the 
Americans were not only conscious of the dependence of the central 
government on the Armed Forces for survival, but were also eager to 
utilise the Pakistani Armed Forces in their regional strategies.
As the coordinated efforts of the military and bureaucracy in 
Pakistan led to the country's formal entry into bilateral and regional 
anti-communist alliances, Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union 
declined sharply. The bilateral relations between the two countries 
had suffered a series of setbacks as the Pakistani "ruling circles" 
followed a policy of using the communist "threat" to forcibly 
suppress domestic opposition.
The Pakistani rejection of Soviet overtures, and the adoption of an 
aggressively hostile anti-Soviet posture after Pakistan's entry into 
the alliances, led to a further deterioration of the relationship. The 
Soviets were now convinced that Pakistan's entry into the alliances 
involved a quid pro quo, that is, the offer of military facilities to the 
West, thereby posing a direct threat to Soviet security. Hence the 
interests and orientations of Pakistan's military and bureaucratic 
leadership led to the country's alignment with the West and the 
adoption of an openly confrontationist stand against the Soviet 
Union. The ambiguity of the foreign policies of Jinnah and Liaquat 
had been abandoned. Pakistan was now a member of the Western bloc 
in the Cold War.
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CHAPTER fq u r
THE ISKANDER MIRZA YEARS (1955-1958)
In the aftermath of Pakistan's entry into the alliances, 
Pakistan-Soviet relations continued to be determined by a number of 
internal and external factors. In the domestic context, the country's 
foreign policy directions had a considerable impact on the military's 
standing in the internal power structure. In the external sphere, 
Pakistan's formal entry into the Cold War led to a deterioration of 
its relations with the Soviet Union as well as to an intensification 
of regional tensions. The political changes within the country 
combined with the developments in the regional environment were to 
determine the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations during the last 
years of parliamentary government in Pakistan.
The Republic of Pakistan
As Pakistan joined the alliances, the chief decision makers and 
formulators of domestic and foreign policies continued to be an 
unrepresentative coterie of bureaucrats-turned-politicians. 
Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed and his Cabinet of Talents, 
backed by the powerful military, ran the country through ordinances 
and decrees. Not even a pretext of parliamentary democracy 
remained since the Constituent Assembly had been dissolved.
Within the Cabinet of Talents, the two most important personalities, 
Minister of Interior, Maj. Gen. Mirza, and serving C-in-C, Ayub Khan, 
held common views on the future constitutional status of the
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country. While Ayub, in his proposed constitutional draft of October
1954, advocated a strong presidential system based on indirect 
elections, Mirza called for a period of "controlled democracy". 
According to Mirza, the Pakistani masses were "overwhelmingly 
illiterate. They are not interested in politics" and are "bound to act 
foolishly sometimes." So there must be "somebody to rectify their 
blunders" and to save the country from "political scallywags."1
Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed was equally sceptical about the 
applicability of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. He was 
especially determined to ensure that any future constitutional 
structure would follow the dictates of his coterie, with a minimal 
input from irresponsible politicians indulging in "parliamentary 
bickering".2 On 27 March 1955, Ghulam Mohammed promulgated an 
"Emergency Powers" Ordinance, which gave him the sole authority to 
frame a constitution and unite the West Pakistani provinces into a 
single administrative unit, followed by an announcement of a new 
Constituent Assembly, to be composed of 80 deputies elected 
indirectly by less than 15 per cent of the electorate. This came into 
being after elections were held on 21 June 1955 and was to prove as 
powerless and ineffective as its predecessor. It was composed 
mainly of a Muslim League majority along with representatives of 
the more moderate Suhrawardy faction of the Awami League; none of 
the represented parties was strong enough to challenge the 
executive.
The increasingly powerful Interior Minister, Iskander Mirza, now 
forced the ailing Governor-General to retire, and on 19 September
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1955 became Governor-General.3 He dismissed Prime Minister 
Bogra and appointed Finance Minister and former Secretary-General 
of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), Chaudhri Mohammad Ali as 
Prime Minister and leader of the Muslim League. Mohammad Ali was 
then given the task of integrating West Pakistan into one unit, a 
project strongly supported by the civil and military bureaucracies.4 
On 30 September 1955, the Constituent Assembly officially 
accepted the West Pakistan Act of 1955, bringing into existence the 
One Unit scheme. In this way the Western-dominated central 
government succeeded in offsetting the numerical superiority of East 
Pakistan and institutionalising the control of the West wing over the 
East.
Mirza then turned his attention to formulating a constitution which 
would consolidate his power, and correspond with his notions of the 
need for "controlled democracy". In February 1956 the Constituent 
Assembly approved a Constitution Bill declaring Pakistan a federal 
republic. It provided for a government headed by a Prime Minister 
responsible to a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly , and 
a President as head of state. The President was provided with 
enormous powers, including the power to appoint and dismiss the 
Prime Minister, the Cabinet and other senior officials; to convene, 
close or dissolve the National Assembly; to issue ordinances when 
the National Assembly was not in session; to return bills to the 
National Assembly and veto Provincial Assembly bills; to proclaim a 
state of emergency, and to suspend fundamental rights. The 
President was also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.5 
On 23 March 1956 Iskander Mirza was sworn in as the first President
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of Pakistan.
He exercised the viceregal powers granted to him by the 1956 
Constitution to the fullest. Holding politicians in contempt, the new 
President continued to rely on the civil service to run the country. 
By the terms of the 1956 Constitution, the CSP, the country's 'higher 
bureaucracy' were granted immunity from dismissal by anyone other 
than the President who also had the power to appoint them. 
Bureaucratic control was also complete in the provinces, since there 
too the civil servants were appointed by and answerable only to the 
central government.6
Mirza made frequent use of his Presidential powers to dismiss and 
appoint Prime Ministers and Cabinets. He also resorted to the 
successful use of divide-and-rule tactics to neutralise political 
opposition both within the Centre and in the provinces.7 In April 
1956, the Republican Party was formed, "encouraged and inspired by 
Iskander M irza."8 This "official" party was used as one more 
instrument to control the politicians by encouraging defections from 
the existing parties and making and unmaking coalitions at the 
Centre.
The Military and Mirza
Mirza could not, however, have succeeded without the support of the 
military. The real power did not therefore lie with Mirza alone but 
was shared by the military, represented by C-in-C Ayub Khan. While 
Mirza removed Ayub Khan from the post of Defence Minister in June
1955 by granting the Defence portfolio to Prime Minister Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali, the change made no real difference.9 According to an 
authoritative military source, there was "no control whatsoever 
from the top, the central government, of the Army machine. The 
Prime Minister was Defence Minister only on paper." The 
"civil-military bureaucracy was now all-powerful; the political Head 
had no real power, he had been by-passed completely" and there were 
"only two people who mattered now - Iskander Mirza and Ayub 
Khan."10
Ayub now undertook the task of reorganising and reconstituting the 
Armed Forces, while at the same time consolidating his position 
within the institution. The C-in-C had succeeded in placing "all his 
'trusted' men in key positions and important commands and no longer 
tolerated any criticism." Promotions were made on political grounds 
and not "on merit and acceptable principles, practices and tradition 
in the Army." Corruption began to seep into the Armed Forces as 
politics "penetrated" the institution.11
The consolidation of Ayub's hold over the military was almost 
complete, while it was obvious that Mirza and his chosen Prime 
Ministers would remain in power only so long as they retained the 
loyalty of the Armed Forces. Ayub was now acknowledged as "the 
mediator in national affairs" by all political forces in the country.12
But while Iskander Mirza was "using the C-in-C for his own ends and 
the C-in-C was using Iskander Mirza for his own ends",13 Ayub 
Khan's contempt for the President and the political leadership grew
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in direct proportion to the latter's dependence on the military. In 
1956, the President replaced Prime Minister Mohammad Ali by 
Awami League leader, Hasan Shaheed Suhrawardy. Commenting on 
the development, Ayub stated, "No one knew any longer who belonged 
to which political party; it was all a question of swapping labels: a 
Muslim Leaguer today, a Republican tomorrow; and yesterday's 
'traitors' were tomorrow's Chief Ministers, indistinguishable as 
tweedledum and tweedledee !", adding that the divided politicians 
were divided even further by the manipulations of the President and 
his Republican Party.14
This contempt for Mirza and the politicians did not mean that the 
C-in-C had equal disregard for the game of politics or had no 
political ambitions. He was using the Army "for political power" 
states a military source, "as his power base for a dictatorial 
position in the political field while still in uniform." Ayub justified 
his stand to fellow officers on the grounds that " 'the bloody 
politicians and the civilians' were so useless - corrupt and 
inefficient" that the Army was forced "to play the role of 'shaking up 
the country'."15 In Ayub's opinion, however, the time was not as yet 
ripe for an open military takeover. He was as yet content to 
consolidate his personal power and the influence of the institution, 
while manipulating political forces indirectly, as well as using his 
enormous powers to insure that Pakistan's internal and external 
directions were in accordance with the interests of the Armed 
Forces.16
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The Western Alliances and the Pakistan Military
In the external sphere, the Military High Command's efforts to link 
Pakistan militarily with the West paid the expected dividends. The 
Armed Forces emerged as the major beneficiary of the policy of 
alignment.
The Americans had, from the very start, singled out the military as 
the target group for assistance mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the 
US realised that this elite group must be wooed if US regional 
objectives, including acquisition of bases, were to be fulfilled. 
Secondly, the Americans were impressed by the potential role a 
strengthened Pakistani military could play in promoting Western 
interests in the Cold War, especially in the sensitive Middle Eastern 
region.17 Thus the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of May 
1954 aimed at providing military "equipment, materials, services 
and other assistance" to the Pakistan Armed Forces, which a House of 
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in 1955 called "the 
largest and strongest military force allied with the Free World 
between Turkey and Taiwan."1®
As the Pakistan military rapidly consolidated its internal position in 
the mid-1950s, the US extended appropriate support in order to 
ensure its continuing cooperation. Thus, for example, Prime Minister 
Bogra had expected American support when he attempted to confront 
Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed in the constitutional crisis of
1954. But when Ayub decided to back Ghulam Mohammed, the 
Eisenhower Administration signalled its support for the C-in-C by
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an aid package of Rs 105 million, nearly four times as large as the 
preceding one, and a fifty per cent increase in arms deliveries.19 
The US also expressed satisfaction at the inclusion of Ayub in the 
Cabinet of Talents. US officials informed the Pakistani media that 
they were "pleased with the selection of General Ayub Khan for the 
Defence portfolio".20
For their part, General Ayub and Iskander Mirza used the bogey of the 
"communist threat" in times of domestic unrest, partly to strengthen 
their internal position and partly to convince the Americans of their 
pro-Western stand. Prior to the dismissal of the United Front 
government in East Pakistan, General Ayub had told American 
officials in the country that he hoped the US "would understand 
Pakistani action, if it became necessary and would be sympathetic in 
spite of the screams of protests which would come from some of 
Pakistan's neighbours". He added that, "Pakistan, having accepted US 
military aid was now the target of the Communists who were bent on 
proving that no Asian country would join forces with the US and 
survive".21
During the constitutional crisis of September 1954, both Ayub and 
Mirza warned the Americans that the pro-Western Pakistani civil and 
military leadership was under threat from leftist forces opposing 
the Governor-General. But once the crisis was resolved to the 
satisfaction of the civil and military bureaucracies, the future 
government "would be committed to military cooperation and close 
relations with the US".22 The American authorities on their part 
concluded that the Army, a "known Western-oriented stabilizing
175
force" remained "the only dependable effective instrument of 
government. It is efficiently organized and disciplined and under 
leadership friendly to West in general and to US in particular".23
When Iskander Mirza replaced Ghulam Mohammed as Governor-General 
and then became President, American policy makers continued to 
believe that US assistance must be used to strengthen the Pakistan 
military, "the greatest stabilizing force in the country", which had 
"encouraged Pakistan to participate in collective defence 
agreements."24
In line with that policy, the US began to extend military assistance 
to Pakistan. After the signing of MDAA, a US Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG), headed by Brigadier General Sexton, set up 
its Army element at the GHQ in Rawalpindi in July 1954.
The initial American assistance did not come up to Pakistani 
expectations. A military survey team sent to Pakistan in March 
1954 assessed needs at a mere $29 million. During his meetings 
with the US team Ayub attempted to obtain substantial military 
assistance, including support for a programme to expand the Pakistan 
Armed Forces to an approximate 400,000 men. In return Ayub 
promised the use of the Pakistani military in the Middle East 
declaring that his object in connection with American aid was "first 
to get this country up to standard militarily, so far as equipment 
went for its own defence, secondly thereafter to equip a force of 
sufficient size to take part in Middle East defence". In the wake of 
the US $29 million offer, Ayub complained to a UK official that the
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Americans "having encouraged expectations of general assistance and 
having exposed Pakistan to Russians, Indians,etc., now looked as 
though they were going to give something quite inconsiderable".25
Even a US reassessed figure of $171 million over a period of three 
years provided in October 1954 did not satisfy the military.26 By 
mid-1956, however, American reassessments of Soviet capabilities, 
especially of the progress of the long-range ballistic missiles 
programme and of bomber force levels, led to an increase in the 
importance of Pakistan, linked to the potential use of its airfields 
and territory for surveillance of the Soviet Union, through U-2 
flights27 and other means.
To obtain the cooperation and support of the Pakistan military, the 
US decided, in January 1957, to fulfil its requirements of military 
hardware and other forms of assistance. In return, the US acquired a 
number of facilities in Pakistan, including the Badaber electronic 
surveillance and communications base near Peshawar, very near the 
Soviet southern borders. According to a Pakistani source, the base 
was used "for monitoring radar signals and tapping radio traffic in 
Russia and China."28 Facilities were also provided for U-2 
surveillance flights from an airfield in Peshawar. The U-2 flights 
surveyed Russian "defences, missile landing sites and military 
developments" and "put together a composite picture of military 
Russia, complete to airfields, atomic production sites, power plants,
oil storage depots, submarine yards, arsenals, missile sites, 
railroads, industrial complexes, radar installations and launch 
sites."29
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Although the Pakistan military had been concerned about the 
piecemeal manner in which American arms had first arrived, causing 
both administrative and operational problems, the arms and 
equipment, "whatever their condition" were "most welcome".30 Once 
the Americans decided to substantially increase the supply, large 
quantities of sophisticated equipment began to pour in. As 
approximately $80 to $90 million annually in US military aid was 
provided to Pakistan, the strength of the Armed Forces increased 
correspondingly. The Army, for example, received enough assistance 
to equip seven full strength infantry divisions, a full Armoured 
division and an independent Armoured brigade.31
New strategic roads, installations and airfields were built, and the 
Karachi naval base was expanded and modernized.32 The three 
services also acquired sophisticated military equipment including 
Patton tanks, new warships and jet aircraft, including the F-86.33 
Training was conducted along modern lines, as the new equipment 
was received and the Armed Forces exposed to the latest American 
techniques. The American assistance obviously had an impact on the 
self-perceptions of the Pakistan military. According to a military 
source, for example, the "introduction of the new equipment into the 
army" enhanced "its already high confidence in itself . . ."34
While the Pakistan military's exposure to the latest American 
weaponry, technology and training had a significant impact on the 
institution, an even more important byproduct of the alliance, from 
the point of view of this study, was its exposure to American
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doctrines and ideology. By the terms of the MDAA, the Pakistan 
government had agreed to receive US personnel . . who will be 
accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the 
assistance furnished . . and granted "full diplomatic status."35 The 
US MAAG set up its directorate at the GHQ in Rawalpindi in 1954, and 
was thus granted direct access to the highest ranks of the Pakistani 
Officer Corps. A senior Pakistani official disclosed that once the 
MAAG began its operations, "the army dealt directly with the 
Pentagon and the Karachi government had little idea of what was 
going on."36
These personal contacts between US and Pakistani military officers 
were to affect the institution as a whole.37 The initial "contacts 
with the American officers", states a military source, "were most 
interesting" and it did not take long for an "understanding" to develop 
between the Pakistanis and their American counterparts.33 Of 
particular significance was the ideological indoctrination carried on 
by the United States Information Service (USIS) as a part of the 
military assistance scheme under the Motivation (later "Troop 
Information*) Programme. A separate wing of the Inter-Services 
Public Relations Directorate was set up which dealt solely with the 
distribution of American material, including publications and films, 
throughout the Pakistan Armed Forces. According to a Pakistan Army 
officer associated with the programme, the "so-called Motivation 
Programme was an elevation of normal PR to a higher sphere of 
intellectual education and indoctrination", adding that the highly 
visible American presence made it appear "as if there were two 
military establishments in one country: one national, the other
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Along with the internal infiltration of American doctrines and 
ideologies through the MAAG presence, American experts lecturing at 
military colleges, including the Staff College, Quetta, hundreds of 
Pakistani officers were sent for training in the US. These courses, 
study tours and visits were to have "a decisive influence over the 
ideas of the officer corps." They also made their "impact on the 
thinking of Pakistani commanders and staff" as these officers 
returned home and the lessons learnt in the US were spread 
throughout the Officer Corps. The "thinking and planning" of 
Pakistani officers was further "developed" by their involvement in 
the activities of the Western-sponsored pacts, SEATO and CENTO.40 
These contacts, links and indoctrination programmes meant, on the 
one hand, a substitution of American influence for British, and on the 
other further strengthened the Pakistan military's inherent 
pro-Western and anti-communist biases.41
Yet another consequence of Pakistan's entry into the alliances was to 
have a significant impact on the future defence and foreign policy 
directions of the country. This was the fact that the US-Pakistan 
Mutual Assistance programme did not in any way reduce the Pakistan 
Armed Forces' dependence on external sources for military hardware, 
as it did not provide for the development of an indigenous defence 
industry through the transfer of weapons technology or for US 
assistance in Pakistani production of weaponry.42 So Pakistan not 
only remained woefully inadequate in the sphere of defence 
production, according to an authoritative source, but also became
foreign."89
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totally dependent "on one source for the supply of military 
hardware”, which put it "in a very vulnerable position."43 This meant 
that Pakistan had to maintain a high level of defence expenditure 
and ensure a continuing supply of US assistance, thereby providing 
the Americans with considerable leverage.
In the internal context, however, Pakistan's entry into the alliances 
modernized and reconstructed the Armed Forces, boosting the morale 
of the m ilitary.44 The military's autonomy was further 
strengthened, as was its internal position relative to other political 
forces.45 At the same time the military continued to claim a major 
share of the country's economy.
Although the government had justified entry into alliances on the 
grounds that the resultant decrease in domestic spending on defence 
would promote economic development, domestic defence expenditure 
continued to consistently absorb approximately half of the annual 
governmental expenditure, although US aid did make it possible to 
somewhat reduce the military's demands on Pakistan's revenues. 
This was partly due to the increases in costs of salaries, 
accommodation and the movement of troops following the expansion 
of the Armed Forces as a result of the MDAA.
The military was, moreover, strongly placed to continue to demand a 
large proportion of the annual budget, because its growing strength 
was accompanied by continued dependence of central governments on 
its support. As the policy of alignment was justified in terms of an 
ever-present external "threaf, governments were not in a position to
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oppose the military's demand for increasing expenditure. So heads of 
state, especially the vocal proponent for alignment, President 
Iskander Mirza, argued that it was the "foremost duty of every 
Pakistani to strengthen our armed forces so that the country can live 
in peace."46 This increase in defence expenditure in turn further 
strengthened the Armed Forces as an internal political force.
TOTAL REVENUE AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN47
Revenue Defence Expenditure Defence Expenditure
Year (millions of Rs) (millions of Rs) as % of Revenue
1954-55 1,172.7 713.4 60.8
1955-56 1,435.8 814.3 56.7
1956-57 1,298.3 820.0 63.2
1957-58 1,495.8 742.9 49.6
1958-59 2,070.2 1,044.2 50.4
The Soviets had been concerned from the very start that Pakistan's 
entry into bilateral and multilateral defence arrangements with the 
West would lead to an increase in US influence in strategically 
placed Pakistan. When the US media first leaked information of an 
impending US-Pakistan military deal, the Soviets intensified their 
propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the pacts. In the 
Pakistani context, the Soviet campaign placed special emphasis on 
considerably exaggerated and largely unsubstantiated allegations 
concerning the negative implications of the pacts on Pakistani 
sovereignty.
Soviet commentators not only stated that it was "well known that
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any country which concludes a military alliance with the US must 
expect to see American military bases and American armed forces on 
its territory”48 but in their protest note of 26 March 1954, the 
Soviets even alleged that the Pakistan Armed Forces would be placed 
under American command by the proposed US-Pakistan military deal. 
The Pakistan government rejected the suggestion, adding that it was 
merely "taking necessary measures to train its technical personnel, 
including members of the services, in the most efficient manner 
possible."49
The Soviets, however, continued to claim, despite all evidence to the 
contrary, that the nature of the new Pakistan-US relationship meant 
that the Pakistan Army had been "placed under Washington's control" 
since American military personnel supervised "the utilization of the 
American 'aid'"; that US experts and advisers, including MAAP 
personnel in Pakistan were "interfering on a grand scale" in the 
country's domestic affairs; and that Pakistan "was unable to take any 
major decision without prior consultation with the USA."50
As a part of their propaganda campaign against Pakistan's 
participation in the pacts, the Soviets also singled out what they 
claimed were other adverse domestic consequences of the policy of 
alignment for Pakistan. These included the alleged militarisation of 
the country and the deterioration of the economy. According to a 
Soviet analyst the "dislocation of the national economy and the 
poverty of the masses are primarily due to . . . the policy of 
militarizing the country, a policy which accords with the interests 
of the US aggressive circles" and not with Pakistan's national
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interests. The Soviets pointed out that military expenditure in 
Pakistan had "swallowed up more than half the national revenue" in 
the past. This unproductive expenditure in 1954, was "four times as 
much" as "on industrial development, education, medical services and 
social insurance," showing that "when an underdeveloped country 
began to focus all its attention on arms, this was the first step to an 
economic crisis."51 Hence they claimed that Pakistan's entry into 
the pacts had not only meant that its "sovereignty" had been 
"seriously impaired" but it had also been "saddled with a burden of 
military obligations" far greater than its economy could "ever hope 
to carry."52
The Soviets also claimed that the Pakistan Armed Forces were now, 
more or less, an instrument of American military power. Soviet 
analysts alleged that under the terms of the MDAA Pakistan had 
undertaken "not to use the armaments supplied by the US without the 
'prior' agreement of the US government. An undertaking of this 
nature is tantamount to a promise that the Pakistan armed forces 
will be used only as the American government directs." The Soviets 
posed the question that since Pakistan had pledged not to use the 
arms that it received without the "preliminary consent" of the US, 
"What remains of the independence of the Pakistan armed forces, if 
they can be employed only as the Americans see fit?"53
Other Soviet allegations included the claim that the armed forces of 
all countries participating in alliances such as the Baghdad Pact, 
were now "under the control of the Western powers" and were "being 
turned into instruments of Western aggressive policy." Hence the
Pakistan military "could at any moment be involved in military 
operations in Near and Middle East and South-East Asia." This, it was 
claimed, posed a danger to the Soviet Union and ail peaceloving 
countries of the region. Moreover, the modernization and expansion 
under US direction of Pakistani military installations situated near 
the Soviet southern borders in itself posed "a serious threat to 
Soviet security."54
Thus the Soviets on the one hand expressed concern about the 
internal effects of Pakistan's policy of alignment, a policy which 
would allegedly undermine Pakistani sovereigny . On the other hand, 
Soviet rhetoric centred on the dangers posed to Soviet and regional 
security and stability by the alleged American penetration of the 
Pakistan military and American intentions to establish military 
bases in Pakistan, close to Soviet southern borders.
Regional Tensions and Pakistan-Soviet Relations
As discussed in the previous chapter, Pakistan's entry into the 
Western-sponsored regional pacts and the adoption of an openly 
confrontationist approach towards the Soviet Union had led to a 
sharp deterioration in Pakistan-Soviet relations. Pakistan's formal 
alignment with the West was also to lead to a decline in its 
relations with neighbouring India and Afghanistan, whose reactions 
to the new directions in Pakistani foreign policy were in turn to 
influence the Soviet response.
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Pakistan's relations with India had improved somewhat in mid-1953,
with the two countries ostensibly agreeing to settle the Kashmir 
dispute by means of an impartial plebiscite. US media leaks on 
negotiations for a Pakistan-US pact, however, once again led to an 
increase in Indo-Pakistan tensions. The Indian Prime Minister, 
Pandit Nehru, declared that although this "was a matter on which 
constitutionally or otherwise it is none of our concern what 
Pakistan and the USA are doing . . . practically it is . . .  of the most 
intense concern to us and something which will have very 
far-reachmg consequences on the whole structure of things in South 
Asia and especially on India and Pakistan."55 Both in official protest 
notes and in his personal correspondence with his Pakistani 
counterpart, Nehru pointed out that the "large-scale rearmament and 
military expansion" in Pakistan, with US assistance "must 
necessarily have repercussions in India"; that a US-Pakistan military 
deal would "bring the East-West Cold War to the subcontinent and 
upset the balance between India and Pakistan." The Indian Prime 
Minister added that, "No person in my knowledge imagines that 
Pakistan is in danger from the North."56
Addressing the Kashmir problem specifically, Nehru said that US 
military assistance to Pakistan had "changed the whole context of 
the Kashmir issue" and that India could "take no more risks now as 
we were prepared to take previously . . ." Pakistan's entry into the 
pacts had, in fact, provided Nehru the excuse he needed to back down 
from his previous commitment to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, which 
could well have resulted in a vote in favour of Pakistan. The 
consequences of Kashmir withdrawing from India would have been 
unthinkable since it would set a precedent for a future Balkanisation
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of the Indian Union. Nehru therefore declared that India was no 
longer willing to hold a Kashmir plebiscite since the situation had 
changed qualitatively with the extension of substantial US military 
assistance to Pakistan.57
As Pakistan’s relations with India and the Soviet Union deteriorated, 
Indo-Soviet relations steadily improved. Until now, the Soviets had 
consistently followed a policy of neutrality in Indo-Pakistan 
disputes. As the Pakistanis proceeded towards alignment with the 
West, regardless of Soviet protestations, the Soviets began to 
express sympathy with India.58 Following Pakistan's entry into the 
pacts, the Soviet Union began to develop even closer political, 
economic and cultural links with India and a significant trade 
agreement was concluded in 1955. During the same year, the Soviet 
Union agreed to provide a steel mill to India on extremely favorable 
terms.59
The Afghan reaction to the Pakistani policy was equally hostile. 
Pakistan-Afghan relations had continued to deteriorate in the 
mid-1950s, because of continuing Afghan support to the 
Pakhtunistan cause and Pakistani refusal to negotiate on an issue it 
regarded as its internal concern. Relations had become particularly 
tense when Sardar Daud, a hardliner on Pakhtunistan, became Prime 
Minister of Afghanistan in 1953. The Afghans therefore reacted to 
US media reports on a forthcoming Pakistan-US military deal by 
denouncing American military assistance to Pakistan, on the grounds 
that it would lead to further repression of the Pakhtun people. Once 
Pakistan entered the alliances, the Afghan Prime Minister called the
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provision of Western military aid "a grave danger to the security and 
peace of Afghanistan.”60
The situation deteriorated further when Pakistan decided to include 
the NWFP in the One Unit scheme of West Pakistan in 1955. The 
Afghans strongly protested that this would further erode the 
autonomy of the Pakistani Pakhtuns. During the same year, 
Pakistan-Afghan tensions increased sharply, leading to a temporary 
severance of diplomatic relations and a closure of land-locked 
Afghanistan's border with Pakistan.61
The border closure faced the Afghans with considerable economic 
hardship. Earlier attempts by Daud to obtain US military and 
economic assistance had failed, since the Americans did not wish to 
annoy the Pakistanis, and Afghanistan therefore turned increasingly 
to its northern neighbour, the Soviet Union. As Pakistan-Afghan 
relations continued to deteriorate, Afghanistan's relations with the 
Soviet Union steadily improved, with the Soviets providing 
economic, technical and military assistance. During the Pakistani 
blockade, for example, the volume of Afghan-Soviet trade increased 
considerably, with the Soviets offering transit facilities and 
favorable trade terms.62
The Soviets had, so far, maintained strict neutrality on 
Pakistan-Afghan differences. With Pakistan's entry into the 
alliances, however, Soviet policy on South-Southwest Asian regional 
disputes also underwent a radical change. The Soviets began to side 
openly with India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pakhtunistan
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issues respectively.
During their visit to India in November/December 1955, Soviet Prime 
Minister N.A. Bulganin and Communist Party Secretary-General, N.S. 
Khrushchev not only promised India substantial economic and 
technical assistance, but also extended support to the Indian stand 
on Kashmir. Addressing a reception in Srinagar, Khrushchev declared 
that, "The Soviet Union has always maintained that the political 
status of Kashmir is a matter to be decided by the people of Kashmir 
themselves . . . .  That Kashmir is one of the states of the Republic of 
India has been decided by thé people of Kashmir."63
During their visit both Bulganin and Khrushchev strongly condemned 
"the policy of forming military blocs" and the "establishment . . .  of 
foreign military bases and . . .  the stationing of alien forces" in Asia, 
and called for "the liquidation of the blocs already formed."64 In the 
joint communique issued at the conclusion of their visit, the Soviet 
leaders and the Indian Prime Minister denounced the Western 
military alliances for bringing the Cold War into South Asia and 
thereby increasing regional tensions.
The two Soviet leaders then visited Afghanistan in December 1955. 
In a speech in Kabul, Bulganin declared that the Soviet Union 
sympathised with Afghanistan's policy on the Pakhtunistan issue. 
"The Soviet Union", he said, "stands for a just settlement of the 
Pushtunistan problem, which can be properly solved only if the vital 
interests of the peoples inhabiting Pushtunistan are taken into 
account."65 The Soviets also confirmed the 1931 Russo-Afghan
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treaty and extended a loan of $100  million to Afghanistan.66
On their return home, Bulganin and Khrushchev reiterated Soviet 
support to India on Kashmir and to Afghanistan on Pakhtunistan. On 
the Kashmir dispute, Bulganin stated that "it had been provoked by 
countries which are pursuing definite military and political aims in 
this area . . .H He added that, "The people of Kashmir are emphatically 
opposed to this imperialist policy. The Kashmir question has already 
been settled by the people of Kashmir themselves; they regard 
themselves as an integral part of the Republic of India." On the 
Pakistan-Afghan dispute, the Soviet leaders stated that, "We regard 
as justified and well-founded the demand of Afghanistan that the 
inhabitants of the bordering region of Pushtunistan should be given 
the opportunity for a free expression of their will", emphasising 
that, "The people of this area have as much right to national 
self-determination as any other people."67
The Alliances and Pakistan's Security Predicament
Pakistan's entry into the alliances had worsened the already hostile 
relations with India and Afghanistan, and antagonised the Soviet 
Union into abandoning its previous policy of neutrality on the 
Kashmir and Pakhtunistan issues. The Pakistani leadership, including 
the Military High Command, was fully aware that alignment with the 
West did not mean either an underwriting of the country's security by 
its Western allies or the latters' support for Pakistan in its regional 
disputes.68
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The basis of the bilateral military relationship with the USA, the
MDAA of 19 May 1954 did not specify any US obligations to bolster
Pakistan's security. Under Article One of the agreement, the US only
agreed to provide "such equipment, materials, services, or other
assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize . . 
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Although the Agreement did mean the fulfilment of some of the 
requirements of the Armed Forces, Pakistan was not entitled to 
specify the quantities or types of military hardware it required, or 
how and where this military aid would be utilised. Unwilling to 
provide Pakistan with an offensive capability, the US obtained the 
Pakistan government's assurance that this assistance would be used 
"exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate 
self-defence" or the "the defence of the area." The Pakistanis agreed 
that the American aid would not be used to "undertake any act of 
aggression against any other nation."70 Once the aid programme was 
underway, the military assistance was directed at strengthening the 
Military Assistance Programme (MAP) forces and installations near 
the Soviet southern borders, in accordance with US regional 
strategies. Non-MAP Pakistani forces, including troops deployed on 
the Indian border or in Azad Kashmir, were given second place even in 
the utilisation of domestic Pakistani resources.71 The US, 
moreover, made it amply clear that the MDAA did not in any way 
oblige the US to provide Pakistan with assistance in case of an 
attack by a third party.
Pakistan's membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact did little more
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to provide the country with tangible assurances of support against 
India and Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan tried his 
utmost to obtain Western guarantees of support against all, and not 
just communist, acts of aggression. During the Manila meeting of 
September 1954, Zafrulla argued that, "Aggression was evil" and 
there were "no varieties of aggression." It was therefore necessary 
"to resist it wherever it came from."72 Dulles, however, reiterated 
that his country would only act in the event of communist 
aggression. A separate declaration to that effect was then attached 
to the Treaty. In any case, signatories of the Manila pact were only 
to be provided with sufficient assistance to enable them to resist 
communist "expansionism" and to tackle internal subversion, with no 
Western obligation to pledge troops. Hence "Pakistan entered into an 
alliance to resist aggression", states an authoritative Pakistani 
source, "from a quarter, which despite its ideological differences, 
had posed no threat to its security."73
Nor did the Baghdad Pact imply explicit Western guarantees of 
security to member states. The USA, in fact, did not even become a 
formal member of the Pact, and even after it joined the Economic and 
Military Committee of the alliance in 1957, it made it clear that US 
involvement was "related solely to the Communist menace and 
carries no connotations with respect to intra-area matters."74
In the wake of the Soviet declarations of support to India and 
Afghanistan, the Pakistanis attempted to obtain the support of their 
SEATO and Baghdad Pact allies. The response was, however, 
disappointing. The communique signed at the SEATO Council meeting
in Karachi in March 1956 only "deplored statements and interventions 
by Soviet leaders" and recognised that "the sovereignty of Pakistan 
extends up to the Durand Line . . . "  On the Kashmir issue, the SEATO 
countries merely "affirmed the need for an early settlement of the 
Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct 
negotiations". The Baghdad Pact Council meeting in May 1956 
provided an even more guarded response, stating that, "Specific 
problems which were causing tension in the area were also discussed 
thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In 
particular the Council emphasised the need for an early settlement 
of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes."75
The Americans were unwilling to antagonise either India or 
Afghanistan by extending to Pakistan the sort of unequivocal support 
the Soviets provided to those countries on Kashmir and Pakhtunistan. 
While the US government wanted to keep its options open vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan, it was particularly interested in maintaining good 
relations with India. Great care was therefore taken to reassure the 
Indians that US military assistance would be carefully monitored, so 
as to prevent the Pakistanis from using it in intra-regional 
disputes.76
Even after the limited extension of support on the Kashmir issue at 
the SEATO meeting in March 1956, Dulles immediately visited India 
where he stated that if Pakistan were to use American arms for 
aggression against India, "Pakistan knows" that "there will be a quick 
ending of its good relations with the United States and that, under 
the UN Charter, the USA would support India if she became the victim
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of any armed aggression.”77 The US also continued to extend 
considerable economic assistance to India despite the latter's 
adamant posture of neutrality, with Dulles declaring that, "We 
believe that India's great effort to achieve economic progress should 
be supported. We should remember that among free nations there is 
room for diversity of views . . . .  It is essential that we continue to 
help (India) if for no reason than to serve our enlightened 
se lf- in te re s t."78 Pakistan's policy of alignment had therefore 
earned it the hostility of India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 
without gaining it assurances of support from its Western allies.
Tbe .,Ups-and. .Downs, .of jbl  .Bfitatiflnsbja
While the Soviet Union had now openly sided with Pakistan's regional 
rivals, it had not written off Pakistan altogether. The Soviets were 
still anxious to keep the door open for rapprochement, hoping that 
such a course would ultimately reduce Pakistan's dependence on the 
West and thereby curtail Western infiltration into the region. Hence, 
even while Bulganin and Khrushchev declared their support for India 
and Afghanistan in their differences with Pakistan, they also 
expressed their desire for an improvement of Pakistan-Soviet 
relations. For instance, during his speech in Srinagar on 10 
December 1955, Khrushchev, referring to the Soviet Union's cordial 
ties with India and Afghanistan, declared, "We should very much like 
to have similar relations with Pakistan and it is not our fault that 
such relations have so far not developed." He added that, "we shall 
persistently strive to improve these relations in the interests of 
peace."79 On their return home Bulganin reiterated that, "The Soviet
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Union would like to have no less friendly relations with Pakistan 
than it has with India . . . and Afghanistan . . . and it is not our fault 
that this is so far not the case. However, the Soviet government had 
endeavoured and will endeavour to improve its relations with 
Pakistan", with Khrushchev adding that, "For our part, we are willing 
to meet Pakistan halfway in establishing friendly relations."80
Despite the lack of reponse from the Pakistani leadership, the 
Soviets extended assistance to Pakistan on several occasions. In 
August 1955, for instance, the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies and the Muslim Religious Board of Kazakhstan donated Rs 
60,000 for the victims of the East Pakistan floods, while in May
1956 the Soviets provided 40,000 tons of food grains for East 
Pakistan.81
The Soviet leadership also offered Pakistan technical assistance and 
an expansion of trade ties. In response to questions from a Pakistani 
journalist in February 1956, Bulganin stated that Pakistan and the 
Soviet Union "could successfully cooperate economically, 
technically, culturally and in other ways," and declared that there 
were "real possibilities for the expansion of trade relations" 
between the two countries, since, "The Soviet Union could buy in 
Pakistan agriculture and livestock produce as well as other goods 
Pakistan needs to export. In its turn the Soviet Union is willing to 
sell to Pakistan complete industrial plants, agricultural and other 
machinery and manufactures and other goods which Pakistan may 
wish to buy." He added that the Soviet Union was willing to assist 
Pakistan in the study of peaceful applications of atomic energy.82
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When Pakistan was proclaimed a republic on 23 March 1956, Soviet 
commentators highlighted the event as "an important landmark in the 
history of the Pakistani people's national liberation movement" 
which would "undoubtedly exert a beneficial influence on the 
Republic of Pakistan's future development . . ." They added that the 
Soviet Union was willing to help Pakistan economically and 
technically, including cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic 
energy, since it wanted "a radical improvement in relations with 
Pakistan . . .  on the basis of normal friendly cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence."83
At Republic Day celebrations at the Pakistan Embassy in Moscow, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, stated that his country was willing 
to construct a steel mill for Pakistan, similar to the project in 
In d ia .84 A 40-member Soviet delegation, headed by the Vice 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Anastas Mikoyan, attended the 
celebrations in Karachi. During his visit, Mikoyan repeated the offer 
of technical assistance, especially in "the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy," and declared that the Soviet Union wanted to improve its 
relations with Pakistan, "pacts or no pacts." The offer was, however, 
bluntly turned down by the Pakistan government, an official 
spokesman declaring that, "Nobody wants aid from them and that is 
our policy."85
The Soviets however persevered in their efforts and on 27 June 1957 
the two countries entered into their first trade agreement. 
According to the joint communique, "all payments between the USSR
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and Pakistan relating to the importation and exportation of goods and 
other payments of a commercial nature" would be made in Pakistani 
cu rrency.86 Although the Soviets favored a 5-year agreement, 
Pakistan insisted on annual reviews. The Soviets also indicated 
willingness to offer Pakistan economic aid as well as industrial 
machinery.87
The Soviet offers and overtures to Pakistan did not, however, lead to 
an improvement of the bilateral relationship, since the Iskander 
Mirza regime followed a consistently anti-Soviet policy, and 
continued to side with the West in both domestic and international 
forums. During the Suez crisis, for example, the Pakistan 
government provided unconditional support to Britain and France, and 
criticised the Soviet invasion of Hungary, supporting anti-Soviet 
resolutions in the UN, and even sponsoring a resolution calling for 
international action against the "violent repression" of the 
Hungarians by the Soviet Union.88 When the Soviets extended an 
informal invitation to Prime Minister Suhrawardy to visit the Soviet 
Union, the Pakistan government not only failed to explore the offer, 
but the Prime Minister visited the United States instead in July 
1957. During his visit, Suhrawardy launched a strong attack on the 
communist bloc while reiterating Pakistan's loyalty to the West. 
"We have thrown our lot in with you", declared the Pakistan Prime 
Minister. "We are very gravely apprehensive of Communist 
domination, infiltration and aggression", he said, adding that he 
considered it a privilege for Pakistan to have the same ideals of 
freedom "as yourself."89 In the joint communique issued on the 
visit, the two sides agreed that "international Communism continues
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to pose the major threat to the security of the free world" and 
"reaffirmed their determination to support and strengthen the 
systems of collective security which have been forged in Asia."90
Despite their overtures of friendship, the Soviets continued to 
criticise strongly Pakistan’s membership of Western-sponsored 
military pacts. While visiting India and Afghanistan in late 1955, 
Bulganin and Khrushchev denounced Pakistan's membership of 
"aggressive" anti-Soviet alliances, with Khrushchev stating that the 
Soviets were "alarmed at the policy" of the Pakistan government 
which had "sanctioned the establishment of American military bases 
on its territory - that is, in close proximity to the borders of the 
Soviet Union", adding that, "the establishment of American military 
bases in Pakistan cannot but arouse our alarm . . . .  we have never 
supported and never shall support the parties of the Baghdad Pact or 
any other alliance directed against the Soviet Union . . ."91
Even though the Soviet leadership expressed its desire to improve 
bilateral relations with Pakistan and offered assistance, it 
emphasised that the Soviet Union could not "remain indifferent to the 
fact that some of the states bordering on it are, in conformity with 
foreign interests, entering m ilitary and political alignments 
endangering the security of the Soviet Union", and that the Soviets 
were "opponents of such military and political alignments as SEATO 
and the Baghdad Pact of which Pakistan is a party."92 At the same 
time, the Soviet media pointed out the disadvantages posed by the 
policy of alignment to Pakistan, claiming that Pakistan's 
participation in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact had "weakened" its
"position in foreign affairs” by "isolating the country from the 
international scene” and earning it the hostility of "nearly ail the 
surrounding countries" including the Middle Eastern countries, India, 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and China, and alleging that Pakistan 
had "received nothing" from its Western allies in return for its 
"political isolation".93
In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union adopted an ambivalent approach 
on the Kashmir issue. While Bulganin and Khrushchev had expressed 
complete support for India's stand, the visiting Deputy Prime 
Minister, Anastas Mikoyan had declared in Karachi, in March 1956 
that, the future of Kashmir "is not for we (s ic) to decide. That is for 
the people of Kashmir to decide."94 In August of the same year, a 
visiting Pakistani parliamentary delegation was told that the 
Soviets did not oppose the Pakistani stand on the conflict.95
Yet the Soviets could ignore neither the negative response of the 
Iskander Mirza government to Soviet offers, nor the dangers posed by 
the American military presence in Pakistan. Moreover, the Kashmir 
issue could be used to pressure the Pakistani leadership into 
abandoning or at least modifying its policy of complete alignment 
with the West, especially with regard to the granting of facilities to 
its allies.
In January 1957, Pakistan took the Kashmir dispute to the Security 
Council after the Indian government announced its decision formally 
to integrate the disputed territory into the Republic of India. At 
Pakistan's urging, an Anglo-US resolution was drafted calling for the
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implementation of the UN decision to hold a plebiscite. The Soviet 
Union at first abstained on the draft resolution, but its attitude 
changed drastically when the Anglo-US draft resolution of February
1957 called for the holding of an impartial plebiscite and advocated 
"the use of a temporary United Nations force in connection with 
demilitarization" of the disputed area.96
The Soviet representative, Sobolev proposed amendments, stating 
that "the situation in Kashmir has changed considerably" since 1948, 
and the Kashmiri people now considered "their territory an integral 
part of the Republic of India." He called for Indo-Pakistan bilateral 
negotiations on the issue "without outside interference of any sort," 
and asked for a deletion of the reference to the use of United Nations 
forces in the Kashmir region.97 When the Soviet amendments were 
defeated, the Soviet Union vetoed the Western-sponsored resolution 
on the grounds that it favored Pakistan. Sobolev added that the 
situation in Kashmir had worsened because of increased regional 
tensions, which were the consequence of Pakistan's alignment with 
the Western bloc.98 This was the first time that the Soviet Union 
had used its veto on the Kashmir issue.
An important reason for the Soviet veto was the Western proposal to 
introduce UN troops into the disputed territory since such forces 
would have been largely Western in origin, and , therefore, suspect in 
Soviet perceptions, with the UN peacekeeping forces operations in 
Korea providing an example of the use of the body by the West to 
protect and advance its interests. The Soviets claimed that the 
"ruling circles" in the US and UK were "intent on using Kashmir for
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their military preparations” and the proposed UN forces would be 
used by them as a "pretext to get control of Kashmir so as to use it 
as a military base"99 with the help of their regional ally, Pakistan.
By early 1957, the Americans had enlarged their military assistance 
programme to Pakistan,due to the increased importance of Pakistani 
territory for surveillance of the Soviet Union, through both ground 
facilities and U-2 flights. The Soviet news media therefore 
continued to put forward greatly exaggerated allegations of US 
military penetration, claiming for example, that "the American 
Department of the Army holds firmly in its hands the key of the 
command of the Pakistan Army. Representatives of this Department 
are today to be found occupying posts, as advisers and trainers, in 
the majority of units of the Pakistan Army."100 One Soviet military 
analyst claimed that in view of Pakistan’s position as one of 
America's "most important jumping-off grounds in the Middle East 
and South East Asia", extensive military construction was being 
carried out in the country "in compliance with the USA's 
dem ands".101 It was also alleged that the US had "imposed on 
Pakistan a burden of armaments which she cannot shoulder."102
Soviet accusations of the provision of bases and other facilities to 
the Americans by the Pakistani "ruling circles" increased after the 
US joined the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact in June 1957. 
Commenting on the development, the Soviet media alleged that the 
Council had discussed the "expansion of military cooperation among 
member countries, under American supervision" as well as a 
programme for the "expansion of foreign bases on (the territories of)
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Asian members of the Baghdad Pact and plans to create an extensive 
network of radar stations and military roads and airfields" near the 
Soviet Union's southern borders.103
The Soviets made numerous allegations, as a continuation of their 
propaganda campaign to discredit the alliances, that Pakistan had 
agreed to the construction of US military bases, partly with the aim 
of dissuading the Pakistanis from granting such facilities. Despite 
the lack of any evidence to substantiate their claims, they alleged, 
for example, that US bases were to be located at Nowshera in West 
Pakistan, Gilgit in Kashmir and Chittagong and Chalna in East 
Pakistan.104 A Soviet analyst claimed that missile sites were being 
constructed at Quetta, Gilgit and Peshawar, while airfields were 
"being reconstructed and new ones built at Karachi, Kohat, Peshawar, 
Gilgit, Quetta, Risalpur and Sargodha" under "American supervision." 
These "military preparations near the Soviet frontier", he added, 
were "certainly not evidence of the Pakistani leaders' peaceful 
intentions."105
On 14 April 1958, the Soviet Union sent a formal protest note to 
Pakistan, accusing it of allowing the construction of American 
launching pads, military installations and modern airfields. The note 
threatened Pakistan that in view of the "geographical proximity of 
Pakistan to the Soviet borders . . . grave consequences will inevitably 
await Pakistan if its territory is allowed for the establishment of 
(foreign) military bases for the purposes of using them against the 
Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries." It added that, "In 
case of aggressive actions against the USSR, the latter will be
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forced to use all the means at its disposal to launch a counterblow 
upon the aggressor as well as upon the aggressor's bases on foreign 
te rrito ries ."1 06
In an equally hardhitting and hostile reply, on 24 May 1958, the 
Pakistan government emphasised the " purely defensive . . . intent 
and character" of the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts. Denying the 
existence of foreign bases and facilities in Pakistan, the note 
pointed out that "the USSR has all types of military bases and 
weapons on her territory, several of them in close proximity to 
Pakistan and the Soviet Union's note indicates clearly the danger 
which this can give rise to", adding that "Pakistan . . . reserves the 
right to take all steps on her territory necessary for her own safety". 
The Pakistan government also strongly criticised the Soviet veto on 
the Kashmir issue in the Security Council.107 The Pakistani 
leadership therefore made it amply clear that it was unwilling either 
to succumb to Soviet pressure or even to meet the Soviets halfway 
and rejecting both Soviet overtures and warnings, continued its 
policy of alignment with the West.
The Closing Davs of the Parliamentary Era
The central government's decision to opt for alignment had internal 
as well as external implications. Internal opposition, especially in 
the East wing, was steadily growing to both the domestic and foreign 
policy directions of the Mirza regime. In late 1955, the leader of the 
more moderate faction of the Awami League, H. S. Suhrawardy, had 
agreed to head an Awami League-Republican Party coalition
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government at the Centre. This split the Awami League; Maulana 
Bhashani and other left-leaning politicians formed the National 
Awami Party (NAP) in 1957. The NAP stood for provincial autonomy, 
dismemberment of the One Unit scheme, withdrawal from the 
Western-sponsored alliances, and the improvement of relations with 
the Eastern bloc.108
The Soviet Union welcomed the emergence of opposition within 
Pakistan which gave them the opportunity to denounce the 
pro-Western government, and to claim that their opposition to 
Pakistan's participation in the pacts was supported by Pakistani 
"progressive" forces. The Soviet news media pointed out that there 
was "Deep dissatisfaction with the country's foreign policy" which 
had now "broken into the open"; that "Broad circles of the Pakistani 
public consider a policy of membership in Western-sponsored pacts 
inflicts tremendous harm on the interests of the country" and was 
"fraught with dangerous consequences." The government was 
presented as "blindly following the aggressive policies of the 
Western powers" which were "directed towards subjugating Pakistan 
to the USA’s agggressive plans."109 The decision to form the NAP 
was welcomed, as a party which "united the democratic forces in 
both parts of the country." The Soviet media further commented 
tha t, desp ite  Pakistan 's m em bership of aggressive 
Western-sponsored pacts, there were still "progressive forces" 
working to free the country from the imperialist yoke and take it 
towards "freedom and true independence."110
The Soviet support to India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and
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Pakhtunistan issues contrasted with the failure of Pakistan's 
Western allies to provide similar support to Pakistan's stand on 
these regional conflicts and therefore led to growing internal 
opposition to the foreign policy of the Mirza regime. Following the 
lukewarm expressions of support in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact 
Council meetings in March 1956, several members of the National 
Assembly severely attacked the government's policy of alignment as 
unproductive .111 The Suez crisis gave a further impetus to the 
domestic discontent, with pro-Egyptian and anti-Western rallies 
held throughout the country. But while the West Pakistanis 
condemned the government's support to Great Britain and France in an 
attack against a brotherly Muslim country, the East Pakistani 
opposition focussed its attack on the dangers posed by Western 
imperialism, and demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO.112
The denunciation of the alliances by the opposition in the East wing 
had several causes. There was a pronounced lack of interest in the 
Middle East, an area far removed geographically from East 
Pakistan.113 And the East Pakistanis were aware that the benefits 
of Western sponsored alliances did not extend to the eastern wing.
American assistance under MDAA was allocated for the development 
of military installations in West Pakistan near the Soviet southern 
borders, and for the expansion of West Pakistani Military Assistance 
Programme forces which were to play a role in US regional 
strategies. According to the terms of the agreement, the Pakistan 
government had to give first priority to the MAP forces, even in
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domestic defence spending, over the troops stationed elsewhere, 
including East Pakistan.114
The East Pakistanis were equally disgruntled with the continuing 
increase in domestic defence expenditure on the expanded and 
modernized military establishment based in the West wing. East 
Pakistan's representation in the military remained very low, nor was 
any attention paid to the development of its defence infrastructure. 
The High Command continued to justify the ethnic composition of the 
Armed Forces by perpetuating the British myth of the martial races. 
It also attempted to justify the neglect of East Pakistani defence on 
the grounds that the defence of the East lay in the West. In June
1956, for instance, C-in-C Ayub Khan declared that, "The defence of 
East Pakistan does not lie in that part of the country. So long as 
Western base (s ic) is not strong, it remains indefensible."115
It was, however, quite obvious that the gross underrepresentation of 
Bengalis in the Armed Forces and the low priority given to East 
Pakistani defence worked to the advantage of the West-based 
military establishment. According to a Pakistani defence strategist, 
"The wing that manned the military would not only be more powerful 
but also more prosperous, monopolizing the nation's large reservoir 
of manpower and employment and its attendent benefits." Thus the 
policy meant that the West Pakistani Military High Command 
consolidated its internal position, while the Bengalis were "deprived 
of their due share in the use, enjoyment and application of state 
authority."116
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MILITARY ELITE IN PAKISTAN IN 1955 
(NO. OF OFFICERS)117
Service East West
Army 24 894
Navy 7 593
Air Force 22_____________ §4Q
S3__________2JL2Z
DEFENCE TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS IN PAKISTAN
IN FEBRUARY 1957118
Service East West
Army 1 12
Navy Nil 3
Air Force 1______________ 15
2____________ 2Q
The continued neglect of the East wing's defence, and of demands for 
equitable representation in the Services, increased resentment in 
East Pakistan, with Bengali politicians accusing the government of 
deliberately perpetuating the dependence of the East on the West. 
There was also increased criticism by East Pakistani delegates in 
the Parliament of the mounting internal defence expenditure.119
The East Pakistani opposition in the National Assembly was, 
however, in no position to challenge the central government's control 
over either domestic or foreign policy making. The more numerous 
Bengalis had only equal representation in the Assembly since 
elections were held on the basis of "parity" between East and West 
Pakistan. In any case, by the terms of the 1956 Constitution the 
President could convene, close or dissolve the National Assembly, 
send back bills to it, and issue ordinances when it was not in 
session.120 Moreover, the members were indirectly elected by less
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than 15 per cent of the electorate, so many of them were unsure of a 
popular base and willingly aligned themselves with the "official 
party".121 Real power therefore lay with the head of state and his 
close associates, with the backing of the civil-m ilitary 
bureaucracies.
President Mirza and his coterie controlled the political arena, 
bringing into power and ousting one coalition Ministry after another. 
There were four short-lived coalition Ministries during the Mirza 
years. The first Muslim League Ministry was replaced by a 
Republican Party-Awami League coalition in 1955, followed thirteen 
months later by a Muslim League-Republican Party coalition which 
lasted only thirty-five days, and was followed in turn by a 
Republican Party-Awami League coalition in December 1957. The 
situation in the provinces was no better as the Centre made and 
unmade Ministries.
The shifting political alignments within the National and Provincial 
Assemblies and the internal tussles for power as one Prime Minister 
replaced another brought the political parties and their leadership 
into public contempt. Yet this edifice of unrepresentative 
institutions was not of their making. It had been deliberately 
created and perpetuated by the head of state, with the support of the 
military and bureaucracy.
As the powerless factions in the legislature were manipulated by the 
executive, the military was steadily gaining in strength. The central 
government’s use of the "external threat" to justify its internal and
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external policies also legitimised the Armed Forces' demands for 
defence funding and enhanced the military's status in the "garrison 
state" mentality engulfing Pakistan.122 The policy of alignment had 
expanded and modernized the Armed Forces, raising their morale and 
strengthening their domestic power position.
The major aid donor, the US, was in fact aware that "Pakistan's main 
reason for devoting more than a quarter of its budget to defence, and 
seeking additional US arms is not to protect the country against a 
Soviet and Communist Chinese attack, for which Pakistan's resources 
will never be sufficient, nor to maintain internal security for which 
the present military establishment is excessive." The Americans 
assessed that although "every Pakistani move in military expediture 
has been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian 
military development, it may also be true that the Pakistan army has 
developed as a pressure group to the point that regardless of Indian 
developments, it might continue to have priority over economic 
development for appropriations."123
This enlarged military establishment became more and more 
important in the internal context, as President Mirza continued to 
depend heavily on the military to maintain internal security and to 
tackle domestic crises such as the anti-famine and anti-smuggling 
operations of 1956 and 1957.
In the anti-famine operation of 1956, "Operation Service Firsts food 
distribution in the East wing was handed over to the Army, with 
near-famine conditions prevailing there.124 The military set up a
209
Command and Control Centre in Dacca, and was given unprecedented 
civil powers by the provincial administration. The food situation 
was soon brought under control but, according to General Fazal 
Muqeem, the Army was "abruptly withdrawn" since its "efficiency in 
tackling this problem created political jealousies" and the situation 
once again deteriorated.125
In '’Operation Close Door", which commenced on 18 June 1957, the 
Army was called in to control the widespread smuggling from East 
Pakistan into India, and was, once again, given wide-ranging civil 
powers. A military source claims that the Army soon brought the 
situation under control but the central government terminated the 
operation under political pressure and so deprived the military of the 
opportunity of striking at the root of the problem.126 According to a 
Pakistani political analyst, however, East Pakistani opponents of the 
military's intervention in politics tried to wind up Operation Close 
Door, but it went "on and on" and "because powerful interest groups 
were opposed to terminating it, its ending required a major political 
push from most east wing politicians."127
In these operations the military not only acquired first-hand 
knowledge of running civil government, but also felt that it was 
more efficient and organised than the corrupt civil administration. 
As the civil government "de facto abrogated much of its 
responsibility to the military" states an authoritative source, the 
"Army mind - especially of those in appointments that mattered - 
had come to accept and expect that the Army as a whole could take 
on any and every problem of the State."128 The Military High
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Command now began to think of replacing the political chaos and 
indiscipline of civil administration by the "good government" of the 
Armed Forces.129
As political conditions steadily deteriorated, by 1957 the military 
operated autonomously of central government control and all "major 
policy decisions made by the Commander-in-Chief" were "invariably 
accepted by the Government." Within the institution, Ayub had 
become the "final arbiter in all transfers, promotions, 
administration and logistics support" of the Army. The Military High 
Command was largely composed of "King's Men" as Ayub "placed 
innocuous officers in key positions" while his subordinates saw that 
"they had to be careful and conform. Those who did not conform left, 
or had to leave, the Army and others learned their lesson."130
Having consolidated his position, Ayub now began to sound out his 
constituency, the Armed Forces, on the possibilities of a military 
takeover. From 1954 to 1957, the C-in-C undertook extended tours 
of both wings of the country, visiting Army units and conversing 
with senior military personnel, a "part of his showing the 
flag-and-himself programme."131
During his tour of the East wing in 1957, Ayub revealed his 
willingness to take over power, piously stating, "If the people want 
me, I shall not shirk my duty."132 He then held discussions with 
senior military commanders and bureaucrats in the West wing. At 
the Army's Divisional Commanders' Conference in Rawalpindi in April 
1957, for example, Ayub was approached by a number of generals who
urged a military takeover in view of the "unsettled" political 
conditions in the country.133
By early 1958, opposition to President Mirza's domestic and foreign 
policies assumed serious proportions, especially in the East wing. 
The criticism of the government's foreign policy directions was the 
result of several factors. These included the setback to Pakistan's 
Kashmir stand from the Soviet Security Council veto of 1957, the 
continued deterioration of relations with India and Afghanistan, the 
pronounced hostility of the Eastern bloc, and the isolation of 
Pakistan from the Middle Eastern Muslim countries because of its 
participation in the pacts and its pro-Western stance on the Suez 
crisis.
In a bid to stem the growing internal opposition both within and 
outside the national and provincial legislatures,134 the central 
government tried to pressure the West into providing Pakistan with 
support against India. For example, Prime Minister Noon declared 
that, "Our people, if they find their freedom threatened by Bharat 
(India), will break all pacts and will shake hands with people whom 
we have made enemies because of others."135
Dissatisfaction with the government's domestic policy also grew due 
to the steady decline in the country's economic position. The US aid 
received was insufficient to prop up the ailing economy.136 
Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves reached a new low and an 
agricultural slump led to acute food shortages. The Mirza 
government proved totally incapable of handling the chaotic
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economic conditions in the country as industrial strife and urban and 
rural unrest became the order of the day.
Realising that elections were unavoidable in view of the hardening of 
the stance of the opposition, President Mirza finally scheduled 
national elections for 15 February 1959.137 Yet Mirza was also 
aware that his chances of re-election were slim if general elections 
were held on the basis of a universal franchise, in view of his 
growing unpopularity and the lack of credibility of his Republican 
P a rty .138 Mirza therefore began to explore the possibilities of 
joining hands with the military to formalise an authoritarian system 
of government.139
The military was as disinclined as the President to see free and fair 
elections held at a time when domestic and foreign policy were being 
attacked by an increasingly popular political opposition; for the 
military they spelled a grave threat to the institution. Greater East 
Pakistani participation in government could have threatened the 
military's demands on the economy, led to an increase in Bengali 
representation in the Armed Forces and even to questioning of the 
national defence strategy, which gave priority to the West wing, and 
could have endangered the policy of alignment which had provided the 
military with material benefits and corresponded with their 
anti-Soviet and pro-Western orientations.
The Military High Command was, in any case, opposed to 
parliamentary democracy. Ayub observed that, "The politicians . . . 
are trying to get back in power by hook or by crook. And having got
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there they know that they will have nothing to show for themselves 
except working for the disruption of the country further. In that 
case they will come face to face with the army and me . . .  . they have 
all been tried and found wanting. I am now certain that if the country 
is left to them we should expect nothing but ruin . . . .  It seems that 
we shall have to have a system of government for a generation or so 
which prepares the country for democracy and solves some of our 
major problems. Under the present Constitution, no one seems to 
have any power except to destroy discipline and to do harm."14Y He 
also had a personal stake in preventing the politicians from coming 
back into power. Ayub had been given a two-year extension in June
1958 and it was likely that an elected government would ask him to 
re tire .141
The President and the C-in-C were therefore in agreement that 
general elections must not be held. When Ayub was approached by 
Mirza, in July 1958, to stage a military coup, he could see that Mirza 
was "desperate and cornered."142 As the Army grew in "strength and 
power" while the civil government began to lose its hold, the "tail 
started to wag the dog."143 The initiative was now in the hands of 
the Armed Forces.
As tensions increased in the East wing, scuffles in the Provincial 
Assembly became the order of the day. In one such incident in 
September 1958, the Speaker of the Assembly was injured and the 
substitute Deputy Speaker, who was also attacked, died a few days 
later from his injuries. This episode provided the C-in-C with the 
opportunity to call upon the Military High Command to prepare a plan
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for a military takeover. Under his instructions, the Chief of General 
Staff drew a tactical outline of the proposed military coup d'etat, 
and Ayub approved it in the last week of September.144
The outbreak of a "rebellion’1 in Kalat in early October 1958 provided 
the military with yet another opportunity to justify the proposed 
takeover, when the Army took action to suppress what the 
government claimed was an attempt by the Khan of Kalat to renounce 
his allegiance to Pakistan, calling upon Afghanistan for 
assistance.145
At 9 pm, on 7 October, President Iskander Mirza, at the direction of 
the C-in-C, issued a proclamation declaring Martial Law throughout 
the country, abrogating the 1956 Constitution, dissolving the central 
and provincial Ministries and legislatures, banning political parties 
and appointing Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.146
On the morning of 8 October 1958, military personnel took control of 
key positions in Karachi and the nation was informed about the coup 
d 'é ta t.147 With the successful implementation of the coup and the 
abrogation of the Constitution, Iskander Mirza "was entirely at the 
mercy of the authority that mattered - the Commander of the Army." 
The military now held "supreme power in the country."148
Summary:
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The final blow to parliamentary democracy in Pakistan was dealt by 
the government of Iskander Mirza, who institutionalised his control 
over the political arena by the 1956 Constitution, and controlled 
governments and the powerless legislature with the support of the 
civil and military bureaucracies. The nature of the partnership 
between the President and the Military High Command slowly changed 
as a result of both internal and external factors.
The main external factor was the country's membership of bilateral 
and multilateral security arrangements with the Western bloc. The 
Pakistan military's successful efforts to align Pakistan with the 
West now paid the expected dividends, as the main beneficiary of 
alignment was the Armed Forces. As US military aid began to pour 
into the country, the military rapidly grew in size and strength 
vis-a-vis all other political forces in the country. Another result of 
the policy was the development of close links between the US and 
Pakistan military establishments, a factor which was to play a 
major part in determining Pakistan's future foreign .policy directions.
While the morale and might of the Armed Forces was boosted by 
Pakistan's participation in the pacts, Pakistan-Soviet relations 
continued to deteriorate. Pakistan's membership of the pacts also 
led to an increase in regional tensions, with a noticeable decline in 
its relations with India and Afghanistan. There was now a shift in 
regional alignments as the hitherto neutral Soviets began to actively 
support India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan.
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Pakistan was now faced with the security predicament of hostile 
neighbours along its borders, backed by an equally antagonised Soviet 
Union, while its Western allies were unwilling to extend similar 
support to it. The Pakistan civil and military leadership, however, 
continued to ignore both Soviet overtures of friendship and warnings, 
and opted instead for even closer ties with the West, which included 
the provision of military facilities to the US on Pakistani soil.
Pakistan's policy of alignment was not only condemned by its 
neighbours and the Soviet Union; there was also growing 
dissatisfaction within the country, especially in the East wing, with 
both the government's repressive internal policies and a foreign 
policy which had earned Pakistan external hostility but provided no 
tangible benefits in return.
As the opposition within Pakistan intensified and demands for 
general elections grew, an apprehensive President turned towards 
the military for support. Unwilling to accept a democratic change of 
government, the Military High Command decided to take action. The 
parliamentary era in Pakistan came to an abrupt close with the 
military coup d'etat in October 1958.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARTIAL LAW IN PAKISTAN (1958-1962)
The Armed Forces of Pakistan had slowly consolidated their position 
throughout the turbulent years of parliamentary rule. With the coup 
of 8 October 1958, the military, represented by Army 
Commander-in-Chief Ayub Khan, was to assume complete control 
over all political power in the land.
The takeover was to have considerable implications for Pakistan's 
internal politics and foreign policy. In the internal context, the 
military, abandoning its "apolitical" claims, would institute measures 
aimed at legitimising and consolidating its hold over power. In the 
external sphere, the military, which had previously played a 
significant role in shaping foreign policy, had now emerged as the 
key decision making force in the country. Henceforth, the course of 
Pakistan's foreign policy in general, and Pakistan-Soviet relations in 
particular, was to be determined by the orientation, interests and 
requirements of the Armed Forces.
Cqup i n. ..Pakistan
On 7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza imposed martial law, 
abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dismissed the Cabinet and 
dissolved the legislature. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
Ayub Khan, was appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)
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and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Justifying the 
promulgation of military rule, Mirza placed all blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the political leadership, accusing them of bringing 
Pakistan to the brink of disaster. Martial Law, he said, was the only 
option left to save the country.1 In his proclamation of 8 October, 
Ayub stressed that the Armed Forces had been forced to step in 
because of the failure of the politicians to run the administration 
effectively and honestly. The military had taken over power "with 
great reluctance" and "with the fullest conviction that there was no 
alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of 
the country."2
The official justifications of the 1958 coup are echoed by Pakistani 
military sources who claim that "martial law's raison d'etre and 
vindication arose largely from the inability of the leaders of the 
public opinion to direct and control public affairs effectively"3 and 
Ayub Khan was forced to take over to save the country from virtual 
d e s tru c tio n .4 Similar explanations are put forward by a large 
number of Pakistani and Western analysts who argue that the 
"infrastructure of democracy" was not properly developed in Pakistan 
and a "ruthless scramble for power among the politicians made the 
constitutional government a farce".5 This failure of the political 
leadership led to a "constitutional vacuum" and the apolitical 
military "was sucked . . . into the vacuum resulting from the 
country's political bankruptcy".6 Since the military had been 
"forced" to intervene to "prevent" a further worsening of the crisis of 
the state, the coup was an example of "reactive militarism", i.e. 
when the political behaviour of armies is "generated by the weakness
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of civilian institutions and the direct pressure of civilian groups” 
seeking to co-opt the military, rather than "designed militarism", 
when armies possess "the positive and premeditated intent to 
intervene in domestic politics and to follow expansionist foreign 
po lic ies".7
These analyses of the developments in Pakistan do not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the role of the military in overthrowing 
the civil government. It is true that the leadership involved in the 
changing coalitions at the centre was unrepresentative, corrupt and 
greedy for the spoils of office. Yet the military had, for their own 
se lf-in terest, worked hand-in-glove with the bureaucracy in 
supporting and perpetuating that entire facade of undemocratic 
ins titu tions .
Moreover, Janowitz's description of "designed militarism" seems a 
fair description of the military's role in politics. The discussion in 
the earlier chapters shows that an ambitious High Command had, over 
a considerable period of time, adopted deliberate and "premeditated" 
policies aimed at expanding the strength and influence of the Armed 
Forces. Army Chief Ayub had even expressed his intention to usurp 
the civil leadership should the military's corporate interests be 
threatened in any way.8 While the Armed Forces had, on the one 
hand, played a vital role in directing the course of domestic politics, 
on the other the Military High Command had also helped shape a 
foreign policy aimed at serving the requirements of the forces.
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As the military and the bureaucracy throttled the growth of 
democratic institutions, pursuing policies aimed at enhancing their 
internal influence, domestic dissatisfaction began to increase.9 
This unrest became a real threat as elections approached in
1959,with a real possibility of leftist parties, opposed to both the 
internal and external policy directions of the civil and military 
bureaucracies, gaining power. Realising that drastic action was 
needed to neutralise this threat, the Military High Command opted to 
overthrow the civil government. Having taken over power, they then 
justified this divergence from the ''apolitical" character of the forces 
by blaming selfish and corrupt politicians for their failure to run the 
country efficiently and effectively.10
In the aftermath of the coup, the immediate task for the Military 
High Command was to find grounds and take measures for 
legitim ising and consolidating their internal position. One 
legitimising strategy was an emphasis on the popular acceptance of 
the coup. It was stressed that the change was not only bloodless and 
peaceful, but that it was given a seal of legitimacy by the 
large-scale support for the takeover and the dissolution of the 
decaying parliamentary system. According to military sources, "not 
even a shot was fired and not even a baton charge made" during the 
coup, and Ayub Khan was "hailed as a real Messiah . . ."11 The Army 
itself was "sparingly used and the extensive deployment of troops 
was neither planned or carried out" since it was rightly anticipated 
that the people would welcome the change.12
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It is true that there was no show of support in favour of the 
unpopular and unrepresentative politic ians involved in the 
short-lived coalitions in the centre. But while there had been hopes 
of electing a popular leadership in the forthcoming polls, there was 
no organised resistance to the coup. This was, however, less due to 
the popularity and "benign"13 nature of martial law, and more the 
result of measures taken to suppress any outburst of opposition, 
including the arrest of a number of leading politicians and the 
issuing of a number of punitive Martial Law Regulations (MLRs).14
While the military consolidated its power through the use of force, 
at the same time it was claimed that the Armed Forces, which had 
reluctantly intervened in politics, remained an apolitical and 
professional force; that the coup was not an attempt to 
institutionalise military rule and that the new government fully 
intended to reintroduce democracy once political stability had been 
established. It was therefore argued that, "The army was popularly 
credited with bringing about the revolution. But it was not a 
revolution by the army: neither was it a conspiracy nor even a coup 
d'état, since the army never revolted nor raised the standard of 
rebellion. True to its training and its ideals it had stood firm and 
loyal. It was simply called in to save the country from further 
ru in."15
In order to ensure continuity with the existing administrative 
structure, the military regime promulgated the Continuance in Force 
Order, 1958, whereby Pakistan would continue to be governed, as far
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as possible, in accordance with the abrogated Constitution of 1956. 
At the same time, however, the acts of Martial Law authorities could 
not be challenged in civil courts, and the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Constitution remained in abeyance. On 27 October
1958, the Supreme Court gave the regime legal sanction, declaring 
that "a successful coup d'état is an internationally recognised legal 
method of changing a Constitution."16
Differences, however, soon emerged within the ruling group as 
President Mirza attempted to challenge the control of CMLA Ayub 
Khan. According to an informed source, Mirza had been appointed 
President in the new set-up in order to provide the coup "a cloak of 
legality", while real power rested with the military authorities.17 
Mirza was forced to resign and Ayub took over the post of President, 
while retaining the position of CMLA. He retained the Cabinet formed 
by Mirza on 27 October, which included Lt General Azam Kham as 
Minister for Rehabilitation and Lt Generals W.A. Burki and K.M. Sheikh 
as Health and Social Welfare and Interior Ministers respectively. 
Two former bureaucrats, M. Shoaib and F.M. Khan were given the 
portfolios of Finance and Communications and a number of other 
civilian figures were also included in the Cabinet.18
The inclusion of former bureaucrats in the new Cabinet was an 
indication of the importance of the civil servants in the martial law 
government. Bureaucrats had, in fact, been closely associated with 
the regime from the very start. A senior civil servant, Aziz Ahmed, 
had been made Secretary-General in the government and DMLA 
(Deputy Martial Law Administrator) and the Advisory Committee
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formed on 8 October included Aziz Ahmed and Secretaries of 
central government Ministries.19
The cooperation of the bureaucrats was necessary for an efficient 
running of the civil administration, but their position was definitely 
that of junior partners. The military made policy, while the 
bureacracy was given the task of implementing it.20 Although a 
general withdrawal order was given on 10 and 11 November to all 
troops to resume peacetime posts and cease from "assisting civilian 
authorities", the military continued to be the supreme law of the 
land.21
M ilitary o fficers were granted senior posts in the civil 
administration. The military authorities were willing to allow the 
bureaucracy a measure in power-sharing in return for complete 
cooperation, but at the same time the threat of dismissal was 
constantly held over the heads of the civil servants.22 Screening 
committees were set up in November 1958 to enquire into the past 
conduct of government servants and more than 16,000 were either 
summarily dismissed or retired on charges ranging from inefficiency 
to corruption.23 The bureaucrats, therefore, had little choice but to 
cooperate.
It was clear that the military, represented by its Supreme 
Commander, was now in complete and absolute control over all 
political power in the state. "In assuming the presidency of 
Pakistan", Ayub Khan had become "its chief executive; by keeping the 
title of Martial Law Administrator, he also remained chief lawmaker
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and chief justice; and by not giving up command of the armed forces, 
he performed his multifarious duties with the authority of the 
military arm."24>
Military Rule and Foreign Policy
The military government made it very clear that there would be no 
change in foreign policy. Pakistan would remain a Western ally and 
as strongly opposed to the Soviet bloc as in the past. In his takeover 
address on 7 October, President Mirza stated, "we shall continue to 
follow a policy which our interests and geography demand", adding 
that, "we shall honour all our international commitments which . . . 
we have undertaken to safeguard the security of Pakistan and, as a 
peace-loving nation, to play our part in averting the danger of war in 
this troubled world." Although he declared his intention "to have 
friendly relations with all nations", including the Soviet Union, 
accusing "po litica l adventurers" for the "bad blood and 
misunderstanding" between Pakistan and the communist bloc, the 
emphasis of his speech was on a reiteration of Pakistan's need for 
security links with the West.25 After Mirza's ouster, Ayub Khan also 
strongly expressed his desire to strengthen and consolidate 
Pakistan's ties with the Western bloc. In his first major public 
address on foreign policy on 25 December 1958, Ayub declared that, 
"We shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steady, 
reliable friends."26
The decision of the Martial Law Administration to opt for continued 
alignment with the West was not unexpected. The officer corps was
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strongly hostile to the communist bloc and inherently conservative 
in its orientation. The military, represented by the Army Chief, had 
played a major role in negotiating Pakistan's alignment with the 
West. Participation in the alliances had, in turn, reinforced the 
military's pro-Western and anti-Soviet views, as they were "exposed 
to the full weight of the American military", including training, 
military doctrines and indoctrination.27 In the Pakistani military's 
perception, the Soviet Union's regional objective remained the 
acquisition of warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and to spread 
communist thought. "Her overall aim remains the spread of 
Communism by subversion and economic bribery. All her efforts are 
geared towards the achievement of that aim by encouraging 
neutralism and anti-W est elem ents."28 While "Communism's 
vanguard is busy feeling soft spots all over the world", the "main 
defence for countries like Pakistan is the protection offered by 
collective security schemes", since CENTO and SEATO alone can 
"prevent any further communist penetration either through 
subversion or direct aggression" and save Pakistan "from the mightly 
steamroller of Russia."29
It must be stressed that the military had been the chief beneficiary 
of the policy of alignment, receiving substantial military assistance 
which had modernized and enlarged the establishment and 
strengthened its position in the internal arena. It was, therefore, of 
the utmost importance to ensure a continued supply of such 
assistance from the West. Hence the threat posed to a continuity of 
this foreign policy by leftist forces in the run up to elections was a 
major factor in the military's decision to take over power in October
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In the aftermath of the coup, Ayub and his military colleagues were 
in an advantageous position to consolidate Pakistan's participation in 
the Western alliance system, since they were now in complete 
control of both the domestic and foreign policy making processes. 
Ayub's anti-Soviet and pro-American leanings were well known. It 
was therefore not surprising that in his first address to his Cabinet, 
he declared that, "there is only one embassy as far as I am concerned 
and that is the American embassy."30
The Americans expressed little concern about the imposition of 
military rule in Pakistan, and soon after extended moral and material 
assistance to the new government. Some Pakistani analysts allege 
that the "primary reason for the coup was the overriding desire of 
the United States to protect its interests . . ."31 threatened by 
anti-Western sentiments gaining strength on the verge of elections 
in Pakistan. Hence the coup was "inflicted on the people of Pakistan 
by a military-bureaucratic complex with the connivance of the 
Central Intelligence Agency."32 While it is difficult to assess the 
level of American involvement in the coup, it cannot be ruled out 
that the US government had been given some indication of the 
impending changeover by Ayub Khan.
The US State Department and Pentagon had close and cordial ties 
with Army Chief Ayub Khan, and the Military High Command had, on 
several occasions in the past, chosen to bypass the civil authorities 
in its negotiations with American authorities. Within Pakistan, the
1958.
246
US MAAG was in "close daily contact with the GHQ" and the 
Americans had "access to nearly everything worth knowing" about the 
Armed Forces.33
In the fateful months preceding the coup, Ayub had remained in close 
touch with the American administration, assuring it, both publicly 
and privately, of his personal commitment to the policy of alignment. 
In April-May 1958, Ayub paid an official visit to the US, where he 
held lengthy informal discussions with senior Pentagon and State 
Department officials, including the Service Chiefs, "regarding our 
problems", warning them that "leftist forces" were gaining strength 
and if Pakistan went to the polls, "in that situation, the leftist 
forces would win."34 On his return home, Ayub declared that he was 
"fully satisfied" with the outcome of his talks.35
A few days before the coup, a high-powered American delegation, 
headed by Defence Secretary Neil McElroy, accompanied by the Chief 
of MAAG, Brigadier General Mercer Walters, and the Vice-Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral James N. Russell, arrived in Pakistan. 
During the trip, the Defence Secretary held several meetings with 
both President Mirza and Ayub and returned home on 26 October, a 
day before the coup took place. Commenting later on the 
developments in Pakistan to the US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, he stated, "I am inclined to believe well of our friends."36 
The then Pakistani Air Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, later 
observed that, "Knowing Iskander Mirza's and Ayub Khan's strong 
leanings towards the United States and Great Britain, it is my belief 
that the coup . . . was carried out with the knowledge of, if not
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encouragement from, the governments of these two countries."37
When Ayub took over the Presidency from Mirza, the Americans did 
not withdraw their support, since Ayub had "good contacts with the 
people in the Pentagon" as well as with the Eisenhower 
Administration as a whole. According to Asghar, Ayub in fact 
enjoyed "the full confidence and increasing support of the United 
States", which increased its economic and military assistance to 
Pakistan to help "strengthen Ayub Khan's position at home."38
The coup in Pakistan had come at an opportune time for the US, due to 
developments in the Middle East in 1958. The July 1958 coup, which 
had led to Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, had seriously 
undermined the future of US-sponsored regional collective security 
schemes. In the London Declaration issued on 28 July 1958 at the 
conclusion of a meeting of the remaining Baghdad Pact states, the US 
had stressed its determination to increase military assistance to its 
regional allies, and also declared its willingness to enter into 
agreements with Pact members aimed at shoring up their territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.39
In a show of confidence in the stability of the Ayub regime, the 
Eisenhower Administration continued its negotiations with Pakistan 
in late 1958 and early 1959 on implementing the objectives of the 
London Declaration. Similar exchanges were held with Iran and 
Turkey, and as a result of these parleys the US entered into identical 
Bilateral Defence Agreements with the three countries on 5 March
1959.
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Article One of the US-Pakistan Agreement stated that,"In the case of 
aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of 
America, in accordance with the Constitution" of the US "will take 
appropriate action, including the use of armed force, as may be 
mutually agreed upon, and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to 
Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the 
Government of Pakistan at its request." Article Two gave assurances 
of greater American economic and military assistance to Pakistan to 
assist it "in the preservation of its national independence and 
integrity . . "40
The Ayub government was pleased with the agreement, presenting it 
as proof that the US regarded Pakistan as a valuable ally, and 
emphasising that the preamble of the Pact stated that the 
"Government of the United States of America regards as vital to its 
national interest and to world peace, the preservation of the 
independence and integrity of Pakistan."41 What was of even more 
importance were American assurances of enhanced military aid, 
which were essential if the regime was to consolidate its internal 
position with the full backing of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the 
agreement was also used to obtain internal legitimacy. Since the 
text did not specify that American assistance would be provided for 
a communist threat alone, the military government was quick to 
imply that it had succeeded, as no other government in the past, in 
obtaining American pledges of assistance in the event of any type of 
aggression, including potential aggression from neighbouring India.42
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While the military coup had resulted in strengthening Pakistan's 
relations with the West, it was to have an adverse effect on 
Pakistan-Soviet relations. By 1958, the growing internal opposition 
to the unrepresentative political structure was accompanied by 
increasing criticism of the policy of siding with the West in the Cold 
War. As elections grew closer, criticism of Pakistan's participation 
in the Western-sponsored collective security schemes also grew, and 
leftist parties, such as the NAP, made repeated calls for an 
improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.
The October coup put an end to this debate on foreign policy as the 
m ilitary government moved quickly to suppress all internal 
dissension and concentrated its attention on consolidation of ties 
with the West. Hence the Soviet reaction to the coup was, not 
surprisingly, hostile. A strong attack was launched, questioning the 
legitimacy of the new regime. Soviet analysts claimed that 
reactionary forces, headed by the military, had taken over power in 
an effort to crush the increasingly popular progressive forces, 
including NAP, fighting for "genuine independence and democratic 
liberties." It was also alleged that the coup had taken place with the 
active connivance of the US government. The coup "occurred with US 
approval and was specifically aimed at squashing growing political 
discontent" resulting both from "the deteriorating economic 
situation" and the opposition to participation in the pacts.43 In his 
report to the Twenty-first CPSU Congress, Khrushchev claimed that 
the Pakistani military coup was a clear indicator that "an attack is 
developing against the democratic gains of peoples who have won 
national independence."44
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The Soviet leadership and media strongly condemned the Ayub 
administration's attempts to forge closer ties with the West, both in 
bilateral dealings and by continued participation in SEATO and CENTO. 
Soviet criticism became more severe as the Pakistanis began 
negotiations on a bilateral military pact with the US in late 1958. 
Soviet commentators claimed that the "projected new military 
agreement" created "a threat to India and Afghanistan, adding to the 
general tension in the Middle East." It was also alleged that the 
negotiations included provisions on the establishment of US bases in 
Pakistan. The Soviets pointed out that "concerned for the security of 
its southern borders . . . the Soviet Union cannot look with 
indifference on the military negotiations." At the same time, strong 
warnings were issued to the Pakistanis to refrain from "playing with 
fire." 45
The Soviets also linked their criticism of the Pakistani government's 
foreign policy with its domestic politics. Thus, for example, it was 
claimed that the proposed pact would harm, "above all, the vital 
interests" of the Pakistani people, since it would expose the country 
"to the danger of retaliatory blows", but the clique responsible for 
negotiating the pact had "little concern for the national interests" of 
the people, and hoped that "foreign policemen" would help them keep 
the population "under their heel."46
On 26 December 1958, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires presented an aide 
memoire to Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, seeking clarifications on 
the US-Pakistani negotiations. The Soviet note emphasised that such
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a pact would "complicate the situation in Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East", a region which lay "in the immediate proximity to the 
Soviet Union." Hence events there "affect - and are bound to affect - 
its security interests." The Pakistan government was strongly 
warned about the dangers inherent in its foreign policy directions, 
and in particular against allowing foreign powers, hostile to the 
Soviet Union, to set up bases on its soil.47
In its reply to the Soviet note on 7 January 1959, the Pakistani 
government strongly rejected the contention that the proposed 
agreement "would involve Pakistan in military ventures of third 
powers which would adversely affect the interests of any country in 
the neighbourhood because the purpose of the agreement is purely 
defensive." It was stressed that the Soviets had themselves 
provided military assistance, and were helping in the construction of 
m ilitary installations, including airfie lds, on the territory of 
Pakistan's neighbour, Aghanistan. But the Pakistanis had not 
objected, since it was an inherent right of every independent state to 
take steps to strengthen its security. Finally, the Pakistani 
government urged the Soviets to use their "great influence" in 
helping to reduce regional tensions "by assisting in the solution of 
disputes which constitute a threat to international peace and 
security." This was a pointed reference to Soviet support to India 
and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan on the Kashmir and 
Pakhtunistan issues respectively.48
Rejecting the Pakistani reply, the Soviet government sent another 
aide memoire on 18 February 1959, once again strongly warning the
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Ayub government of the consequences of its anti-Soviet policies. 
The note rejected the Pakistani attempts "to justify the aggressive 
nature" of the collective security pacts and also "the steps on the 
part of Pakistan which are being taken by her as a member of these 
blocs." It strongly disagreed with "the assertion that the . . . 
military blocs do not lead to aggravating the tension in these regions 
and do not endanger peace." It pointed out that Pakistani foreign 
policy had a bearing on Soviet security, and warned that "the entire 
responsibility for the consequences of the steps taken by Pakistan 
towards turning her territory into a foreign military base will rest 
with the Government of Pakistan."49
The Pakistanis continued to deny Soviet allegations of the presence 
of foreign military bases, while at the same time implying that the 
Soviets themselves were partially responsible for tensions in the 
region. For instance, a Foreign Office spokesman declared that, 
"there is no foreign military base on the soil of Pakistan", accusing 
the Soviets of attempting to conduct "a deliberate . . . campaign to 
mislead international public opinion and the Soviet people 
them selves."50 In its formal reply to the Soviet note on 27 February, 
the Ayub government once again stressed the defensive nature of the 
pacts and denied the presence of foreign bases, but added that it was 
its "duty to take suitable measures to safeguard the independence 
and territorial integrity of Pakistan" which was "too sacred . . .  to be 
omitted on any account." The Pakistanis "noted with regret that the 
Soviet Government has thought it fit to adopt a threatening tone in 
its Aide Memoire . . ." Expressing a desire to maintain "the most 
cordial relations" with the Soviet Union, the Pakistanis pointed out
253
that, HThe Soviet Government, although repeating their assertion that 
Collective Security Pacts aggravate tension in the regions, have 
remained silent on the request of the Government of Pakistan" for 
assistance "in the solution of disputes which constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region."51
When the Ayub government signed the bilateral agreement with the 
United States, the Soviets reacted by, once again, attacking both the 
foreign and internal policies of the Pakistanis. It was once again 
argued that the Pakistanis were willingly allowing the Americans to 
use their territory as a strategic and military base to conduct 
aggressive activities against the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
the Soviets claimed that the Pakistani military regime had become a 
willing accomplice of American imperialist schemes, motivated by a 
desire to shore up its internal position by obtaining American 
assistance. A Soviet analyst, for instance, commented that the Ayub 
regime was continuing "to look for solutions to internal difficulties" 
by entering into such pacts, and "attempting once again" to justify 
its policy "by references to the 'threat of communism.' "52
In a statement issued on 25 March 1959, the Soviet Government 
described the American bilateral pacts with Pakistan, Iran and 
Turkey as a hostile act against the Soviet Union, heightening tension 
in an area "stretching along or in close proximity to the southern 
borders of the Soviet Union." Not only were the pacts a "threat" to 
the Soviet Union, but they were also aimed at "peace-loving 
countries" such as India, Afghanistan and the People's Republic of 
China.
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The Soviets accused the governments of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey of 
deliberately tying in their foreign and internal policies to the 
"strategic and colonialist plans of the aggressive military bloc 
whipped together under United States' aegis" with "little concern for 
the real security and independence of their states." The Soviets 
claimed that, "The United States' ruling circles, as the stronger 
partner in these agreements, have retained the possibility of 
interfering in the domestic affairs" of the three countries.
The Soviets further alleged that Pakistani entry into the military 
pact was rapidly leading to an enhanced "dependence of the Pakistani 
army and of Pakistan itself as a state, on the aggressive plans of the 
United States." This dependence, it was claimed, was obvious in the 
increased presence of American military advisers in Pakistan. 
Finally, the Soviets once again warned the Ayub regime of the "grave 
consequences" of a policy.53
The Soviet warnings and threats did not result in any modification in 
Ayub Khan's foreign policy. Not only did the military regime 
continue its efforts to consolidate its alliance with the West, at the 
same time it made no attempt to soften its anti-Soviet and 
anti-Communist rhetoric.
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The Trials and Tribulations of Alignment
Despite General Ayub's wholehearted support for a pro-Western 
foreign policy, tensions arose in US-Pakistan relations soon after 
the signing of the bilateral military pact. Although the Eisenhower 
Administration continued to provide moral and material assistance 
to Pakistan, there was growing opposition within the US Senate to 
the extension of military aid to Pakistan.
During the Mutual Security Committee hearings of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in April, May and June 1959, a number of 
Democrats called for radical changes in the military assistance 
programme, on the grounds that Pakistan was being granted arms aid 
far beyond its requirement, that in the event of conflict between the 
two superpowers the Pakistan Army would prove of little use to the 
Americans, and finally, that such assistance was both antagonising 
the Indians and promoting an arms race in the subcontinent.54
During these hearings, it was also disclosed that the US government 
had been putting pressure on Pakistan to reduce the size of its Armed 
Forces, which the Americans felt were far beyond its external 
defence requirements. Testifying before the Senate, US Air Force 
Chief, General Thomas White, and Defence Secretary, Neil McElroy, 
said that they had so far been unsuccessful in persuading Pakistan to 
reduce its force levels which, "in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff", were over and above those needed "to support US strategic 
objectives." But since Pakistan was a sovereign nation, it could not 
be forced to follow US dictates.55
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The Ayub regime was perturbed by this open criticism of its Armed 
Forces, and by the questioning of the rationale and quantum of arms 
aid to Pakistan. It was even more disturbed when the US Senate 
subsequently reduced the Eisenhower Administration's proposed 
foreign aid allocations in the 1959 budget by $383 million.56 
Conscious of the need for continued American assistance to his main 
constituency, the Armed Forces, and hopeful of upgrading Pakistan's 
importance as a valuable ally, Ayub adopted a two-pronged strategy. 
On the one hand, he warned the Americans that his government would 
be hardpressed to resist internal and external pressures for change 
in its pro-Western foreign policy without assurances of adequate 
support. On the other, the Pakistani government continued to 
reiterate its determination to side with its Western allies, issuing 
frequent reminders of the constant communist threat from the North 
to Pakistani security.
On 22 June 1959, Ayub issued a statement, dismissing American 
criticisms of the excessive size of Pakistan's defence forces as 
"totally erroneous and based on an incorrect appreciation of the 
m ilitary requirements of Pakistan" which had 1,400 miles of 
frontiers to defend, including a "very sensitive frontier on our 
North-West." He added that, "I would like our friends to understand 
very clearly that they shall find us dependable and trustworthy but, 
at the same time, if they think they can lead us to confused thinking 
against the hard facts of life, then we just cannot oblige."57 On 
another occasion, when asked if Pakistan would turn to "other 
powers" for assistance should American assistance prove
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insufficient, Ayub responded that "the camp opposing the Americans 
attaches a great deal of importance to our country, from the military 
as well as political point of view and persistently makes advances to 
us." He added that there was also increasing internal dissatisfaction 
towards the policy of alignment, warning that "In the long run, the 
people would oblige us" to abandon that policy should the US fail 
Pakistan, "We hope that we will not reach that position but there is 
a question of the instinct of self-preservation."58
At the same time, the government pledged its loyalty to its Western 
allies, and emphasised the ever-present threat of Soviet and Chinese 
expansionism. Thus Ayub declared that Pakistan, Iran and Turkey 
were "acting as a shield of security for the entire Middle East, South 
Asia and the African continent", but warned of the dangers posed to 
these bastions of the free world by the communist bloc;59 while 
Foreign Minister Qadir declared that Pakistan attached great 
importance to pacts like SEATO which were "a guarantee of security 
which is badly needed in this area" due to the threats posed by the 
communist states.60
As Sino-lndian differences emerged in March 1959, with the Dalai 
Lama escaping from Tibet and receiving shelter in India, the US began 
to seriously consider the possibilities of using India as a 
counterweight against China, while at the same time encouraging 
Indo-Pakistan rapprochement to prevent further Chinese regional 
"expansionism". Aware of these changes in American orientation, 
Ayub decided to extend a hand of friendship to India to assure the 
Americans that arms assistance to Pakistan would neither threaten
258
nor antagonise the Indians.
Indo-Pakistan relations had deteriorated sharply in the wake of the 
October coup. Prime Minister Pandit Nehru declared that with the 
imposition of Martial Law, Pakistan had "ceased to be, even in name 
or form, a free country" , adding that it was a development which his 
country deeply regretted.61 The Ayub Administration had also 
adopted a hardline posture on sensitive issues such as Kashmir in a 
bid to gain internal legitimacy and support. Hence Ayub declared that 
his government would "make all possible sacrifices if necessary to 
liberate Kashmir" and warned that if the Indians refused to solve 
their differences with Pakistan peacefully, his Government would 
know how to deal with them.62 This stand had further heightened 
Indo-Pakistan tensions.
As the US emphasis shifted to a united Indo-Pakistan front against 
the PRC, Ayub was also forced to adopt a more conciliatory policy 
towards India. With the intention of making a favourable impression 
on the US Administration, and thereby ensuring continued military 
assistance, Ayub began to make repeated offers of "joint defence" to 
India against the 'threat' from the North. At the same time, however, 
Ayub made the offer conditional on a final settlement of the Kashmir 
dispute, knowing full well that the Indians would choose to reject 
such a precondition.
Thus, for instance, in April 1959, the Pakistani President declared 
that his country and India should defend the subcontinent jointly in 
the event of an external threat, adding that "the prerequisite for such
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an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir . . . . 
Once these were resolved, the armies of the two countries could 
disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers." On 
another occasion, Ayub declared that India and Pakistan should 
jointly defend their territories against the threat from the North, 
stating that the "crux of the whole thing is that Indian and Pakistan 
forces are at the moment facing each other; if differences between 
them were resolved, these forces could be released to the job of 
defending their territories" against the Sino-Soviet threat. Once 
bilateral differences such as Kashmir were resolved, "both Pakistan 
and India should look outward instead of facing each other inward."63
Distrustful of Pakistan's motives, and unwilling to negotiate the 
Kashmir issue, Prime Minister Nehru rejected the offer, declaring 
that, "I do not understand when people say 'let us have a joint 
defence' - against whom? Are we to become members of the Baghdad 
Pact or the SEATO or some other alliance? We do not want to have a 
common defence policy; the whole policy we have pursued is opposed 
to this conception." He added that "common defence was not the real 
issue at all but something else - the Kashmir issue."64
Ayub, however, continued to reiterate his offers of joint defence to 
India, in the hope of obtaining American goodwill, and at the same 
time adopted an even harsher anti-Soviet rhetoric in his foreign 
policy pronouncements. It was claimed that the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet and expansion of Soviet influence in Afghanistan were part of a 
larger communist "plot to obtain complete control over the region." 
On 21 October 1959, Foreign M inister Qadir, referring to
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Soviet-Afghan rapprochement, warned that, "If Russian influence 
increases somewhere, you cannot exclude the possibility of a threat"; 
while Ayub declared that, "In four or five years time, the 
development of communications that is taking place in Afghanistan 
by the Russians, and also of the bases being constructed by the 
Chinese in Tibet, will present us with a new situation. It is not 
inconveivable that one of the dangers is that the Communist world 
will have the power and facility to bring direct military pressure to 
bear. This is self-evident. They have the capacity. I do not say that 
is their intention . . . "  65 On yet another occasion, Ayub warned that 
"a Russian-Chinese drive to the Indian Ocean is a major aim in the 
Communist drive for world domination."66
Not only did the Pakistanis warn the Americans that the communist 
threat to the region remained "as dangerous, abhorrent and 
potentially violent as ever before"67 , but the US was also cautioned 
that, "If Pakistan's defences were not sufficiently developed, through 
our folly or through lack of assistance", then all that can be said is 
that "there is no alternative except falling into the vast sea of 
communism, which is a most terrible thought . . ."68
Ayub's warnings and overtures did seem to succeed in persuading the 
Eisenhower Administration to provide assurances of moral and 
material support to a "military leadership" which had proved to be 
"even more outspoken in its support of existing m ilitary 
arrangements than its predecessor civil regimes."69 Hence, in the 
joint communique issued at the conclusion of his visit to Pakistan in 
December 1959, President Eisenhower recognised "the heavy
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financial burden placed upon Pakistan in its efforts to undertake 
substantial development projects and at the same time to maintain 
Armed Forces consonant with its national security" and both 
governments reiterated their "determination . . .  to continue strongly 
to support these regional collective security organisations."70
It was not surprising that Ayub's open hostility to the Soviet bloc 
and his constant pledges of loyalty to the West contributed to the 
further worsening of Pakistan-Soviet relations. The Soviets 
continued to accuse Pakistan of providing bases to third countries, 
which would be used for "aggression directed against the USSR, 
People’s China, India and Afghanistan", while Ayub's references to a 
joint Sino-Soviet threat were dismissed as an attempt "to justify 
the policy of subordinating Pakistan to the United States and to get 
bigger American appropriations via CENTO." It was also alleged that 
Ayub's statements "were also prompted by domestic considerations" 
due to growing internal discontent. This was the result of a 
deteriorating economy as the Pakistani government spent "more 
money on military purposes than its predecessors" as "more than half 
the total budgetary expenditure was allocated for defence spending." 
Thus, the Soviets claimed, by "harping on the 'Communist menace' the 
leaders of the military regime wish to divert the attention of the 
people from Pakistan's vital economic and political problems."71
The Soviets retaliated by increased moral and material support to 
India and Afghanistan on the Kashmir and Pakhtunistan disputes 
respectively, both as a part of a larger regional strategy aimed at 
consolidating ties with the two countries and in a bid to exert
262
pressure on the Ayub regime. The Pakhtunistan dispute came into 
prominence during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul in March 1960. By the 
late 1950s, the Soviet Union had forged close links with Afghanistan, 
which was the recipient of substantial economic and military 
assistance. While Afghanistan was drawing closer to the Soviet 
Union, its relations with Pakistan were even more strained than in 
the past.
During his visit to Kabul, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union 
"never deserted its good neighbour and friend in times of 
misfortune", adding that, "We understand Afghanistan's anxiety over 
the conduct of definite circles in certain states to whom the concept 
of respect of the lawful national rights of other peoples is 
apparently alien" in an indirect reference to Pakistani actions in 
deliberately interfering with the Afghan economy by periodic border 
c losu res .72 The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the 
visit stated that the two sides had "exchanged opinions regarding the 
fate of the Pushtus and concurred in stating that the reasonable way 
to allay tension and ensure peace in the Middle East is to apply the 
principle of self-determination on the basis of the United Nations 
Charter for resolving this issue . . ."73
On his return home, Khrushchev once again declared that 
"Pushtunistan has always been part of Afghanistan" and that Soviet 
"sympathies in this matter lie with the Pushtu people" who were 
striving to obtain the "right of self-determination under conditions 
of freedom and non-intervention."74 A few days after Khrushchev's 
endorsem ent of the Afghan stand on Pakhtunistan, the
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newly-appointed Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Dr Mikhail Kapitsa, 
called for a plebiscite for the Pakistani Pakhtuns which would allow 
them to decide between an independent Pakhtun state, a merger with 
Afghanistan or continued union with P ak is tan /5
The Pakistani government strongly condemned the Soviet stand on 
Pakhtunistan, and Foreign Minister Qadir declared that Pakistan could 
not "ignore certain recent developments across our northern and 
northwestern borders", implying that Soviet-Afghan rapprochement 
bore ominious repercussions for Pakistan's security.76 The Ayub 
regime also used the Soviet declaration on Pakhtunistan to justify 
Pakistan's need for continued participation in the Western alliances 
in view of the ever present "threat" from the North. Ayub warned 
that the object of Soviet support to Afghanistan on the issue was 
quite clearly "to aggravate problems in this part of the world" and 
"to pave the way for the age-old attempt of the North to dominate 
the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent and the areas surrounding it."77 The 
Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Aziz Ahmed, not only condemned 
Soviet support to India on Kashmir and the "open incitement by it of 
Afghanistan to lay claim to Pakistani territory", but also, reiterating 
Pakistan’s loyalty to the West, stated that if the Western sponsored 
pacts were of little value, then "the countries whose expansionist 
ambitions they are designed to thwart would not continue to 
denounce them so violently or work so assiduously for their undoing." 
Earlier, the Foreign Minister had called Pakistan's alliance with the 
West the "sheet anchor" of its foreign policy, adding, "If there are 
any implications arising from it . . . they are there. In the Western 
a lliance is im plic it the guarantee of our sovereignty and
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independence."78
The "implications" arising from the policy of alignment became 
glaringly obvious as the U-2 incident of May 1960 led to heightened 
tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations. On 1 May, an American 
Lockheed U-2 intelligence gathering aircraft was shot down in the 
Sverdlovsk region, some 2000 kilometres inside Soviet territory. 
While the State Department at first claimed that the plane was on a 
weather reconaissance mission, the capture and subsequent 
interrogation of pilot Gary Powers revealed the true nature of the 
mission. On 7 May, the State Department admitted that the downed 
U-2 had "probably" flown over the Soviet Union in an attempt "to 
obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain."79 The 
plane had flown from the Turkish city of Adana to the Peshawar 
airfield in Pakistan. It had then taken off from Peshawar on an 
espionage mission over Soviet territory and was due to terminate its 
flight at the Bodo airfield in Norway.
The Soviet reaction to the incident boded ill for Pakistan, as 
Khrushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet on 5 May, not only 
launched a strong attack on the US for violating Soviet state 
frontiers, but added that, "I believe it is also necessary to warn, 
from this lofty platform and in the sternest manner, those countries 
that make their territory available to aggressive forces and thereby 
make it easier for these forces to act against us. The governments 
of these countries should have understood a long time ago that they 
are playing with fire, since the retaliatory blows will shower on 
these countries as well. . ." In his concluding remarks on 8 May,
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Khrushchev stated, T h e  governments of three countries - Turkey, 
Pakistan and Norway - must clearly realize that they were 
accomplices in this flight because they permitted use of their 
airfields against the Soviet Union . . . They must judge where the 
situation may lead when they open their territory to third countries 
that use it for aggressive purposes."80
At the Czechoslovak Republic Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May, 
Khrushchev once again warned Pakistan, Turkey and Norway that if 
they continued to permit American flights "into our territory from 
their bases, then we will destroy these bases."81 On 11 May, 
addressing a press conference on the U-2 incident, Foreign Minister 
Gromyko issued identical protest notes to the three American allies, 
accusing them of w illingly and consciously "allowing foreign 
military aircraft to use their airspace for the preparation and 
execution of intrusions into Soviet airspace." They were then warned 
that "should such provocational actions be continued . . .  we will then 
strike at the bases from which the aggressors make their flights", 
adding that,"It is not necessary to say that the Soviet Union 
possesses all necessary means for this."82
The Pakistanis had granted unlimited access to the airstrip in 
Peshawar for the operation of the U-2 flights conducted over Soviet 
te rrito ry , photographing m ilitary and industria l installations, 
communications networks, etc.83 and the programme had been in 
operation for three years when the ill-fated May flight took place. 
According to Gary Powers, U-2 flights also took place from Lahore, 
and the Ayub government was fully conscious of the nature of the
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operation.84
In the wake of the U-2 incident, however, the Ayub regime refuted all 
Soviet allegations of Pakistani complicity, stating that Pakistan had 
played no part "in the preparation and execution of the flight of any 
aircraft for the purpose of military intelligence over the USSR." 
They admitted the existence of the Badaber base, but stressed that 
the base did not have an airstrip attached to it. Pakistani 
authorities also acknowledged that the US had sought and received 
facilities to refuel and service their aircraft in Pakistan, but 
emphasised that the Americans were not questioned about the 
onward destinations of such flights.85 It was admitted that the U-2 
plane shot down in the Soviet Union had taken off from Peshawar, but 
claimed that it had then "been diverted to USSR in the course of its 
flight without the knowledge of Pakistan." It was also stressed that 
Pakistan had no foreign military bases on its soil, "therefore, the 
question of their being put to aggressive purposes did not arise." 
Furthermore, in a counterattack on the Soviet Union, the Pakistanis 
alleged that their "own airspace had been violated several times in 
recent months" and the "type of aircraft used in these operations and 
their direction of flight indicate that these must have been Soviet 
planes."86
Soon after the incident President Ayub expressed his desire to 
improve relations with the Soviet Union, and ordered a personal 
inquiry into the matter. An official protest note was also lodged 
with the US, calling for a cessation of any further U-2 flights, with 
Foreign Secretary Ikramullah declaring that if the Soviet allegations
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were found correct, Pakistan would "ensure that such a thing does 
not happen again". 87 But at the same time Ayub emphasised that 
Pakistan was not defenceless, as its security was underwritten by 
its Western allies. Referring to Soviet threats of retaliatory action, 
Ayub said, "After all, Russian threats are not new to us. We are not 
afraid of such threats", adding that these "harsh things of life have 
to be faced." At the same time, he warned that in case of a Soviet 
attack on Pakistan, the West would retaliate in kind and this could 
lead to a world war.88
The Pakistani response antagonised the Soviets even further. In June 
1960, the Soviet Union sent a second protest note, accusing the Ayub 
regime of ignoring the consequences of its irresponsible behaviour. 
In the note, the Soviets stated that "instead of giving a clear answer 
that it would not allow Pakistan territory to be used by the American 
Air Force for aggression against the Soviet Union", the Pakistanis 
were attempting "to escape responsibility." Hence the Soviet Union 
could "only reach the conclusion that the government of Pakistan 
underrated all the seriousness of this question." The Pakistanis 
were once again warned about the "danger . . . resulting from the use 
by the USA of airfields of its alliances for military purposes."89
The Search for New Directions
In the wake of the U-2 incident, there was no change in Pakistan's 
pro-Western foreign policy directions. While Foreign Minister Qadir 
emphasised that the free world would have to be even more wary of 
the communist bloc, the Pakistani Air Chief told his counterparts in
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SEATO that Pakistan was "convinced of the need to maintain its 
military strength at a level sufficient to deter those countries that 
have military designs in this area."90 The regime also allowed the 
US to continue its electronic monitoring and intelligence-gathering 
operations at the Badaber base, with the facility becoming even more 
important after the suspension of the U-2 flights.91
General Ayub continued to harp on the interconnected themes of a 
need for continued alignment with the West, the ever-present 
Sino-Soviet threat, and the necessity of joint defence with India to 
guard the subcontinent's northwestern approaches against communist 
expansionism. In an article published in Foreign Affairs. Ayub wrote 
that, "Pakistan has openly and unequivocally cast its lot with the 
West, and unlike several other countries around us, we have shut 
ourselves off almost completely from the possibility of any major 
assistance from the Communist bloc. We do not believe in hunting 
with the hound and running with the hare." He added, "As a student of 
war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the 
north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This 
push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with 
each other. If, on the other hand, we resolve our problems and 
disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, 
and face them outwards, I feel we shall have a good chance of 
preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, which was that 
whenever this subcontinent was divided . . . someone or other invited 
the outsider to step in."92
Yet the U-2 affair could not be brushed aside so easily by the
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military regime, due to both domestic and external compulsions. In 
the internal context, the incident and the subsequent international 
attention to the provision of facilities to the Americans proved a 
source of embarrassment, since the Ayub administration's previous 
denials of anti-Soviet operations from Pakistani soil lost 
credibility. Furthermore, the strong Soviet reaction, including 
threats of retaliatory action against American facilities in Pakistan, 
led to a renewed internal debate on the risks entailed in a policy of 
alignment with the West, which had exposed Pakistan to tremendous 
danger.93
In the external context, the incident had taken place at a time when 
the Americans were reassessing their regional strategy, probing the 
possib ilities of wooing neutral India as a counterweight to 
communist China. In line with this policy, the Eisenhower 
Administration had not only extended generous economic assistance 
to India,94 but even provided it with assurances of security.95 Ayub 
was particularly concerned that a continued decline in Pakistan's 
regional importance vis-à-vis India could result in a substantial 
reduction of American military and economic assistance, or a US 
decision to extend military aid to India, or both. If any of these 
scenarios became reality, it would have serious consequences for the 
regime, especially if it was unable to deliver the goods to the Armed 
Forces, where there was already growing dissatisfaction with the 
quantity of American assistance.96
Taking internal and external factors into consideration, the Ayub 
regime opted for a change in tactics, aimed on the one hand at
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assuaging domestic criticism and regaining internal credibility, and 
on the other at pressuring the Americans into reassessing their 
regional priorities. This strategy focussed mainly on the adoption of 
a new rhetoric in foreign policy. Although the military government 
had no intention of breaking away from the Western alliances which 
were a continual source of military assistance, equipment and 
training for the Armed Forces, it strongly cautioned the Americans 
not to take Pakistan's loyalty for granted while, at the same time, 
expressing its intention to explore new foreign policy alternatives to 
advance Pakistan's interests. Hence Ayub Khan not only criticised 
the US administrative machinery as "cumbersome, sluggish and a 
clumsy juggernaut", but also declared his intention to "do business" 
with the Soviet Union.97
While the Ayub regime decided to use the Soviet card due to its own 
compulsions, the Soviet Union responded positively to the new 
Pakistani overtures. Although the Soviets had been antagonised by 
Ayub's pro-Western policies, they had, from the very start, 
attempted on the one hand to threaten and on the other to cajole 
Pakistan into changing its foreign policy directions. Hence Soviet 
threats and warnings had been accompanied by offers to improve 
political and especially economic relations. The Soviet Ambassador, 
for instance, declared in mid-1959 that, "Only 10 per cent of the 
problems" in their bilateral relations "are controversial in nature", 
while "on the remaining 90 per cent there is possibility of developing 
friendly relations", and offered Pakistan technical assistance, 
especially in the agricultural sector.98 In November 1959, the two 
countries entered a barter agreement covering the exchange of
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$400,000 worth of manufactured goods, and in March of the following 
year, visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin offered every 
possible assistance to Pakistan in implementing its Second 
Five-Year Plan.
Even when tensions were highest during the U-2 affair, the Pakistani 
media reported that the Minister in the Soviet Embassy had extended 
offers of economic assistance. In the wake of the incident, the Ayub 
government announced its willingness to accept a Soviet offer of 
assistance, first made in November 1958, in the exploration of 
mineral resources, including o i l . "  In January 1961, Pakistan's 
Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
began negotiations on the offer in Moscow, following talks in Karachi 
in September 1960. On his return home, Bhutto disclosed that the 
Soviet Union was "willing to consider favourably proposals for 
economic collaboration with Pakistan w ithout any conditions 
attached . . ."10°
The Pakistanis were, however, careful to emphasise that the ongoing 
negotiations did not imply any change in foreign policy. While Bhutto 
refuted reports that the proposed deal could lead to a reassessment 
of ties with the West, Foreign Minister Qadir categorically stated 
that, "The agreement (under negotiation) is a realistic interpretation 
of the policy hitherto pursued and does not involve a change of 
attitude towards the alliances necessary for jo int action in the 
event of aggression."101 The Administration, therefore, made it 
clear that it would stand by its international commitments, but much 
would depend on the response of its Western allies to Pakistani
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needs and requirements.102
The inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in January 1961 was 
viewed with apprehension in Pakistan. The Democrats had been 
sharply critical of the Eisenhower government's policy of showing 
clear preference to allied countries at the cost of ties with neutral 
and nonaligned states. During his election campaign, Senator 
Kennedy had pledged to reassess the Dullesian policy of collective 
security arrangements and had expressed a desire to establish closer 
relations with countries such as India.103 After coming into office 
President Kennedy embarked on a policy of expanding economic and 
political relations with nonaligned states such as India, so as to 
include them in a loose alliance with the West for the containment of 
communism.104
Perturbed by the policy directions of the new US government, the 
Ayub Administration continued with its overtures to the Soviet 
Union, in an attempt to put pressure on the Americans. The Soviets, 
on their part, seemed willing to show greater flexibility than in the 
past in their dealings with Pakistan. The Soviet Ambassador, Dr 
Kapitsa, not only expressed his country's willingness to share its 
"accumulated experience" in many fields of development with 
Pakistan, but added that, "We don't want that Pakistan should weaken 
her relations with her Western allies. On the other hand, we too 
want to be on good terms with Pakistan's friends" and with Pakistan 
itself. The Soviet Union wanted "to be neighbours psychologically 
and friends really", he stated.105 On 4 March 1961, Pakistan signed 
an agreement for Soviet assistance in the exploration of its oil and
273
gas resources, the first of its kind with a communist country. The 
Soviets extended a loan of $30 million, repayable over a period of 
twelve years in Pakistani rupees, which would then be used by the 
Soviets to purchase Pakistani goods.106 The project and the oil and 
mineral sources when found would be owned entirely by Pakistan. 
The Soviet Ambassador expressed the hope that the two countries 
would develop even closer ties, calling the agreement Han evidence of 
Soviet intentions."107
Soon after signing the oil contract, the Pakistan government also 
announced its intention to negotiate its border problems with China. 
The resolve of the Ayub Administration to use the China card as a 
further lever in its dealings with its Western allies was aided by the 
fact that Sino-Pakistan relations had remained correct, although 
cool, in the past.
Pakistan had been fairly prompt in extending recognition to the PRC 
in January 1950. Although its relations with the PRC were slow to 
develop, they were quite cordial, with Pakistan voting in favour of 
the PRC's representation in the UN. Once Pakistan became a member 
of the Western pacts, including SEATO which was specifically aimed 
at containing China, the bilateral relationship came under strain. But 
while the PRC condemned the pact as an "illegal" organisation 
pursuing "aggressive" American aims, its criticism of Pakistan was 
restrained. The Chinese were then pursuing a policy of peaceful 
coexistence with newly-independent Asian countries, and were keen 
to convince them of their peaceful intentions.106
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Criticism of Pakistan was also low key, because the Chinese realised 
that Pakistani participation was influenced more by its interna! 
compulsions than by the adoption of a deliberate anti-Chinese 
posture. Premier Chou En-lai, for example, publicly accepted Prime 
Minister Bogra's assurances at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 
that "although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty", it "was not 
against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression 
against her". Through "these explanations, we (Chou and Bogra) 
achieved a mutual understanding . . ."109
Relations, however, deteriorated as Pakistani involvement in the 
pacts grew, and Pakistan began to side with its Western allies 
against the PRC in international forums. Relations were especially 
strained as the military regime under Ayub Khan constantly stressed 
the theme of a Sino-Soviet threat to the subcontinent, offering joint 
defence to India in the wake of Sino-lndian border tensions in 
1959.110
But the onset of Sino-lndian tensions had also led to a rethinking of 
Pakistani policy towards China, since there were possibilities of 
exploiting the situation to Pakistan's advantage, both in its relations 
with neighbouring states and with the superpowers. Such a strategy, 
however, could not be adopted without first defusing sensitive 
issues such as its own unsettled border with China. In September
1959, Pakistan obtained Chinese maps showing parts of the 
Gilgit-Hunza-Baltistan areas as Chinese territories. The following 
month, Ayub declared his desire to peacefully demarcate the 
Sino-Pakistan border.111
275
The inauguration of the Kennedy Administration introduced a new 
urgency in the Pakistani strategy of forging closer ties with China as 
a means of gaining leverage in its international dealings. As 
US-Pakistan relations came under strain due to the pro-Indian 
leanings of the new US government, the Pakistanis formally proposed 
border talks with China on 28 March 1961 and, during the same year, 
voted in favour of PRC admission to the UN.112
The Ayub Administration had been hopeful of upgrading Pakistan's 
position in US regional strategies through the use of the Soviet and 
China cards. But while the Americans were concerned about 
Pakistani overtures to the S ino-Soviet bloc, to Pakistan's 
disappointment there was no change in the Kennedy Administration's 
pro-Indian leanings. After a visit to South Asia in early 1961, Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, in fact, disclosed that he had delivered 
a message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru urging 
him "to extend his leadership to other areas in South East Asia."113 
Similarly, US economic assistance to India continued to increase 
while aid allocations to Pakistan were reduced.114
The Ayub regime was concerned that this decline in economic 
assistance could also extend to the military sphere, and was 
disturbed by media reports that the US was contemplating the 
extension of military assistance to India. The Administration 
realised that such developments would not only provide opposition 
forces with greater opportunity to attack its foreign policy leanings 
but, more importantly, would threaten a withdrawal of essential
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support by the American-equipped Armed Forces. Hence the regime, 
on the one hand, made an overt show of support for the alliances, 
offering, for example, facilities within Pakistan to its CENTO 
a llie s .115 At the same time, the Pakistanis urged their allies to 
strengthen pact members militarily, with Foreign Minister Qadir 
telling a CENTO Ministerial Committee Meeting that "CENTO has to 
concern itself with developing the military as well as the economic 
strength of the area."116
On the other hand, the Ayub government launched a series of bitter 
attacks on the Americans. The President declared that, "The 
American policy of encouraging neutrality in areas where we know it 
will operate in the long run against their interests and their friends' 
interests is incomprehensible." On another occasion, Ayub warned 
that Pakistan had joined the pacts "for the purpose of ensuring our 
security and it is only logical to judge our continued membership by 
the extent to which that is achieved."117
According to a former Pakistan Foreign Office official, Ayub was "so 
perturbed" over the changed American policy that his scheduled visit 
to the US "was brought forward by about six months to July 1961" at 
his request.118 On the eve of his visit Ayub warned the Americans 
that "unless an area of understanding between India and Pakistan is 
reached, this subcontinent remains vulnerable and indefensible" 
against the communist threat.119
During his trip, Ayub time and again stressed the need for continued 
American military and economic assistance to help Pakistan
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withstand the internal and external pressures of communism. Ayub 
pointed out that, "If there is any trouble in Asia . . .  the only country 
that will stand by you is Pakistan." On the question of aid, he said, 
"you have to give it to us because it involves the fate of the world 
and also your own destiny", adding that, "we are pressing against you 
today as friends . . . .  If we do not make good and if, heaven forbid, we 
go under Communism, then we shall still press against you but not as 
friends." Ayub also cautioned the Americans against extending 
military assistance to India, warning that should the United States 
extend such aid , " it will put tremendous strain on our friendship." 
He called on the Kennedy Administration "not to compromise the 
situation of your friends", warning that the extension of US military 
assistance to India would lead to "a tremendous groundswell of 
public opinion in Pakistan" against the West.120
While Kennedy reassured Ayub of constant US friendship, and pledged 
continued military assistance, including the delivery of F-104 
fighters promised by the previous Administration, Ayub's visit had 
little  impact on US regional s tra teg ies.1 21 The Kennedy 
Administration continued to focus on the strengthening of economic 
relations with neutral states such as India in a bid to form an 
informal front against the communist bloc. Moreover, Pakistan's 
importance in US global strategy had also fallen due to developments 
in nuclear technology, including ICBMs and missile carrying nuclear 
submarines such as Polaris, which had reduced the strategic value of 
military bases on the periphery of the communist bloc. The 
Americans were, therefore, disinclined to give in to Pakistani 
pressures for greater moral and material assistance.
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The Pakistanis continued their attempts to acquire concessions from 
the West by threatening closer ties with the East. When, for 
example, the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium failed to fulfil Pakistan's 
demands for its Second Five-Year Plan, Minister of Industries 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared that help would be sought from other 
sources if Western assistance was withheld, adding that Pakistan 
would be willing to seriously consider any Soviet offers of 
assistance.122 While the Soviets did respond positively and cultural 
and economic ties improved, political relations remained strained.
The Soviets were aware that the Ayub government, despite its 
differences with its allies, was still deeply committed to a policy of 
alignment with the West. The Pakistanis, in fact, made it amply 
clear where their sympathies lay. On the one hand, Pakistani 
authorities continued to press the Americans to fulfil their needs, 
especially in military hardware. In August 1961, for example, 
visiting Defence Secretary Fida Hussain called upon Pentagon 
officials to help Pakistani forces attain their peak of modernized 
s tre n g th .123 On the other, despite its threats of withdrawal from 
the alliances unless the US reconsidered its regional priorities, the 
Ayub Administration continued to reiterate its loyalty to its major 
Western ally at both domestic and international forums.
In July 1961, Pakistan's Permanent Representative at the UN, Said 
Hasan, declared that his country would stand by the United States in 
the event of a Soviet-American confrontation124 while President 
Ayub, explaining the rationale of Pakistan's foreign policy, stressed
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that, "Pakistan lies between three mighty powers of Asia. One is 
virtually hostile to us. The other two have an ideology which 
conflicts with us." In this situation, the "only way in which we can 
ensure our security . . .  is to have friends, powerful friends" and that 
"is the reason why we are in military pacts, like CENTO and SEATO. 
That is the reason we are in military alliance with the United 
S ta tes."125 Since Pakistan continued to identify so closely with the 
policy of alignment with the West, the Soviets also continued to 
criticise sharply the military regime's internal and foreign policy 
directions, and to extend support to India and Afghanistan in their 
disputes with Pakistan.
Pakistani-Afghan relations had deteriorated rapidly throughout
1960, resulting in the closure of consulates and commissions in each 
other's territory and a breakdown in diplomatic relations by 
mid-1961. The Soviets reponded to these developments by providing 
strong support to their Afghan allies. The Soviet media stressed the 
Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent" to a conflict taking place in 
the "immediate vicinity" of its southern borders and accused 
Pakistan of deliberately "enacting measures" aimed at the "forcible 
suppression of the just national aspirations of the Pushtus." The 
Soviet government once again declared its support for a "just 
settlement of the Pushtu problem, through peaceful means" with the 
"most reasonable way" being the "application of the principle of 
se lf-d e te rm in a tio n ."126 The Soviet stand led to a deterioration in 
Pakistan-Soviet relations and the Ayub government accused the 
Soviets of providing arms to the Afghans for use against 
Pakistan.127
280
Tensions grew even further as the Soviets, in an attempt to 
undermine the international credibility of the Western bloc and its 
Asian allies, claimed in mid-1961 that they were in possession of 
secret CENTO documents which not only proved that CENTO bases 
existed in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, but that these bases would be 
used to launch nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union and other 
neighbouring states, including Afghanistan. It was claimed that the 
documents also showed that CENTO had drawn up lists of targets in 
Pakistan and Iran, which would be turned into "nuclear death zones" 
to act as barriers in the event of open war between the West and the 
Soviet Union.128 While the Soviets warned that their armed forces 
would "nip in the bud" any attempt at launching aggressive attacks 
from Pakistan and Iran,129 CENTO and Pakistani officials strongly 
refuted the Soviet charges. Senior Pakistani diplomat Zafrulla Khan, 
for example, called the Soviet charge "as false as it is absurd."130
The Pakistanis also retaliated by once again pledging their loyalty to 
their Western allies. On a number of occasions President Ayub 
declared that Pakistan's continued membership in the pacts was 
necessitated by the hostility of some of its powerful neighbours. 
"This makes it necessary that we should be always in search of 
dependable friends who are interested in the internal as well as 
external security of Pakistan." Calling for the strengthening of 
CENTO and SEATO, Ayub emphasised that in the event of an attack on 
member-states by a stronger power, "We are not entirely without 
hope" and that if "we are attacked, the attacker will also be 
a tta c k e d ."131 The Pakistanis, therefore, continued to follow a
---------------- --------------------------
policy of alignment while at the same time pressing upon their 
Western allies to strengthen the pact members militarily in view of 
the ever present communist threat.
The Pakistani policy of siding with the West led to renewed Soviet 
criticism of the Ayub regime. In his report to the Twenty-second 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October
1961, Khrushchev declared that while his country "would like to live 
in peace and friendship with neighbours such as . . . Pakistan", the 
Pakistani "ruling circles" had "thus far been unable or unwilling to 
disengage themselves from the snares of the military blocs" and had 
deliberately "failed to avail themselves of the opportunities for 
business-like cooperation with our country." Khrushchev singled out 
Ayub's internal policies for attack, claiming that since the military 
government spent "two-thirds of its budget for military purposes" 
the "national industry is not developing and foreign capital rules as 
if it were in its own bailiwick. The sad fate of Pakistan . . . should 
set the public thinking in some other countries where influential 
forces are destroying national unity and persecuting progressive 
leaders . . ."132
Aside from these criticisms of the Ayub regime,133 the Soviets also 
expressed their displeasure by extending support to the Indian stand 
on Kashmir during the UN Security Council debate on the issue in
1962. When discussions were underway in the forum, Pakistani 
Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
called on the Soviet Union to refrain from using its veto on the 
Kashmir question if it really wanted, as it claimed, friendly
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relations with Pakistan.134 But when Ireland introduced a 
resolution calling for direct Indo-Pakistan negotiations on the basis 
of previous UN resolutions, the Soviet Union vetoed it.
During the debate, Soviet representative Morozov gave a clear
indication of the Soviet stand, reiterating that, "The question of
Kashmir, which is one of the States of the Republic of India and
forms an integral part of India, has been decided by the people of
Kashmir itself." On 22 June, Morozov vetoed the Irish resolution on
the grounds that it presented only "a one-sided and hence incorrect
view of the question of Kashmir." He claimed that the UN resolution
about a plebiscite had been adopted "in quite a different set of
practical circumstances", resting "on conditions which were
prerequisites for carrying out this whole plan", with the most
important condition being "withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the
entire territory of Kashmir." According to the Soviet representative,
since Pakistani forces continued "to occupy" approximately one-third
of Kashmiri territory, his country could not support a resolution
based on "the principle set forth in the now outdated resolutions . . 
«135
Withdrawal of Martial Law
In the external sphere, the Ayub government worked consistently and 
at times against great odds to consolidate alignment with the West, 
a policy which created tensions in Pakistan-Soviet relations but was 
tailored to suit the orientation of the military government and to
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serve the interests of the Western-equipped and trained Armed 
Forces. In the internal context the Martial Law Administration 
worked with equal dedication to consolidate the military's hold over 
political power. The continued military dominance of the internal 
decision-making processes in turn enabled the regime to pursue a 
foreign policy of its dictate, and to quell any domestic opposition to 
its foreign policy directions.
The fundamental task facing most military regimes endeavouring to 
consolidate their internal position is to find ways of legitimising 
their political role. "As soon as they are in power, military officers 
will offer to regenerate the society in short order and to 
reconstitute the polity along more just lines. Once they have 
restored order, they claim, they will happily return to the 
b a r ra c k s ."138 This legitimising strategy was adopted by the 
Pakistani m ilitary government, which instituted a number of 
reforms, claiming that these measures would set the country on the 
path to progress and stability, replacing the corruption and 
inefficiency of the old political order by the "good government" of 
the Armed Forces.137
The military government also took a number of measures to 
strengthen its control over the outlawed politicians. On the one 
hand, it continued to base its legitimacy on the "failure" of selfish 
and d ishonest politic ians to provide e ffic ien t and honest 
governm ent.133 On the other, Martial Law Ordinances, such as the 
Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and the Elective 
Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO), were used to prevent a
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re-emergence of the political leadership.189 Offices of political 
parties were sealed, their funds frozen, and a number of prominent 
political figures arrested.
Although the military government was successful in preventing any 
outburst of opposition in the West Wing through coercive means, 
aided by the fragmented nature of the opposition, the situation in 
East Pakistan was far more volatile. The East Pakistanis had been 
hopeful of gaining a voice in the central government as the first 
national elections had approached in 1959, but the October coup had 
shattered these hopes and placed ail power in the hands of an 
overwhelmingly West Pakistani dominated military regime. East 
Pakistani unrest flared up in the shape of student demonstrations in 
1960.
The Martial Law authorities were quick to respond. Instead of 
acknowledging and making attempts to rectify East Pakistani 
grievances, the Ayub Administration blamed the unrest on communist 
agitation. Ayub claimed that pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communist 
agents "operating out of Calcutta" were responsible for East 
Pakistani demands for "a weak federal structure, Parliamentary 
democracy, too many provinces and an ineffective government for 
P ak is tan ."140 He declared that students playing into "undeserved 
hands" would not be allowed to undermine national security. Soon 
after the dem onstrations were effective ly quelled by the 
law-enforcing agencies.141
As earlier mentioned, an important vehicle for consolidating military
285
rule was the formation of an "alliance" with other civilian 
b u re a u c ra ts 142 which enabled the military to withdraw troops to 
peacetime posts and ensured an effic ient running of civil 
administration. The civil servants had been coerced and cajoled into 
supporting the military government. Martial Law Ordinances had 
been passed threatening the dismissal of bureaucrats charged with 
corruption, inefficiency, etc., and the permanent tenure of civil 
servants had been removed. Military officers had been appointed both 
to the bureaucracy and to civil posts. In the final analysis, however, 
this body of legislation was barely enforced. Very few high ranking 
bureaucrats were actually dismissed from service, the previous 
guarantees of permanent tenure were restored, the practice of 
inducting military officers into the bureaucracy stopped, and 
bureaucrats were allowed a share in power in return for their 
cooperation. Nor was any attempt made to bring about any real 
reform in the civil service, since such a move would have seriously 
underm ined the working re lationship between the m ilitary 
authorities and the civil administration.148
According to Feit, the partnership that developed between the 
military and bureaucracy transformed Ayub's government into a 
"m ilitary-administrative state".144 The complete cooperation of the 
civil servants did mean a smooth and efficient running of the Martial 
Law government and the bureaucrats did have a significant role to 
play in it.145  Yet it must be emphasised that the military, 
represented by its Supreme Commander, was in complete control of 
all decision-making, whether in defence or foreign policy or in 
domestic politics. ^
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Ayub's main base of support remained the military and he took 
several measures to ensure its continued backing. Defence 
expenditure was continuously increased and senior military officers 
were given lucrative posts, including diplomatic assignments.148 At 
the same time, Ayub consolidated his own position within the 
institution. Promotions, transfers and retirements were used to 
reward or punish military personnel. For instance, the Chief of Army 
Staff, Lt General Habibullah, who had clashed with Ayub, was retired, 
and the post abolished. Announcing this decision, Ayub warned that 
every military officer had to be completely obedient to the 
Commander-in-Chief, and if anybody was found wanting, he would be 
dismissed. During the same month, Ayub was granted the rank of 
Field Marshal by the Presidential Cabinet.147 Ayub also decided to 
shift the federal capital from Karachi to a new site named 
Islamabad, located near the outskirts of Rawalpindi, so as to be near 
the Army GHQ.148
Despite his dominance over the central government, with the 
complete backing of the military and civil bureaucracies, Ayub 
realised the necessity of institutionalising that control by a 
politica l framework which would grant his government the 
legitimacy it required. As mentioned earlier, the Martial Law 
government had pledged a return to democratic rule, from the very 
start, but "of a kind that people can understand and work." Ayub 
continued to make such pledges, aimed at securing popular support 
and a measure of legitimacy, stating for example, "The revolution of 
October 7, 1958, was not aimed against the institution of democracy
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as such. No, it was only against the manner in which its institutions 
were being worked,” and affirming his intention to restore a suitable 
democratic order in the country.149 Faced with the dilemma of 
offering a political alternative which would possess at least the 
trappings of representative government and yet perpetuate 
authoritarian rule, the military needed a system to serve its 
interests.
This was the scheme of Basic Democracies, promulgated on 26 
October 1959. The scheme envisaged the setting up of a five-tier 
system of self-government. In the first tier, the Union or Town 
Council, units with a population of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 
people would elect a representative to it by simple majority. 
One-third of the membership would be nominated and the Council 
would work in close co-ordination with the civil authorities of the 
area concerned. The Union Councils would elect Chairmen to 
represent them in the next tier, the Thana or Tehsil Council, which 
would include an equal proportion of nominated members from the 
bureaucracy, while the subdivisional officer of the Tehsil or Thana 
would be appointed Council Chairman. In the three higher tiers - that 
is, the District, Divisional and Provisional Development Councils - 
the principle of election was abandoned altogether and the official 
members, belonging to the civil service, would far exceed the 
appointed representatives in numbers as well as in power.150
Elections to the Basic Democracies units were completed in January
1960. The ban on political activity remained in force, and the 
elections were held on a non-party basis. Candidates were not
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allowed to present party manifestos, discuss sensitive issues such 
as defence or foreign affairs or critic ise the Martial Law 
government. Moreover, a large number of candidates were 
disqualified by a liberal use of EBDO.151
After the approximately 80,000 candidates were elected to the first 
tier of the system, they were called upon to participate in a 
referendum on 14 February in which they were asked to express their 
confidence or otherwise in Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan. No 
other presidential candidate was put up, and polling took place under 
strictly controlled conditions.
The result of the ballot showed that Ayub had received 75,084 votes 
or approximately 95.6 per cent of the votes. On 17 February, the 
Field Marshal was sworn in as the first "elected* President for a 
five-year term .152
The Basic Democracies referendum had also given the President the 
authority to formulate a future constitution for the country. Ayub 
now declared his intention to set up a Constitution Commission to 
help devise a future political structure. The President pressed for 
the establishment of a Presidential system, based on a strong 
executive, which, he stated, was the only way of ensuring effective 
government and political s tab ility .15^ Ayub also reiterated his 
opposition to political parties, calling for indirect elections on 
non-party grounds for the executive and the legislature, with, 
preferably, the Basic Democrats acting as the electoral college.
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The Constitution Commission set up in 1962 was given strict terms 
of reference by the Martial Law regime. Ayub declared that it was up 
to his Administration to accept or reject the proposals of the 
Commission. According to the President, the Commission was "not 
being appointed to tell us what we should do. We know what we 
should do. We are clear in our minds that we cannot accept the 
parliamentary system."154 The Commission's report was presented 
to Ayub in May 1962.
In the meantime, elections were held in the central and provincial 
legislatures in April 1962, with 80,000 Basic Democrats acting as 
the electoral college. The newly elected National Assembly accepted 
the Constitution, which was promulgated on 2 June 1962. Martial 
Law was simultaneously withdrawn and power transferred to a 
"civilian" government headed by President Ayub.
Summary
The military's endeavours to obtain supreme power had culminated in 
the Martial Law of 1958. The takeover was followed soon after by 
measures to consolidate and legitimise the internal position of the 
military regime, including the promulgation of legislation aimed 
ostensibly at eradicating the ills of the past and replacing inept 
civilian governments by a stable and effective administration. Apart 
from these legitimising measures, Martial Law Regulations and 
Ordinances were issued to prevent a re-emergence of the political 
leadership. The use of the external, particularly the "communist" 
threat was also resorted to in order to justify the forcible
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suppression of anti-Martial Law sentiments.
At the same time, an alliance was forged with the bureaucracy to 
enable a smooth functioning of civil adm inistration. The 
bureaucrats, however, remained junior partners, and were given the 
task of implementing the policy directives issued by the military 
authorities. Thus the military, represented by its Supreme 
Commander, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, remained in complete control 
of all decision-making, whether in the sphere of domestic politics or 
in the realm of foreign policy.
In the pursuance of both domestic and foreign policy goals, the Ayub 
regime was careful to ensure that the requirements of its main 
constituency, the Armed Forces, took precedence over all other 
national needs. In foreign policy, this meant a continuance of the 
policy of alignment with the West, a course dictated by the 
orientation and interests of the Armed Forces. The military's 
participation in the alliances had not only reinforced its pro-Western 
and anti-Soviet views, but had also made it the chief beneficiary of 
substantial assistance which had modernized and enlarged the 
establishment, thereby strengthening its internal position.
While the Americans supported the takeover, providing the new 
government with considerable economic and military assistance and 
consolidating their links with Pakistan through a bilateral pact, the 
coup had an adverse effect on Pakistan-Soviet relations. Aware of 
the orientation of the Pakistani High Command and its role in 
aligning Pakistan with the West, the Soviets strongly attacked the
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regime's foreign policy directions and questioned its internal 
legitim acy.
The Ayub Administration, however, ignored Soviet threats and 
warnings and adopted an even harsher anti-Soviet rhetoric. 
Pakistani warnings of a S ino-Soviet threat to the Indian 
subcontinent and offers of joint assistance to India, in the wake of 
Sino-lndian tensions, in the hope of gaining greater Western 
assistance, further aggravated Pakistani relations with the Soviet 
Union. The latter retaliated by a continued extension of support to 
India and Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan.
Relations between the two countries reached an all-time low with 
the U-2 incident, which exposed the military regime's policy of 
extending facilities to the US to conduct anti-Soviet operations from 
Pakistani soil as part of a quid-pro-quo for military and economic 
assistance. While the Martial Law government did not renounce its 
alignment with the West in the wake of the U-2 incident, and allowed 
the Americans to continue using Pakistani facilities to monitor the 
Soviet Union, both internal and external determinants were to have 
their own influence in shaping the future course of Pakistani foreign 
policy.
Internally the U-2 incident led to a renewed internal debate on the 
risks involved in a policy of alignment with the West. Externally the 
Pakistanis were perturbed by the reassessment of American South 
Asian strategies, especially under the Kennedy Administration, 
which now began to focus on the potentialities of neutral India
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acting as a counterweight to Chinese communism. This occurred at a 
time when the strategic value of land-based alliances ringing the 
communist bloc was declining, due to nuclear technological 
developments, such as the deployment of ICBMs and SLBNs. US 
interest in and assistance to Pakistan concomitantly declined.
The Ayub regime was therefore forced to adopt a change in foreign 
policy rhetoric, both to placate domestic criticism and to put 
pressure on its American allies to reconsider their policy directives 
towards Pakistan. The new Pakistani strategy included threats of 
withdrawal from the alliances if sufficient aid was not forthcoming, 
and moves to improve relations, especially in the economic sphere, 
with the Soviet Union. It also involved the use of the China card as a 
lever in Pakistan's dealings with regional and external powers.
The Martial Law Administration was particularly concerned about the 
internal consequences of a reduction in external military assistance 
for its West-trained, West-equipped Armed Forces. A decline in such 
aid could well mean a withdrawal of support from this vital 
institution. Efforts were therefore to be made to establish closer 
ties with Pakistan's major aid donor, the US, a policy which was in 
keeping with the regime's own ideological leanings. Hence, the Ayub 
Administration continued to emphasise the existence of the Soviet 
threat, calling upon its Western allies to help strengthen it against 
the internal and external pressures of communism.
The military regime's professions of loyalty to the West meant 
continuing tensions in relations with the Soviet Union which
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consistently denounced the internal character of the Pakistani 
government while, at the same time, both cajoling and putting 
pressure on the latter to change its foreign policy directions. Thus 
the orientation of the Martial Law government and the needs of its 
main constituency, the Armed Forces, continued to dictate the course 
of Pakistan's pro-Western and anti-Soviet foreign policy.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MILITARY IN MUFTI M 962-1969)
In the post-Martial Law period, the course of Pakistan-Soviet 
relations was to be influenced by the very nature of the new political 
order devised by Ayub Khan, in which the military was to continue to 
operate as the dominant domestic actor. Since civilianization would 
not reduce Ayub's dependence on the military to perpetuate his rule, 
the orientation, needs and requirements of the Armed Forces were to 
determine the course of Pakistani politics and foreign policy. While 
defence policy would continue to dictate the directions of foreign 
policy, there was a close interconnection between internal and 
external variables and changes in the global and regional 
environments were to have their own impact on Pakistan-Soviet 
relations. Thus developments in the domestic and international 
arenas would influence the course of the relationship.
A New Political Order
Martial Law was formally withdrawn in June 1962 and a new 
government formed by Ayub. The key questions relevant to this 
study are whether the changeover represented a withdrawal of the 
military from politics and an abdication of its direct and indirect 
influence in the domestic and foreign policy formulation and decision 
making processes.
The end of direct military rule does not necessarily lead to the 
adoption of a non-political role by the Armed Forces, reluctant to
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give up the enormous benefits of the power they have enjoyed. They 
therefore devise a political framework which allows them to retain 
a considerable measure of power, even after a formal withdrawal to 
the barracks. One of several strategies can be adopted. A nominal 
civilian government can be set up under direct military control or 
power can be handed over to a civilian leadership, which is not 
allowed to interfere with the special privileges of the military. 
Thirdly, the Armed Forces' political role can be institutionalised by 
means of a regulated process of "civilianizing" military rule.
In this last strategy, the military withdraws to the barracks but 
leaves behind "a soldier, perhaps, the original coup-leader, in the 
driving seat." Although this leads to a change in the nature of 
government, the military continues to play a dominant political role 
by helping to perpetuate the rule of the former military commander. 
This support continues only as long as the military is confident of 
his ability to advance its "corporate and professional interests." 
Finally, the new ''civilian” ruler is willing to protect the military's 
interests and allow it a voice in decision making not only because he 
is dependent on it for survival, but also because he continues to 
identify with his parent institution.1
This last option was adopted by the Ayub regime. At this stage, it 
may be helpful to recapitulate some of the steps leading to the 
transfer of power from military to ’'civilian" rule and to analyse 
Ayub's new political structure. Ayub had carefully monitored the 
process of civilianization to protect his own position as well as the 
m ilitary's corporate interests. He first devised the Basic
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Democracies scheme, discussed in the previous chapter, and then set 
up a Constitution Commission. The Commission's report of 1 May 
1961 called for the re-establishment of the parliamentary system 
and recommended direct elections, on the basis of limited franchise, 
for both the executive and legislature. 2 Rejecting the report, Ayub 
and his advisors took over the task of devising a constitutional 
framework to suit their own requirements, which was finally 
announced on 1 March 1962.® National and Provincial Assembly 
elections were held soon after on non-party lines, with Ayub 
continuing to oppose the re-emergence of political parties.4 Not only 
were the elections held indirectly, with the handpicked Basic 
Democrats acting as the electoral college, but potential candidates 
were carefully screened and the actual polling monitored by both 
military and civil authorities.5 Following the ratification of the 
Constitution by the National Assembly and the swearing-in of Ayub's 
new Cabinet, Martial Law was finally withdrawn on 8 June 1962.®
The system introduced by the 1962 Constitution allowed the 
executive to dominate the legislature and judiciary.7 Elected 
indirectly by the Basic Democrats for a five-year term neither the 
President nor his Cabinet, which was solely an advisory body, were 
answerable to the National Assembly.
The President exercised considerable control over the Assembly. All 
bills required his consent and he possessed the right to propose 
expenditure and taxation while the Assembly could only control new 
expenditure in the national budget.® He could promulgate certain 
legislation when the Assembly was not in session, and declare an
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indefinite state of emergency, during which he could issue 
ordinances which could not be challenged by the legislature or the 
judiciary. The National Assembly could not easily amend the 
Constitution without the President's consent and it was virtually 
impossible to impeach the President, while he possessed the right to 
dissolve the Assembly.9
The judges of the Supreme and High Courts were appointed and 
dismissed by the President. The judiciary could not review 
legislation passed in Parliament nor challenge the legality of 
Presidential Ordinances.
The President exercised control over the provinces as he could 
appoint or dismiss Provincial Governors, who controlled the 
provincial legislatures but were answerable to him alone. The 
Provincial Cabinets in turn were responsible to the Governors and not 
to the Assemblies. The Constitution gave the Military High Command 
autonomy in defence matters and prevented any future civilian 
interference in military matters. According to Article 238, the 
Defence portfolio would be held for at least twenty years after 
promulgation of the Constitution by persons with the military rank 
or equivalent of Lieutenant-General. The Constitution therefore 
"guaranteed that the military's voice would be 'heard' in the highest 
levels of government officially as well as unofficially in the next 
decade." 10
Ayub took measures to maintain close links with and a measure of 
control over his parent institution. He continued to hold the rank of
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Field Marshal and assumed the positions of Defence Minister and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, responsible for appointing 
Service Chiefs and determining the terms of office of military 
personnel. 11
Continued emphasis was placed on fulfilling the requirements of the 
forces and defence and foreign policies were geared to ensure that 
the military's needs would be given priority over all other internal 
demands. Financial benefits were extended to military officers, many 
of whom were appointed to lucrative posts in public and private 
sector enterprises. To neutralise any potential threats from within 
the institution, Ayub’s fellow coup-makers Burki and Sheikh were, 
for example, sent abroad on diplomatic assignments, while other 
officers of doubtful loyalty were retired or moved to less sensitive 
posts. 12 These actions did not, however, reduce the military's 
influence in the new political set-up; as the government's most 
important base of support, it continued to exercise its influence on 
all aspects of policy making, both through the President himself and 
through its own High Command.
The bureaucracy also maintained its importance in the new system 
since its continued cooperation was essential for smooth running of 
the administration. The CSP was allowed to maintain its privileged 
position and continued to man some of the most sensitive posts in 
the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . According to a former bureaucrat, Ayub's new 
political order was, in fact a system "in which the real 
decision-making body was composed of the top bureaucrats and army 
generals" and all important decisions were taken with the help of
this "inner cabinet."14
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The Basic Democrats remained an integral part of Ayub's political 
system, their most important role being that of a safe electoral 
college. The regime was also hopeful that they would provide a loyal 
political leadership, influential enough to prevent the re-emergence 
of the old politicians.
Ayub's political order had been specifically designed to exclude 
politicians from an active role in decision making. Political parties 
remained banned and the Assembly was elected on non-party 
g ro u n d s .15 Soon after it started functioning, however, informal 
aligments began to emerge. The Administration realised they could 
be put to good use as most legislators were proven allies. Hence the 
leader of the House, External Affairs Minister, Bogra was allowed to 
form a "democratic group" followed soon after by the formation of 
two small "opposition groups" which posed no threat to the 
Adm inistration.15
The re-emergence of political opposition outside the legislature was 
a more threatening development. Ayub quickly passed the Political 
Parties Act of 1962 and accepted an ’’invitation" to join the Muslim 
League. His party then formed the majority grouping in the National 
and Provincial Assemblies.17 Ayub was now secure in the knowledge 
that, with a system of his own devising and the backing of the 
military and civilian bureaucracies, he was in complete and effective 
control.
The Sino-lndian Conflict and Pakistani Foreign Policy.
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There was no change in Pakistan's foreign policy directions in the 
post - Martial Law period. The ideological orientation of Ayub and 
his Military High Command meant the continuation of a pro-Western 
and anti-Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, the interests of the 
Western-equipped military demanded a consolidation of links with 
the US, the major donor of military and economic assistance. In the 
regional context, it was politically expedient to adopt an anti-Indian 
stand so as to acquire internal support and to justify the need to 
strengthen Pakistan's defences, both through increased domestic 
expenditure and through alignment with the West. Yet the American 
interest in building up India as a counterweight to China forced 
Pakistan to ostensibly adopt a policy of rapprochement with India.
Ayub therefore continued to offer joint defence to India against the 
Sino-Soviet threat, while at the same time, warning his American 
allies that their regional strategy of befriending neutrals at the cost 
of allies was subjecting his Administration to "tremendous political 
propaganda" from internal opponents.18
Ayub's delicate diplomatic manoeuverings were threatened by the 
eruption of the Sino-lndian conflict in late 1962. As Chinese troops 
inflicted a military defeat on India and then unilaterally withdrew, a 
humiliated Indian leadership sought to strengthen its Armed Forces 
with assistance from both the Western and Eastern blocs.19 Since 
the US and UK had extended military aid to India both during and after 
the hostilities, Ayub was concerned that a continued influx of
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Western arms could lead to a shift in the regional balance of power 
in favour of India.20 He was equally concerned that a consolidation 
of Indo-American ties could also result in a decline in similar 
Western assistance to Pakistan.21
Western arms aid to India also had serious internal repercussions 
since it undermined the entire structure of Ayub's foreign policy, 
which was based on the need for alignment with the West to 
strengthen Pakistan against India. Protest meetings were held 
throughout Pakistan, calling for an abandonment of the policy of 
alignment.22 Forced to respond, the government strongly attacked 
the regional policies of its Western allies, claiming that their arms 
assistance to India would threaten Pakistani security.2^ Addressing 
an emergency session of the National Assembly, Foreign Minister 
Bogra also warned the West that, "in international relations, there 
can be no eternal friends, nor can there be eternal enemies . . . "24 
At the same time, an attempt was made to obtain Western backing on 
the Kashmir issue to boost the government's internal standing.25
Although the Western countries did persuade India to re-open 
negotiations on Kashmir, the talks ended inconclusively. While the 
Americans continued to assure Pakistan that arms provided to India 
would not be used against it, they were unwilling to make arms 
supply to India conditional on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. 
26 As domestic criticism once again mounted after the failure of 
the Kashmir talks, the Ayub regime continued to warn its Western 
allies that it might be forced to withdraw from the pacts unless the 
US reassessed its policy. 27
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Ayub also embarked in earnest on a policy of using China as a lever in 
his dealings with the US, adopting a sympathetic attitude towards 
the Chinese role in the Sino-lndian conflict. The Pakistanis claimed 
that the war had resulted from Indian provocations and that India 
was using the Chinese ''threat" to obtain external military aid for use 
against Pakistan. Ayub warned the West that if it continued arming 
India, the smaller regional countries would be forced to turn to China 
for help. 28
After Bogra's sudden death in January 1963, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was 
appointed Foreign Minister. 29 Bhutto was to play an important role 
in Ayub's policy of playing the China "card'! While Ayub kept his 
criticism of his Western allies low-key, Bhutto adopted an 
anti-imperialist and pro-Chinese rhetoric, which appealed to the 
anti-Western sentiments sweeping P a k i s t a n . U n d e r  Bhutto's 
"guidance'' Sino-Pakistani political, economic and cultural relations 
grew apace. In March 1963, their long- drawn negotiations on a 
border agreement were c o n c l u d e d . During the same year, an air 
agreement and their first trade agreement were signed.
Political relations reached their peak during Premier Chou En-lai's 
visit in February 1964, during which the Chinese abandoned their 
neutrality on the Kashmir issued2 In an attempt to gain domestic 
support and to put pressure on India, Bhutto even implied the 
existence of a defence agreement with China, informing the National 
Assembly in July 1963 that, "An attack by India on Pakistan would no 
longer confine the stakes to the security and territorial integrity of
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Pakistan” but would also "involve the security and territorial 
integrity of the largest state in Asia ." 33
The Ayub regime had, however, no intention of abandoning its 
pro-Western orientation or withdrawing from the anti-communist 
pacts in view of its dependence on the West for military and 
economic assistance. During his July 1963 speech, Bhutto had added 
that it was for the West "to act in such a manner as to assure the 
security of Pakistan and the inviolability of its political, economic 
and social systems," 34 while Ayub also dismissed fears that 
Pakistan was growing more tolerant of Communism. "I told . . .  my 
American friends" he said "that nothing could be more absurd."35
Both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, however, reacted 
with hostility to Pakistani attempts to use China as a lever in 
dealings with the West. Moreover, the growing Sino-Pakistani ties, 
combined with the increase in Indo-Pakistan tensions, undermined 
the US bid to forge a joint Indo-Pakistani shield against China. The 
Americans retaliated by strongly criticising the moves towards 
Sino-Pakistani rapprochement ancf put pressure on the Ayub regime 
to abandon its China policy.36 A $4.3 million credit for the 
development of Dacca airport was cancelled and the delivery of 
F-104 aircraft suspended.37 In April 1965, Ayub's visit to the US 
was suddenly postponed. The Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium's meeting, 
to discuss in July the Pakistani request for a $500 million grant, 
was also postponed for two months. 38
321
The Pakistani government had also attempted to establish closer 
relations with the Soviets, both as a bargaining counter in its 
dealings with the West and to appease internal anti-alignment 
sentiments. The Soviets were willing to react positively. 
Pakistan-Soviet relations at this juncture can be best understood by 
examining Soviet South Asian strategies during and after the 
Sino-lndian conflict. The conflict had erupted at a time when 
Sino-Soviet differences were on the increase. The Soviets, 
therefore, for the first time, extended support to a non-Communist 
state in a dispute with a Communist country.39 Soviet support was 
also extended to prevent India from growing too close to the West, 
which had provided considerable assistance to it during the crisis.
India's defeat, however, led to a further rethinking of Soviet policy 
towards the region. The Soviets now felt that India could withstand 
Chinese "expansionism1' only if it joined hands with Pakistan. Hence 
an improvement of relations with Pakistan was necessary to acquire 
the influence needed to promote a unified Indo-Pakistani front 
against China. Moreover, Indo-Pakistani rapprochment would promote 
regional stability and decrease the possibilities of external 
intervention in South Asia.40 The rise of anti-American feeling in 
Pakistan strengthened the Soviet resolve to encourage the Ayub 
government to move away from the alliances. The Soviets also felt 
it necessary to improve relations with Pakistan so as to arrest the 
expansion of Chinese influence in that country.41 Finally, the climate 
was ripe for improved Pakistan-Soviet relations as detente gradually 
replaced the Cold War in the wake of the Cuban crisis, allowing the 
two countries to adopt a more flexible stance in their bilateral
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dealings. Moreover, the Soviets and Americans now had a common 
purpose, to resist the growth of Chinese influence. The imperatives 
of this, which resulted in greater US patronage of India and Soviet 
wooing of Pakistan, was however to result in exacerbating 
Indo-Pakistan relations, as well as relations of each with its super 
power patron, combined with attempts by them to use whatever 
leverage they possessed in the international arena to regain the 
patronage which they perceived was being withdrawn. In the 
Pakistani case, this, of course, resulted in the Ayub regime 
attempting to use the Soviet card in its dealings with the West.
In June 1963, Pakistan's UN representative, Zafrulla Khan, returning 
from a visit to the Soviet Union, observed that Khrushchev and 
Foreign Minister Gromyko had given him the impression that they 
would be "very responsive" to any Pakistani overtures for improved 
relations, especially in the economic sphere.42 The Pakistani 
response was characteristically cautious, since the pro-Western 
Administration did want to use the relationship as a lever in its 
dealings with its Western allies and yet had no real desire to come 
too close to the Soviets.
Talks were therefore initiated on an expansion of trade links, but the 
Pakistani side kept on delaying a successful conclusion of the 
negotia tions.43 In view of Pakistan's hesitancy no general trade 
agreement was reached, although barter trade pacts were signed in 
August and September 1963, providing for an exchange of Rs 10 
million annually. By the end of the year, Pakistan's trade with the 
Eastern bloc constituted only 2.5 percent of its total trade volume.44
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In October 1963, a civil aviation agreement was signed giving 
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) its first transit rights in the 
Soviet Union. The oil and gas exploration agreement of 1961 was 
extended and a Pakistan-Soviet Cultural Association was formed in 
1 9 6 3 .45 The Pakistan government declared that their "main 
consideration" in improving such bilateral links was to obtain Soviet 
assistance to "help us resolve the disputes confronting this 
region."46
The Soviets did make an important concession on the Kashmir 
question during the Security Council debate in May 1964.47 Although 
he reiterated the stand that the Kashmiri people had settled "the 
question of Kashmir's belonging to India," themselves, the Soviet 
delegate also recognised the existence of the conflict, declaring that 
"the India-Pakistan dispute should be settled directly by the parties 
concerned . . . exclusively by peaceful means."48
The new Soviet neutrality on Indo-Pakistan issues was demonstrated 
during President Mikoyan's visit to India in June 1964 during which 
he asked the Indian Prime Minister to improve relations with 
Pakistan, while Deputy Premier Mazurov declared that his country's 
bilateral relations with Pakistan would not be dictated by 
In d o -P a k is ta n i d if fe re n c e s .4 9 During Indian President 
Radhakrishnan's visit to Moscow in September 1964, the Soviets 
called on the Indians to peacefully resolve their disputes with 
Pakistan.50
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After Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, new Soviet leaders, Party 
Chief Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin adopted an even more 
flexible policy towards Pakistan, hoping to wean it away from the 
West and China. Welcoming the internal changes in the Soviet Union, 
Foreign Minister Bhutto called on the new Soviet leadership to adopt 
" a correct and objective position" on Indo-Pakistan differences, "a 
position . . . commensurate" with the Soviet position "as a great 
power seeking to establish international peace and goodwill." 51
Continuing with their policy of using the Soviet card as a bargaining 
counter in their dealings with the West, the Pakistanis ostensibly 
distanced themselves from SEATO and CENTO, claiming that their 
membership of the Western security pacts should not affect 
Pakistan-Soviet relations since the pacts themselves were now of 
little value. During Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Lapin's 
visit in November 1964, for example, Bhutto claimed that Pakistan 
was for all practical purposes a non-aligned state, since it had 
serious differences of opinion with the United States on a number of 
issues, including Vietnam.52
The new Soviet leadership renewed an invitation extended to 
President Ayub by Khrushchev and the visit was scheduled for April 
1965. In a preparatory visit in January, Bhutto declared that 
Pakistan and the Soviet Union had overcome most of their past 
differences. "Now our countries" he said, "see each other face to 
face. In the past they had their backs to each other." 53
Yet differences did continue to divide the two sides. The Soviets
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were not reconciled to Pakistan's continued membership of the 
Western pacts. So when Bhutto claimed that Pakistan was 
"practically non-aligned"; that it was "playing a moderate role inside 
SEATO in preventing escalation of war" ; and that its foreign policy 
was "more independent than that of India," he was "bluntly " told by 
Kosygin that the Soviet leadership "did not share Bhutto's opinion on 
the relative independence of Pakistan's and India's foreign 
policies."54
Ayub's visit in April 1965, the highest level visit by a Pakistan 
dignitary , was described by Kosygin as "a momentous event" in 
Pakistan-Soviet relations. He added that, "It is our conviction that 
different views on public systems should not prevent our peoples 
from becoming good neighbours and even friends, and our 
Governments from cooperating with each other."55 Yet Pakistan's 
membership of the pacts and the issue of Soviet arms supplies to 
India left a jarring note to these pronouncements of goodwill.
According to a former Pakistan Foreign Office official, one of the 
objectives of Ayub's visit was to assess the possibility of Soviet 
arms supplies to Pakistan.56 If the move was successful, it would 
be both an internal propaganda victory and a means of persuading the 
Americans to meet Pakistan's defence requirements.
In the past, the Ayub government had consistently opposed the 
extension of Soviet arms aid to India. For instance, reacting to a 
Soviet $140 million military aid grant offer to India in October
1964, Ayub said that the future course of Pakistan-Soviet relations
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would depend "on whether or not Russia will continue to arm India 
against us or not." 57 During his visit, Ayub continued to argue that 
the "security of the subcontinent was not served by the massive 
supply of arms to India, whether the arms came from the Western 
countries or from the Soviet Union." Accusing India of harbouring 
aggressive designs towards Pakistan, Ayub also claimed that Soviet 
arms aid to India was helping it "to pursue her aggressive and 
expansionist policies." 58
The Soviet leaders, however, dismissed Ayub's objections and at the 
same time made it clear that Pakistan's membership of the Western 
pacts had been responsible for the extension of Soviet military 
support to India. Kosygin also directly criticised Pakistan's alliance 
with the West. When Ayub claimed that Pakistan's presence in the 
alliances was serving as a moderating influence and "in any case, the 
Pacts were not hurting the USSR", Kosygin responded that "they may 
not be hurting us, but they give us no pleasure either." He made it 
clear to Ayub that only non-aligned countries like India "who were 
fighting colonialism and imperialism" were eligible for Soviet arms 
assistance.59
Some progress was made during the visit, especially in the economic 
sphere. A trade pact was signed and a $150 million credit extended 
to Pakistan for the provision of "machinery and equipment necessary 
for the development" of its "industry and agriculture." It was also 
estimated that bilateral trade would "double or treble" by 1967 in 
comparison with 1964.60
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The Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with the progress made during 
the trip, with Ayub stating that "there was general recognition on 
both sides that the meeting might prove a turning point in our 
relations . . . "  61 Although no support had been extended to the 
Pakistani stand on Kashmir, Ayub attempted to get some domestic 
leverage out of the statement in the joint communique in which both 
sides expressed their "resolute support for peoples who are engaged 
in a struggle for their national liberation and independence and for 
peoples fighting for the right to determine their own future in 
accordance with their own will," 62 implying that this statement 
augured a changed Soviet posture which had "a direct relevance to 
many problems of this area." 63
On his return home, Ayub admitted that substantial political 
differences existed between their two countries, stressing that it 
was not possible to achieve "radical results overnight."64 The 
Pakistanis were in fact satisfied with the limited progress made 
thus far and "radical" results were seen as neither necessary nor 
desirable. Pakistan remained committed to alignment with the West 
and a limited opening to the East served the purpose of acquiring 
internal legitimacy and warning its Western allies not to take it for 
granted.
Conflict in the Subcontinent
While external factors such as regional strife and changes in the 
global environment influenced the course of Pakistan-Soviet 
relations, internal constraints played an equally important role in
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determining the direction of Pakistani foreign policy. This was 
clearly demonstrated by the events of the mid-1960's.
In the post-1962 period, the Ayub government took every measure to 
ensure the continued support of the civil and military bureaucracies, 
including pay increases in 1964 and the grant of agricultural land 
under central government control to military personnel and civil 
se rvan ts .65 While this policy reinforced the feudal nature of the 
state, building up linkages between the civil and military 
bureaucracies and the landowning classes, there was increasing 
resentment amongst the rural landless masses. Unrest was also rife 
in the cities as the government's economic policies benefited only a 
small emerging entrepreneurial class and further enlarged the gap 
between the rich and the poor.66
Any opposition was however effectively suppressed by the use of 
repressive legislation and resort to force. Hence Ayub was confident 
that his domestic position was secure as he prepared for elections to 
the Basic Democracies in October and November 1964, followed by 
Presidential polls in January 1965, with the aim of gaining internal 
legitimacy.67
Contrary to his expectations, the weak and divided opposition parties 
aligned themselves on a joint electoral platform, the Combined 
Opposition Party (COP) with a nine-point programme, calling for the 
restoration of parliamentary democracy, based on direct elections.68 
A major propaganda victory was achieved by them as Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah's sister, Fatima Jinnah, agreed to stand as their Presidential
candidate.69
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The most important factor working in favour of the President was 
the system of indirect elections in which the Basic Democrats acted 
as the electoral college. In the elections to the Basic Democracies, 
which preceded the legislative and presidential polls, the 
government machinery was fully utilised to ensure that suitable 
candidates were elected.70 In the Presidential elections, Ayub 
received 49,951 votes as compared to Miss Jinnah's 28,691. The 
Basic Democrats had decided to side with Ayub as many realised that 
an opposition victory threatened the continuance of the Basic 
Democracies system itself, while others were coerced into 
supporting the President. Ayub's party, the Convention Muslim 
League, also emerged as the clear winner in the National Assembly 
elections.71
Although Ayub thanked his countrymen for having granted him "a 
clear mandate" to pursue his "internal and external policies," he was 
shaken by the election results. 72 Despite the inbuilt constraints of 
his "controlled" democracy, the opposition had acquired thirty 
percent of the vote, reflecting growing internal unrest. 
Dissatisfaction with election irregularities, combined with the 
knowledge that the system was responsible for Ayub's victory, led to 
violent clashes in major cities like Karachi. Realising the necessity 
of containing the unrest, Ayub resorted to a tried and proven method 
of achieving domestic unity, i.e., the use of the Indian threat.73
Pakistan had been following events within Indian-held Kashmir with 
great interest as unrest there had grown after successive measures 
to gradually amalgamate the territory into the Indian Union in 1963 
and 1964.74 Ayub's response to the developments in Kashmir was 
dictated by both internal and external factors.
In the external context, Ayub's foreign policy manoeuvres had proved 
unsuccessful in achieving their major goal of consolidating ties with 
the US so as to gain maximum military and economic assistance. 
American military aid to Pakistan had, in fact, begun to decline as it 
was downgraded in US global and regional strategies. By 1965, the 
Americans had slowed down their deliveries and no new 
commitments were made.75 India, on the other hand, continued to 
receive substantial military and economic assistance from both 
blocs. It also possessed a far superior indigenous arms 
manufacturing capability, and had modernized and expanded its 
Armed Forces through greatly enhanced domestic expenditure.76
Ayub had continued to increase domestic military spending, but he 
was aware that without sufficient external assistance, there would 
soon be no possibility of matching, let alone surpassing India's 
military might. He therefore had the option of either adopting a 
policy of rapprochement with India or challenging it militarily 
before the regional balance of power moved further to Pakistan's 
disadvantage. Rapprochement was unacceptable, as Ayub needed the 
Indian "threat" as a means of gaining internal support and was 
dependent for his very survival on a military establishment which 
had been indoctrinated over the years to view India as an implacable
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foe.77 Moreover, Ayub desperately needed a foreign policy victory in 
view of the unrest resulting from the 1965 elections and to halt the 
growing dissatisfaction within the military, especially as external 
arms assistance began to decline.78 There could be no better way of 
countering these developments than successful action against 
India.79
In early 1965, the Ayub government stepped up its military activity 
along the Kashmir ceasefire line and in April-May, resorted to armed 
action, albeit on a limited scale, in the disputed territory of the Rann 
of Kutch, on the Rajasthan-Sind borders.80 The Rann conflict, which 
ended on 30 June, was used by the Pakistanis to test their military 
strength against India and also to determine Indian reaction to the 
localised use of force. 81
The Pakistanis had been careful to ensure that the skirmishes in the 
Rann had remained limited. The Air Forces, for instance, were kept 
out of the battle by mutual agreement between the Pakistani and 
Indian Air Chiefs.82 The Indian willingness to keep the conflict 
localised led the Pakistani Military High Command to believe that it 
could successfully resort to force to further its strategic objectives 
without the danger of a full-scale war.83
An equally important outcome of the Rann conflict was the 
performance of the respective forces. India's defeat in its war with 
China had convinced the Pakistanis that its Armed Forces were 
militarily inferior 84 and that conviction was reinforced by their 
performance in the Rann encounter. According to senior military
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sources, the performance of the Pakistani forces "reinforced Ayub 
Khan's faith . . .  in our inherent strength" 85 and gave the Pakistan 
Army "a new confidence", making them "very much bolder in 
formulating their contingency plans".86 Thus the Rann dispute 
proved to be " a curtain raiser" as the Pakistan military prepared to 
meet the enemy. 87
As Indian and Pakistani troops faced each other across the ceasefire 
line in Kashmir, when tensions within the Valley were on the 
increase, a number of senior Army Generals believed that the 
"political climate" there "had become so unstable that a mere spark 
was needed to engulf the whole region in an anti-Indian armed 
insurgency." 88 These influential Army hawks, supported by Foreign 
Minister Bhutto, began to press Ayub to take action before India, 
supported militarily by the Western and Eastern blocs, became too 
formidable to challenge successfully. 89
Ayub was of the same opinion himself.90 So it was decided to 
infiltrate trained military and civilian personnel into the Valley to 
assist local dissidents in stirring up massive internal unrest, which 
would force the Indian authorities to negotiate a settlement 
favourable to Pakistan. Ayub and his military advisors assumed that 
"wide-spread support existed within occupied Kashmir to make such 
a guerrilla campaign a success"; they were confident that "as a 
consequence of this action" India would be unlikely "to attempt a 
large-scale military offensive against Azad Kashmiri territory"; and 
they also "ruled out" altogether "the possibility of India crossing the 
international frontier either in East or West Pakistan . . ."91
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On 1 August 1965 specially trained units were sent into the Valley. 
The force, however, soon ran into serious difficulties as the 
expected support failed to materialise, and was driven back by the 
Indians "without having made much headway on the political or 
military situation."92 As the Indians retaliated by occupying a 
number of strategic posts in Azad Kashmir, Ayub was forced to 
escalate hostilities and on 31 August launched a counter-offensive, 
sending regular Army units across the ceasefire line in Kashmir. The 
Indians then moved to reduce the pressure on Kashmir by launching a 
three-pronged attack into West Pakistan on 6 September.93
Since Ayub and his Military High Command had not expected the 
Indians to extend hostilities beyond the international frontier, they 
were ill-prepared to meet the offensive.94 Adequate preparations 
had not been made along the ceasefire line, and there was no plan 
"for a joint, overall higher conduct of the war." 95
While the Indian forces halted the Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, at 
first a stalemate emerged as both sides were "inclined to conserve 
their forces" and reluctant to pay the human and material costs of an 
all-out o ffensive.96 As the hostilities continued, Pakistan's 
position grew steadily weaker. Its ability to carry on fighting was 
heavily dependent on a steady replacement of its war losses and a 
continuing supply of spares, tank ammunition and even fuel by the 
Americans.97
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This assistance was, however, not forthcoming. Not only was the US 
preoccupied with Vietnam but, according to a former CIA official, 
the conflict was seen "as an important failure of US policy in the 
subcontinent" since India and Pakistan's "willingness to fight raised 
fundamental questions about the seriousness of their interest in 
development and defence of the subcontinent" against the communist 
th re a t.98 The US therefore imposed an arms embargo on both 
countries,99 accompanied by a freeze in economic assistance,100 
brushing aside Pakistani protests that the arms embargo had far 
more serious repercussions for Pakistan which was almost totally 
dependent on the US for arms.
Pakistan's attempts to obtain military assistance from SEATO and 
CENTO proved equally unsuccessful.101 Turkey and Iran turned down 
Pakistani requests, on the grounds that they could not transfer their 
US-supplied hardware.102 All Pakistani appeals for direct US 
mediation were also turned down, although the Americans did press 
both parties to reach an immediate ceasefire for fear of escalation 
of the dispute and, in particular, the potential involvement of 
China.103
The Chinese did see the conflict as an opportunity to play an active 
role in the subcontinent, demonstrate their loyalty to Pakistan and 
undermine Indian security. During both the Rann dispute and the 1965 
war, China sided completely with Pakistan. On 7 and 8 September, 
the Chinese issued offical statements, condemning India for its 
"naked aggression" against Pakistan. India was also accused of 
engaging in "acts of aggression and provocation against China" and
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asked to "dismantle all the aggressive military structures it has 
illegally built beyond or on the China-Sikkim border" or "bear 
responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom."104 On 16 
September, the Chinese government issued a three-day ultimatum to 
India to dismantle its "aggressive military works" along the 
Sino-lndian border, to return captured Chinese citizens and live­
stock and to halt all future "harassing raids across the border." 105
The Chinese threats caused concern not only in India but also in the 
United States and the Soviet Union; both super powers issued public 
and private warnings to the Chinese to refrain from intervening.106 
The Soviets were especially apprehensive about the regional 
implications of the conflict. By the mid-1960s, they had adopted a 
policy of equidistance on Indo-Pakistani disputes, in a bid to promote 
rapprochement between the two South Asian rivals and to counter 
the growth of Western and Chinese influence in the region. The Rann 
conflict was therefore viewed with dismay in Moscow. Adopting a 
strictly impartial stand, the Soviets called on both sides to resolve 
their differences peacefully "through direct negotiations, taking into 
account" their mutual interests. At the same time, it was claimed 
that while a continuation of the conflict threatened regional peace, 
it was "grist for the mill of the imperialists and the reactionaries 
, . . "1 0 7
During Prime Minister Shastri's visit, which took place during the 
hostilities in the Rann, the Soviets maintained their impartial 
posture. There was no mention of either the Rann conflict or the 
Kashmir dispute in the joint communique, except for a Soviet
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comment that disputes Hmust be solved by way of peaceful talks 
„108
The Soviets also continued their attempts to improve bilateral ties 
with Pakistan in the hope of gaining a measure of influence, and, in 
particular, tried to exploit the growing differences between Pakistan 
and the United States. For instance, when the Aid-to-Pakistan 
Consortium postponed its meeting under US pressure in July 1965, 
the Soviets came forward with offers of economic assistance. They 
also agreed to provide a grant of $150 million for the expansion of 
Dacca airport after the withdrawal of the US offer.109
As the Pakistanis mounted their guerrilla offensive in Kashmir, the 
Soviets continued to strive for close relations with both Pakistan 
and India, while at the same time, urging them to reach a peaceful 
settlement. Commenting on events in Kashmir the Soviet media 
stressed that, "People in the Soviet Union are concerned about the 
bloodshed in Kashmir. The Soviet Union is concerned for the 
immediate cessation of the conflict." Such a settlement "would be 
an important contribution to the preservation of peace in Asia." It 
was also emphasised that the Soviet Union was "striving" for "the 
further development of its relations with Pakistan", proceeding 
"from the fact that neighbourliness between our states does not 
contradict our friendship with any third country," adding that, "We 
would like Soviet-Pakistan relations, like our traditional friendship 
with India, to be a stabilizing factor in . . . Asia and to contribute to 
the normalization of relations between Pakistan and India."110
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As the conflict errupted into open fighting within Kashmir, the 
Soviets were concerned about further escalation of the crisis in an 
area near their southern borders. They therefore considered it of 
the utmost importance to work for a cessation of hostilities and, 
hence continued to adopt a strictly impartial attitude towards the 
dispute.111
On 4 September, Premier Kosygin sent identical letters to Prime 
Minister Shastri and President Ayub in which he expressed concern 
over the outbreak of fighting "in an area directly adjacent to the 
frontiers of the Soviet Union," adding that "in the present situation 
one should hardly put to the fore the question of causes behind the 
conflict or seek who is right and who is wrong. The main efforts 
should be concentrated on the immediate discontinuance of military 
operations . . ." Kosygin then offered his government's "good offices" 
to help mediate a peaceful settlement.112
The Soviets also promoted and supported UN initiatives to end the 
dispute. Warning that "any further exacerbation of the conflict . . . 
might further aggravate tension on the Asian continent", the Soviet 
delegate hoped that India and Pakistan would "themselves find a way 
to put an immediate end to the bloodshed . . . and halt this conflict."
113 The Soviet Union then supported the 6 September Security 
Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and a mutual 
troop withdrawal to 5 August 1965 positions.
In a statement on 7 September, the Soviet Union once again offered 
"its good offices" to help resolve the conflict. 114 The Soviets also
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began to attack the Chinese stand on the dispute, claiming that there 
were certain "forces" which sought "to derive advantages for 
themselves from the exacerbation of Indian-Pakistani relations" and 
by their "inflammatory statements" sought "a further heating up of 
the military conflict" in an attempt "to bring under their influence 
these two big Asian Powers." 115 Indirect warnings were issued to 
the Chinese, with the Soviets emphasising that "those who through 
their inflammatory statements and their policies are promoting the 
heating up" of the conflict "must be warned" that "they are thereby 
taking upon themselves the grave responsibility for such policies 
and such actions." 116
When the Chinese government issued its three-day ultimatum to 
India on 16 September, the Soviets were alarmed, as was the West, 
at the increased prospects of Chinese intervention. The Soviets and 
Americans therefore accelerated their efforts to find a peaceful 
solution.117 On 17 September, Kosygin sent messages to Ayub and 
Shastri once again offering assistance in mediating the dispute and 
inviting them to meet on Soviet soil, "for instance" at Tashkent, " to 
establish a direct contact in order to achieve agreement on the 
re-establishment of peace . . ,"118 Within the Security Council, the 
Soviet delegate once again condemned the Chinese role, claiming that 
it was "all too evident that the continuation of this conflict benefits 
only the forces which are pursuing the criminal policy of dividing 
people so as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims."119 
At the same time, in a show of support to India, the Soviets resumed 
the supply of arms suspended since the outbreak of war. 120
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As the Chinese extended their ultimatum for another three days, the 
Soviet Union and the United States joined hands to end the dispute. 
On 20 September, they approved a Security Council resolution 
demanding the imposition of a ceasefire on 22 September, and a 
withdrawal of all armed personnel to 5 August 1965 positions. This 
would be followed by UN measures to ascertain "what steps could be 
taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problems 
underlying the present conflict." 121 In an indirect warning to China, 
the resolution called on "all states to refrain from any action which 
might aggravate the situation in the area".122 The ceasefire was 
accepted by India on 20 September and by Pakistan on 22 September, 
bringing the undeclared war to a close.
Aftermath of War
As the ceasefire came into operation, each side claimed to have 
achieved its strategic objectives and outfought the other. The 
Pakistan C-in-C, General Musa,claimed that his forces had prevented 
India from capturing vital territory in Azad Kashmir and West 
Pakistan and had inflicted heavy losses on the Indians. "For every 
Shaheed (Muslim Martyr)" he said "ten Indians fell."123 His Indian 
counterpart, J.N. Chaudhri, declared that his country had achieved its 
strategic goal of diverting Pakistani forces from Kashmir by means 
of a limited drive across the international border.124
Some Pakistani analysts accept official claims that despite India's 
"fourfold numerical advantage," Pakistani forces had put up a 
credible fight against the enemy and had successfully prevented the
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Indians from achieving substantial gains in Kashmir and across the 
international border.125 It is important, however, to identify the 
party responsible for initiating the conflict, its objectives in doing 
so and the relative strategic gains made by both sides during the 
hostilities.
The 1965 war was the direct result of the policies of President Ayub 
and his military and civilian advisers. The decision to resort to 
armed action had been based on the assumptions that the guerrilla 
campaign in Kashmir would lead to a massive internal uprising, 
forcing India to reach a settlement of the dispute with Pakistan; that 
Pakistani forces were far superior to their Indian counterpart and 
would quickly achieve their strategic objectives in Kashmir ; and 
that "no matter what happened in Kashmir, India would not be in a 
position . . .  to react against the international borders."126
These assumptions, however, proved ill-founded. There was no wide­
spread revolt in Kashmir. Pakistani forces only achieved some 
limited gains in the fighting and the Indian forces not only halted 
their offensive but also won a number of strategic victories at their 
expense, especially in the closing stages of the war.127 Finally, the 
Indian decision to extend hostilities prolonged what was meant to be 
a limited war, putting a heavy strain on Pakistan's military 
resources. This factor was ultimately to decide the outcome of the 
conflict for Pakistan once the US and its other Western allies 
refused to replace its war losses and provide it with a continual 
supply of spare parts, ammunition and fuel.
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Pakistan did receive some valuable assistance from China, but not 
enough to make a decisive impact on its military position. The 
Chinese had provided Pakistan with diplomatic support and even 
threatened to intervene in the conflict. Yet it was unlikely that this 
threat would have been carried out since Chinese security interests 
were not at stake and also because of American and Soviet 
warnings. Nor were the Pakistanis keen on direct Chinese 
intervention since it would have led to extension of American and 
Soviet support to India.128
When the USA and Soviet Union passed the 20 September ceasefire 
resolution, the Ayub Administration was more than willing to 
comply. It was diplomatically isolated, the Indian forces were 
proving far superior to their Pakistani counterparts, who were 
fighting with their backs to the wall, and shortages of military 
supplies were reaching alarming proportions. Acceptance of the 
ceasefire, however, proved costly for Ayub. As a result of the 
propaganda campaign conducted during the war it was generally 
believed within Pakistan that India had launched an unprovoked 
attack in a bid to dismember Pakistan, but had been beaten by 
Pakistani forces. The American and Soviet pressures for ceasefire 
were interpreted within Pakistan as a conspiracy by India's allies to 
prevent Pakistan from defeating India militarily.129
When Ayub accepted the ceasefire, there were large scale 
demonstrations in West Pakistan. Accusing him of succumbing to 
American pressure, enraged mobs attacked the US embassy and 
consulates, burning down the USIS Library in Karachi.130 Ayub
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imposed a curfew in both wings of the country.
In an attempt to allay domestic unrest, Bhutto was sent to the UN 
with instructions to adopt a hardline stand on Kashmir. Addressing 
the Security Council on 25 October, Bhutto emotionally declared, "We 
will wage war for a thousand years, a war of defiance . . . "  He 
warned that Pakistan would withdraw from the UN unless the 
Security Council initiated measures to find a just solution of the 
Kashmir conflict. While his speeches won him enormous personal 
popularity in West Pakistan, they did not lend any internal credibility 
to the Ayub government. 131
Apart from domestic unrest, Ayub was also confronted with other 
problems arising from the conflict, including the return of captured 
territories and the danger of resumption of war as troops continued 
to clash periodically along the border. His Western allies were 
disinclined to help resolve these problems, but the Soviets continued 
to extend offers to help mediate a just and viable peace.
The Soviets had welcomed the ceasefire, with Premier Kosygin 
stating, in messages to Ayub and Shastri, that it was "an important 
step to general settlement of the disputes existing between India 
and Pakistan."132 Yet the Soviets were also aware of the fragile 
nature of the peace, and their continued offers of mediation were 
prompted by a desire to prevent the Chinese from exploiting 
Indo-Pakistani tensions. Active Soviet participation in the 
conclusion of a peace settlement would also help to consolidate and 
expand bilateral ties with both countries.133
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The Soviet media therefore emphasised that while the ceasefire was 
"warmly welcomed by all peace lovers", it did not mean "the 
elimination of the causes of the conflict" and as long as troops 
remained stationed on battle positions, there was always a 
"possibility of war breaking out again." The Soviet Union, it was 
stressed, was interested in promoting Indo-Pakistani rapprochement 
since regional instability directly affected Soviet security interests. 
In an indirect reference to China, it was also alleged that while 
Indian and Pakistanis would suffer should war resume, "certain third 
parties would be delighted to see them sinking deeper into mutual 
enmity, for that would weaken them both and smooth the way for 
foreign interference and dictation."134
The Ayub Government was reluctant to accept Soviet mediation, 
preferring to rely on its Western allies to help it achieve even 
limited gains on Kashmir within the UN. Hence Ayub declared that 
while he accepted the Soviet offer " in principle," he felt that "such a 
meeting would not at present be useful," until the Security Council 
first prepared the groundwork for mediating Indo-Pakistani 
differences. He then called upon the Soviets to use their influence in 
the Security Council to propose "a meaningful resolution that can 
lead to an honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute."135
The Soviet offer, however, had the full support of the United States 
which wanted Indo-Pakistani rapprochement but had no desire to play 
a direct role in the mediating process. According to authoritative 
Pakistani and American sources, the US Administration had decided
to "wash their hands" of the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Yet, like the 
Soviets, they were "worried about Pakistan's growing friendship 
with China" and so they welcomed any Soviet attempt to create a rift 
between Pakistan and China.136 Hence they exerted pressure on the 
Pakistanis,137 forcing a reluctant Ayub to accept the Soviet offer of 
mediation on 11 November. This was followed by Indian acceptance 
on 23 November.
Ayub and Shastri met on 4 January 1966 at Tashkent, where the 
Soviets were represented by a high powered contingent, including 
Premier Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defence Minister 
Malinovsky. During the talks, the Soviets remained completely 
neutral, while at the same time playing an active role in encouraging 
the two sides to reach a settlement.
The talks soon ran into difficulties, with the Pakistanis insisting on 
the inclusion of the Kashmir issue on the conference agenda, while 
the Indians not only wanted its exclusion, but also insisted on 
Pakistani acceptance of a "no war pact" as a pre-condition to Indian 
troop withdrawal, a demand which was politically unacceptable to 
the Pakistanis.138 The talks seemed to be heading for a total 
breakdown when the Pakistani delegation threatened to leave 
Tashkent. At this point, Kosygin played a vital role as intermediary, 
holding intensive discussions with both sides and finally succeeding 
in convincing them to accept a compromise draft resolution.139
On 10 January Ayub and Shastri signed the nine-point Tashkent 
Declaration, in which they expressed their "firm resolve" to settle
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"their disputes through peaceful means” and to restore "normal and 
peaceful relations” between their two countries. But as the accord 
was based on the mininum concessions the two sides were willing to 
make, it merely led to the restoration of the status quo, without 
solving any of their outstanding bilateral disputes. 140
The accord was as warmly welcomed by the Western bloc as it was 
denounced by the Chinese. While Rusk declared that, "we are very 
much encouraged by the results at Tashkent and have congratulated 
all three parties on what seems to have been a most constructive 
step taken there",141 the Chinese alleged that the conference was 
the "product of joint US-Soviet plotting," accusing the Soviets of 
using the talks to promote their policy of "peaceful coexistence in 
order to weaken the united struggle against imperialism in Asia and 
Africa." 142
The Soviets were satisfied with the results of the conference. 
Although the accord did not offer any long-term solution to 
Indo-Pakistani diferences, it had suceeded in re-establishing 
regional stability by a restoration of the status quo. Kosygin 
expressed the hope that it would lay down "the real foundations for 
the creation of peace in this highly important area of Asia" and 
would help the Indians and Pakistanis "find solutions that answer the 
fundamental interests of their people."143
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Soviet media and analysts, 
hailing the Declaration as "an unqualified success" and a "historic 
document." The Soviet role in negotiating the accord was highlighted
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and the conference used to legitimise the Soviet Union’s position as 
an "Asian power."144 One Soviet analyst, for example, claimed that 
this meeting of the "leaders of two Asian countries", which had taken 
place "on Asian soil in the Soviet Union" showed that "the time had 
passed when the destinies and affairs of Asian countries could only 
be settled under the guidance of and on instructions from Western 
quarters."145
A number of Western and Pakistani analysts have also described the 
Declaration as a "triumph for the Soviet Union and for Kosygin 
p e rs o n a lly "146 since it created "a new Soviet image - that of 
guarantor of peace in the subcontinent,"147 and Soviet diplomacy 
quite conclusively "proved itself as a major factor in the power 
politics of South Asia."148 A dissenting voice, however, holds that 
the American decision to allow the Soviets to act as mediators was 
a "distinctly shrewd" move. While the conference may have 
"underlined the Soviet presence in the subcontinent" it also "placed 
upon the Soviet Union a kind of responsibility which, in all 
probability, it could never discharge satisfactorily", and that was 
complete impartiality in all future dealings with India and 
P akistan.149 It was indeed the Pakistani demand for impartiality 
which was to cause serious stresses and strains in future 
Pakistan-Soviet relations.150
The Tashkent Declaration was met with great hostility within West 
Pakistan, which had borne the brunt of the 1965 conflict, and where 
anti-Indian hysteria was at its height. When the accord merely 
called for a restoration of the status quo on Kashmir, it was
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violently rejected and riots broke out in nearly all the major West 
Pakistani cities.151
Although the Administration succeeded in suppressing all 
d isse n t,152 there was concern about its political consequences. 
Ayub therefore emphasised that the Kashmir issue had not been 
compromised in any way.153 Aware of the necessity of cooling 
anti-Indian sentiments, since a consolidation of the gains of 
Tashkent meant a return of occupied territories as well as a 
withdrawal of troops from the volatile border, Ayub called for peace 
with India and warned the public that, "There may be some amongst 
you who will take advantage of your feelings and will try to mislead 
you. They are no more patriotic . . . than you or me. The ordeal is not 
yet over."154
Left-wing opponents of the Ayub regime including parties such as the 
NAP, had, in fact, extended support to the accord since it had been 
endorsed by the Soviets. They believed that the Declaration would 
lead to improved relations with the Soviet bloc and furthermore, 
that rapprochement with India would halt the regional arms race, 
thereby reducing Pakistan's dependence on the West.155 Right wing 
parties, on the other hand, had strongly denounced the Declaration, 
appealing to the anti-Indian sentiments of the West Pakistanis. The 
Jamaat-i-lslami and the Council Muslim League, for instance, held a 
conference in Lahore in February 1966, where they issued calls for 
the abrogation of the accord.
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Of particular importance, from the point of view of this study, is the 
dissatisfaction within the Armed Forces which resulted from the 
ceasefire and Tashkent Declaration. Ayub's war propaganda had not 
only influenced the perceptions of the West Pakistani masses but 
also those of a large segment of the military. Very few within the 
Armed Forces, barring the High Command, knew that Pakistan could 
not have continued fighting because of its fast-depleting supplies. 
Nor was it commonly known that many of the so-called victories 
were insignificant.156
There was also little understanding amongst a large section of the 
officer corps of Pakistan's diplomatic isolation. In view of this 
isolation combined with military deficiencies, the High Command had 
concurred with the Administration's decision to accept a 
ceasefire .157 The ceasefire, however, came as a shock for many 
misinformed middle-ranking officers and rank-and-file who believed 
that Pakistan was in a position to press home its advantage and 
force India to reach a settlement on Kashmir.158
When Ayub agreed to enter into negotiations at Tashkent, there was 
still hope amongst sections of the military that he would succeed in 
obtaining some diplomatic gains in a future over-all peace 
settlement. These expectations were shattered by the Tashkent 
Declaration which "came to be looked at as a betrayal of the nation 
and the armed forces", driving a "wedge. . . between the armed forces 
and the supreme commander."159
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According to a source close to the President, Ayub was deeply 
concerned about the anti-Tashkent feelings amongst the Armed 
Forces.160 Measures were taken to silence anti-Tashkent elements. 
It was reported that fourteen officers were sentenced to life 
imprisonment on charges of spreading dissatisfaction against the 
agreement.161
Ayub also reorganised the command structure of the Armed Forces to 
eliminate any threat from within. A protege of his, General Yahya 
Khan, was appointed C-in-C in place of General Musa, who was 
appointed to the sensitive post of Governor of West Pakistan.162 
Ayub had, however, lost the unquestioning support of the military as 
many officers continued to believe that the government had deprived 
them of victory in response to external pressure.
The Declaration also led to the first serious signs of dissent within 
the Administration itself, as Foreign Minister Bhutto emerged as a 
vocal opponent of the agreement. Bhutto's anti-imperialist and 
anti-Indian rhetoric had won him considerable support in the West 
w ing ,163 and he was aware of the unpopularity of the ceasefire in 
West Pakistan. He must also have assessed the political liabilities 
of accepting a domestically unpopular peace settlement. During the 
conference, Bhutto insisted on the inclusion of a machinery to solve 
the Kashmir dispute and distanced himself from the peace accord 
both during the negotiations and after the signing of the 
D e c la ra tio n .164 Bhutto's rejection of the Declaration and his 
subsequent disassociation from the Ayub government in June 1966 
won him even greater support in West Pakistan, and he was soon to
350
emerge as one of Ayub's major political rivals.
Anti-Tashkent sentiments were confined mainly to West Pakistan. 
Most East wing politicians supported the accord in the hope that it 
would lead to rapprochement with India and reduce the heavy burden 
of defence. East Pakistani opposition, however, centered on the 
Ayub regime's decision to opt for war in 1965.
Although the Bengalis had rallied behind the government in 1965, the 
Eastern wing had been totally isolated from the West during the 
course of the war, and left to defend itself with inadequate 
fo rces.165 In the aftermath of the crisis, East Pakistani politicians 
bitterly criticised the government for having opted for war without 
consideration for the security predicament of the East Wing.166
East Pakistanis were enraged when Bhutto told the National 
Assembly that, "The defence of East Pakistan was the 
subject-matter of consideration and debate between the United 
States' representatives and those of the People's Republic of China at 
Warsaw", where it was decided that "East Pakistan would be 
insulated and quarantined from the war.167 Responding to the 
Foreign Minister's statement, Bengali members of Parliament 
declared that it was "an insult to the patriotism of this country that 
a foreign country saved the freedom of East Pakistan and not the 
Government of Pakistan" and "If we really owe the salvation of East 
Pakistan during the war not to the military strength West Pakistan 
always boasted about, but only to the fortuitous circumstances of 
Chinese hostility to India, what need have we of West Pakistan?"166
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The East Pakistanis also voiced their opposition to the strategic 
doctrine that the defence of the East lay with the West, and renewed 
demands for self-reliance in defence matters.169 Pointing to the 
vulnerability of the East wing in the 1965 conflict, one legislator 
called for "an equal amount on arrangements for defence" for East 
Pakistan, including the establishment of a Naval Headquarters. 
"Fifty-six per cent of the population is living in the Eastern wing", he 
said, "and you cannot keep them unprotected."170 This increased 
resentment of the West-dominated government led to an 
intensification of tensions between the two wings and enhanced 
support for regional autonomy in East Pakistan.
The Quest for Arms
Indo-Pakistani relations assumed a facade of normalcy following the 
Tashkent Declaration as troop withdrawals took place, prisoners of 
war and captured equipment were exchanged, and diplomatic 
relations resumed. No real progress was, however, made towards 
rapprochement, and tensions between the two countries in fact 
increased in the aftermath of the crisis. India accused Pakistan of 
attempting to set up an anti-Indian front with China while a 
majority of West Pakistanis continued to believe that India was still 
hoping to dismember Pakistan.
As the situation stabilised along the international borders, the Ayub 
government was compelled to adopt a hardline stand in view of the 
prevalent anti-Indian sentiments, both among the Armed Forces and
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amongst the West Pakistani population at large. India was therefore 
once again identified as the major threat to Pakistani security.
While the acceptance of the ceasefire and Tashkent Declaration had 
led to a perceptible increase in anti-government feeling, the 
military's prestige had soared both during and after the conflict. 
During the war, government propaganda had highlighted the vital role 
played by the Armed Forces. The military continued to be glorified 
as the saviours of the country in the aftermath of the conflict, due to 
the unpopularity of the peace agreement. According to a defence 
analyst, "The nation discovered both its heroes and martyrs in the 
armed forces. Outside, there were only weak and vacillating leaders 
ready to make a compromise at the first available opportunity."171 
The playing up of the Indian "threat” in the wake of the peace 
settlement further strengthened the internal power and prestige of 
the military.
Domestic opposition to the Ayub government continued to grow while 
economic conditions deteriorated as a result of the costly war. The 
Administration therefore grew even more dependent on the military 
for survival and attempted to win back the support of the forces by 
perpetuating the myth of Pakistani victories in the 1965 
con flic t.172
Yet the Administration realised that the military's demands would 
have to be met if its vital support were to be retained. This was 
especially important since influential sections of the Armed Forces 
had implied that the government's failure to fulfill their demands for
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expansion and modernization had adversely effected their ability to 
counter the Indian advances into Kashmir and dangerously close to 
Lahore.173 The Military High Command also pointed out that the 
massive expansion of the Indian military in the wake of the 1965 
conflict would mean a continuous shift of the regional balance of 
power in India's favor unless remedial action was taken.
The Ayub government responded by giving defence policy and military 
expenditure precedence over all other domestic demands, citing the 
ever-present Indian threat as a justification. The President declared 
that, "There are . . . many lessons which we have learnt during the 
war. The most important of which is that the defence of the country 
comes first", while his Foreign Minister pointed out that "We cannot 
lower our defences’ while India is building up her arms."174 As all 
attention was focussed on meeting the military's needs, including 
replacing war losses and training additional forces, defence 
spending reached unprecedented heights.
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE: 1963-1966175 
(millions of Rs)
Defence Expenditure 
Year Defence Expenditure as % of Total Expenditure
1963-64 1,156.5 49.48
1964-65 1,262.3 46.13
1965-66 2,855.0 63.47
1966-67 2,293.5 60.09
There was, however, a limit to what could be diverted from domestic 
resources, and external assistance was essential to meet the
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objectives of expansion and modernization. According to Ayub, "What 
we can spare from our own resources may not be adequate for all our 
defence requirements. We have, therefore, to seek assistance from 
others to supplement our efforts."176 and the most desirable source 
of assistance in the opinion of Ayub and his Military High Command 
remained the United States.
Although anti-American sentiment had increased following the US 
embargo on military and economic assistance, the President and his 
military allies were unwilling to abandon their pro-Western posture. 
Alignment with the West had rewarded Pakistan with some $3 billion 
in economic aid from 1954 till the imposition of the embargo in
1965, along with nearly $630 million in direct grant military aid 
and some $670 million in defence support and concessional sales 
a ss is ta n ce .177 The US had trained, expanded, equipped and 
modernized all the Pakistani service arms.178 The long-standing 
relationship with the Americans had, in turn, continued to shape the 
external orientation of Pakistani military personnel, reinforcing 
their pro-Western and anti-Communist views.179
Even though the US had gradually reduced its military assistance, it 
was still Pakistan's main suppliers of arms at the time the embargo 
was imposed. Removal of the ban was therefore a major objective, 
especially since the Pakistani forces were badly in need of spare 
parts and replacement of war losses. According to a senior military 
source, the "strict and severe" nature of the embargo, particularly on 
the sale of spare parts, meant that it "was only a matter of time 
before most weapons systems would become ineffective. This
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created a very serious situation as Pakistan's military equipment 
was predominantly of American manufacture and, therefore, 
dependent on the US government's goodwill for its continued supply 
support."180
Under pressure from the military, Ayub was desperate to obtain a 
resumption of arms aid. Equally important was a renewal of 
economic assistance, especially since the demands of defence had 
already put an intolerable strain on the national economy. Ayub, 
therefore visited the United States in December 1965, in the hope of 
persuading the Americans to lift the ban.
During his talks, Ayub assured the Americans that Pakistan had not 
entered into a secret military alliance with the Chinese and asked 
the US to "lend its full support towards a resolution of the problems" 
facing his country.181 While President Johnson expressed his 
"sympathetic understanding of the special position of Pakistan", he 
reportedly told Ayub that the embargo would only be lifted when 
Pakistan's stand on contentious issues such as China and Vietnam 
coincided with that of the US. At the conclusion of the visit, US 
authorities declared that the discussions had been "most helpful, 
direct and free riding" and that the misunderstandings between the 
two sides had been cleared up.182 Ayub claimed that he had been 
assured that the US was "deeply interested in the preservation of 
independence and integrity of Pakistan."183 Yet he was unsuccessful 
in obtaining American assurances of a resumption of military and 
economic assistance.
South Asia remained low in US global priorities. Americans also felt 
that India and Pakistan were unreliable allies in the fight against 
Chinese communism because of their preoccupation with their 
bilateral disputes. The US resented the fact that the two sides had 
used American weapons against each other in 1965. The Americans 
therefore adopted the stand that military and economic assistance 
would be resumed only when the two countries proved their desire to 
resolve their differences, joined hands against the communist 
threat, and provided active support to US policies in Southeast 
Asia.184
In view of the US embargo, the Pakistanis turned in "desperation" to 
the Chinese for help, and by late 1965 negotiations on arms 
assistance produced results.185 The Chinese agreed to help Pakistan 
recoup some of its war losses by supplying aircraft and training 
facilities for the PAF and military hardware for the army,186 with 
Premier Chou En-lai pledging the supply of spare parts for all 
equipment.187
During 1965 and 1966, the Chinese provided planes, tanks, heavy guns 
and other equipment "in large numbers, either totally free or at 
nominal cost".188 When Bhutto was questioned about the apparent 
contradiction in Pakistan's membership of anti-Communist alliances 
and acceptance of Chinese military assistance, he responded, "If 
Communist and Western arms can marry in India, why can't they 
marry in Pakistan?"189
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Pakistan's leaders were, however, wary of the risks involved in 
coming too close to a Communist state. Nor did they want to 
antagonise the US to the point of jeopardising resumption of military 
and economic aid. They therefore made it clear that rapprochement 
with China would not be at the cost of relations with the West. 
During President Liu Shao-chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s visit in 
March 1966, Bhutto declared that Pakistan "will do nothing to 
endanger our relations with the United States in our relations with 
other countries, including China."190 He also stressed that Chinese 
arms had been acquired due to the stoppage of US supplies and that 
this was "not a preconceived policy."191
Although China became Pakistan’s major external arms donor by
1966, the very nature of its arms assistance was a limiting factor in 
the relationship. Chinese weaponry was quantitatively and 
qualitatively far inferior to the previously supplied American 
equipment. Nor could Chinese arms fulfill the US-equipped forces' 
needs for spare parts and replacements. According to a Pakistani 
military source, although the Chinese had provided military 
assistance "with very good grace", China was itself "a poor country", 
with "relatively limited resources in the technical and industrial 
spheres". Hence its assistance was provided "within the limitations 
of their own capability" and there were "major differences in 
operational procedures and systems", including "poor channels of 
communication with the sources of supply . . ,"192 The problems of 
long-term Chinese assistance became glaringly obvious as China 
became preoccupied with internal affairs during the Cultural 
Revolution and the flow of military supplies came to a halt by
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1967.193
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Chinese assistance had not changed the American nature of 
Pakistan's military infrastructure. Hence the "principal aim" of the 
Pakistani military remained "the resumption of military ties with 
the US, which alone could supply the vital spare parts and equipment 
needed to help Pakistan's military machine functioning."194
The US Administration partially relaxed its arms embargo in 1966 by 
allowing Pakistan and India to purchase non-lethal weapons, 
including communications, medical and transport equipment, on a 
case-by-case basis. According to State Department and Pentagon 
sources, this relaxation was motivated by a desire to renew 
"military contacts" with Pakistan, as well as to bring about a 
"possible reduction of the pressures on Pakistan to seek supplies and 
equipment from other foreign sources, particularly from Communist 
C h ina."195 The US also announced the resumption of economic 
assistance to India and Pakistan on 15 July 1966 and two days later 
the Ayub Administration disclosed that Bhutto had been given 
permission to proceed on long leave for "medical treatment." His 
dismissal was perceived by some as a sign of Pakistan's willingness 
to abandon its flirtation with China. 196
As the US decided against lifting the ban on the sale of lethal 
weapons and spares, Pakistan continued its efforts to fill the gaps in 
its military machine. American hardware was purchased from third 
countries, including Iran and Turkey and equipment was acquired for 
cash or on credit from a number of European sources, including
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France, West Germany and Belgium. 197 Yet domestic resources 
were limited, and it was essential to find alternative sources of 
supplies and funding.
One potential source was the Soviet Union, a major supplier of arms 
to India. Since the Soviets had adopted an impartial posture in 
Indo-Pakistani disputes, Ayub felt that if sufficiently pressured, 
they could also possibly adopt an equitable stand on arms supply. 
Any Pakistan success in acquiring Soviet arms could in turn be used 
to persuade the US to revise its arms embargo and could also lead to 
an expansion of defence links with China.
The Soviets showed even greater interest in improving relations 
with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Tashkent Declaration, and 
continued to maintain impartiality in Indo-Pakistan disputes in the 
hope of reducing Chinese and American influence in Pakistan and 
promoting regional stability. Addressing the Twenty-third Congress 
of the CPSU, Kosygin declared that Pakistan-Soviet relations were 
improving satisfactorily, adding that, "The Soviet Union for its part, 
intends to take further steps" to expand the relationship. 198
Cultural relations grew rapidly after the signing of a bilateral pact 
in April 1966 as did economic ties, and a number of trade agreements 
were signed in 1966 and 1967. 199 The Soviets also pledged 
considerable economic and technological assistance to Pakistan. By 
late 1966, the Soviet Union had become the second largest donor of 
economic assistance to Pakistan. 200
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While the Ayub Administration welcomed Soviet economic 
assistance, especially in view of the decline in US aid, cooperation 
in defence matters was a much more sensitive issue. The Soviet 
Union was one of the major arms suppliers to India, having provided 
the latter with more than $300 million in military assistance from
1961 to 1965. 201
The Pakistanis had consistently opposed the provision of Soviet 
arms to India. In the wake of the US arms embargo, however, they 
combined that opposition with calls for the extension of similar 
supplies to Pakistan, expressing great interest in establishing 
defence links with the Soviets. In May 1966, Mazarov, the head of a 
Soviet parliamentary delegation, was specifically questioned about 
Soviet arms supplies to India. He reportedly responded that the 
Soviets would have no objections to the provision of weaponry to 
Pakistan on the same terms.202
In June 1966, a high-level military delegation headed by PAF Chief 
Air Marshal Nur Khan was sent to the Soviet Union to initiate 
discussions on the issue, though officially it was on a "goodwill 
mission-cum-educational tour."203 Although there was a spate of 
news reports that a deal had been concluded, the Soviets decided 
against providing arms to Pakistan.204
The reluctance was partly due to their awareness of the Ayub 
government's continuous efforts to resume close ties with the US 
and partly dictated by their concern over an adverse reaction in India. 
During Mrs Gandhi's visit in July 1966, she was categorically assured
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that Soviet arms would not be supplied to Pakistan.205
The Pakistanis, however, persevered with their efforts. During the 
visits of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, N.P. Firyubin to Pakistan in 
September 1966 and Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada to the Soviet 
Union in May 1967, there was speculation amongst diplomatic circles 
that the issue of arms supplies had been raised.206
The Soviets continued to display reluctance to enter into an arms 
deal with Pakistan but were concerned about the arms race in the 
subcontinent and the increase in regional tensions. They therefore 
urged both countries to peacefully resolve their bilateral 
differences. During Mrs Gandhi's visit in July 1966, Kosygin 
acknowledged that "certain difficulties" had arisen "on the path 
toward the realization of the Tashkent Declaration" and expressed 
the hope that the Indian and Pakistani leaderships would be "guided 
by the fact that the setting to of rights of Indian-Pakistani relations 
without any kind of outside interference" was in their countries' 
interests and in "the interests of strengthening peace in Asia."207
In September 1967, Ayub paid a visit to the Soviet Union. On the eve 
of the visit, Kosygin reportedly expressed concern over the arms race 
in the subcontinent and, recalling the Tashkent precedent, offered 
Soviet good offices to help resolve Indo-Pakistani differences. Ayub, 
however, was more concerned about the worsening arms imbalance 
between Pakistan and India and interested in exploring the 
possibilities of acquiring Soviet weaponry. During his visit, he 
expressed his appreciation of the "continuing interest of the Soviet
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Government in the establishment of good relations between Pakistan 
and India,” but also pointed out that while moves for peace were 
desirable, at the same time "the indiscriminate increase in 
armaments and the growing military imbalance in the Subcontinent" 
was a "danger to (regional) peace."298
The Soviet leadership, in response, continued to stress the need for 
Indo-Pakistani rapprochement through bilateral negotiations. 
Kosygin, for example, stated that "we are deeply convinced that
I
Pakistani-lndian relations can be improved without any foreign 
interference and that this met the interests of both India and 
Pakistan, the interests of consolidating peace in Asia." He added 
that, "on our part, we will facilitate this in every way."209
When Ayub brought up the issue of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan, 
the Soviets were still unwilling to make any immediate commitment 
without first assessing the regional consequences. They also 
realised that the issue could be used as a lever to put pressure on 
Pakistan to move away from the Western alliances and withdraw US 
facilities on its soil, as the Badaber monitoring base was still in 
operation. So when Ayub called for help to redress the regional arms 
imbalance, Kosygin responded, "Does Pakistan believe that it could 
stay in the pacts and yet ask for the assistance of the Soviet Union 
for the solution of its problems with India?". According to a 
Pakistani Foreign Office source, Ayub gave the Soviets an assurance 
that the lease of the Badaber base would not be renewed. He was 
then assured that the Pakistani request for arms would be given 
serious consideration, but that some more time was needed before a
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final decision.210
On his return, Ayub continued to call on the Soviets to demonstrate 
practically their claims of neutrality on Indo-Pakistani issues. On 
one occasion, he declared "when world powers say that they desire to 
establish peace and security in the subcontinent, it is their duty to 
remove the imbalance that is being created by the Indian arms 
bu ildup .”211 Strains in the relationship began to build up as the 
Soviets continued to provide arms to India. In early 1968, there 
were reports that the Soviets had agreed to provide 100 SU-7 
bombers, 100 MiG-21 s and some 500 tanks to India. Commenting on 
the deal, Foreign Minister Pirzada pointed out that it would "further 
widen the military imbalance between India and Pakistan and 
thereby contribute to the threatening arms race between them to the 
detriment of their economic development." He cautioned the Soviets 
that these tensions in fact worked against their desire for 
Indo-Pakistan rapprochement.212
Concerned about the deteriorating relationship, Kosygin decided to 
pay a visit to Pakistan in April 1968. During the visit he emphasised 
the Soviet desire to promote Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, urging 
Pakistan to adopt a "step-by step" approach in negotiating its 
bilateral differences with India "and by this way lay the foundation 
of good relations between both countries . . . "  At the same time, he 
warned the Pakistanis about the dangers implicit in a policy of 
establishing close relations with China, claiming that while the 
Soviets had "good normal relations" with all South Asian and Middle 
Eastern countries and sought that "our cooperation with them would
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promote the strengthening of principles of peace and security", there
were "other forces in Asia which would like to establish here their
own hegemony and . . .  put under their influence many countries . . 
..213
The Pakistanis continued to refer to the need to redress the regional 
balance of power, which, they claimed was tilting dangerously in 
favour of India. During the visit, the issue of Soviet military supplies 
to Pakistan was once again brought up.214
In a conciliatory gesture to the Soviet Union, the Pakistani 
government had given notice to the US on 7 April that the Badaber 
lease would not be renewed for another ten-year period except on an 
annual basis.215 Since the facility had become largely redundant due 
to the development of more sophisticated methods of intelligence 
gathering, the Pakistanis calculated that this move would not 
endanger their relations with the US, while it could be used as a 
demonstration of good faith to the Soviet Union.
In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit, 
the two sides expressed satisfaction at the expansion of bilateral 
ties, and the Soviet Union pledged further economic and 
technological assistance aimed at strengthening Pakistan's 
industrial infrastructure and economy and thereby reducing its 
dependence on the West.216
The Soviets expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would resolve 
their "outstanding disputes in the spirit of the Tashkent
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D eclara tion.”217 Although there was no mention of the issue of 
defence cooperation, a Pakistan Foreign Office source discloses that 
Kosygin had, during the visit, agreed to the sale of arms to 
Pakistan.218
In May 1968 Foreign Minister Mian Arshad Husain formally announced 
that Pakistan had given the US notice for the termination of the 
Badaber base lease and that the installation would be closed before 1 
July 1969.219 On 22 June, it was disclosed that the Army C-in-C, 
General Yahya Khan would lead a military mission to Moscow. The 
same morning, the Foreign Minister told the National Assembly that 
the question of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan was "under our 
consideration", adding that there seemed to be a "better 
appreciation" of Pakistan's position in Moscow.220 At the conclusion 
of General Yahya's visit to the Soviet Union, it was formally 
announced on 9 July that the two sides had reached agreement on the 
sale of Soviet arms to Pakistan.221
The Indian reaction to this change in Soviet policy was immediate, as 
Mrs Gandhi expressed concern about the potential danger to Indian 
security and warned the Soviets about the adverse impact of this 
development on Indo-Soviet relations. The Soviet leadership 
reassured Mrs Gandhi that "Nothing would be done to undermine 
Soviet-lndian friendship"; that only a limited quantity of weapons 
would be supplied to Pakistan; and that these arms would not be used 
against India.222
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President Ayub responded to the Indian protest by pointing out that 
the limited quantity of Soviet arms would "fill a few gaps in 
Pakistan's defence requirements."223 The Soviets had, in fact, 
agreed only to the sale of a small quantity of weapons, including 
tanks, helicopters, field guns, trucks and some aircraft spare parts. 
This supply of hardware was aimed on the one hand at convincing the 
Pakistanis of Soviet intentions to maintain a strictly neutral posture 
on Indo-Pakistan issues. On the other hand, the Soviets hoped to 
weaken Pakistani links with the West, as well as to counter the 
growth of Chinese influence. Moreover, the Soviets realised that 
defence concerns had always dictated the course of Pakistan's 
foreign policy in view of the dominant role of the military. Hence 
the promise of future arms supplies could also be used to woo the 
Pakistani Armed Forces.224
Soviet-Pakistan defence links appeared to expand as high-level 
visits were exchanged. In May 1968, a Soviet naval squadron made 
its first appearance at Karachi. During the visit, the Soviet Deputy 
Naval Commander-in-Chief reportedly stated that a strong Pakistani 
Navy would be a positive factor in promoting stability in the Indian 
Ocean.225
In March 1969, Marshal Andrei Grechko paid an official visit to 
Pakistan, the first ever by a Soviet Defence Minister. During the 
visit, his Pakistani counterpart, Admiral A. R. Khan, stressed that it 
was essential that the subcontinental balance which already "weighs 
heavily against us is not allowed to tilt any further to our 
disadvantage", while Army Chief Yahya Khan declared that, " . . .  we do
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not want war but this should not prevent us from arming ourselves 
for the defence of our country . . ." and expressed the hope that 
Grechko's visit would further strengthen relations between the 
Armed Forces of both countries.226
The Soviet Minister's response was gratifying, for it seemed to 
endorse Pakistani views on the need for a stable military balance in 
the subcontinent as he stated that the Soviet Union "believed that 
Pakistan . . . wanted to live in peace with all its neighbours" but "to 
maintain peace, one must be strong so that the enemies may not get 
any pretext to reach one's borders." He concluded with the hope that 
Pakistan's borders "remain quiet so that the people of Pakistan could 
work peacefully for the progress and prosperity of their 
homeland."227 The Pakistan Ministry of Defence's statement, issued 
at the conclusion of Grechko's visit, expressed satisfaction that 
bilateral cooperation was "developing satisfactorily" in "numerous 
fields", adding that "mutual contacts between the state and military 
leaders of Pakistan and the USSR will help further improve 
Pakistan-Soviet relations."226
Yet defence cooperation remained confined to pledges for the sale of 
a limited quantity of weaponry as Soviet strategy towards Pakistan 
continued to focus on an improvement of bilateral ties through the 
extension of economic and technological assistance, which would 
help build up Pakistan's economy and increase Soviet influence 
the re .229 The Soviets' decision to focus on the consolidation of 
economic rather than defence links continued to be influenced by 
their concern that large-scale Pakistan-Soviet military ties would
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seriously endanger their links with India, and increase the chances of 
Indian dependence on the West. It also resulted from the realisation 
that even an expansion of defence ties was unlikely to persuade the 
Pakistani leadership to sever its links with its Western allies.
The US government was equally disinclined to drastically change its 
arms policy towards Pakistan, as the subcontinent in general and 
Pakistan in particular continued to have a low priority in American 
global and regional strategies. The Johnson Administration did, 
however, want to retain a measure of influence in South Asia. A 
revised version of its arms policy was therefore announced in April 
1967. Although it was decided not to resume grant military aid, the 
restrictions on the sale of spares for previously supplied military 
equipment were removed. Requests would be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis, and credit would be advanced only for non-lethal 
end items. The US MAAG and the Military Supply Mission in Pakistan 
would be withdrawn and replaced by a smaller grant military 
training programme.230
The Pakistani government protested strongly against the US decision 
not to resume military assistance. While Ayub dismissed the lifting 
of the embargo on spare parts for lethal equipment as "no concession 
to any country like us that has been and still is in alliance with the 
United States", his Foreign Minister declared that the American 
decision was "fraught with serious effects on Pakistan's security" 
since it "had emboldened India to become even more intransigent in 
her attitude towards Pakistan." Pirzada added that Pakistan would 
"have to do whatever is possible under the present circumstances" to
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safeguard its security.231
The Pakistanis also claimed that they had "reduced the level of our 
participation in SEATO and CENTO" since the pacts had "lost a good 
deal of their importance" with "the change in the world situation." 
Pakistan, it was stressed, was "no longer taking part in the military 
side of the Pacts . . . Our interest is confined only to their cultural 
and economic activities".232
Yet the Administration remained as deeply committed to its 
pro-Western policy aimed, above all, at consolidating military and 
economic links with the US. Not only did Pakistan remain heavily 
dependent on American economic assistance,233 but the revised US 
policy on arms was in fact greeted with relief since its military was 
badly in need of spare parts. The US remained the most desirable 
potential source of arms. According to a Pakistani analyst, Pakistan 
had "so standardized its military characteristics" by 1965 that "its 
entire orientation had become 'Americanized'. She could not have 
demolished her painstakingly developed defence structure . . . 
without radical changes in the makeup and orientation of her armed 
forces" and without "disturbing the standardized equipment of the 
weapons they were used to." So the Ayub government had no 
alternative but to find ways of maintaining the existing structure 
"and wait for a change of heart in Washington."234
Chinese military assistance had been welcome but the quantity and 
quality of their weapons were found wanting, and there were qualms 
about the reliability of supply. The Soviets were unwilling to
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assume the role of major supplier, nor could their weaponry fulfill 
the needs of Pakistan's US-equipped forces. Although the 
Administration continued to increase domestic expenditure on 
defence and attempted to obtain US equipment on the open market, 
its failure to persuade the Americans to renew arms assistance was 
viewed with disappointment by the Military High Command.
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (1967-1968)235 
Millions of Rupees
Year Defence Expenditure Total Expenditure Percentage
of
met from Revenue Total
1967-68 2,186.5 4,077.1 53.52
1968-69 2,426.8 4,371.0 55.52
The Ayub regime was most concerned about the growing restlessness 
among influential sections of the military. Its apprehensions about 
the potentially serious consequences of dissatisfaction within the 
ranks of the Armed Forces were to prove justified as 
anti-government agitation intensified by the late 1960's.
The Downfall of Avub Khan
In October 1967, the government launched the "Decade of 
Development" celebrations to mark ten years of Ayub's rule. Meant to 
serve as the main thrust of Ayub's electoral strategy as general 
elections approached in late 1969 and early 1970, the continual 
barrage of official propaganda highlighted the economic and political
achievements of the regime. But the campaign was to have quite the 
opposite effect to that intended.
Spectacular economic growth had in fact been achieved in 
quantitative terms as industry developed rapidly and the GNP grew at 
a steady pace.23® Ayub's economic strategy focussed mainly on 
expansion of the private sector, and no measures were taken to 
ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of development and 
g ro w th .237 This policy led to the concentration of capital in the 
hands of a few entrepreneurial families, which served as a base of 
support for the government,238 but the gap between the rich and the 
poor continued to widen, resulting in increasing urban unrest.
Conditions in the countryside were no better, as government policies 
aimed at achieving maximum agricultural growth through the 
extension of subsidies and other benefits to large landowning 
families and middle farmers, while the interests of millions of 
landless peasants and tenant farmers were ignored. The comparative 
neglect of the agricultural sector in favor of industrial growth 
further worsened the lot of the rural poor.239
Domestic opposition also grew, as Ayub increasingly resorted to the 
use of corruption and bribery to reward his supporters, while 
repressive methods were used to silence all opposition.240 The 
State of Emergency imposed during the 1965 war was retained, and 
liberal use was made of the security legislation provided by it. Even 
the Constitution was manipulated at will by the President to 
perpetuate his rule.241
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The "Decade of Development" celebrations reached their peak in 
October 1968, at a time of deteriorating economic conditions, which 
led to further urban unrest. The ranks of the opposition were 
strengthened by the re-entry into politics of former Foreign Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto had left the government in June 1966 and 
formed his own political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in
1967, on a platform, amongst other issues, of land reform, 
nationalisation of industry and an anti-imperialist and anti-Indian 
foreign policy. In his campaign against Ayub, Bhutto claimed that a 
secret clause existed in the Tashkent agreement on the Kashmir 
issue, and called for a withdrawal from the Western pacts, since the 
US had stopped arms aid and no longer guaranteed Pakistan's 
security.242
In mid-1968, Bhutto toured the West wing, leading to an 
intensification of anti-Ayub feeling, especially amongst students. In 
the first week of November, clashes between students and police 
resulted in massive anti-government demonstrations, leading to the 
deployment of the Army and an imposition of curfew in 
Rawalpindi.243 Despite large-scale arrests, rallies led by students 
and supported by dissatisfied workers and other sections ot the 
urban population took place in most West Pakistani cities. As Bhutto 
and NAP Chief Wali Khan were arrested, along with hundreds of their 
party workers, anti-government agitation spread further.244 The 
opposition was strengthened further as prominent former members 
of the regime, including Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Justice 
Murshid, joined their ranks.
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By late-1968, the movement spread to East Pakistan, where 
anti-government sentiments had intensified due to the increasing 
disparities in East-West representation in the Central government 
and military and civil bureaucracies.245 Not only were the East 
Pakistanis denied participation in policy-making but the economic 
policies of the West-dominated centre also worked to their 
detriment. Although East Pakistan was the major earner of foreign 
exchange, that revenue as well as foreign economic aid was used to 
promote West Pakistani industrial development. Deprived of 
industry, East Pakistan was then used as a market for goods produced 
in the West. Economic disparities between the two wings therefore 
became more and more glaring.24®
East Pakistani alienation led to the growing popularity of Sheikh 
Mujib's six-point programme, which called for the establishment of a 
federation, with central government control limited to defence and 
foreign affairs. The two provinces would have complete control over 
their financial resources, and East Pakistan would be given the right 
to form para-military forces.247 Denouncing the programme as a 
disguise for secession, the Administration arrested Sheikh Mujib and 
hundreds of members of his party.
In December 1967 and January 1968, some 46 East Pakistanis, 
including a number of military personnel, were charged with 
conspiring with India for the secession of the East wing, in what was 
known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case.248 Sheikh Mujib, who was 
already in prison, was charged with complicity. The flimsy evidence
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on which the case was based further reinforced his popularity, and 
increased Bengali distrust of the Centre.249
In December 1968 there was an outburst of agitation during a visit 
by President Ayub to Dacca. Soon after, a mass movement engulfed 
not only the urban centres but also large tracts of the countryside in 
East Pakistan, with Maulana Bhashani's NAP250 playing a pivotal 
role.
The anti-Ayub movement rapidly assumed massive proportions in 
both wings. As the resistance intensified, even those parties which 
had stayed outside the struggle decided to participate. Foremost 
amongst these was an alliance of conservative parties, the 
Democratic Action Committee (DAC), which was supported by Mujib's 
Awami League and Wali Khan's NAP.251
Since the two parties spearheading the movement, Bhutto's PPP and 
Bhashani's NAP, stayed outside the alliance, the DAC realised that its 
only chance of benefiting from the struggle would be through 
negotiations on power-sharing. Ayub .had also come to realise that 
repression alone would not curb the unrest. The leaders were invited 
to enter negotiations, and on 18 February the DAC pre-conditions, 
including withdrawal of the State of Emergency and release of all 
political prisoners, were accepted.
Yet agitation continued unabated, with calls for Ayub's removal. In a 
bid to halt the momentum of the movement, on 21 February, Ayub 
announced his decision to retire from politics at the conclusion of
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his term of office.252 The following day, the Agartala case was 
dropped. These developments were perceived as political victories 
by the demonstrators, and the DAC leadership took the opportunity of 
entering into negotiations with the government.
The talks, known as the Round Table Conference (RTC), began in 
February. Ayub accepted the DAC demands for restoration of 
parliamentary democracy and direct elections, but declared that only 
a new parliament could decide on the issues of provincial autonomy 
and One Unit.253 Mujib insisted on a resolution of the issue of 
provincial autonomy and disassociated himself from the talks, which 
ended inconclusively.
Also refusing to negotiate with the government, Bhutto and Bhashani 
had issued joint calls for the establishment of a socialist, 
anti-imperialist order to replace the existing system. This radical 
rhetoric provided an added impetus to the mass movement. The 
Government was particularly concerned about the intensity of the 
struggle in East Pakistan, where a demoralised bureaucracy and 
police force began to desert their posts and general strikes 
paralyzed the civil administration.254
By late March, the options available to Ayub were dependent on the 
stand taken by the Military High Command. As earlier mentioned, 
there were serious misgivings in influential military circles about 
Ayub's ability to provide the necessary means to modernize and 
expand the Armed Forces, while others were antagonised by his 
acceptance of the ceasefire and the Tashkent Declaration. At a time
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when the military was reconsidering its policy of supporting the 
President, his dependence on the Armed Forces increased as internal 
tensions continued to mount.
When his protege, General Musa, retired in 1966, Ayub had appointed 
Yahya Khan to the post of Army C-in-C, superseding a number of 
senior officers, since Yahya was considered professionally 
competent but apolitical. Yahya, however, proved to be as politically 
ambitious as his Supreme Commander.255 He proceeded to 
strengthen his internal position, promoting and transferring 
hand-picked officers to key positions.25®
In January 1968, Ayub fell ill, and a battle for succession ensued 
amongst key military figures, including Yahya, Defence Minister A. R. 
Khan, and PAF Chief, Nur Khan. Heading the strongest service arm, 
Yahya quickly took the initiative. The Presidency was cordoned off 
and the C-in-C "set up a private command-post there in order to stay 
in touch with developments". By February, Yahya was claiming that 
he would become the next President, but Ayub recovered and Yahya 
and his colleagues returned to the barracks. Although Ayub's 
recovery upset the plans of the ambitious generals, they "did not 
quite forget the taste of power they had briefly savoured," and 
awaited the opportunity to seize ultimate control.257
This opportunity came in the form of the mass agitation in West 
Pakistan in late 1968. While the Military High Command began to 
think more concretely of exploiting the situation to their advantage, 
anti-Ayub feeling within the military intensified as respected
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figures such as former PAF Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, entered 
the ranks of the opposition. Charging the Administration with 
nepotism and corruption, Asghar issued an indirect appeal to his 
former comrades-in-arms to withdraw their support from Ayub, 
warning that the military's involvement in the "people's upsurge" 
against the government would bear serious consequences.258 
According to Ayub's Law Minister, S. M. Zafar, the entry of Asghar and 
like-minded officers, including the popular former East Pakistan 
Governor, Lt. Gen. Azam Khan, "created the impression that Army was 
not going to act on behalf of the regime."259
As the situation deteriorated, the Army was called out in aid-to civil 
operations in both wings. The deployment of Punjabi and Pakhtun 
troops in their home provinces increased unrest in the officer corps 
and the ranks. In some instances officers even disobeyed orders to 
fire on demonstrators.260 The regime's increased dependence on the 
Armed Forces also served to strengthen further the hands of the 
Military High Command.
By early 1969, the government had also lost the backing of its other 
pillar of support, the bureaucracy, since the civil servants were 
reluctant to be identified with an authoritarian regime on the verge 
of collapse. Yet Ayub could have retained control of the situation had 
the military continued to back him.
By February 1969, however, the senior military commanders had 
decided to go ahead with their plans to seize complete power, 
influenced by both foreign policy and domestic concerns. A major
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factor was the government's failure to persuade the Americans to 
resume arms aid. According to Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar, 
the Generals had by now begun to feel that "so long as Ayub remained 
in power, the Americans would not change their policy towards 
Pakistan."261
Internally, the growing popularity of Bhashani's NAP and Bhutto's 
PPP, with their anti-Western, pro-Socialist slogans disturbed the 
inherently conservative and pro-Western Armed Forces.262 There 
was also uneasiness about Mujib's six-point programme, which would 
weaken central government control over defence funding and which 
called for the establishment of East Pakistani para-military forces. 
The Military High Command was equally concerned about the unrest 
within the ranks, as the military grew more and more involved in 
aid-to-civil operations. There was also the "realization that Ayub 
had become a liability to the Army because of the mounting unrest 
against him." If the military continued to prop up his discredited 
regime, it would jeopardise its internal standing.263
Yahya Khan knew that the tottering government and divided 
opposition could not challenge a military bid for supreme power. He 
therefore adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, he made 
it clear to Ayub that the military had withdrawn its support, and 
that its deployment in the ongoing crisis would henceforth be kept to 
a minimum. On the other hand, he began to put pressure on Ayub to 
permit a smooth transfer of power into military hands.
As the situation worsened, Ayub held a series of meetings with the 
three service chiefs, attempting to convince them of the necessity of 
supporting the government. According to high-ranking military and 
civilian sources, some of whom were participants, the most crucial 
meeting was called on 20 February , while Ayub's negotiations with 
the DAC were still going on. Ayub "explained that since the political 
situation was getting out of hand, he intended to impose martial law" 
in some East and West Pakistani towns. The service chiefs, however, 
refused to impose a "penny-packet" martial law, which, they said 
would bring the forces into "disrepute."264
Speaking on behalf of his colleagues, Yahya stated categorically that 
"if the army was to be used and martial law imposed, he, as the head 
of the army, must be in effective control of national affairs. As 
Chief Martial Law Administrator he must . . . direct and control the 
entire government machinery."265 Until then the military would be 
used "to the minimum extent needed to keep the administration 
functioning and prevent the situation from being exploited by any 
foreign country . . ."266 The following day it was decided that 
although the "promulgation of martial law throughout the country 
was unavoidable, it was still necessary to make another effort to 
have a dialogue with the opposition."267
In a final attempt to retain power, Ayub announced his retirement 
from politics and dropped the Agartala case. These moves succeeded 
in dividing the opposition. Since the main aim of the agitation in the 
West wing had been the removal of the President, tensions eased. In 
East Pakistan, however, while the announcement was seen as a
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political victory, it was also felt that conditions were finally ripe 
for a thrust for real political change. Hence the militancy of the 
movement increased.268
By March, Yahya began to press Ayub to step down. At one stage, 
when the regime was hopeful of containing the situation, Ayub's 
representatives including Altaf Gauhar and Admiral A. R. Khan, tried 
to persuade Yahya that there was no longer any need for a military 
takeover. Yahya, however, responded that the military could no 
longer avoid the imposition of martial law to save the country from 
disintegration, warning that any further delay could mean that "some 
mad-cap in the Army" could decide to take action himself.269 On 25 
March, Ayub announced his resignation from the Presidency and 
transferred power to the military, represented by Yahya Khan.
Till the very last, the Field Marshal remained loyal to his parent 
institution and firm in his belief that the military was the only 
dependable institution in the country. Accusing the political 
leadership of leading the country on the path of destruction in their 
selfish search for power, Ayub declared in his * last address to the 
nation that Pakistan was faced by a "fast deteriorating" situation in 
which the "administrative institutions are being paralyzed. 
Self-aggrandizement is the order of the day" and the "economy of the 
country has been crippled." This situation was "no longer under the 
control of the Government. All Government institutions have become 
victims of coercion, fear and intimidation." He concluded that, 
"Except for the Armed Forces, there is no constitutional and 
effective way to meet the situation" and the "security of the country
demands that no impediment be placed in the way of the defence 
forces . . ."27° In a separate letter to Yahya on 24 March, Ayub 
informed the C-in-C that the Armed Forces "alone can restore sanity 
and put the country back on the road to progress in a civil and 
constitutional manner."271
CMLA General Mohammed Yahya Khan imposed martial law throughout 
the country, abrogating the 1962 Constitution, dissolving the 
National and Provincial Assemblies, and dismissing the President, 
his Cabinet and the Provincial Ministries. The C-in-C declared that 
it was his intention to restore "sanity" by re-establishing internal 
stability and putting the Administration "back on the rails".272 The 
military had, once again, assumed supreme power in Pakistan.
Summary
The withdrawal of martial law had not meant an end to the military's 
role in directly or indirectly influencing the course of 
Pakistan-Soviet relations as well as all other aspects of the 
country's foreign policy. In the domestic sphere, Ayub's new 
political order had ensured that the military's needs would take 
precedence over all other national demands as Ayub remained 
dependent on the continued backing and support of the Armed Forces 
for survival. Hence the military's corporate interests were not only 
protected by such measures as constitutional safeguards but defence 
and foreign policy were also geared to suit the orientation and to 
meet the requirements of the Armed Forces.
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While these factors dictated the continuation of a pro-Western and 
anti-Soviet foreign policy, external determinants proved a stumbling 
block as the Western powers shifted their attention from Pakistan to 
India, especially in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
Developments in nuclear and missile technology also reduced the 
strategic value of land-based pacts, thereby downgrading Pakistan’s 
importance as an ally. When its Western allies began to extend arms 
assistance to India, while at the same time reducing similar aid to 
Pakistan, the Ayub regime attempted to put pressure on them to 
revise their regional strategy by improving relations with China and 
making overtures to the Soviets.
Although Pakistan-Soviet relations began to expand substantially in 
the economic and cultural fields, political tensions remained, due to 
Pakistan's continued membership of the US-sponsored pacts and the 
pro-Western orientation of its leadership. Relations with the West 
were equally strained as the US, reacting strongly to Sino-Pakistan 
rapprochement, warned the Ayub government to refrain from 
establishing closer ties with China and, in a bid to pressure 
Pakistan, not only suspended economic assistance, but also further 
reduced military aid to that country.
The decline of US military aid to Pakistan, accompanied by continued 
Western assistance to India, created dissatisfaction within 
Pakistani military circles with the performance of the government. 
When this unrest was linked with increased domestic opposition, the 
regime attempted to regain lost ground by resorting to what was 
perceived as a calculated risk, that is, a limited war with India. The
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escalation of the conflict, Pakistan's inability to achieve its 
strategic goals, and the failure of its Western allies to come to its 
rescue,forced the Ayub government to accept a ceasefire and a 
Soviet-sponsored peace settlement which were unacceptable to both 
the West Pakistani people and large segments of a disillusioned 
m ilita ry.
In the aftermath of the conflict, the government attempted to win 
back the support of the Armed Forces by increasing domestic 
expenditure on defence. But it was aware that substantial external 
assistance was required to fulfill the military's demands for 
expansion, modernization and a replacement of war losses. When the 
regime failed to persuade the US to withdraw its arms embargo and 
resume military assistance, it embarked on a military aid programme 
with China. Ayub also made persistent attempts to acquire arms 
supplies from the Soviet Union, in the hope of putting pressure on the 
US to revise its stand.
The Soviets had played an active role in restoring the status quo in 
the subcontinent both during and after the 1965 war, with the 
objective of promoting regional stability. They had also continued in 
their efforts to improve bilateral ties with Pakistan by extending 
economic and technological assistance and demonstrating 
impartiality in Indo-Pakistani disputes. The Soviets even agreed to 
supply a limited quantity of arms in the hope of consolidating 
bilateral ties, drawing Pakistan away from the West and China, and 
acquiring some influence with the powerful Pakistani military. 
Pakistan-Soviet defence links, however, remained limited, due to
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Pakistan's reluctance to distance itself from the West, and also 
because the Soviets did not want to endanger their ties with India.
The Ayub regime's attempts to meet the military's needs through 
enhanced defence spending and by acquiring arms from the 
Communist bloc failed to satisfy its American-equipped and trained 
Armed Forces, which viewed the government's failure to obtain a 
revision of the US arms policy with disapproval. When internal 
opposition to Ayub's authoritarian rule swept the country in the 
late-1960's, an ambitious Military High Command decided to 
withdraw its support from a government which had proved incapable 
of protecting and advancing the military's corporate interests, and 
which was fast becoming a political liability. The withdrawal of the 
military's support led to the downfall of Ayub, and the Armed Forces, 
represented by Army C-in-C, Yahya Khan, once again emerged as the 
sole custodians of political power in Pakistan.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE YAHYA JUNTA AND THE DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN
(1969-1971)
The course of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy was to assume 
a new significance under its second military government, headed by 
General Yahya Khan. As the Armed Forces once again openly adopted 
the role of the dominant political actor, all policy-making was to be 
determined by the military's corporate interests.
In this most eventful phase of Pakistan's history, internal and 
external variables were to be more closely interlinked than ever 
before. Thus the internal policies of the new military rulers 
combined with regional and global alignments were ultimately to 
determine not only the course of Pakistan-Soviet relations but the 
continued existence of the state of Pakistan itself.
Pakistan Under Yahva Khan
With the imposition of martial law in March 1969, the military, 
represented by Army Commander-in-Chief Agha Mohammad Yahya 
Khan, once again emerged as the supreme custodian of political 
power in Pakistan. The departing President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, 
had justified transfering power to military rather than civilian 
hands on the grounds that a divided self-serving political leadership 
had brought Pakistan to the brink of disaster.
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Ayub's justifications were echoed by Yahya Khan, who stressed that 
the military had reluctantly intervened when Ayub failed to solve the 
political impasse, and the law-and-order situation continued to 
deteriorate. "The Armed Forces," he declared in his takeover address 
on 26 March, "could not remain idle spectators of this state of near 
anarchy. They have to do their duty and save the country from utter 
disaster." According to Yahya, the main objectives of his regime 
were "to bring back sanity" and "to put the Administration back on 
the rails"1
These justifications seem to have been accepted at face value by a 
number of civil and military analysts who claim that the coup was 
also an example of "reactive" as opposed to "designed" militarism, 
since an apolitical military was forced to intervene due to the 
failure of the politicians to provide a viable alternative leadership. 
Military sources argue that the "military intervened" in the wake of 
"repeated political failure"2 as irresponsible politicians, failing to 
reach agreement on a future constitutional structure, created "the 
inevitable setting for martial law."3 Similar arguments are put 
forward by a number of political analysts who claim that the coup 
was "a reaction to the weakness of civilian institutions."4 Martial 
Law came "hesitantly" since there was "no alternative . . .  in sight"5 
and Yahya "reluctantly accepted the responsibility for cleaning up the 
mess Pakistan was in . . ."6
As already discussed in Chapter Six, the notion of the military 
leadership being forced to take over power bears little resemblance 
to the events leading to Ayub's downfall. Having taken over power,
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the Yahya regime moved quickly to counter any potential resistance 
to the coup. Special military courts were set up, and a large number 
of arrests were made. The Military High Command was, however, 
aware that the mass movement of 1968/69 had highly politicised 
the Pakistani masses and created widespread resentment against 
authoritarian rule. Yahya therefore categorically declared that he 
had no political ambitions, and that his main aim was "the creation 
of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional 
Government" and "the smooth transfer of power to the 
representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the 
basis of adult franchise."7
Yahya's initial moves seemed, however, to aim at consolidating his 
own position as well as that of the Armed Forces. The CMLA took 
over the post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, while 
retaining the position of Army Commander-in-Chief, and on 31 March 
1969 assumed the position of President. The Chiefs of Staff of the 
three service arms, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Air Marshal Nur Khan 
and Admiral S.M. Ahsan, were appointed Deputy Martial Law 
Administrators (DMLAs) and they, together with Yahya and his 
Principal Staff Officer (PSO), Lt. Gen. S.G.M. Peerzada, composed a 
Council of Administration heading the new government. The 
Ministries were divided amongst the CMLA and three DMLAs, with 
Yahya heading Defence and Foreign Affairs.
Unlike the Ayub government, the Yahya regime personified the 
dominance of the military, and the days of civil-military partnership 
seemed over. Headquarters CMLA (HQCMLA), composed entirely of
military personnel, was formed soon after the imposition of martial 
law and "placed supreme over the entire existing machinery of the 
G overnm ent."8 The Government Secretariat functioned under its 
control, and military officers were appointed to oversee their 
civilian counterparts at all levels of government. Two zonal Martial 
Law Administrators (MLAs) performed the functions of Governor in 
the provinces, with the civil bureaucracy operating under their 
control. Senior civil servants "lost all direct approach to the 
President," and all decisions, both in the centre and in the provinces, 
were made by the martial law authorities.9
The foreign policy making processes, as in the case of internal 
policy, were the sole prerogative of the military. Yahya and his 
military colleagues, especially General Peerzada, determined the 
country's external directions. It was therefore quite natural for the 
new military rulers to focus on the needs of the Armed Forces while 
formulating foreign policy. This did not entail any major departure 
from the previous government's external policies, since Ayub had 
also given the highest priority to the requirements of the military.
The Yahya regime did adopt a harsher stance on Indo-Pakistani 
relations so as to gain internal legitimacy and support, especially 
from those sections of the Armed Forces and the Punjabi population 
who had been strongly opposed to the signing of the Tashkent 
Declaration. The use of the Indian "threat" and anti-Indian rhetoric 
continued to be useful in justifying both the need for a military 
government and for increased defence expenditure. In his first press 
conference, Yahya therefore referred specifically to the need for a
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just solution of Indo-Pakistan differences, implying that future 
bilateral relations would be determined by the Kashmir question.1 ^
The Yahya regime, once again following the guidelines of its 
predecessor’s foreign policy, ostensibly adopted a policy of 
"bilateralism" in its dealings with the major powers, "which means 
conducting our relations with other countries on the basis of 
mutuality of interests independently of our or their relations with 
other countries . . . We, therefore, try to have balanced relations 
with the major Powers and do not solicit the friendship of one at the 
expense or to the exclusion of the other."11 Yet like Ayub, a primary 
objective of Yahya's foreign policy was a consolidation of ties with 
the US, which were given precedence over improvement of relations 
with the Soviet Union.
Yahya, like his former Supreme Commander, "was a staunch believer 
in the wisdom of remaining allied with the West."12 He was 
particularly aware that a major factor in the withdrawal of military 
support from Ayub had been the Field Marshal's failure to obtain 
renewed American military assistance, accompanied by the feeling 
that the US would not change its arms policy towards Pakistan so 
long as Ayub remained in power. For the new military government, it 
was therefore imperative to prove that it would succeed in meeting 
the military's needs. Yahya was also keen on consolidating his hold 
within the Armed Forces by embarking on a new military buildup, 
both to replace the losses of the 1965 war and to expand and 
modernize the military even further. Since internal defence spending 
could not be increased any further without damaging the economy,
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already strained by the anti-Ayub agitation, beyond repair, the 
pro-Western military turned to the US for assistance, hoping to 
receive a positive response from the Nixon Administration.13
Yahya was no stranger to the Americans. As Ayub's Chief of Staff 
and Commander-in-Chief, he had had several dealings with Pentagon 
and State Department officials. According to Ayub's Information 
Secretary, Yahya had attempted to curry favour with the Americans, 
including an attempt "to win US goodwill by obstructing the 
completion of the Sinkiang Road" linking Pakistan and China, which 
Army units were helping to build.14 The 1969 military coup was 
welcomed by the US, since it had prevented political forces 
demanding radical socio-economic change and an anti-imperialist 
foreign policy from taking over.
But while the Americans found in Yahya a "congenial . . . 
associa te",15 heading a pro-Western group of generals, his initial 
overtures bore little fruit. During Secretary of State William 
Rogers’ visit to Pakistan in May 1969, Yahya requested a resumption 
of military assistance, or at least softer terms for weapons 
purchases to Pakistan.16 Although the Americans were on the whole 
favourably inclined towards the Yahya regime, they did not respond 
positively since Pakistan was still an area of low priority to the US, 
which was gradually decreasing its involvement in Asia.
Once again in line with Ayub's foreign policy tactics, the Yahya 
regime's stress on a policy of "bilateralism" 17 was partly aimed at 
keeping its options open vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the hope of
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upgrading Pakistan's position in US regional strategies. Another 
important consideration for the Pakistanis was the continued 
implementation of the 1968 arms agreement with the Soviet Union 
and the hope of obtaining greater Soviet military assistance, which 
could also be used as a lever in their dealings with the Chinese and 
Americans.
The Soviets, on their part, had their own reasons for responding 
favourably to the change of government in Pakistan. Although 
relations with Ayub had been far from satisfactory, the Soviets were 
disturbed by the nature of the mass movement against his 
government. While a modicum of understanding had been reached 
with Ayub, the anti-government forces were led by politicians such 
as the pro-Peking Bhashani in the East and the anti-Indian 
chauvinist, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the West wing.18 The Soviets 
leadership was therefore relieved when the agitation resulted in a 
reimposition of military rule and was quick in officially extending 
its support to the Yahya government. In his reply to Yahya's letter, 
for instance, Kosygin declared that Pakistan could "always count on 
the friendly understanding and support of the Soviet Union," and 
expressed his belief that "the friendly relations existing between the 
Soviet Union and Pakistan will be not only preserved but will grow 
further."19 As a concrete signal of confidence in and approval of the 
military regime the Soviets continued to implement the 1968 arms 
agreement with Pakistan.
The Soviet moves to consolidate relations with Pakistan continued to 
be motivated by their desire to reduce Chinese influence in that
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country in particular and in the region at large. As Sino-Soviet 
relations reached a new low in 1969, following clashes along the 
Ussuri River, the Soviets also began to explore the possibilities of 
establishing regional security schemes aimed at containing China.20 
Hence Pakistan's importance increased in Soviet regional strategies.
In May 1969 Kosygin paid a visit to Pakistan, where he proceeded to 
caution the new leadership on the dangers of rapprochement with 
China. He warned Yahya that China, unlike the Soviet Union, was "not 
interested in peace in this region," and alleged Chinese interference 
in Pakistan's internal affairs. According to a former Pakistani 
Foreign Office official, Kosygin also told Yahya that "simultaneous 
friendship with Moscow and Peking would not be tolerated." When 
Yahya asked how the Soviets could justify friendly relations with 
both India and Pakistan, he was told that "What is possible for a 
superpower is not possible for a smaller power."21
During his visit Kosygin proposed the formation of a regional 
economic grouping, consisting of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
which could also include Iran and Turkey, aimed at promoting the 
wellbeing of its member states as well as regional stability. "For 
its part," he added "the Soviet Union would do everything in its power 
to encourage this." He also proposed a conference between Pakistan, 
India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union "to discuss the question of 
transit trade."22 While the latter proposal would have strengthened 
Soviet economic ties with member states and hence its regional 
influence, the former was proposed with the objective of 
establishing some sort of loosely grouped alliance to contain China.
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At the conclusion of the visit, Yahya expressed the hope that 
Pakistan-Soviet relations would "continue to grow in strength," 
while Kosygin emphasised the Soviet desire to "continue to work for 
the consolidation of friendly ties with Pakistan." Both leaders also 
stressed their determination "to expand areas of cooperation 
between the two countries in the economic, cultural and other 
fie lds."23
The Pakistani reaction to the Soviet proposals for a regional 
economic grouping was, however, ambiguous. The Yahya regime had 
no intention of joining a Soviet-sponsored scheme which would 
endanger future ties with the West and limit Pakistan's options 
vis-à-vis China. Some willingness was however indicated on 
exploring the possibilities of a conference on transit trade.24 It 
was therefore clear that the Yahya regime intended to maintain the 
Soviet option, while at the same time pursuing its primary objective 
of strengthening relations with the West as also its ties with China 
which could, in turn, serve as a lever in its dealings with both the US 
and neighbouring India.
The Politics of Confrontation
Internal developments rather than foreign policy concerns were, 
however, to preoccupy the Yahya regime in the first months of its 
existence. Soon after the imposition of martial law, divisions 
appeared within the junta. DMLAs Admiral Ahsan and Air Marshal Nur 
Khan were soon at odds with the Army generals, the former because
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he favoured a speedy return to civilian rule, the latter because he 
was perceived as ambitious and a potential threat to Yahya Khan.
The President soon neutralised the threat posed by Ahsen and Nur 
Khan by appointing them as Governors of East and West Pakistan 
respectively, and retiring them from active service.25 The key 
decision makers now consisted of the CMLA, Army Chief Hamid, PSO 
Peerzada and two other Army colleagues, National Security Council 
(NSC) Chairman, Major-General Ghulam Omar, and Chief of 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Major-General Akbar Khan.
Yahya then moved to consolidate his control and in September 1969 
appointed a "civilian'’ cabinet composed of nominated ministers to 
replace the Council of Administration. Real power remained with the 
inner military cabinet. The bureaucracy also remained deprived of 
any major role in decision making, with the regime ensuring the 
continued cooperation of the civil servants by intimidation tactics. 
These included the enforcement of Martial Law Regulations (MLRs) 
such as MLR No. 58, under which some 303 Class 1 bureaucrats were 
dismissed, demoted or retired on charges ranging from corruption to 
ineffic iency.26
The regime also issued a number of MLRs aimed at curbing 
anti-social activities such as smuggling and blackmarketeering, and 
also announced its intention to enunciate socio-economic reforms.27 
These attempts, aimed at defusing the domestic demand for reform 
did not, however, succeed in acquiring the regime the legitimacy it 
was seeking. Feelings against it ran especially high in the East Wing,
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which perceived the coup as yet another attempt to deprive the 
Bengalis of their rightful share in political power and economic 
resources.
By November 1969 there were open shows of defiance in East 
Pakistan. The regime therefore embarked on a carefully monitored 
process of transferring power to "civilian'’ hands in a strictly 
regulated manner which would perpetuate the military's control and 
at the same time defuse internal opposition.28 Yahya announced on
28 November 1969 that National Assembly polls would be held on 5 
October 1970, and conceded the demands of East Pakistan and the 
minority West Pakistani provinces for a dissolution of One Unit and 
elections to a unicameral legislature on the basis of "one man, one 
vote".29 Realising that differences amongst the political leadership 
could be exploited, especially in view of the East-West divide, Yahya 
deliberately left the contentious East Pakistani demand for maximum 
provincial autonomy unresolved.
On 30 March 1970, a "provisional" Legal Framework Order (LFO) was 
promulgated, which laid down the regime's guidelines for a future 
constitutional framework. The most significant clauses of the LFO 
were sections 24, 25 and 27, which gave the Assembly a period of
120 days in which to draft a constitution; provided that the 
Assembly's Constitutional Bill would need the President's 
authentication, without which the Assembly would stand dissolved; 
and declared that the interpretation of the provisions of the LFO 
"shall be resolved by . . . the President" alone.30 It was therefore 
clear that Yahya and his military colleagues were leaving nothing to
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chance.
The ban on political activities was lifted on 1 January 1970, and 
National and Provincial Assembly polls were held on 17 and 19 
December respectively, with over 25 parties participating. Some 
analysts claim that Yahya's decision to hold the polls was 
determined by his desire "to return the country to unfettered 
democracy"31 and that he was "committed to the re-establishment 
of a parliamentary form of government."32 It is far more likely that 
the Yahya regime went ahead with the elections since it was 
confident that no party would emerge with an absolute majority. 
The military would then be in a position to manipulate the divided 
political leadership at will.33
The election results, however, disproved the military's calculations. 
In the West Wing, the government had patronised a number of right 
wing parties, such as the Jamaat-i-lslami and the Qayyum Muslim 
League, in a bid to obtain a fragmented vote. It was assessed that 
Zulfikar AM Bhutto's PPP would win approximately 30 National 
Assembly seats, with the remainder going to the right wing 
parties.34 The PPP, however, managed to capture 81 out of the 138 
seats. Its calls for socio-economic reforms and an anti-imperialist 
foreign policy appealed to the masses while a hawkish and 
anti-Indian stance won Bhutto the support of the Punjabis in 
particular.35
The pre-election estimates of the regime concerning East Pakistan 
proved even more unfounded, since it was calculated that Sheikh
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Mujibur Rahman's Awami League would obtain at best some 60 to 70 
seats in the National Assembly. The League, however, campaigning on 
its six-point programme for maximum provincial autonomy, swept 
the polls, obtaining 160 out of East Pakistan's 162 National 
Assembly and 288 out of the 300 Provincial Assembly seats.36
Although Yahya declared that he would step down, adding "I have a 
perfectly good job waiting for me back in the barracks",37 the 
regime was unprepared to hand over power to a civilian government 
which would have an absolute majority in the National Assembly. It 
was especially unwilling to transfer power to the Awami League, 
since its six-point programme threatened the interests of the West 
Pakistani dominated centre and military. In the realm of foreign 
policy, for instance, the programme called for withdrawal from the 
Western alignments and an improvement of relations with India.38 
Its domestic content was even more significant, since it was 
perceived that an Awami League government would threaten the 
military's autonomy, drastically curtail defence spending and reduce 
the size of the Armed Forces.39
Faced with the task of evolving a new strategy to prevent a transfer 
of power without eroding its own legitimacy, the Yahya regime was 
given support from an unexpected quarter, the dominant West 
Pakistani party, the Pakistan People's Party. Zulfikar Bhutto, who 
had also not anticipated an Awami League majority, was now 
unwilling to assume the role of the opposition leader in the National 
Assembly.
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His trump card lay in the fact that the Awami League had not won 
even a single seat in the West Wing, while his party had obtained an 
absolute majority of National Assembly seats in the politically 
dominant province of Punjab.40 Playing on the sympathies of his 
Punjabi electorate, Bhutto now claimed that the Awami League could 
not speak for the West Pakistani people, in the hope that a future 
settlement between the Awami League, the Yahya regime and his 
party would grant him a share of the federal government.
While Bhutto's refusal to acknowledge the Awami League's majority 
in the National Assembly increased tensions between the two wings, 
it served the purposes of the military regime, which decided "to play 
Bhutto and Mujib against each other."41 Instead of calling the 
National Assembly session, Yahya began talks with the Awami League 
and PPP leadership on a future constitutional framework. After 
holding talks with Mujib in January, Yahya acknowledged publicly 
that "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is going to be our next Prime 
Minister"42 but he then proceeded to Bhutto's home town, Larkana, 
accompanied by some influential members of his inner cabinet. 
There, according to civil and military sources close to the CMLA, "a 
new and most sinister alliance seems to have developed between the 
military junta and Bhutto . . . "  43 and the two "decided not to hand 
over power to Mujibur Rahman."44
Bhutto's refusal to acknowledge the Awami League's majority in the 
National Assembly was satisfying to the regime which required his 
cooperation to legitimise its refusal to implement election results. 
Taking full advantage of Bhutto's stand, Yahya announced on 1 March
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an indefinite postponement of the National Assembly session due to 
be held on 3 March, on the grounds that the West Pakistani majority 
party was unwilling to participate.45
Civil War in Pakistan
Perceiving Yahya's decision to postpone indefinitely the National 
Assembly session as an attempt to prevent his party from taking 
over power, Mujib attempted to pressure the regime to reverse its 
decision by launching a large scale civil disobedience movement 
which included province-wide strikes. Yahya, however, responded by 
using force to suppress all dissent. This resulted on the one hand in 
strengthening the radical forces within the Awami League, 
especially amongst the student body, leaving Mujib with little room 
to compromise with the central government. On the other hand, the 
centre's actions further alienated the Bengalis, resulting in a 
corresponding increase in the Awami League's popularity and the 
party by March 1971 virtually controlled all political and 
administrative life in the province.46
On 6 March, Yahya declared that the National Assembly session would 
be held on 25 March, while at the same time strongly criticising the 
Awami League's stance.47 The following month Yahya began a series 
of talks with Mujib in Dacca, which were joined at a later stage by 
Bhutto. Little progress was made, as the regime appeared to have no 
intention of meeting the Awami League's preconditions. According to 
one analyst, these negotiations were, in fact, conducted since the 
Army "needed more time in order to dispatch extra troops" before
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taking more drastic action.48 This is borne out by military sources 
as well.
The regime was at first divided on an ultimate solution of the East 
Pakistan crisis between the military doves and hawks. The former 
included East Pakistan Governor, Admiral Ahsan, who, after 
repeatedly calling for a political settlement with Mujib, finally 
submitted his resignation. His successor as Governor and MLA was 
Commander, Eastern Command, Lt. General Yaqub Khan, who was also 
forced to resign when his calls for a peaceful solution were ignored. 
Yaqub's replacement by Lt. General Tikka Khan, a hardliner, was a, 
clear indicator that the regime had no intention of reaching a 
political settlement.49
While Yahya was ostensibly conducting negotiations with Mujib in 
Dacca, as early as 16 March he told General Tikka Khan to prepare for 
action. On 24 March, the plan for military action was approved by the 
P resident.50 The following day, Yahya held his last meeting with 
Mujib and then departed for West Pakistan. On 25/26 March, the 
Army took action in the East Wing. On 26 March, Yahya accused Mujib 
and the Awami League of treason.51 Mujib was arrested, his party 
banned and West Pakistani troops moved in to crush all those 
suspected of supporting Bengali nationalism, including politicians, 
students and intellectuals, resulting in large scale casualties.
Yahya and his inner cabinet had calculated that a "punitive" crackdown 
would effectively reassert central government control within no 
tim e .52 They had, however, underestimated the level of popular
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support for the nationalistic cause and the intensity of resistance 
which accompanied it. The atrocities which accompanied military 
action in Dacca and elsewhere in the province further fuelled a 
widespread uprising against the centre, which rapidly took the shape 
of a civil war.
The East Pakistan crisis assumed an external dimension as Bengali 
military personnel, political leaders and hundreds of thousands of 
civilians fled across the border into India. Indo-Pakistan relations, 
which had deteriorated after the 1969 coup and incidents such as the 
hijacking of an Indian airliner by two dissident Kashmiris in January 
1970,53 reached a new low with the exodus of the East Pakistani 
refugees, since India's financial and administrative resources were 
strained and the refugee presence created serious political tensions 
in the bordering Indian states. India also saw in the East Pakistan 
crisis an opportunity of embarrassing an unfriendly neighbour. Soon 
after the Pakistani military action, the Indian government and the 
Indian parliament extended their "profound sympathy for and 
solidarity with the people of East Bengal"54 and the Awami League 
leadership-in-exile was allowed to form a Provisional Government of 
Bangladesh headed by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed.
By spring 1971, India decided to back the Bangladeshi cause as the 
Pakistan military continued its operations in the East Wing with the 
resultant increase in the numbers of refugees crossing the border as 
well as an almost complete alienation of the population within the 
province, who were by now fully supportive of the struggle for 
independence. The Indian decision was partly due to the realisation
that the crisis could be used to render a crippling blow to Pakistan, 
putting an end, once and for all, to a Pakistani two-border threat. 
Moreover, the refugees were unlikely to return home until the 
Pakistani forces were ousted, but the Bangladeshi resistance was 
equally unlikely to succeed without a prolonged struggle unless an 
external power decided to intervene. The Indian government also 
expected that an Indian-backed and supported liberation struggle 
would bring into power an independent Bangladesh government which 
would be ideologically suitable as well as politically sympathetic to 
its benefactor.55
The Yahya regime, however, appeared oblivious of the internal and 
external implications of the crisis, still focussing its attention on a 
forcible suppression of Bengali dissent. The regime also continued 
to strive for political legitimacy in the West Wing. Yahya, for 
example, declared his intention to nominate a 'Council of Experts' to 
draft a future constitutional framework and reiterated his intentions 
to transfer power once the East Pakistan crisis was resolved.
The regime also attempted to gain West Pakistani support for the 
military action in the East Wing, claiming that the crisis was the 
product of a conspiracy between Awami League secessionists and 
India. Hence limited amnesties were announced in mid-1971 for 
refugees and rebels who had been "misled" by Indian-supported 
"anti-state elements and miscreants."56
As Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated even further, the Indians 
continued to prepare for military action, moving troops to East
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Pakistan's borders, increasing their moral and material support to 
the Bangladeshi resistance and escalating their campaign to 
internationalise the issue in a bid to gain external acceptance for 
their stand on the crisis. Mrs Gandhi, for example, both in public 
pronouncements and in messages to a number of heads of government, 
accused the Pakistani military of perpetuating the crisis which had 
resulted in a large scale refugee presence, and warned that India 
might be forced to take action to protect its national interests if the 
situation deteriorated even further.57 It was becoming increasingly 
clear that a future Indian decision to take military action against 
Pakistan would be partly dependent on Mrs Gandhi’s success in 
mustering sufficient international support, as also on the ability of 
the Yahya regime to neutralise a potential Indian thrust by acquiring 
sufficient assistance from its allies.
The escalation of the Bangladesh crisis was viewed with particular 
concern by the Soviets, fearing that an exacerbation of Indo-Pakistan 
tensions would threaten regional stability and increase the chances 
of external intervention in South Asia. The Soviets had thus far 
consistently followed a policy of attempting to establish cordial 
relations with both Pakistan and India in the hope of promoting 
Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, and also with the objective of 
reducing Pakistan's dependence on the West and China.
As Sino-Soviet relations reached a new low in 1969, the Soviets 
were even more interested in reducing Chinese regional influence and 
promoting a joint Indo-Pakistan front against China. As mentioned 
earlier, Kosygin had proposed a regional economic grouping to the
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Pakistanis during his March 1969 visit. From mid-1969 onwards, the 
Soviets began to actively promote the notion of an Asian collective 
security system. Introducing the scheme at the International 
Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969, 
Brezhnev declared that such "a system of collective security in Asia" 
would be "the best replacement for the existing military groupings", 
helping to protect Asian countries from "the danger of another world 
war, of armed conflicts" in the region.58
The enunciation of this proposal was an indicator that the Soviets 
were interested in adopting a more active role in Asia at a time 
when the British were withdrawing from East of Suez and the US was 
beginning to reconsider its involvement in Vietnam. The Soviets 
were especially interested in exploring the possibilities of setting 
up collective security groupings to contain the expansion of Chinese 
influence in the region.59
Both the Soviet proposals were met with coolness by the Pakistanis. 
On 10 June 1969, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman declared 
Pakistan's unwillingness to enter into any such economic 
arrangement with India until Indo-Pakistani bilateral differences 
were resolved.60 Yahya also turned down the collective security 
proposal as he was warned by his military and civilian advisers 
about the "grave implications" of participation in "a Soviet-built 
political grouping on China's southwestern flank" which would be 
nothing but "the Russian version of SEATO."61 Rejecting the 
proposal, a Pakistani official spokesman stated on 10 July that 
Pakistan did not intend to enter any arrangement which would "cast
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doubts on Sino-Pakistan relations.”62
The pro-Western military regime had indeed no intention of 
participating in Soviet-sponsored schemes which would endanger 
Pakistan's relations with the West or China. The Pakistanis did 
decide to use the leverage gained by the issue to consolidate their 
ties with China. The Yahya regime not only wanted to use China as a 
counter to India, but was also keen on a resumption of military 
assistance which had come to a halt due to the Cultural Revolution.
The Pakistanis were therefore quick to reassure the Chinese that 
they had no intentions of participating in any Soviet-sponsored 
regional scheme. On 3 July 1969, the Pakistan Foreign Office 
informed the Chinese Ambassador that "Pakistan will not be a party 
to any arrangement, economic or military, which will be aimed 
against C h ina ."63 The following month Yahya sent his 
representative, Air Marshal Nur Khan, to Peking where, according to 
an authoritative source, he told the Chinese leadership that Pakistan 
would not "collaborate, no matter what the Soviet pressure, in any 
scheme that would be directed against China . . . "64
As Sino-Pakistani relations improved even further, this relationship 
was in turn to lead to a consolidation of US-Pakistan ties as 
President Nixon, who had already established a good personal 
equation with Yahya, had reached the conclusion that the Pakistanis 
could help the US in opening direct relations with China. The Yahya 
regime was first approached on the subject by Secretary of State 
Rogers during his visit to Pakistan in May 1969. During his trip to
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Pakistan the following August, President Nixon called on Yahya to act 
as an intermediary between the US and China. Realising the strong 
bargaining position this would give his government vis-à-vis both 
Washington and Peking, Yahya was more than willing to oblige. 
According to one of Yahya's close associates, the Pakistani President 
then fulfilled this assignment "most faithfully and with strict 
secrecy."65
As a result of Yahya's cooperation, US-Pakistan relations received a 
tremendous boost. Yahya was particularly hopeful of using this 
improved relationship to obtain US arms assistance. Although he had 
consistently increased domestic defence expenditure from Rs 2,187 
million in 1968 to Rs 2,761 in 1970,66 it was still insufficient to 
meet the military's requirements. Moreover, the Pakistani forces, 
especially the Air Force, were badly in need of spares for their 
American supplied hardware.
Pakistan's cooperation in helping to establish Sino-American 
relations was indeed rewarded as the Nixon Administration 
announced its decision in October 1970 to sell Pakistan "several 
items of military equipment to replace equipment previously 
supplied", including B-57 bombers, F-104 Starfighters, armoured 
personnel carriers and spare parts as "an exception to the general 
policy" on arms supplies to South Asia.67
During Yahya's visit to China in November 1970, the Chinese also 
rewarded him for services rendered by agreeing not only to an 
additional $200 million in economic aid but also to a resumption in
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the supply of defence equipment. Pakistan's role in bringing the US 
and China together culminated in Henry Kissinger's secret trip to 
Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971, with both sides agreeing to 
normalise relations.
The improvement in Pakistan's relations with China and the US was 
to assume a new significance as the situation in East Pakistan 
continued to deteriorate. The Chinese were disturbed by the nature 
of the crisis in the East Wing. Yet they felt compelled to support 
their Pakistani allies in a struggle which was being assisted by the 
Indians. In their response to the events in East Pakistan, they were, 
therefore, careful not to condone the Pakistani military operations, 
but emphasised instead the role being played by India. Thus a 
Chinese note of 6 April accused India of "flagrant interference in the 
internal affairs of Pakistan"6® and in a letter to Yahya on 11 April, 
Premier Chou declared that "should the Indian expansionists dare to 
launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and 
people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan government and 
people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and 
national independence."69
The Chinese Premier's letter, however, significantly omitted any 
pledges of support for Pakistan's ''territorial integrity'*, and private 
warnings were issued to the Yahya regime to reach a political 
solution. A Bengali source, for instance, claims that Chou had added 
in his letter that, "The question of East Pakistan should be settled 
according to the wishes of the people of East Pakistan."70 The 
Pakistanis were also told to beware of the "grave consequences" of
Indian involvement.71 Nor did the Chinese, apart from cautiously 
worded declarations of support, commit themselves to any course of 
action in support of the Yahya regime, wanting first to assess the 
implications of the situation.
The American response to the crisis was to be shaped by both 
domestic and external compulsions. There was, however, conflict 
within the Administration on the course to be followed. As the 
Pakistani forces continued their operations within East Pakistan, 
State Department officials dealing with the crisis, but ignorant of 
Pakistan's role in the ongoing Sino-American negotiations, advised 
Nixon to condemn the Yahya regime and force the Pakistanis to reach 
a political solution of the crisis by cutting off economic and military 
aid.72
Nixon, however, adopted a pro-Pakistani "tilt", since the Yahya regime 
was still playing a vital mediatory role between the Chinese and 
American top leadership. Moreover, West Pakistan was perceived as 
far more vital to the US than East Bengal and the West Pakistani 
military regime a more conducive instrument, as opposed to the 
Bangladeshi resistance, for the promotion of American regional 
interests.73
Despite his sympathy for the Yahya regime, Nixon had to be 
circumspect in supporting the Pakistanis in view of public and 
Congressional condemnation of the military operations in East 
Pakistan.74 He therefore accepted a State Department decision to 
impose "a 'hold' on military equipment" to Pakistan in April. At the
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same time, however, State Department officials dealing with the 
crisis were "cautioned" by Kissinger "to keep in mind President 
Nixon's 'special relationship' with Yahya."75 Humanitarian 
assistance was provided to East Pakistani refugees in India so as to 
divert attention away from the continuing and, in fact, increased 
economic aid to Pakistan. Above all, the Nixon Administration 
emphasised that the East Pakistan crisis was "basically an internal 
matter within Pakistan" to be resolved by the Pakistanis alone, and 
that no external power could justify interfering in the matter.76
While the Yahya regime received the limited but welcome support of 
its American and Chinese allies, its indifference toward Soviet 
overtures of friendship was to prove a costly mistake. Despite the 
pro-Western orientation of the Pakistani military government, the 
Soviets had continued with their efforts to improve relations with 
Pakistan, placing special emphasis on the consolidation of economic 
and technological links. Thus, for instance, agreements were signed 
during 1970 for the expansion of bilateral trade and the construction 
of electrical complexes in Pakistan. In May 1970, the Soviet and 
Pakistani governments entered into a 10-year agreement for 
technical collaboration in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.77
The Pakistanis for their part, wanting to use the relationship in their 
dealings with the West and China, did not forego the Soviet option 
altogether, and Yahya visited the Soviet Union in June 1970. During 
the visit, the two sides signed a long-term trade agreement for 
1971-1975. The Soviets offered assistance for Pakistan's Fourth 
Five-Year Plan and the Pakistanis accepted a Soviet offer of
442
assistance in setting up a steel mill in Karachi.78
By the terms of the 1968 arms agreement, the Soviets had provided 
Pakistan with a number of T-54/55 tanks, spare parts for Chinese 
supplied MiGs and IL-28 aircraft, and 130 mm guns.79 The Yahya 
regime was interested in exploring the possibilities of acquiring 
further Soviet hardware. The Soviets had by now realised that the 
extension of military supplies had not led to any change in the 
orientation of the Pakistani military leadership. Yet they were 
interested in linking the issue of arms supplies with their new 
regional security proposal. Hence when Yahya raised the question of 
continued Soviet arms shipments, Kosygin told the Pakistani leader, 
"You cannot expect Soviet arms when you are unwilling to endorse 
our Asian Security System", adding that the scheme would be "the 
best guarantor for her (Pakistan's) territorial integrity."80
The Soviets were particularly concerned about the deterioration in 
Indo-Pakistani relations since the takeover of the Pakistani military 
hawks. When Yahya stated that " . . .  we deeply regret that our hopes 
and expectations for a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Pakistani 
disputes through negotiations have not yet been realised", Kosygin 
urged Yahya to solve Indo-Pakistani differences through bilateral 
negotiations "in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration."81
The Soviets also followed internal developments in Pakistan with 
great interest as elections approached towards the end of the year, 
hoping for the emergence of a more sympathetic civilian government 
to replace the military regime. They welcomed Mujib's electoral
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victory since the Awami League called for Pakistan's withdrawal 
from the Western security pacts, and emphasised the need for cordial 
relations between India and Pakistan. Mujib's majority was also 
welcome since it was at the cost of pro-Chinese and anti-Indian 
political forces, such as Bhashani's NAP and Bhutto's PPP.82
The Soviet leaders were disturbed by the post-election events in 
Pakistan. They were apprehensive that an escalation of the crisis 
could lead to an Indo-Pakistan conflict, increasing the chances of 
Western and Chinese intervention, and equally concerned that the 
short sighted domestic policies of the ruling Pakistani military 
clique could ultimately lead to the dismemberment of united 
Pakistan, thereby destabilising the region.83
Soviet efforts were therefore focussed on pressuring the military 
regime to reach a political settlement of the crisis within the 
framework of a united Pakistan, and above all to prevent the 
outbreak of war on the subcontinent. Soon after the military action 
in East Pakistan the Soviet Consul-General in Karachi expressed 
Premier Kosygin's concern about the crisis in a meeting with Yahya 
on 28 March. This was followed by Podgorny's letter to President 
Yahya Khan on 2 April, in which the Soviet leader expressed his 
concern at "the arrest and persecution of M. Rahman and other 
political figures who received such convincing support from the 
overwhelming majority of East Pakistan's population in the recent 
general elections," and called on Yahya "to adopt the most immediate 
measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the populace 
of East Pakistan", adopting instead "methods of a peaceful political
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settlement.”
The Soviet President was careful not to express any support for the 
Bangladeshi movement for independence, and demonstrated total 
support for a united Pakistan, warning Yahya that a continuation of 
force in the East Wing "may be highly detrimental to the vital 
interests of all the Pakistani people." He also expressed his concern 
that an escalation of the crisis could lead to war in the region, 
stressing that his friendly advice was meant to promote "the 
interests of all the Pakistani people and the cause of preserving 
peace in this area."84
The Soviet leadership and media continued to press on the Pakistani 
military government to seek a political solution in Pakistan, while 
acknowledging that it was an internal problem and implicitly 
stressing Soviet support for Pakistan's territorial integrity. 
Kosygin, for instance, reportedly told the Pakistan Ambassador, 
Jamshed Marker, that the Soviet Union considered the developments 
in East Pakistan were "Pakistan's internal matter."85 Similarly, a 
Soviet commentator in Pravda, analysing the "acute domestic crisis" 
in East Pakistan, pointed out that the "continuing bloodshed in East 
Pakistan is doing serious harm not only to the vital interests of the 
Pakistani people but also to the cause of peace in Asia and 
throughout the world", adding that it was "precisely a political 
settlement and not a military solution that would correspond to the 
interests of the entire Pakistan people and to the cause of 
maintaining peace in this region and throughout the world."86
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As the continuing Pakistani military action and resultant influx of 
refugees into India increased Indo-Pakistan tensions, leading to 
greater Indian support for the Bangladeshi resistance forces, the 
Soviet calls for a political solution of the crisis and a peaceful 
resolution of Indo-Pakistani differences correspondingly grew. In an 
election meeting in June, Kosygin urged the Yahya regime to take 
immediate measures to reach a political solution of the crisis and a 
"peaceful solution" of Indo-Pakistani differences "with the cause of 
preserving peace on the Hindustan Peninsula." Soviet concern about 
potential Chinese and Western involvement was evident in the Soviet 
Premier's warning that an exacerbation of tensions "would play into 
the hands of those . . . foreign forces that, in pursuing their selfish 
goals, are acting to the detriment of the interests of both India and 
Pakistan."87
The Pakistani leadership reacted with great hostility to the Soviet 
calls for a peaceful settlement of the Bangladesh crisis and 
Indo-Pakistani differences. In his reply on 6 April to Podgorny's 
letter, General Yahya Khan declared that "no country, including the 
Soviet Union, can allow - or has allowed - anti-national and 
unpatriotic elements to destroy it or to countenance subversion." 
The CMLA also stressed that it was "of paramount importance that 
all efforts should be made to ensure that no interference takes place 
in a matter which is strictly Pakistan's own internal affair."88
In subsequent exchanges with the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan, 
President Yahya pointed out that the Soviets were in no position to 
criticise Pakistan's military action within its borders, when they
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themselves had violated the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary on the grounds of national interests. He also accused the 
Soviets of conducting atrocities in Czechoslovakia and within the 
Soviet Central Asian Republics.89
While Pakistan-Soviet relations took a turn for the worse under the 
Yahya government, Indo-Soviet relations were, in contrast, 
progressively improving. At the time of the outbreak of the East 
Pakistan crisis, India and the Soviet Union had come even closer 
together in view of their common antipathy towards China. 
Indo-Soviet rapprochement was given an added impetus as the US and 
China moved closer together, with the active connivance of Pakistan.
Since Nixon's announcement of the opening with China on 16 July had 
come at a time when the Indians had begun to seriously consider the 
possibilities of taking military advantage of the East Pakistan 
crisis, the Indira government was particularly concerned that 
Sino-US rapprochement could lead to American neutrality in the 
event of Chinese interference in a future Indo-Pakistan war. This 
concern was heightened when Kissinger, on his return home from 
Peking via Pakistan, warned the Indian Ambassador in Washington 
that the US "would be unable to help you against China" should such a 
conflict erupt.90
To neutralise such a Chinese threat, and to ensure Soviet diplomatic 
and material support, the Indians decided to go ahead with a bilateral 
treaty of friendship which had been under negotiation with the 
Soviet Union for the past two years. On 9 August 1971, India
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therefore entered into a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union.
A major motivating factor for consolidating ties with India from the 
Soviet point of view was their desire to form a joint front against 
China, especially in view of Sino-American rapprochement. An 
equally important consideration was the Soviet desire to prevent an 
outbreak of war in South Asia. The Treaty could, therefore , be used 
to put pressure on Pakistan to resolve the East Pakistan crisis and 
its differences with India peacefully, since it would now be clear 
that the Soviet Union would side with India in the event of an 
Indo-Pakistan war. Yet should the Pakistanis continue to follow a 
confrontationist policy towards India, combined with a refusal to 
seek a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis, the Treaty could 
then be used to ensure an Indian victory in any potential 
Indo-Pakistan conflict, by the provision of Soviet support for India 
and the neutralisation of American and Chinese support for 
Pakistan.91
Indo-Pakistan War of 1971
The Indo-Soviet treaty was to have far reaching implications for 
Pakistan. Although the Indians had been considering, as early as 
April, the possibilities of taking advantage of the East Pakistan 
crisis to neutralise their regional rival, they had been hesitant to 
escalate hostilities until the ground had first been prepared both 
diplomatically and militarily. The former precondition was partially 
fulfilled as India managed to convince the international community
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of the justness of its stand on the Bangladesh issue. It was, in 
Indian perceptions, totally fulfilled with the signing of the 
Indo-Soviet accord.92
India's military preparations were also complete by late 1971. The 
Indians were aware that the Bangladeshi resistance forces, would be 
ultimately capable of defeating the Pakistan Army on their own, but 
only after a prolonged war of national liberation. Such a 
development was not desirable from the Indian point of view, since 
it would mean not only the continued presence of the Bangladeshi 
refugees on Indian soil but also the possibility of radical nationalist 
forces emerging triumphant. The Indians therefore opted for direct 
intervention with the approval of the Awami League leadership in 
exile, which was also aware that a protracted national liberation 
war could deprive them of the chances of assuming political power in 
an independent Bangladesh.93
The Pakistani military regime, on its part, appeared oblivious of the 
deteriorating conditions within East Pakistan, and continued to focus 
its attention on legitimising and consolidating its internal hold.94 
Nor did Pakistan's military leadership appear to be perturbed at the 
prospects of waging war with India95 at a time when a civil war 
was under way within its own territory. Although the ruling 
generals were well aware of the prospects of war with India, they 
took no steps to defuse regional tensions and instead adopted a 
hostile and confrontationist attitude. Yahya, in fact, threatened to 
take military action against India if that country played an overt role 
in supporting the "secessionist" movement within East Pakistan.96
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According to one of Yahya's former associates, the regime "professed 
'confidence' in facing simultaneously both the Indian threat and the 
secessionist challenge from East Bengal", believing that the 
Pakistani forces would be able to achieve their objectives both 
within East Pakistan and against India in an all-out war of limited 
duration.97
This confidence was to prove ill-founded as war broke out in the 
subcontinent in December 1971. On the Western front, following the 
Pakistani attacks across the international border on 3 December, 
aimed at diverting Indian pressure on East Pakistan, the poorly led 
and disorganised Pakistani forces soon found their offensive blunted 
on the sea, air and land.98 In the East Wing the Pakistani forces soon 
found themselves in a state of virtual siege. In their all-out 
offensive, the superior Indian naval and air forces soon managed to 
impose a sea and air blockade around East Pakistan.99 Nor was the 
isolated Pakistan Army, separated by some 3,000 miles of territory 
from its home base, any match for its Indian counterpart on the 
ground. A Pakistani force of only three weak infantry divisions100 
and some 73,000 paramilitary personnel faced an Indian Army 
comprising eight infantry divisions, accompanied by superior armour 
and artillery, along with twenty-nine battalions of the Border 
Security Force and the Indian trained Mukti Bahini of some 100,000 
men.101 Above all, the Indians had the advantage of fighting the war 
with the active support of the vast majority of the local population. 
As early as 3 December, the fighting in East Pakistan was clearly to 
the disadvantage of the Pakistani forces, and Eastern Command 
"seemed to have lost control over the operations."102
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It was therefore obvious that Pakistan could not afford to wage a 
protracted war in either the East or the West Wing. The poorly led 
and outnumbered Pakistani forces were no match against an Indian 
military following well defined war aims, with a superiority of 
"eight to one in aircraft, four to one in troops, three to one in armour 
and five to one in naval vessels" over Pakistan.103 India also 
possessed the advantage of a substantial indigenous arms 
manufacturing capability, and had a reliable external supplier of 
military hardware in the Soviet Union.
Unlike the 1965 war, when hostilities had been terminated by mutual 
agreement before any conclusive result was reached, the Indians in 
1971 intended to fight a quick and decisive war to victory in the East 
Wing while neutralising Pakistani forces in the West. Hence they 
were faced with the task of resisting external pressures to put an 
end to fighting until East Pakistan surrendered. The Pakistanis, on 
the other hand, wanted to continue resistance in the East Wing long 
enough for their allies to bring pressure on India to halt the 
hostilities. The outcome of the conflict would therefore depend, to 
some extent, on the nature and extent of external support the two 
warring parties would be able to muster.
The military atrocities committed in East Pakistan and India's 
successful international campaign largely isolated the Pakistanis in 
the international arena. Moreover, the Yahya regime, with its "lack 
of understanding of international affairs", states an influential 
source, "did not and could not fully realise the international
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implications of the crisis, particularly the . . . indirect involvement 
of the Soviet Union".104 Concentrating on consolidating its relations 
with the West and China, the military government failed to 
understand the significance of the Indo-Soviet accord which was, to 
some extent, the result of Yahya's foreign policy manoeuvrings.
While a Pakistani analyst claims that the Russians "were all along 
backing the Bangladesh movement by proxy by extending full support 
to India in her policy vis-à-vis East Bengal",105 the Soviets had, 
from the onset of the crisis, consistently called on the Yahya regime 
to reach a peaceful settlement of the East Pakistan problem, which 
had the potential of destabilising the region by increasing the 
chances of Indo-Pakistan strife and the intervention of external 
powers. At the same time, the Soviets had also continued to call for 
a resolution of Pakistan's internal crisis within the framework of a 
united Pakistan. Moreover, the Soviets also tried to restrain India 
from adopting a confrontationist course in the hope of defusing 
regional tensions.106 Thus, for instance, the Indo-Soviet joint 
statement issued after the signing of the treaty by Gromyko in New 
Delhi not only stressed that a political solution of the East Pakistan 
crisis alone would serve "the interests of the entire  people of 
Pakistan and the cause of the maintenance of peace in the area", but 
also emphasised that "all international problems . . . must be settled 
by peaceful negotiations and that the use of force . . .  is not 
perm issible."107
In September 1971 Pakistan Foreign Secretary Sultan Mohammed 
Khan paid a visit to the Soviet Union. Prior to his departure, the
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Foreign Secretary claimed that the Indo-Soviet treaty did not have 
negative repercussions for the region, stating, "We believe that the 
Soviets will exercise their influence in India to restrain it from 
attacking Pakistan." On his return home, Sultan commented that he 
had received Soviet assurances of their "deep interest in the unity 
and territorial integrity of Pakistan."108
While the Soviets were interested in keeping their options open 
vis-à-vis Pakistan, they had entered the Indo-Soviet treaty not only 
with the aim of warning Pakistan and its Chinese and American 
allies to refrain from opting for a confrontationist as opposed to a 
peaceful resolution of the subcontinental crisis but also to ensure 
that India would be in a favourable position should the existing 
tensions result in an outbreak of war. Moreover, by September 1971, 
the Soviets were, in fact, irked by the Pakistani military regime's 
refusal to acept a peaceful solution of the East Pakistan crisis, since 
the continued use of force was heightening regional tensions. They 
were equally displeased by the "anti-Indian chauvinism" and the 
adoption of what was interpreted as a "war psychosis" by the 
Pakistanis, since it was further increasing the chances of war.109 
Hence the Soviet leadership became more openly critical of the Yahya 
regime's domestic and external policies, while, at the same time, 
continuing to call on both Pakistan and India to negotiate their 
differences peacefully.
During Mrs Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union on 27 September, 
Kosygin expressed strong support for the Indian stand on the East 
Pakistan crisis and equally strident criticism of the Pakistani
policies in the East Wing, stating, for instance, that "It is impossible 
to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities . . . .  The mass 
flight of the population from East Pakistan . . . can be explained only 
by the fact that unbearable living conditions have been created 
there." Kosygin, however, was careful to add that, "an early political 
settlement in East Pakistan" should "take the legitimate interests of 
its population into account", thereby implying Soviet support for a 
settlement within a united Pakistan. The Soviet leader also 
emphasised that his country "is doing and will continue to do 
everything possible on its part to maintain peace in this region and 
to prevent the outbreak of an armed conflict."110
These sentiments were reiterated by President Podgorny during a 
stopover in New Delhi on 1 October, when he stressed that the 
Indo-Soviet treaty was "not directed against any state", adding that 
it was essential "to prevent further slippage toward a military 
conflict and that the tension that has arisen here must be eliminated 
by a just political settlement that takes into account the legitimate 
rights and interests of the peoples of this region."1 11 The 
Soviet-Algerian joint communique of 8 October also referred to the 
need for a peaceful solution of the East Pakistan crisis, and the 
Soviet Union declared its "respect for the national unity and 
territorial integrity of Pakistan and India . . ."112
The Soviet stand on the East Pakistan crisis began to move slowly 
away from an overt position of neutrality as the military hawks in 
the Pakistani cabinet continued to ignore Soviet calls for a peaceful 
settlement of the civil war and Pakistan's relations with India and
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remained strongly critical of Soviet regional policies. For instance, 
a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman, justifying continuing military 
action in the East Wing on the grounds that it was "taken against 
anti-national elements . . . who had organised armed revolution 
against established authority and attempted to dismember the 
country", criticised the Soviet calls for a political settlement, and 
alleged that the Indo-Soviet treaty had "encouraged India to step up 
provocative activities against Pakistan."113 The Yahya regime also 
protested to Soviet authorities against what they claimed was 
anti-Pakistani propaganda concerning the East Pakistan issue.114
While the Pakistanis rejected Soviet calls for a peaceful solution of 
their internal crisis and bilateral relations with India, tensions 
continued to mount in the region, and India prepared in earnest to 
mount an offensive in East Pakistan. By September the Indians had 
also begun consultations with the Soviets on their security needs 
should the situation deteriorate further. During her visit to the 
Soviet Union in September, Mrs Gandhi had emphasised that the East 
Pakistan crisis had created "difficulties of immense scope" for her 
country, adding that her government was "fully determined to take 
all necessary steps" to safeguard Indian national interests.115 
According to a Pakistani military source, Mrs Gandhi had also called 
on the Soviets to recognise "the urgency of providing additional 
sophisticated hardware," and succeeded in obtaining "a promise of 
help . . .  for any action India might have to take to tackle the 
situation in Bangladesh."116
454
455
The Soviets were by now aware that the danger of an outbreak of 
hostilities was real, in view of the refusal of the Yahya regime to 
reach a political settlement and the Indian determination to take full 
advantage of the vulnerability of the Pakistanis. Since Pakistan's 
American and Chinese allies could pose a threat to Indian security in 
the event of such a crisis, the Soviets decided to ensure that their 
regional ally would be in a position to offset such threats and 
emerge victorious should military confrontation become inevitable. 
A number of high level delegations were therefore exchanged to 
ascertain Indian defence requirements.117
In late October Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister N.P. Firyubin visited 
India for "consultations" under Article X of the Indo-Soviet treaty on 
the crisis in the subcontinent. At the conclusion of the visit, both 
sides expressed their complete agreement on "their assessment of 
the situation. . ."1 18 Firybin's visit was followed by that of the 
Soviet Air Force Chief, Marshal P.S. Kutakhov, who held discussions 
with his Indian counterpart as well as Defence Minister P.C. Lai. In 
the wake of these exchanges the Soviets increased the flow of 
m ilita ry  hardw are, inc lud ing  su rfa ce -to -a ir  m issiles, 
communications equipment and tanks, to India.
By November the Soviet media and political analysts were more 
pointedly critical of the Pakistani military junta for failing to reach 
a political solution of the East Pakistan crisis, and for heightening 
regional tensions by waging an anti-Indian campaign. Warnings were 
issued to the Pakistani military government to "find the path leading 
to the establishment of good neighbourly relations with India" for
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"the sake of international security as well as for its own national 
interests . . . "  At the same time, however, the Soviets also called for 
a "peaceful settlement of the existing complications on the basis of 
the solution . . .  of the problem of East Pakistan. . .",119 implying 
continued Soviet support for a solution within the framework of a 
united Pakistan.
The Soviets also continued to call for a peaceful resolution of 
Indo-Pakistan differences. Even after the Indian incursions into East 
Pakistani territory towards the end of November it was stressed, for 
instance, that while the East Pakistan crisis had become "a source of 
tension on the entire subcontinent", leading to "a dangerous 
exacerbation of relations" between India and Pakistan, the two South 
Asian neighbours should refrain from war, as the "existing 
complications on the Indian subcontinent can be solved on the basis 
of a peaceful political settlement of the East Pakistan crisis."120
Once all out war broke out, following the Pakistani attacks across 
the Western borders on 3 December, the Soviets abandoned this overt 
posture of neutrality for one of total support for the Indian cause. 
This decision was influenced by the realisation that India had not 
only the intention but also the capability of fighting the war in the 
Eastern front to a decisive end. It was also clear that a political 
solution of the East Pakistan crisis within the framework of a united 
Pakistan was no longer feasible. Since the dismemberment of 
Pakistan was inevitable, it would serve Soviet interests to extend 
military and diplomatic support to help India achieve the 
independence of Bangladesh. This would not only result in a
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consolidation of relations with India, but would also ensure Soviet 
prestige and influence in an independent Bangladesh.121
The Soviets also realised that the Pakistani military government 
would be supported by both the US and China. Hence all out Soviet 
support was necessary, both to deter the Americans and Chinese 
from intervening in the crisis to the detriment of India and to 
prevent an escalation of the dispute as far as possible. As 
hostilities ensued, the Soviets made their loyalties amply clear. 
Kosygin emphatically stated that the Soviets would not help to 
mediate in the war, as they had done during the 1965 crisis, since 
the Indo-Soviet treaty placed them under certain obligations 
vis-à-vis India.122 Once again, in a marked departure from the 1965 
war, in which they had called for an immediate unconditional 
ceasefire, the Kremlin leaders now emphasised the need for ending 
hostilities but by means of a peaceful settlement of the East 
Pakistan crisis, which was identified as the root cause of the war.
Addressing the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on
6 December, Brezhnev stressed that while the Soviet Union stood 
"firmly for an end to bloodshed", that was dependent on "a peaceful 
political settlement of the problems, at issue, with due 
consideration for the legitimate rights of the people without any 
interference from without and for the creation of conditions for a 
just and lasting peace in this area."123 The Tass statement of 5 
December also singled out Pakistani actions in East Pakistan, 
including "mass repressions and persecutions", as the "main cause of 
the tension" in the subcontinent, and the Yahya regime was warned of
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"the grave responsibility that they assume, following this dangerous 
course of aggression" against India.124
A major Soviet concern was to prevent external intervention, 
particularly on the part of China, which could threaten India 
militarily and lead to an escalation of the conflict. Warnings were 
therefore issued to all external powers to desist from adopting such 
a course. It was stressed, for instance, that since the conflict in 
South Asia was "occurring in direct proximity to the borders of the 
USSR", it involved "its security interests." Hence all external powers 
were advised to "refrain" from taking "steps that would in one way or 
another signify their involvement in the conflict and would lead to 
the complication of the situation on the Hindustan Peninsula."125
Soviet commentators claimed that the Chinese had deliberately 
"played an instigator’s role in the exacerbation of the situation on 
the Hindustan peninsula" in pursuance of "their own selfish, 
chauvinistic aims", with the objective of "using any means in the 
attempt to strengthen their position in Asia." It was also alleged 
that there was collusion between the Chinese and Americans, and 
that both countries had encouraged and assisted Pakistan in 
attacking India and militarily suppressing the legitimate rights of 
the people of East Bengal.126
There was little substance in the Soviet attacks on China, since the 
Chinese leadership had extended only limited support to Pakistan 
both before and after the outbreak of war. Since the Chinese could 
not, on the one hand, condone the military's actions in the East Wing
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and, on the other, support an Indo-Soviet backed movement for 
independence, they had publicly adopted a policy of condemning 
Indian and Soviet interference in the crisis, while privately urging 
the Pakistani authorities to find a political solution of the problem.
By late 1971, however, the Pakistani regime, aware that conflict 
with India was inevitable, was keen on obtaining more tangible 
pledges of Chinese support. Yahya therefore sent Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
heading a high powered military delegation, including all three 
service chiefs, as his special envoy to China in November. Bhutto's 
mission was to obtain a Chinese pledge that in the event of an 
Indo-Pakistan conflict China would resort to diversionary action, to 
prevent India from moving its forces from the Sino-lndian frontier 
for use against Pakistan. Bhutto reportedly also expressed 
Pakistan's interest in entering into a defence pact with China. The 
Chinese, however, were unwilling to extend any such assurances of 
support, or to enter into a security treaty with the Yahya regime. 
The Pakistani delegation was, in fact, advised to seek a political 
solution of the East Pakistan crisis,and to work towards the 
prevention of war with India.127
Although Yahya claimed, on Bhutto's return, that "if India attacked 
Pakistan, China will, of course, intervene",1 28 once the 
Indo-Pakistan war broke out, Chinese support remained confined to 
strong condemnation of India and the Soviet Union, combined with 
limited military assistance. The Chinese were aware that the 
continued existence of "united" Pakistan was an unlikely prospect, in 
view of Yahya's refusal to seek a political solution of the East
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Pakistan crisis. Hence China, unlike the Soviet Union, had even 
refrained, from the onset of the crisis, from issuing any pledges to 
support Pakistan's territorial integrity.129 Moreover, even if China 
had decided to prop up the Yahya regime after the outbreak of the 
Indo-Pakistan war, it could not risk intervening militarily not only 
because of the unfavourable weather conditions along the Sino-lndian 
border but especially in view of the all out Soviet support for India. 
As Sino-Soviet tensions had escalated, especially in the wake of 
their border clashes in 1969, the Soviets had resorted to a massive 
military build up on the Sino-Soviet border. This factor, combined 
with Soviet assurances of support to India contained in their 
Friendship pact, was enough to deter the Chinese from intervening in 
the conflict on the side of Pakistan.130
While the Chinese were effectively neutralised by the Indo-Soviet 
treaty, the Yahya regime's hopes that "they would be bailed out by the 
United States"131 were to prove equally unfounded, as Nixon's hands 
were to a considerable degree tied by the strong opposition within 
and outside Congress to the Pakistan military's operations in East 
Pakistan. Prior to the outbreak of all-out war between India and 
Pakistan, the Nixon Administration had sought ways to circumvent 
this opposition. Hence while the government officially suspended 
military supplies to Pakistan in April 1971 to mollify the prevailing 
anti-Pakistani feeling, the flow of arms continued. Although no new 
licenses were issued or previous ones renewed, the supply of items 
in the pipeline, including spare parts for US aircraft supplied under 
earlier licenses, continued until as late as November 1971.132
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Nixon also tried to help the Yahya regime in resolving the impasse by 
initiating negotiations with the pro-American faction within the 
Bangladesh government-in-exile in Calcutta, headed by Foreign 
Minister Khondakar Mushtaque. Once Prime Minister Tajuddin and 
other senior Awami League leaders came to know of the talks, which 
were interpreted as an American-Pakistani bid to split the Awami 
League from within, the parleys came to a halt and Mushtaque was 
dismissed.133 Nixon then attempted to persuade Mrs Gandhi to reach 
accommodation with the Pakistanis, but with little success.
The US extended strong support to Pakistan as the December war 
broke out. Although it was officially acknowledged that Pakistan 
was responsible for initiating hostilities, a State Department 
spokesman added that "We believe since the beginning of the crisis 
that Indian policy in a systematic way has led to perpetuation of the 
crisis, a deepening of the crisis and that India bears the major 
responsibility for the broader hostilities which have ensued."134
The US government proceeded to impose an arms embargo on India on
1 December, halting the supply of ammunition worth over $ 3 million 
and President Nixon called on officials responsible for formulating 
American policies on the crisis to adopt a pro-Pakistani posture. 
Nixon was, however, constrained to limit his support for the Yahya 
regime to the diplomatic sphere, due to Congressional opposition to 
the extension of any form of military assistance to the Pakistanis. 
Yahya's attempts to obtain US assistance by invoking the 1959 
US-Pakistan bilateral agreement were therefore turned down, and he 
was informed by the Americans that "the commitment would become
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operative only in the event of Communist aggression."135
While the Americans and Chinese failed to provide much more than 
diplomatic support to Pakistan, the Soviets were taking every step 
possible to ensure an Indian victory. As the tide of the war began to 
rapidly turn against it, Pakistan's position became even more 
precarious.
The Disintegration of Pakistan
The 1971 conflict was to prove conclusively the military superiority 
of the Indian forces over their Pakistani counterparts. The Pakistani 
High Command, far more involved in the country's politics than in 
planning its territorial defence, failed to provide the leadership and 
direction needed to make the counter-offensive in the West a 
success.136 The ill-planned offensives of the poorly led Pakistani 
forces conducting the Western campaign were therefore easily 
countered by the Indians. Not only did the Indian forces succeed in 
neutralising the Pakistani offensive, but they also managed to 
capture strategic real estate both in Azad Kashmir and within West 
Pakistani borders, forcing the Pakistanis to adopt defensive tactics.
The Indian forces, supported by the Bangladeshi guerrillas and a vast 
majority of the local population, were to prove equally successful in 
attaining their war aims in the Eastern theatre. On 6 December, Mrs 
Gandhi announced India's recognition of the Bangladesh 
government-in-exile, on the grounds that the Yahya regime had 
proved itself "totally incapable of regaining control of the
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This was an accurate description of the situation in East Bengal. As 
the Indian forces, bypassing the scattered Pakistani pockets of 
resistance, began their advance towards Dacca, it was clear that "the 
fall of East Pakistan was a foregone conclusion."133 The Yahya 
regime, however, encouraged its Eastern Command to continue 
fighting until the Americans and Chinese succeeded in pushing 
through a ceasefire resolution in the UN.139 While the Pakistanis 
were hopeful that fighting would be terminated before the fall of 
Dacca, the Indians were equally optimistic of Soviet support to help 
them resist external pressure to end the conflict until victory was 
achieved in East Pakistan. The role played by the major powers in 
the UN was therefore to influence the outcome of the 1971 war.
In view of the Pakistani dilemma, the US and China had decided to 
join hands in the UN in a bid to bring about an immediate end to the 
fighting. The Soviets, on their part, closely coordinating their 
stance with India, were determined to prevent the passage of a 
ceasefire resolution until the Indians had achieved their objectives 
in East Pakistan. Hence while US representative Ambassador Bush 
called for an immediate ceasefire, his Soviet counterpart, Malik, 
declared that the Security Council did not have the right "to close its 
eyes to the cause of the emergence and the deterioration of the 
s itu a tio n ", emphasising that any discussion of ceasefire must 
simultaneously take into consideration a "speedy attainment of a 
political settlement in East Pakistan that would take into account 
the will and the inalienable rights and lawful interests of its
te r r i to ry ."1 37
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In line with this policy, the Soviets vetoed a US-sponsored and 
Chinese backed Security Council draft resolution on 4 December, 
calling for the implementation of an immediate ceasefire, mutual 
withdrawal of troops and stationing of UN observers along the 
Indo-Pakistan borders, on the grounds that it ignored the vital 
question of a political settlement of the crisis. The Soviets then 
introduced a draft resolution which called upon the Pakistan 
government to "take measures to cease all acts of violence by 
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan" and implement a political 
settlement which would lead to a cessation of hostilities.141 The 
Soviet-sponsored resolution was vetoed by China, exercising its 
first veto in the Security Council.
In bilateral negotiations with the Americans, the Soviets made it 
equally clear that they would not compromise on "a political solution 
in East Pakistan as a precondition for a ceasefire."142 When another 
US-sponsored draft resolution was introduced on 5 December, which 
once again called for an immediate ceasefire, without proposing the 
simultaneous implementation of a political solution, the Soviets 
vetoed it. The Soviet draft resolution, calling for a ceasefire to be 
accompanied by "effective action" by the Pakistan government 
"towards a political settlement in East Pakistan" was in turn vetoed 
by China.143
The US then attempted to pressure India into ending the war, by 
supporting the transfer of the issue to the General Assembly, where
population.”140
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a resolution was passed calling for an "immediate cessation of 
hostilities between India and Pakistan and . . .  a withdrawal of their 
armed forces to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders."144 
The Soviet representative opposed the resolution on the grounds that 
the crisis could not be resolved without "the elimination of the main 
cause of the conflict" by reaching a political settlement in East 
Pakistan. The Indians, on their part, refused to abide by the 
resolution until after a withdrawal of the Pakistani military from 
East Bengal.145
As the debate on a ceasefire was deliberately prolonged by the 
Soviets, Indian troops were gaining on Dacca. By 10 December, Lt. 
General Niazi acknowledged the futility of any further struggle, and 
Governor Malik urged the Yahya regime to accept a UN-sponsored 
transfer of power to the Awami League, to be accompanied by an 
immediate ceasefire and repatriation of West Pakistani civilian and 
military personnel to their home base.146
These requests were, however, overruled by Yahya, who was still 
hopeful that the Americans would succeed in pushing through a 
ceasefire resolution in the UN before Dacca fell. It is now known 
that Yahya's decision was also influenced by American perceptions of 
the situation. According to senior State Department officials, Nixon 
and Kissinger were convinced that a success in the East Wing would 
encourage India "to dismember West Pakistan and convert it into a 
'vassal state'." Hence Kissinger urged Yahya to reject the option of a 
ceasefire accompanied by the transfer of power to Bangladeshi 
hands, although it would have led to the repatriation of Pakistani
military and civilian personnel under UN auspices.147
Despite Soviet assurances on 12 December that India had "no 
aggressive designs in the West" 148 and similar pledges by Mrs 
Gandhi, Nixon and the NSC Chief decided to take immediate action to 
demonstrate their commitment to West Pakistan's territorial 
integrity. On 12 December, the Seventh Fleet nuclear powered 
aircraft carrier, Enterprise, accompanied by nine destroyers, was 
sent towards the region. According to Henry Kissinger, the Task 
Force movement was meant "to scare off an attack on West Pakistan .
«149 j he despatch of the Seventh Fleet was also meant "to 
demonstrate to Beijing that the United States stood by its 'ally' in 
time of need."150
The US decision to show the flag in the Bay of Bengal did not result 
in any major change in the Soviet regional strategy. While the 
Soviets retaliated by strengthening their naval presence in the 
a re a 151 as a show of support for India, they had no intention of 
encouraging the Indians to dismember West Pakistan since such an 
action would have escalated the conflict. The Soviets, in fact, 
advised the Indira government not to continue the war in the West 
Wing once victory was achieved in the East.152 Nor did the Indians 
intend to subjugate West Pakistan; such a move would have had a 
detrimental effect on Indian security as it would have destabilised 
the subcontinent.
Although the Soviets and the Indians were unimpressed by the 
American threats to intervene militarily, the Seventh Fleet
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movement did raise the hopes of the Yahya regime. This partly 
explains Pakistan's reluctance to accept the Soviet-supported Polish 
draft resolution, introduced in the Security Council on 15 December, 
which called for a transfer of power "to the elected representatives 
of the people, headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman" and the "repatriation 
of Pakistan armed and civilian personnel" from East Bengal.153
Although Indian troops were poised to strike on the outskirts of 
Dacca, the Pakistanis did not take the opportunity offered by the 
resolution to prevent a surrender of their forces to India, in the hope 
that the Americans would intervene in time.154 As the hoped-for US 
intervention failed to materialise, the Pakistani Eastern Command 
surrendered in Dacca on 16 December. India then informed the 
Security Council of its intentions of observing a unilateral ceasefire 
on the Western front, effective from 17 December. In an address to 
the nation on 16 December, Yahya declared Pakistan's resolution to 
carry on the struggle but the war came to a close as his government 
accepted the Indian ceasefire offer the next day.155
While the Americans and Chinese had failed to prevent the 
dismemberment of their beleagured ally, the Indians had succeeded, 
with Soviet assistance, in fulfilling their objective of helping to 
create an independent state of Bangladesh and crippling the military 
might of their main South Asian adversary. The Soviets had reason 
to be satisfied with the outcome as they had emerged on the side of 
the victor in a conflict where international sympathy lay with the 
people of Bangladesh. The war between the two South Asian 
neighbours was now blamed on the "aggressive and expansionist"
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ambitions of the Chinese and Americans, and the Soviets welcomed 
the cessation of hostilities as serving "the fundamental interests of 
the peoples of that area" and removing "a seat of serious tension in 
the world."156
The war had ended in a humiliating surrender for the Pakistani forces 
in the East, the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of the 
independent state of Bangladesh. The West Pakistani people, kept in 
total ignorance about the war by the government-controlled news 
media, were enraged 1 at the outcome of the conflict. Mass 
demonstrations following the fall of Dacca called for the arrest and 
trial of Yahya and members of his military government. While Yahya 
was hopeful of retaining power with the backing of the military, that 
support was however withdrawn in the wake of the defeat.157 
Certain influential factions within the Military High Command, 
including Air Force Chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan and Army Deputy 
Chief of Staff Gul Hasan were anxious to replace a regime which had 
discredited the Armed Forces internally. Realising that the 
"disenchantment of the people with the military establishment was 
universal",158 they opted to look for a civilian figurehead, to replace 
Yahya Khan, who could be counted on to advance and protect the 
interests of the parent institution.
Their favoured candidate was PPP leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who 
had established close links with certain military circles, serving as 
Deputy Prime Minister with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the 
interim government formed on 7 December. Bhutto had negotiated 
with the Chinese on behalf of Yahya prior to the outbreak of the 1971
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war and had also represented Pakistan's case in the UN during the 
conflict, where his emotional anti-Indian rhetoric won him even 
greater support in West Pakistan. Bhutto was also considered the 
ideal candidate to replace Yahya as his party had the overwhelming 
support of the Punjab, the main recruiting ground for the Pakistan 
Armed Forces.159
Yahya and his allies did attempt to resist a transfer of power to 
civilian hands. After the fall of Dacca, however, Gul Hasan and Rahim 
warned the ruling group of generals that they had no choice but to 
step down.160 Yahya then handed over power to Bhutto, who took 
over as President and Pakistan's first civilian Chief Martial Law 
Administrator on 20 December 1971.
Summary
The 1969 takeover had resulted in the military once again emerging 
as the supreme custodian of political power in Pakistan. The 
military government then quickly moved to consolidate its internal 
hold under General Yahya Khan. Unlike Ayub's working partnership 
with the bureaucracy, the Yahya regime personified the dominance of 
the military, and both internal and external policy-making processes 
became the sole domain of the ruling generals.
Since the military's needs and orientation were to determine the 
regime's foreign policy directions, concerted efforts were made from 
the very start to consolidate ties with the West, with special 
emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. In view of
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Pakistan's low priority in American global strategies, the Yahya 
regime, like its predecessor, also kept its options open vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union. Although the Soviets responded positively, motivated 
by their desire to contain Western and Chinese influence in Pakistan, 
the Yahya regime was careful to keep a certain distance from the 
Soviet Union, and continued to focus on its primary objective of 
stregthening ties with the United States.
Pakistan's foreign policy directions assumed a new significance as 
internal tensions rapidly increased in the wake of the general 
elections of December 1970. While the generals had hoped to use the 
elections to consolidate their internal hold, anticipating that a 
divided legislature would allow them to manipulate the elected 
representatives at will, the West Pakistani dominated regime was 
unwilling to hand over power to the East Pakistan based Awami 
League which had emerged as the majority party, since its six-point 
programme threatened its political and economic interests.
Yahya's refusal to hand over power, with the support of the leader of 
the major West Pakistani party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, further 
exacerbated East-West tensions. The regime then made the fatal 
error of attempting to forcibly deny the Awami League its right to 
form government by resorting to military action in the East wing, 
leading to widespread resistance, which soon took the shape of civil 
war.
The crisis in the East wing also assumed an external dimension due 
to the large-scale influx of East Pakistani refugees into neighbouring
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India. Seeing in the crisis an opportunity to render a crippling blow 
to Pakistan, the Indians decided not only to back the Bangladeshi 
movement for independence, but also to intervene directly so as to 
influence the course of events within East Pakistan. Pakistan's 
military rulers, oblivious of the internal and external dimensions of 
the crisis, responded by continued army action within East Pakistan 
and the adoption of a confrontationist posture towards India.
It was at this point that the Pakistan military's policy of 
consistently downgrading relations with the Soviets and 
concentrating on consolidating ties with the West became 
particularly significant. While the Soviets had so far followed a 
neutral policy towards quarrels between the two South Asian rivals, 
hoping to wean Pakistan away from the West and China, their 
overtures had been met with Pakistani indifference. Soviet attempts 
to include Pakistan in collective security schemes, which would have 
endangered Pakistan's relations with the US and China, had been 
rejected by the Yahya regime. Equally important was the role played 
by the military government in helping the US establish direct 
relations with China.
Although this policy helped the Yahya regime to fulfill some of the 
needs of the Armed Forces as the Americans and Chinese began to 
extend limited arms assistance, the Pakistani mediatory role was to 
have major repercussions as the Soviets and Indians, perceiving the 
move as the emergence of a Washington-Peking alliance, came even 
closer together at a time when Indo-Pakistan relations were under 
strain and Pakistan-Soviet relations were correct at best.
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Since the Indians saw Sino-lndian rapprochement as a potential 
threat to their plans to intervene militarily in East Pakistan, they 
entered into a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets, on their part, disturbed by the nature of 
Pakistan's internal crisis and growing Indo-Pakistan tensions, on the 
one hand unsuccessfully pressed the Yahya regime to reach a 
political settlement in East Pakistan and on the other formalised 
ties with India, not only in the hope that the treaty would serve as a 
warning to the Yahya regime to resolve its internal problems and 
differences with India peacefully and discourage Pakistan's allies, 
especially China, from intervening in regional affairs, but also to 
ensure that the Indians would emerge victorious should war erupt in 
the subcontinent.
Since the Indians saw the treaty as an insurance of Soviet diplomatic 
and material support, they increased their involvement in East 
Pakistan, leading to the outbreak of war on the subcontinent in 
December 1971. The Pakistani military regime had taken no steps 
either to settle its internal problems or to prepare militarily or 
diplomatically for the coming war. The Indians soon put the 
ill-prepared Pakistani troops on the defensive in the West and 
assumed the upper hand in the East wing, with the active support of 
the Soviet Union. Pakistan's only hope to avert defeat therefore lay 
in its American and Chinese allies forcing India to agree to a 
ceasefire prior to the surrender of its East Pakistan garrison. The 
Indians, for their part, were relying on the Soviets to help them to 
resist such pressures until victory was achieved in East Pakistan.
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The Soviets were therefore to play a major role in determining the 
outcome of the 1971 war. Although after the signing of the 
Indo-Soviet accord, the Soviets had made every effort to prevent an 
outbreak of hostilities in South Asia, warning the Yahya regime time 
and again to reach a peaceful settlement of the East Pakistan issue 
and of its differences with India, the Pakistanis not only ignored 
their advise but also reacted with great hostility to the their stand 
on the crisis. The negative Pakistani response, combined with the 
realisation that India was determined to resort to armed action and 
fear of Chinese and American intervention in such a future conflict 
led the Soviets to help the Indians to prepare militarily should armed 
conflict become inevitable. Once war broke out the Soviets extended 
all-out support to the Indian cause, providing India every possible 
diplomatic and material support to ensure its victory against 
Pakistan, and to prevent Sino-American intervention on the side of 
Pakistan.
While India's friendship with and Pakistan's indifference to the 
Soviet Union had led the Soviets to side with India in the crisis, 
Pakistan's American and Chinese allies were incapable of and 
disinclined to extend more than limited diplomatic support to the 
Yahya regime on the Bangladesh issue. The Americans and Chinese 
did attempt to force India to accept a ceasefire in the UN before the 
fall of East Pakistan, but were prevented from doing so by the 
Soviets.
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The shortcomings of the Yahya regime’s internal and external 
policies were to prove disastrous for Pakistan. The widespread 
support for independence in the East wing had greatly facilitated 
India's victory over the Pakistani forces, while Yahya's pro-Western 
and anti-Soviet foreign policy had antagonised the Soviets to the 
point of abandoning their prior stance of neutrality on Indo-Pakistani 
disputes. Pakistan's existence as a united state came to an end as 
its American and Chinese allies failed to prevent its 
dismemberment, and India succeeded, with Soviet assistance, in 
helping to create the independent state of Bangladesh.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to determine the role of the Pakistan military in 
influencing and determining the directions of Pakistan's foreign 
policy, using Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union to 
demonstrate the extent to which the military dominated the 
country's external directions during the period under examination. 
The thesis argued that Pakistan’s foreign policy was, to a 
considerable extent, the offshoot of defence policy, as perceived and 
formulated by its military establishment. Thus, in assessing the 
military's role in foreign policy, special emphasis was placed on 
ascertaining the importance of defence concerns, with their 
emphasis on "security’' through the acquisition of arms assistance, in 
shaping Pakistan's external relationships.
In its efforts to understand why Pakistani governments had, during 
the period under study, adopted cool to hostile postures towards the 
Soviet Union, the thesis attempted to answer questions which had 
been inadequately addressed in previous research, examining, as it 
has mainly done, the relationship in isolation from internal factors, 
including an identification of domestic actors and decision-makers 
in the realm of foreign policy, as well as the effect of the domestic 
environment on Pakistan's foreign policy. The thesis not only 
established the close interrelationship between domestic and 
external variables in Pakistan's foreign policy in general and 
Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular but also demonstrated the 
vital role played by the Pakistan military in directly or indirectly
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influencing the country's external orientation.
In determining the extent to which the Pakistan military's strategic 
perceptions, interests and requirements, especially its needs for 
arms, affected the course of Pakistan's foreign policy, it was 
necessary to analyse the military's internal role. Only then was it 
possible to assess its influence on both domestic politics and 
foreign policy.
This assessment of the military's role in politics reached three 
major conclusions, all of which are useful in understanding Pakistani 
foreign policy directions. Firstly, the thesis rejected previous 
analyses that the Pakistan military's behaviour in assuming direct 
control of political power could be defined as an example of 
Janowitz's "reactive militarism" , when a reluctant apolitical force 
intervenes due to the inability of civilian institutions to function 
effectively. The Pakistan military's political role seems far more in 
line with his definition of "designed" militarism, in which a military 
takes over power in a premeditated fashion so as to consolidate its 
internal standing and to pursue a foreign policy designed to advance 
its interests.
During both Ayub's and Yahya's coups d'état, the Military High 
Command willingly and deliberately assumed complete control of 
political power, motivated by the desire to protect and advance the 
institution's corporate interests. This finding is especially relevant 
in understanding the importance given to foreign policy by the 
Pakistan military, since one of the major factors for Ayub's takeover
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was the possibility of leftist forces, calling for change in a foreign 
policy which had advanced the military's interests, gaining power in 
the approaching elections of 1959. Similarly, the failure of Ayub's 
foreign policy in advancing and protecting the military's interests 
was partly responsible for Yahya's coup d'etat.
Secondly, the thesis demonstrated that the military played a 
dominant role and remained an effective force, even during those 
periods of time when Pakistan was under civilian (1947-1958) or 
supposedly civilian (1962-1968) rule. Not only did the military 
influence the course of domestic politics by supporting the continued 
existence of unrepresentative governments which willingly 
protected and advanced its interests, but it also played an equally 
significant role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy directions, 
acting independently of civilian control.
Finally, once the military did take over power (the 1958 and 1969 
coups), its behavior did not demonstrate any aversion to involvement 
in politics. On the contrary, having assumed power, the military took 
every possible step, in collaboration with a civilian bureaucracy 
cajoled or coerced into cooperation, to legitimise and consolidate its 
internal hold. The formal withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962, for 
example, did not lead to the adoption of a non-political role by the 
military but was in fact a legitimising strategy employed to 
perpetuate its influence. The Armed Forces therefore supported Ayub 
Khan in devising and implementing a political framework which not 
only protected his own position but also the military's corporate 
interests. Ayub's new political order ensured that the military's
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autonomy would be protected by constitutional safeguards and 
foreign and defence policies were also geared to fulfil the Armed 
Forces's requirements. Thus, throughout the period under 
examination, it was clear that the final "veto'' on questions of vital 
importance in Pakistan's foreign or domestic policies lay with the 
High Command, regardless of whether or not the military was in 
direct control of the state.
Since thé Pakistan military played a key role in shaping Pakistani 
politics and foreign policy, it ensured, from the very start, that 
defence and security concerns, as defined by its High Command, 
dictated the course of foreign policy, including relations with the 
Soviet Union. Hence the military's strategic perceptions influenced 
the adoption of Pakistani foreign policy options. It is important to 
stress that the policy options adopted were determined by the 
military's political leanings and requirements, especially its need 
for external arms assistance.
The external perceptions of the Pakistani Officer Corps, were, in 
turn, greatly influenced by its close links with the British 
establishment in the early years of Pakistan's independence. This led 
the military to adopt anti-Soviet attitudes and support the political 
leadership and civilian bureaucracy's decision to adopt a pro-Western 
foreign policy. Moreover, conscious of the need for arms assistance, 
the Military High Command also began to explore the possibilities of 
establishing defence and security links with the West, both in 
collaboration with and independently of the civilian leadership. The 
military and bureaucracy's efforts succeeded in aligning Pakistan
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formally with the West as Pakistan entered the Western-sponsored 
collective security pacts. These developments not only led to a 
deterioration of Pakistan-Soviet relations but also to the 
establishment of close links between the Pakistani and American 
military establishments, which reinforced the pro-Western and 
anti-Soviet views of the Pakistani Officer Corps.
There was, moreover, a close interaction between internal and 
external variables in Pakistan's foreign policy. For instance, the 
military made liberal use of the '’threat" of communist expansionism 
to Pakistan's security to justify alignment with the West. While 
Pakistan's foreign policy leanings in the external context earned it 
the hostility of the Soviet Union, alignment with the West led to 
substantial US military assistance and was thus a policy best suited 
to the interests of the Pakistan Armed Forces. In the internal 
context, Pakistani governments used the 'communist threat' in their 
attempts to justify domestic policies, achieve political benefits and 
legitimise unrepresentative rule, regardless of the adverse 
consequences on Pakistan-Soviet relations.
Since the policy of alignment with the West resulted in the extension 
of large-scale American military assistance to Pakistan, it quite 
obviously had its own internal dynamism. This massive influx of US 
aid resulted in further strengthening and expanding the Pakistani 
military establishment. By 1958, the military was powerful enough 
to oust the civilian government and assume direct control.
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Since the military's role in foreign policy could not be looked at in 
isolation from external variables, the thesis examined the nature of 
regional constraints and imperatives on Pakistan's foreign policy as 
a whole and on Pakistan-Soviet relations in particular. Indo-Pakistan 
relations were of special significance since they dominated 
Pakistan's regional relationships. Troubled from the very start and 
resulting thrice in armed conflict during the period under 
consideration, Indo-Pakistan relations once again demonstrated the 
close linkages between internal and external variables. The 
deliberate perpetuation of hostilities with India and the resultant 
"garrison state" mentality in Pakistan in view of the constant Indian 
"threat” served the interests of the Pakistan military. The Indian 
threat was used to legitimise and consolidate the military's 
dominant political position as the main guarantor of Pakistan's 
territorial integrity as well as to justify a constant increase in 
domestic defence spending. It was also a convenient tool in 
justifying foreign policy decisions, such as entry into the 
Western-sponsored pacts on the grounds of the necessity of 
acquiring "reliable friends" who would underwrite Pakistan's 
security.
While Pakistan's confrontationist attitude resulted in antagonising 
the Indians even further, its entry into the pacts not only led to the 
deterioration of Pakistan-Soviet relations in the mid-1950s, but 
also resulted in the Soviets providing support to India on such 
sensitive issues as the Kashmir dispute.
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Pakistani governments continued to follow hostile policies towards 
India dictated, in part, by domestic compulsions. The Ayub 
government, for instance, resorted to war with India in 1965 in an 
unsuccessful bid to acquire internal legitimacy and regain the 
support of the Armed Forces, dissatisfied with the government's 
performance. The Soviets, on their part, did adopt a policy of 
neutrality on Indo-Pakistan disputes and supported Indo-Pakistani 
rapprochement in the hope of reducing instability and decreasing the 
chances of external intervention in an area of strategic significance. 
The pro-Western orientation of Pakistani military rulers such as 
Yahya Khan and their refusal to reach peaceful accommodation of 
their differences with India once again led the Soviets to side with 
India in the 1971 conflict.
There was an equally close linkage between domestic and external 
imperatives in Pakistan's hostile relations with Afghanistan, 
focussing on the Pakhtunistan dispute. Although the Pakistan 
military did not perceive Afghanistan as an actual threat, the tense 
relations with that country were used to justify the need for 
external assistance from the West to protect Pakistan's territorial 
integrity. Pakistan's siding with the West in the Cold War led in turn 
to both deteriorating Pakistan-Soviet relations and the consolidation 
of Soviet-Afghan ties as an antagonised Soviet Union extended moral 
and material support to the Afghans.
Great power (the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the 
United States) interests, objectives and competition, both at the 
global level and within the South Asian region, had their own impact
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on the course of Pakistan's foreign policy, including Pakistan-Soviet 
relations. Pakistan's decline or increase in importance to the three 
great powers, as well as their policies towards the other regional 
states, especially India, offered the Pakistan military opportunities 
or placed constraints in the formulation of foreign policy directions 
which would further its interests.
Hence Pakistan-Soviet relations were dependent on Soviet 
objectives, interests and goals in Pakistan in terms of both the 
bilateral relationship and Soviet regional and global policies. 
Throughout most of the period under study, for instance, Soviet 
policy towards Pakistan aimed at cultivating closer ties in the hope 
of preventing and curbing the expansion at first of American, and 
following the Sino-Soviet split, of both US and PRC influence in 
Pakistan.
At the same time, however, the Pakistani military played an 
influential role in determining the acceptance or rejection of options 
available in relations with the Soviet Union. It was, for example, 
Pakistani policies adopted with the military's active support, such 
as membership in the pacts and the provision of facilities for 
anti-Soviet operations to the US as a quid-pro-quo for military and 
economic assistance, which resulted in tensions in Pakistan-Soviet 
relations.
The thesis confirmed that the most important external relationship 
in the Pakistan military's perceptions was that with the United 
States. US-Pakistan military ties and the question of arms
499
assistance assumed a special significance in shaping Pakistan's 
overall foreign policy, including relations with the Soviet Union.
The issue of Western arms assistance was in turn closely linked 
with Pakistan's position in US regional and global strategies. Hence 
while one of the major motivating factors for the Pakistan military's 
consistent support for a pro-Western foreign policy was the 
acquisition of American arms, this assistance was only forthcoming 
in substantial terms during those periods when East-West tensions 
were at their height, accompanied by an increased strategic 
importance of the South Asian region. For instance, during the peak 
years of the Cold War, Pakistan's strategic location led the 
Americans to establish close bilateral security ties and to include it 
in alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. The main beneficiary of the 
policy of alignment was the Pakistan military, as US military 
assistance expanded and modernized it, greatly strenghtening its 
internal political standing. Pakistan's alignment with the West and 
the extension of facilities on its soil to the US were accompanied by 
a decline in Pakistan-Soviet relations, which almost reached 
breaking point with the U-2 incident of 1960.
When, however, US interests were at a low in South Asia and/or 
accompanied by policies which were more sympathetic to neutral 
India, there was also a loosening of American ties with Pakistan, 
resulting in a decline of military assistance to that country. This led 
the Pakistan military to adopt different strategies in the hope of 
pressuring the Americans to reconsider their policy directives 
towards Pakistan, especially with regard to the issue of arms
500
assistance. These strategies included, as they did in the period 
directly following the Sino-lndian conflict of 1962 when the 
attention of the Western powers shifted to India, the adoption of an 
overtly neutral foreign policy, including threats of withdrawal from 
the alliances, and the establishment of closer diplomatic and 
military links with the PRC .
In the context of this thesis, it is especially important to note the 
extent to which Pakistan-Soviet relations were dependent on 
Pakistan-US ties and the issue of American arms aid to Pakistan. 
Thus, when American interest in Pakistan was at its peak, leading to 
the extension of substantial military assistance, the Pakistanis not 
only distanced themselves from the Soviet Union, but even, as in the 
mid-1950s and early 1960s, adopted hostile policies towards it. 
When, on the contrary, US-Pakistan relations were strained due to a 
decline in Pakistan's importance in American global and regional 
strategies, resulting in a decline in US arms aid, Pakistani military 
or military-dominated governments not only adopted a more neutral 
stance in their foreign policy rhetoric but also attempted to use the 
Soviet card in their dealings with the West.
Pakistan's willingness to accept Soviet overtures of friendship when 
it was facing problems in its relations with the US did lead to some 
improvement in Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations. Tensions, 
however, continued due to the pro-Western orientation of Pakistan's 
leaders and their stress on a consolidation of ties with their allies. 
For instance, Pakistan-Soviet relations took a turn for the better 
under the Ayub regime in the mid to late 1960s, when the Pakistani
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government attempted to use the threat of closer ties with the 
Soviets to obtain a reversal of the US arms embargo, imposed during 
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. Yet Pakistan's relations with the 
Soviets did remain strained as the Ayub Administration made every 
effort to ensure that closer ties with the Soviets did not actually 
endanger links with the West and no real effort was made to 
disengage Pakistan from the alliances.
Similarly, the Yahya regime kept its options open vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union only so long as the Americans downgraded Pakistan's 
importance as an ally. The Yahya regime's primary foreign policy 
objective, however, remained a strengthening of relations with the 
West, with an emphasis on a revival of defence links with the US. 
Hence when the Nixon Administration established closer ties with 
the Pakistanis, due to the latter's mediatory role in helping the US to 
open direct relations with China, the Pakistani military government 
downgraded relations with the Soviet Union. Yahya's pro-Western and 
anti-Soviet foreign policy, combined with his inability to settle his 
internal problems and his differences with India peacefully in the 
wake of the East Pakistan crisis contributed to the Soviet decision 
to align with India during the 1971 war, which was to lead to the 
dismemberment of Pakistan.
Thus the pattern of Pakistan-Soviet relations remained constant 
throughout the years of united Pakistan's existence. The relationship 
remained a peripheral one for the Pakistan military, whose main 
concern in foreign policy consistently centred on the consolidation of 
ties, especially in the spheres of defence and security, with the
502
West. The military, however, had no objections to using the Soviet 
card when its main Western ally, the United States, withdrew its 
active support. Pakistan-Soviet relations therefore ran an uneasy 
course as the Pakistani military dictated the directions of Pakistan's 
pro-Western foreign policy.
503
BIBLIOGRAPHY
This bibliography contains only those works, including books, 
articles, documentation and newspapers, which have been 
specifically mentioned in the thesis, excluding documentation 
consulted at the National Archives, Washington DC, and the Public 
Record Office, London, which was too exhaustive to cite 
individually. See Note on source material in Chapter One.
3QQKS AND MONOGRAPHS
AHMAD, Brigadier Gulzar, Pakistan Meets Indian__Challenge
(Al-Mukhtar Publishers, Ralwalpindi, n.d.).
AHMAD, Iftikhar, Pakistan General Elections 1970 (South Asian 
Institute, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1976).
AHMAD, Kamruddin, The Social History of East Pakistan (Orient 
Longmans, Dacca, 1967).
AHMAD, Colonel Mohammad, Mv Chief (Longmans, Green & Co., Lahore, 
1960).
AHMED, Manzooruddin (ed.), Contemporary Pakistan: Politics. Economy
504,
and Society (Royal Book Company, Karachi, Second Edition, 1982).
AHMED, Muneer, PQlittaaL SiQgiQiQqyi-EfiESPgCtives QP Pakistan (Punjab 
Adab Markaz, Lahore, 1978).
AHMED, Mushtaq, Pakistanis- Foreign Policy (Space Publishers, 
Karachi, 1969).
ALAVI, Hamza, KHUSRO, Amir, Pakistan: The Burden of US Aid (Asian 
Book Centre, Karachi, 1965).
ALI, Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan (Research 
Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Fourth Edition, 
1983).
ALI, Tariq, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (William Morrow 
and Company, New York, 1970).
________ , Can PaKistan . Survive? The Death of a. State (Penguin
Books Ltd., Ha rmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983).
AWAN, A.B., Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes (New 
Century Publishers, London, 1985).
BARNDS, William J., India. Pakistan and the Great Powers (Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1972).
BHUTTO, Zulfikar Ali, The Mvth of Independence (Oxford University
505
BLACKBURN, Robin (ed.), Explosion in a Subcontinent; India. Pakistan. 
Bangladesh and Ceylon (Penguin Books, iqi5).
BOLITHO, Hector, Jinnah; Creator of Pakistan (John Murray, London, 
1954).
BRINES, Russell, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (Pall Mall Press, 
London, 1968).
BROWN, W. Norman, The United States and India. Pakistan and 
Bangladesh (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Third Edition, 1972).
BURKE, S.M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy; An Historical Analysis (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1973).
BURKI, Shahid Javid, State and Society in Pakistan 1971-1977 (The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1980).
CAMPBELL-JOHNSON, Alan, Mission With Mountbatten (Robert Haie 
Ltd., London, 1952).
Press, Karachi, 1969).
CHAUDHRI, Mohammed Ahsen, Pakistan and the Regional Pacts (East 
Publications, Karachi, 1958).
506
CHAUDHRY, Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan, September '65: Before and 
After (Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, 1977).
CHAUDHRY, Air Marshal Zafar A., Mosaic of Memory (Rahber Printers, 
Lahore, 1985).
CHOUDHURY, G.W., Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966 (Pall 
Mall Press, London, 1968).
_________ , The Last Days Q.f United Pakistan (University of Western
Australia Press, Western Australia, 1974).
_________ , India. Pakistan. Bangladesh and the Maior Powers;
Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (The Free Press, New York, 1975).
COHEN, Stephen P., The Indian Armv; Its Contribution to the 
Development of a Nation (University of California Press, Berkeley,
1971).
_________ , Arms and Politics in Bangladesh. India and Pakistan
(Council of International Studies, Buffalo, Special Study No. 49, 
November 1972).
_________ , The Pakistan Army (University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1984).
CONNELL, John, Auchinleck (Cassell and Co., London, 1959).
EMBREE, Ainslie T. (ed.), Pakistan's Western Borderlands; The 
Transformation of a Political Order (Royal Book Company, Karachi, 
1979).
507
FEIT, Edward, The Armed Bureaucrats;__Military-Administrative
Regimes and Political Development (Houghton Mifflin and Company, 
Boston, 1973).
FELDMAN, Herbert, Revolution in Paksistan: A Study of the Martial 
Law Administration (Oxford University Press, London, 1967).
_________ , From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969 (Oxford
University Press, London, 1972).
_________ , The End and the Beginning; Pakistan 1969-1971 (Oxford
University Press, London, 1976).
GANKOVSKY, Yu.V., GORDON-POLONSKAYA, L.R., A History of Pakistan 
(People's Publishing House, Lahore, n.d.).
GANKOVSKY, Yu.V. and MOSKALENKO, N., The Three Constitutions of 
Pakistan (People's Publishing House, Lahore, 1978).
GARDEZI, Hasan, RASHID, Jamil (eds.), Pakistan: The Unstable State 
(Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1983).
GARTHOFF, Raymond L., Detente and Confrontation; American-Soviet 
Relations from Nixon to Reagan (The Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, 1985).
GUPTA, Sisir, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Asia 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966).
508
HAENDAL, Dan, The Process of Priority Formulation: US Foreign Policy 
in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 (Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1977).
HARRISON, Selig S., In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and 
Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
New York, 1981).
HASAN, Masuma (ed.), Pakistan in a Chancing World (Pakistan 
Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1978).
h a y e s , Louis D., Poi ¡tic^ n ,.P akistan; The Struggle» far... Legitimacy
(Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984).
HERSH, Seymour M., The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White 
House (Summit Books, New York, 1983).
HUDSON, G.F. (ed.), Reform and Revolution in Asia (George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd., London, 1972).
HUREWITZ, J.C., Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension 
(Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969).
HUSAIN, Ahmed, Politics and People's Representation in Pakistan 
(Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, 1972).
509
HUSSAIN, Asaf, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of 
Pakistan (Dawson, Kent, 1979).
HUSSAIN, Syed Shabbir, Lengthening Shadows; The Storv of Pakistan's
Politics and Politicians; From. Advent of Pakistan to Fall of Ayub
(Mujahid Publications, Rawalpindi, 1970).
HUSSSAIN, Syed Shabbir, QURESHI, Squadron Leader M. Tariq, History 
of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-1982 (PAF Press, Masroor, Karachi,
1982).
JAHAN, Rounaq, Pakistan; Failure in NatLonaLMeacaìion (Colombia 
University Press, New York, 1972).
JAIN, J.P., Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (Radiant 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1974).
JANOWITZ, Morris, The Military in the Political Development of New 
Nations: An Essav in Comparative Analysis (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1964).
_________ , Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing
Nations (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977).
KAUSHIK, Devendra, Soviet Relations With India and Pakistan (Vikas 
Publications, Delhi, 1971).
510
KENNEDY, Gavin, The Military in the Third World (Duckworth, London,
1974).
KHAN, Major-General Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir (National Book 
Foundation, Islamabad, 1970).
KHAN, Major-General Fazal Muqeem, The Story of the Pakistan Armv 
(Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1963).
_________ , Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership (National Book Foundation,
Islamabad, Second Edition, 1973).
KHAN, Liaquat Ali, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950).
KHAN, Air Marshal Mohammad Asghar, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan 
War 1965 (Tabeer Publishing House, Lahore, n.d.).
_________ , Pakistan at the Crossroads (Ferozsons Ltd., Karachi,
1969).
_________ , Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982 (Vikas, New
Delhi, 1983).
_________ , (ed.), Islam. Politics and the State: The Pakistan
Experience (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1985).
KHAN, Mohammad Ayub, Friends Not Masters: A Political 
Autobiography (Oxford University Press, London, Second Edition, 
1967).
KISSINGER, Henry, White House Years (Little Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1979).
LAMB, Alastair, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem 
(F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968).
LAPORTE, Robert Jr., Power and Privilege: Influence__and
Decision-Making in Pakistan (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1975).
LIFSCHULTZ, Lawrence, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (Zed 
Press, London, 1979).
MAHMOOD, Safdar, Pakistan Divided (Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, 1984).
MAXWELL, Neville, India's China War (Penguin Books, Har mondsworth, 
Middlesex, 1972).
MINATTUR, Joseph, Martial Law in India. Pakistan and Ceylon 
(Martinus N ijhofi, The Hague, 1962).
MOORE, Raymond A. Jr., Nation-Building and the Pakistan Armv 
1947-1969 (Aziz Publishers, Lahore, 1979).
MUNIR, Chief Justice Muhammad, From Jinnah to Zia (Vanguard Books 
Ltd., Lahore, Second Edition, 1980).
511
512
MUSA, General Mohammad, Mv Version: India-Pakistan War 1965 
(Wajidalis, Lahore, 1983).
NOGIE, Joseph L., DONALDSON, Robert H., Soviet Foreign Policy Since 
World War II (Pergamon Press, New York, 1981).
NOON, Firoz Khan, From Memory (Ferozsons, Lahore, 1966).
PALMER, Norman D., South Asia and United States Policy (Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966).
PATAUDI, Major-General Sher Ali, The Story of Soldiering and 
Politics in India and Pakistan (Al-Kitab, Lahore, Second Edition,
1983).
RAHMAN, Lieutenant-General M. Attiqur, Leadership: Senior 
Commanders (Ferozsons Book Corporation Ltd., Lahore, 1973).
_________ , Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and
Future Military Role (White Lion Publishers Ltd., London, 1976).
RAIS, Rasul Bux, China and Pakistan: A Political Analysis of Mutual 
Relations (Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1977).
RAM, Raghunath, Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan (S. Chand and 
Company Ltd., New Delhi, 1983).
RASHID, Rao, Jo Main Ne Dekha (S.F. Publishers, Lahore, 1985).
RAY, Aswini K., Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy: Pakistan in 
Indo-Soviet Relations 1947-1958 (Manas Publications, New Delhi,
1975).
RAZVI, Mujtaba, The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier 
Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (National Publishing House 
Ltd., Karachi, 1971).
RIZVI, Hasan Askari, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 
(Progressive Publishers, Lahore, Second Revised Edition, 1976).
SAEED, S.A., President Without Precedent (Lahore Book Depot, Lahore,
n.d.).
SALIK, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender (Oxford University Press, 
Karachi, Second Edition, 1978).
SAREEN, Rajendra, Pakistan; The India Factor (Allied Publishers Ltd., 
New Delhi, 1984).
SHELLEY, Mizanur Rahman, Pakistan: The Second Republic; Politics and 
Parties (Concept Publications, Dacca, 1970).
SIDDIQI, Aslam, Pakistan Seeks Security (Longmans, Green and Co., 
Lahore, 1960).
513
514
SIDDIQUI, Kalim, Conflict. Crisis and War in Pakistan (MacMillan, 
London, 1972).
SINGH, S. Nihal, The Yoai and the Bear: A Study of Indo-Soviet 
Relations (Mansell Publishers Ltd., London, 1986).
STEIN, Arthur, India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969).
STEPHENS, Ian, Pakistan: Old Countrv/New Nation (Pelican Books Ltd., 
Har.mondsworth, Middlesex, 1964).
SYED, Anwar H., Ctiina_and_ Pakistan; Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale 
(The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1974).
SYMONDS, Richard, The Making of Pakistan (Faber & Faber, London, 
n.d.).
TAHIR-KHELI, Shirin, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution 
of an Influence Relationship (Praeger, New York, 1982).
_________ , Soviet Moves in Asia (Ferozsons Ltd., Lahore, n.d.).
TASEER, Salman, Bhutto: A Political Biography (Ithaca Press, London, 
1979).
THOMAS, Raju G.C. (ed.), The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security 
(Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983).
515
TINKER, Hugh, India and Pakistan; A Political Analysis (Praeger, New 
York, Second Revised Edition, 1967).
TOUVAL, Saadia and ZARTMAN, I. William (eds.), International 
Mediation in Theory and Practice (Westview Press, Boulder, 1981).
VAN DOORN, Jacques (ed.), Armed Forces and Society; Sociological 
Essavs (Mouton and Company, The Hague, 1968).
________ , Military.. P-rafessions..,and Military Regimes;. Commitments.
and Conflicts (Mouton and Company, The Hague, 1969).
VARMA, S.P., NARAIN, Virendra (eds.), Pakistan; Political System in 
Crisis; Emergence of Bangladesh (South Asian Studies Centre, 
Rajasthan University Press, Jaipur, 1972).
VENKATARAMANI, M.S., The American Role in Pakistan. 1947-1958 
(Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1984).
v o n  VORYS, Karl, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965).
WILCOX, Wayne Ayres, Pakistan; The Consolidation of a Nation 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1963).
WILLIAMS, L.F. Rushbrook, The State of Pakistan (Faber and Faber, 
London, 1962).
516
WOLPERT, Stanley, Roots of. Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan. 
Pakistan. India and the Superpowers (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1982).
WRIGGINS, W.H. (ed.), Pakistan in Transition (University of Islamabad 
Press, Islamabad, 1975).
ZAFAR, S.M., Through the Crisis (Book Centre, Lahore, 1970).
ZIRING, Lawrence, The Avub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969 
(Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1971).
_________ , Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Westview
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980).
_________ , (ed.), The Subcontinent in World Politics: India. Its
Neighbours and the Great Powers (Praeger Publishers, New York, 
Revised Edition, 1982).
ZIRING, Lawrence, BRAIBANTI, Ralph and WRIGGINS, W. Howard (eds.), 
Pakistan: The Long View (Duke University Press, Durham, 1977).
ARTICLES
ABBASI, Major Mehr Khan, "Balanced Economy for Pakistan", Pakistan 
Armv Journal (Vol. I, No. 4, 1958).
517
AHMAD, Colonel Bashir, "Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy”, 
Pakistan Armv Journal (Voi VII, No. 1, June 1965).
AHMED, Major Wasiuddin, "What Prevents a Third World War", 
Pakistan Armv Journal (Vol. I, No. 3, 1957).
AKHYAR, M.A., "Pakistan: The Way Ahead from Martial Law", South 
Asian Review (Vol. 3, No. 1, October 1969).
ALAM, M. Baidur, "Soviet Perception and Behaviour in the Bangladesh 
Crisis of 1971", Asian Profile (Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1978).
ALAVI, Hamza, "The Army and the Bureaucracy in Pakistan", 
International Socialist Register (Year 3, No. 14, March-April 1966).
_________ , "Class and State in Pakistan", Hassan Gardezi, Jamil
Rashid (eds.).
ALEXEYEV, A., "The Political Situation in Pakistan", New Times (No. 
47, 21 November 1951).
ALI, Mehrunnisa, "East Pakistan Crisis: International Reactions", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Second Quarter 1971).
ALI, Tariq, "Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects", Robin 
Blackburn (ed.).
518
ANDRONOV, I., "Kashmir Conflict: Some Antecedents", New Times (No. 
41, 13 October 1965).
ARON, Raymond, "Remarks on Laswell's The Garrison State' ".Armed 
Forces and Society (Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1979).
AYOOB, Mohammed, "Pakistan's Trade with the Soviet Union", 
International Studies (Vol. 11, No. 1, July 1969).
__________, "Pakistan's New Political Structure: Change and
Continuity", International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 2, April-June 1973).
BALOCH, Inayatullah, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan", 
Aussen Politik (Vol. 31, No. 3, 1980).
BARNDS, William J., "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability 
Amidst Discontinuity", The China Quarterly (No. 63, September 1975).
_________ , "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Shifting Opportunities and
Constraints", Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard 
Wriggins (eds.).
BILGRAMI, Brigadier Syed Abed Ali, "Limited War and Likely Areas of 
Conflict", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. 1, No. 5, 1959).
BOCHKARYOV, Y., "Pact of Aggression", New Times (No. 50, 8 
December 1955).
519
BOPEGAMAGE, A., "Caste, Class and the Indian Military: A Study of the 
Social Origins of Indian Army Personnel", Jacques Van Doom (ed.), 
Military Professions and Military Regimes: Commitments and 
Conflicts.
BORISOV, I., "The Political Situation in Pakistan", New Times (No. 32, 
25 August 1955).
BUDHRAJ, Vijay Sen, "Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh", Asian 
Survey (Vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1973).
_________ , "Major Dimensions of Indo-Soviet Relations", India
Quarterly (Vol. XXXI, No. 1, January-March 1975).
BURKE, S.M., "The Management of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Lawrence 
Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, W. Howard Wriggins (eds.).
BURKI, Shahid Javid, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service in Pakistan: 
A Réévaluation", Asian Survey (Vol. IX, No. 4, April 1969).
CHANG, David W., "The Military and Nation-Building in Korea, Burma 
and Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. 9, No. 11, November 1969).
CHARI, P.R., "Civil-Military Relations in India", Armed Forces and 
Society (Vol. 4, No. 1, Fall 1977).
_________ , "Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review", Asian
Survey (Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1979).
520
CHAUDHRI, Mohammad Ahsen, "Pakistan, India and the United States", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. VI, No. 4, December 1953).
_________ , "The Relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan", Pakistan
Horizon (Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 1955).
_________ , "Pakistan, India and the West", Asian Studies (Vol. Ill, No.
3, December 1965).
_________ , "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union", Asian
Survey (Vol. VI, No. 9, September 1966).
_________, "Pacts and Aid", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 2, Second
Quarter 1968).
CHOPRA, Maharaj K., "India and the Asian Security System", Aussen 
P.Qi.i.titL (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1976).
CHOUDHURY, G.W., "Pakistan Under General Ayub", Current History 
(Vol. 40, No. 235, March 1961).
COHEN, Stephen P., "Arms and Politics in Pakistan", India Quarterly 
(Vol. XX, No. 4, October-December 1964).
_________ , "US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis", Pacific
Affairs (No. 49, No. 1, Spring 1976).
_________ , "Pakistan: Coping with Regional Dominance, Multiple
Crises, and Great Power Confrontations", Raju G.C. Thomas (ed.).
DIL, Shirin, "The Extent and Nature of Soviet Involvement in the 
Bangladesh Crisis", Asia Quarterly (No. 37, 1973).
521
DOBELL, W.B., "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty", 
Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, Fall 1964).
_________ , "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan", Pacific Affairs
(Vol. XLII, No. 3, Fall 1969).
DONALDSON, Robert H., "India: The Soviet Stake in Stability", Asian 
Survey (Vol. XII, No. 6, June 1972).
_________ , "Soviety Security Interests in South Asia", Lawrence
Ziring (ed.).
DUTT, D. Som, "Foreign Military Aid and the Defence Strength and 
Policies of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study", International 
Studies (Vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967).
DYAKOV, A., "The British Plan for India", New Times (No. 24, 13 June
1947).
_________ , "Partitioned India", New Times (No. 3, 14 January 1948).
_________ , "The Situation in India", New Times (No. 23, 2 June 1948).
ELLIOTT, Brigadier J.O., "The Army in India: The Reconstitution of the 
Army", T h e Army. Quarterly (Vol. LV, No. 1, October 1947).
FARUKI, Kamal, "The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 and the United Nations", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXV, No. 1, First Quarter 1972).
FINER, S.E., "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and 
the Theory of Military Withdrawal from the Seats of Power", Third
522
FRANDA, Marcus F., "Communism and Regional Politics in East 
Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. XX, No. 7, July 1970).
GAUHAR, Altai, "Pakistan: Ayub Khan's Abdication", Third World 
Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985).
GHEBHARDT, Alexander O., "The Soviet System of Collective Security 
in Asia", Asian Survey (Vol. XIII, No. 12, December 1973).
GLADKOV, N., "In Pakistan (Travel Impressions)", New Times (No. 21, 
24 May 1950).
GRIFFITH, William E., "Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-65", China 
Quarterly (No. 25, January-March 1966).
GRIGORYNN, Kh., "More US Trouble-Making in the Middle East", 
International-Affairs, Moscow (No. 6, June 1959).
HARRISON, Selig S., "India, Pakistan and the US: I: Case History of a 
Mistake", New Republic (10 August 1959).
HASAN, Ibnul, "Full Circle Tashkent", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, No. 8, 
1985).
World Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985).
523
HASAN, K. Sarwar, "The Foreign Policy of Mr Liaquat Ali Khan", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. IV, No. 4, December 1951).
HASAN, Zubeida, "Western Arms Aid to India", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. 
XVI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1963).
_________ , "United States Arms Policy in South Asia, 1965-1967",
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XX, No. 2, Second Quarter 1967).
_________ , "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India", Pakistan Horizon
(Vol. XXI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1968).
_________ , "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the 1960s", The
World,,, Today (Vol. 25, No. 1, January 1969).
_________ , "Russian Pressures on Pakistan", Outlook (19 August
1972).
HASHMI, Bilal, "United States Influence in the Development of the 
Civil Elite in Pakistan", South Asia Papers (Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1977).
_________ , "Dragon Seed: Military in the State", Hassan Gardezi,
Jamil Rashid (eds.).
HEIMAN, Leo, "Lessons from the War in Kashmir", Military Review 
(Vol. XLVI, No. 2, February 1966).
HENNIKER, M.C.A., "The Early Days of Pakistan", Journal of the Rovai 
United Services Institution (Vol. XCIII, No. 569, February 1948).
HUSAIN, Altaf, "The Foreign Relations of Pakistan", The Asiatic 
Review (Vol. XLVI, No. 166, 65th Year, April 1950).
524
HUSAIN, Syed Adil, "Politics of Alliance and Aid: A Case Study of 
Pakistan (1954-1966)", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXXII, Nos. 1 and 2, 
First and Second Quarters 1979).
HUSAIN, Syed Anwar, "Soviet Diplomacy and the Emergence of 
Bangladesh", Asian Affairs (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1982).
HUSSAIN, Akmal, "Pakistan: The Crisis of the State", Mohammad 
Asghar Khan (ed.).
HYDER, Khurshid, "Pakistan’s Foreign Policy", The World Today 
(November 1966).
INNIS, F.M., "The Political Outlook in Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (Vol.
XXVI, No. 4, December 1953).
ISPAHANI, M.A.H., "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-1964", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Third Quarter 1964).
_________ , "Pacts and Aid", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIX, No. 2, Second
Quarter 1966).
_________ , "The Ire of Pakistan", Asian Review (Vol. 1, No. 1,
November 1967).
IVANOV, K. "The Middle East Situation", International Affairs. 
Moscow (No. 1, January 1959).
525
JHA, D.C., "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analytical Study", The Indian 
Journal of Political Science (Vol. XXXI, No. 2, April-June 1970).
JONES, Philip E., "The Changing Party Structures in Pakistan: From 
Muslim League to People's Party", Manzooruddin Ahmed (ed.).
KADEER, A.A., "Soviet-Pakistan Relations: The Ideological Context", 
Journal of European Studies (Vol. I, No. 1, January 1985).
KAPUR, Harish, "The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistan Relations", 
International Studies (Vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967).
KATSERIKOV, D., "Pakistan: Deplorable Results", International 
Affairs. Moscow (No. 10, October 1961).
KHAN, D. Shah, "An Autopsy of the Left", Outlook (Vol. 2, No. 13, 30 
June 1973).
KHAN, Hafeez-ur-Rahman, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 1, First Quarter 1961).
KHAN, Major-General K.M. Azhar, "Battle Lore: Offensive in the Desert 
- II", Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. XI, No. 1, December 1969).
KHAN, Brigadier Mohammad Akhtar, "We learn from history", Pakistan 
Army Journal (Vol. XXI, No. 3, September 1980).
526
KHAN, Mohammad Asghar, "Pakistan’s Geopolitical Imperatives", 
Mohammad Asghar Khan (ed.).
KHAN, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub, "Pakistan Perspective", Foreign 
Affairs (Vol. 38, No. 4, July 1960).
_________ , "Essentials of Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pakistan
Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1961).
_________ , "Foreign Relations", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 1,
First Quarter 1965).
KHAN, Lieutenant-General Nawabzada Mohammad Sher Ali, "Some 
Aspects of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIII, No.
1, First Quarter 1970)
KHAN, Brigadier Riazul Karim, "Higher Conduct of 1965 Indo-Pak 
War", Defence Journal (Vol. X, Nos. 1-2, 1984).
KHATTAK, Lieutenant-General M. Habibullah Khan, "Martial Law: An 
Appraisal", Defence Journal (Vol. XI, Nos. 4-5, 1985).
KHURO, H., "Pakistan's Experiments in Democracy", G.F. Hudson (ed.).
KHURO, M.A., "Looking at the Soviet Union", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. IX, 
No. 3, September 1956).
KRAUSE, Joachim, "Soviet Military Aid to the Third World", Aussen 
Politik (Vol. 34, No. 4, 1983).
527
KUDIN, George, "The Situation on the Indian Subcontinent", New Times 
(No. 43, October 1971).
LERSKI, George J., "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Re-Evaluation 
of the Past Decade", Asian Survey (Vol. VIII, No. 5, May 1968).
LEVI, Warner, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China", Pacific Affairs 
(Vol. XXXV, No. 3, Fall 1962).
MALIK, Hafeez, "Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan", W.H. Wriggins 
(ed.).
MARON, Stanley, "The Problems of East Pakistan", Pacific Affairs 
(Vo. XXVII, No. 2, June 1955).
MARSHALL, Charles B., "Reflections on a Revolution in Pakistan", 
Foreign Affairs (Vol. 37, No. 2, January 1959).
MARWAH, Onkar, "National Security and Military Policy in India", 
Lawrence Ziring (ed.).
MASUD, H.S., "A Diary of Betrayals", Outlook (Vol. 2, No. 14, April
1973).
MCCONNELL, James M. and KELLY, Anne M., "Super-Power Naval
528
Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 1971", Survival (Vol. 
XV, No. 6, November/December 1973).
MUSA, General Mohammad, "Some Aspects of the War", Pakistan 
Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965).
MOSKALENKO, Vladimir, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Asian Survey 
(Vol. XIV, No. 3, March 1974).
MUSTAFA, Zubeida, "USSR and Indian Action in East Pakistan", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1971).
NAQVI, M.B., "Martial Laws in Pakistan: An Historical Survey", 
Defence Journal (Vol. XI, No. 12, 1985).
ORESTOV, O., "The War in Kashmir: A Correspondent's Note", New 
Times (No. 40, 29 September 1948).
OTLEY, C.B., "Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British 
Army Elite", Jacques Van Doom (ed.), Armed Forces and Society: 
Sociological Essays.
PALMER, Norman D., "Foreign Policy and Political Development: 
International and Comparative Dimensions", The Indian Journal of
Political Science (Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, July-September 1972).
\
_________ , "Pakistan: The Long Search for Foreign Policy", Lawrence
Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, W. Howard Wriggins (eds.).
529
POPOV, Y., "Kashmir - Artificial Issue", New Times (No. 21, 7 March
1957).
POULLADA, Leon B., "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial 
Years", The Middle East Journal (Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 1981).
_________ , "Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations
with Pakistan", Ainslie T. Embree (ed.).
PRONIN, A., "Pakistan Affairs", New Times (No. 42, 16 October 1954).
PYADYSHEV, B., "New Developments in Pakistan", International 
Affairs. Moscow (No. 6, June 1968).
QAZI, Lieutenant-Colonel Shamsul Haq, "A Case for Citizen Army", 
Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. VI, No. 1, June 1964).
QURESHI, Khalida, "Pakistan and the Sino-lndian Dispute - II", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XVI, No. 1, First Quarter 1963).
_________ , "Diplomacy of the India-Pakistan War", Pakistan Horizon
(Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965).
_________ , "Arms Aid to India and Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon (Vol.
XX, No. 2, Second Quarter 1967).
QURESHI, S.M.M., "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXIX, Nos 1 & 2, 
Double Issue, Spring-Summer 1966).
530
RAHIM, Aminur, "Territorial Politics and National Development in 
Pakistan (1947-1969)", Asian Profile (Vol. 10, No. 3, June 1982).
RAHMAN, I.A., "Powers of President and Prime Minister: Lessons of 
Crises in Pakistan: 1953-69", V iewpoint (Vol. IV, No. 34, 1 April
1979).
RASHID, Lieutenant-Colonel Irshad, "State of Alert", Defence Journal 
(Vol. XI, No. 9, 1985).
RASHID, Jamil, "Intellectual's Role in Pakistan's Crisis - II", 
Viewpoint (Vol. V, No. 2, 19 August 1979).
RASHIDUZZAMAN, M., "The Awami League in the Political Development 
of Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol. X, No. 7, July 1970).
RAZAQ, Major Abdul, "My Memories of 1971 War: The Battle of 
Laksham", Sarhang (37 Division, December 1982).
RIZVI, Hasan Askari, "Pakistan's Defence Policy", Pakistan Horizon 
(Vol. XXXXI, No. 1, First Quarter 1983).
_________ , "Civilianization: A Transition from Rule to Role". Defence
Journal (Vol. XI, No. 12, 1985).
RUDOLPH, Lloyd I. and RUDOLPH, Susanne Hoeber, "Generals and 
Politicians in India", Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Spring 1964).
531
SAEED, Major Tariq, "Why our attacks failed", Pakistan Armv Journal 
(Vol. XX, No. 10, December 1979).
SAYEED, Khalid Bin, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service", 
Pacific Affairs (Vol. XXXI, No. 2, June 1958).
_________ , "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan", The
Middle East Journal (Vol. 13, No. 4, Autumn 1959).
_________ , "Pakistan's Basic Democracy", The Middle East Journal
(Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1961).
_________ , "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy", Pacific Affairs
(Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64).
_________ , "1965 - An Epoch-Making Year in Pakistan - General
Elections and War with India", Asian Survey (Vol. VI, No. 2, February 
1966).
_________ , "The Capabilities of Pakistan's Political System", Asian
Survey (Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1967).
_________ , "Pakistan: New Challenges to the Political System", Asian
Survey (Vol. VIII, No. 2, January 1968).
_________ , "Southeast Asia in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Pacific
Affairs (Vol. XLI, No. 2, Summer 1968).
_________ , "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", Jacques Van Doom
(ed.), Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essavs.
_________ , "Political Leadership and Institution-building Under
Jinnah, Ayub and Bhutto", Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, W. 
Howard Wriggins (eds.).
532
SETH, S.P., "Russia's Role in Indo-Pak Politics", Asian Survey (Vol. IX, 
No. 8, August 1969).
SHRIVASTAVA, B.K., "US Military Assistance to Pakistan: A 
Re-appraisal", India Quarterly (Vol. XXXII, No. 1, January-March
1976).
SHUAIB, Major M., "The Russo-Afghan Dilemma", The Owl (Staff 
College, Quetta, Vol. XII, December 1960).
SIDDIQI, Brigadier Abdul Rahman, "1971: Causes and Conduct", 
Defence Journal (Vol. II, No. 12, 1976).
_________ , "South Asian Armed Conflict - 1965", Defence Journal
(Vol. Ill, Nos. 9-10, 1977).
_________ , "The Nation and the Armed Forces", Defence Journal (Vol.
XI, Nos. 4-5, 1985).
_________ , "Of Pakistan's First War and Coup", Defence Journal (Vol.
XI, Nos. 6-7, 1985).
SIDDIQI, Aslam, "Can Pakistan Stay Neutral", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. 
XI, No. 2, June 1958).
SIMON, Sheldon W., "The Kashmir Dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective", 
Asian Survey (Vol. VII, No. 3, March 1967).
SINGHAL, D.P., "The New Constitution of Pakistan", Asian Survey (Vol.
2, No. 6, August 1962).
533
SOBHAN, Rehman, "East Pakistan's Revolt Against Ayub Khan: Old 
Resentments and New Needs", The Round Table (No. 235, July 1969).
SPAIN, James W., "The Pathan Borderlands", The Middle East Journal 
(Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1961).
STEPANOV, Lev, "The Indo-Pakistan Accord", New Times (No. 3, 19 
January 1966).
_________ , "After Tashkent", New Times (No. 4, 26 January 1966).
SYED, Anwar, "Foreign Aid: Case Studies in Recipient Independence", 
Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XXIII, No. 1, First Quarter 1970).
THORNTON, Thomas Perry, "Between the Stools: US Policy Toward 
Pakistan During the Carter Administration", Asian Survey (Vol. XXII, 
No. 10, October 1982).
__________, "The Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Soviet Mediation at
Tashkent, 1966", Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (eds.).
TOMILIN, B., "Baghdad Pact: USA Holds Military Talks", International 
Affairs. Moscow (No. 1, January 1959).
TURANOV, A., "Pakistan on the Eve of Elections", New Times (No. 49, 9 
December 1970).
VAIDYANATH, R., "Some Recent Trends in Soviet Policies Towards
534
India and Pakistan", International Studies (Vol. VII, No. 3, January 
1966).
VAN HOLLEN, Christopher, "The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger 
Geopolitics and South Asia", Asian Survey (Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980).
VENKATARAMANI, M.S. and ARYA, Hamish Chandra, "America's Military 
Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy 
Partnership", International Studies (Vol. 8, July 1966-April 1967).
VOLSKY, Dimitry, "Pakistan's Worries", New Times (No. 26, June
1958).
_________ , "The India-Pakistani Conflict", New Times (No. 38, 22
September 1965).
_________ , "The India-Pakistan Conflict and American-Chinese
Collusion", New Times (No. 51, December 1971).
WILCOX, Wayne A., "The Pakistan Coup d'Etat of 1958", Pacific 
Affairs (Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, Summer 1965).
_________, "Pakistan: A Decade of Ayub", Asian Survey (Vol. IX, No. 2,
February 1969).
_________ , "The Kashmir Problem and the Indo-Pakistan War of
1965", Masuma Hasan (ed.).
_________ , "Political Role of Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections",
S.P. Varma, Virendra Narain (eds.).
YASILYEV, L., "Pakistan: Out of Step with the Times", International
535
YERSHOV, T., "The Truth about Kashmir", New Times (No. 10, 3 March
1948).
ZAHID, Brigadier Ch. Muzaffar Ali Khan, "Supported and Supporting", 
Pakistan Army Journal (Vol. XVIII, No. 3, June 1977).
ZIRING, Lawrence, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration", Masuma Hasan 
(ed.).
_________ , "Perennial Militarism: An Interpretation of Political
Underdevelopment - Pakistan under General Yahya Khan, 1969-1971", 
W.H. Wriggins, (ed.).
OTHERS
A Political Analyst, "Tortured Career of the Opposition: From 
Emergence to Dismemberment: Part One", Viewpoint (Vol. Ill, No. 1, 
14 August 1977).
A Pakistani Correspondent, "Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with 
Tashkent", Round Table (No. 223, July 1966).
Special Correspondent, "India's Moscow Connection: No. I - The Treaty 
Relationship", Pacific Defence Reporter (May 1984).
Staff Study, "Pakistan's Relations with the Commonwealth: Political 
and Strategic Aspects", Pakistan Horizon (Vol. XIV, No. 2, Second 
Quarter 1961).
Affairs. Moscow (No. 1, January 1960).
536
Staff Study, "The India-Pakistan War: A Summary Account", Pakistan 
Horizon (Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1965).
Staff Study, "The War Commission and the Surrender", Outlook (Vol.
3, No. 8, 25 May 1974).
Staff Study, "Bhutto and Tashkent", O utlook (Vol. 2, No. 42, 19 
January 1974).
Staff Study, "CIA in Pakistan", Outlook (Vol. 1, No. 49, 1975).
Staff Writer, "Pakistan's Doubts about 1959 Treaty with the US", 
Viewpoint (Vol. V, No. 27, 10 February 1980).
NEWSPAPERS. WEEKLIES. PRESS SERVICES. COLLATED AND 
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTATION
ARIF, K. (ed.), Documents on America-Pakistan Relations (Vols I and 
II) (Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1984).
BHUTTO, Zulfikar Ali, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Compendium of 
Speeches Made in the National Assembly of Pakistan 1962-1964 
(Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1964).
_________ , Pakistan and the Alliances (Pakistan People's Party,
Political Series, Lahore, 1969).
British Broadcasting Service, (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts
British Conspiracy: Defence Implications of a Partition of India into
537
Hindustan and Pakistan (East and West Publishing Company, Karachi, 
Second Edition, 1976).
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan ^Debates!
Current Digest of the Soviet Press
Daily Mail (London)
Dawn
Department of State Bulletin 
Economist (London)
Foreign Relations of the United States (Government Printing Office, 
Washington DC)
Guardian (Manchester)
HASAN, K. Sarwar, (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Relations of 
Pakistan: The Kashmir Question (Pakistan Institute of International 
Affairs, Karachi, 1966).
JAIN, R.K., Soviet-South Asian Relations 1947-1978 (Vols 1 and 2) 
(Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1979).
538
Keesinas Contemporary Archives
Morning News
Muslim
National Assembly of Pakistan Debates
News Chronicle
Newsweek
New York Times
Outlook
Pakistan Observer 
Pakistan Times 
Peking Review
Report on Arms Assistance to Pakistan. Comptroller-General of the 
United States to Senator Kennedy (B-173651, Washington, n.d.).
The Bangladesh Papers: The recorded statements and speeches of Z.A. 
Bhutto. Mujeeb-ur-Rahman. Gen. Yahva Khan and other Politicians of
539
United Pakistan 1969-1971 (Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, n.d.).
Times (London)
Times of India
US News and World Report
Viewpoint
INTERVIEWS
Khalid Ahmed
Former Pakistan Foreign Office official on the Soviet and Eastern 
European desk
William J. Barnds 
Former CIA official
Lieutenant-General Faiz Ali Chishti 
Former Deputy Martial Law Administrator
Major-General Shahid Hamid 
Former Master-General of Ordnance
Mushahid Husain 
Former Editor, Muslim
540
Major-General Wajahat Hussain
Former Corps Commander, Armoured Corps
Sajjad Hyder
Former Pakistan Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Mazhar Ali Khan 
Editor, Viewpoint
General Tikka Khan
Former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army
Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan 
Former Chief of Staff, Pakistan Air Force
General Mohammad Musa
Former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army
Major-General Ghulam Omar 
Former National Security Chairman
Colonel Qayyum
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Information, Islamabad
Former Senior Instructor, Staff College, Quetta; National Defence
College, Rawalpindi
541
Brigadier Abdul Rahman Siddiqi
Editor, Defence Journal: former Director, Inter-Services Press
Thomas Perry Thornton 
Senior State Department official
Formerly dealt with South Asia on the National Security Staff 
Christopher Van Hollen
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs
ADDITIONAL NOTE TO BIBLIOGRAPHY
The importance of this archival m ateria l canno t be 
underestimated. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic  
concerned it was very difficult to obtain the evidence necessary 
to substantiate my arguments (see Note on Sources). The 
substantial body of primary source material I was able to consult 
in the national archives of Great Britain and the United States was  
therefore invaluable for my work.
Very little of this material has been previously used by 
researchers of either Pakistan's foreign policy or domestic  
politics. This is especially true of the material consulted in the 
PRO, London, since the material, covering the initial years of 
Pakistan's independence, has only recently been made available for 
public use.
While I had to be fairly selective, due to time - constraints, 
in selecting relevant files at the National Archives, the excellent 
reference system there made my task fairly easy. The cooperation 
extended to me by the research staff of the PRO made it poss ib le  
for me to consult every file in the Archives, containing any 
reference to Pakistan. In writing the thesis, I sifted through the 
hundreds of documents consulted to find the evidence I needed to 
strengthen my arguments and provide the evidence necessary for 
my thesis.
As earlier mentioned, each individual archival source will not 
be cited in the bibliography. It will not, however, be difficult for
2researchers to locate any of the documents referred to even 
though Record Groups have not been cited in the complete  
reference.
For example, as far the archival material from the US is 
concerned, the record group for State Department Records is 
Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State. All 
of the documents with Decimal File numbers are in Record Group 
59. The Decimal File is a record series that is arranged by 
decimal file number.
Also in Record Group 59 are office files of the State 
Department such as the following reference. "Office Memo, US 
Government to Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) 
McGhee From SOA, 25 January 1950".
Documents without Decimal File numbers are from the Office 
File or Lot File. Another Office File is the Office of Intelligence, 
Research and Analysis Branch (example: "Pakistan’s Current 
Economic and In te lligence, Research and Analys is, State 
Department, 5 May 1958).
The following reference, "Us Ambassador, Karachi, to 
Secretary of State enclosing report of the US Military Attache, 
Pakistan, 24 April 1948. Ref. 845-F-00/4-2448" is in Record 
Group 353, Records of the In te r-a n d - ln tra -D e p a rtm e n ta l  
Committees (State Department) while the following reference 
"The position of the US with Respect to South Asia. NSC Staff 
Study (98/1) January 1951. NSC (Approved by President Truman
3on 25 January 1951” is from the Records of the National Security 
Council, Record Group 273.
